RJL v MCP - [2025] QDC 117

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

RJL v MCP [2025] QDC 117

PARTIES:

RJL

(Appellant)

v

MCP

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

D1 of 2025

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal under s 164 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Kingaroy

DELIVERED ON:

Judgment delivered ex tempore on 1 August 2025
Reasons delivered on 22 August 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Kingaroy

HEARING DATE:

21 and 23 July 2025 and on the papers

JUDGE:

Kefford DCJ

ORDER:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. Each party is to bear their own costs.

CATCHWORDS:

DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE LAW – APPEAL – PROTECTION ORDER – where the learned Magistrate refused to make a protection order in favour of the appellant – whether the learned Magistrate erred in finding that there was no relationship – whether there should be an order as to costs in the exercise of the discretion

LEGISLATION:

Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) ss 5, 8, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 23, 37, 142, 145, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr 765, 783, 785

CASES:

ACP v McAuliffe [2017] QDC 294, approved

Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172, applied

Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd [1976] HCA 62; (1976) 135 CLR 616, applied

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission & Ors [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194, applied

DU v Jackson (DCJ) [2024] QCA 122, considered

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118, applied

GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248, approved

HBY v WBI & Anor [2020] QDC 81, approved

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, applied

Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513, applied

OMD v Queensland Police Service & Anor [2021] QDC 282, approved

SOLICITORS:

Appellant self-represented
Respondent self-represented

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary

What occurred in the proceedings below?

What evidence did the parties rely on at the hearing before the learned Magistrate?

What case was advanced by the respective parties?

What was the reasons of the learned Magistrate?

What is the relevant legislative context governing a decision to grant a protection order?

What is the nature of the appeal?

What are the grounds of appeal?

What preliminary issues are raised by MCP?

What occurred in the lead up to the determination of the appeal?

Is RJL’s failure to serve the Police Commissioner fatal?

Has RJL sufficiently particularised the grounds of appeal?

Are there procedural deficits with the appeal that are determinative?

Is there a material error in the finding that there is no relevant relationship?

Did the learned Magistrate fail to consider whether the relationship was an “intimate personal relationship”, not limited to a de facto relationship?

Did the learned Magistrate err in finding that RJL lived in a granny flat?

Did the learned Magistrate err in relying on inadmissible evidence?

Does the evidence relied on by RJL demonstrate an error in the learned Magistrate’s finding that there was no relevant relationship?

Should there be an award of costs?

What is the relevant legal framework governing a decision to order costs?

Should I exercise my discretion to make an order other than that the costs follow the event?

What are the orders?

Summary

On 24 January 2025, Magistrate Guttridge dismissed an application for a protection order under s 37 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld). The application named the appellant as the aggrieved and the respondent as the respondent. In these reasons, I will refer to the appellant as RJL and the respondent as MCP.
RJL appeals against that decision. For reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed.
What occurred in the proceedings below?
On 20 September 2024, RJL filed an application for a protection order under s 37 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) in the Holland Park Magistrates Court. A temporary protection order was made ex parte on 23 September 2024.
The application came on for hearing before the learned Magistrate on 24 January 2025. At that hearing, RJL was self-represented and MCP was represented by a solicitor.
What evidence did the parties rely on at the hearing before the learned Magistrate?
The evidence adduced by RJL that was before the learned Magistrate included:
(a)Notice of Filing of Media Exhibit filed by RJL and the associated media exhibit that contains:
(i)video files in a folder titled “Additional videos film when feeling scared or forced”, and which files are named IMG-0237, IMG-0383 and IMG-0388;
(ii)other video files, including those named IMG-0097-1 and IMG-0888-1;
(iii)images in a folder titled “Dvo breeches”, which include images that are named IMG-2981, IMG-2982, IMG-2986, IMG-2987, IMG-2988, IMG-2989, IMG-2992, IMG-2994, IMG-3003(1), IMG-3003, Screenshot 3! Passport, Screenshot3 comfrimation (sic) withholding passport; signal-2024-10-14-011825;
(iv)various other images of text messages, facebook messages and pdf copies of emails;
(v)copies of correspondence from MCP, on the letterhead of the law firm at which MCP is a solicitor, dated 1 July 2024 and 18 July 2024;
(b)an affidavit of RJL sworn 23 November 2024 with attached media exhibits including:
(i)various facebook images;
(ii)an unreported decision of Magistrate Sinclair delivered 22 November 2024 in relation to M7718/24 dismissing an application for summary judgment and/or striking out of a defence;
(c)a statement of RJL taken by police on 27 November 2024;
(d)a statutory declaration of RJL taken on 13 December 2024 attaching medical records;
(e)an affidavit of RJL sworn 3 July 2024; and
(f)an affidavit of RJL sworn 25 August 2024.
The learned Magistrate also heard oral evidence from RJL.
The evidence adduced by MCP that was before the learned Magistrate included:
(a)an affidavit of MCP sworn 7 November 2024 and media exhibits CM-1 to CM-25 that are referenced in the affidavit;
(b)an affidavit of a person who I will refer to as NM sworn 30 September 2024 and witnessed by MCP as solicitor and media exhibit NMM-1 that are referenced in the affidavit;
(c)an affidavit of a person who I will refer to as EN as sworn 31 October 2024 and witnessed by MCP as solicitor;
(d)an affidavit of a person who I will refer to as RS sworn 1 October 2024 and witnessed by MCP as solicitor; and
(e)an affidavit of AH sworn 30 October 2024 and witnessed by MCP as solicitor.
The learned Magistrate also heard oral evidence from MCP, RS, AH, NM and EN. In their evidence in chief, each of RS, AH, NM and EN gave evidence under oath that everything in their respective affidavits was true and correct.
In addition to the affidavits referred to above, prior to the hearing MCP had also filed:
(a)an affidavit of a person who I will refer to as DM sworn 30 September 2024 and witnessed by MCP as solicitor; and
(b)an affidavit of a person who I will refer to as JS sworn 30 September 2024 and witnessed by MCP as solicitor.
At the hearing, MCP indicated that he was not relying on the evidence in the affidavits of DM and JS. RJL confirmed that neither witness was required for cross-examination.
What case was advanced by the respective parties?
At the conclusion of the evidence, the learned Magistrate heard oral submissions from each party. The key issue agitated in final submissions related to the existence of a relevant relationship.
The case advanced on behalf of MCP was that the learned Magistrate would not be satisfied that there was a relevant relationship because:
(a)RJL’s testimony contained multiple inconsistencies and, as such, was not credible or reliable;
(b)the images, videos and other documents relied on by RJL were insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a relevant relationship; and
(c)although the undisputed evidence demonstrated that MCP was RJL’s solicitor and that MCP allowed RJL to stay at his home, that did not of itself demonstrate that there is a relevant relationship under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012.
With respect to the existence of a relevant relationship, the case advanced by RJL, through her evidence and submissions, was that:
(a)there was behaviour that demonstrated the existence of a relationship, such as evidence that RJL was living with MCP off and on between August 2023 and July 2024; and
(b)the evidence demonstrated that:
(i)contrary to the assertion of MCP in his oral testimony, the relationship between RJL and MCP was not only a solicitor and client relationship; and
(ii)on one occasion there was a “sex act” between RJL and MCP that involved RJL inserting a vibrator in MCP’s anus.
What was the reasons of the learned Magistrate?
At the conclusion of the submissions, the learned Magistrate gave ex tempore reasons for judgment. They are brief. On my review of the transcript and the audio recording, the learned Magistrate’s reasons were as follows:
“I’ll give my decision ex tempore. This is an application for a domestic violence protection order brought by [RJL] against [MCP]. The application was filed in the Holland Park Magistrates Court on the 20^th of September 2024. A temporary protection order was made ex parte on the 23^rd of September 2024. The conditions included the mandatory condition, further conditions not to attend the residence of the aggrieved and not to approach within 50 metres and have no contact with the aggrieved. In her application, the aggrieved states that the respondent is her former de facto partner and states the relationship was from August 2023 to July 2024.
Moreover, the aggrieved states that the respondent abused her, assaulted her, forced her to have non-consensual sex, controlled her finances, threatened to harm her family if she left him and isolated her by changing her passwords on social media accounts. The aggrieved made allegations about the aggrieved’s (sic) sexual deviance. Moreover, the aggrieved made allegations of serious physical and sexual assault allegations against the respondent and provides photographs of physical injuries to support some of the claims. Both parties accept that the aggrieved has mental health issues, which seem to arise out of a work-related post-traumatic stress disorder.
The respondent denies there was a relevant relationship between them. Moreover, he denies the allegations and merely states he was trying to give the aggrieved assistance, both professionally as her lawyer and, beyond that, as a friend. The alcohol problems – sorry, the respondent stated that the aggrieved had mental health and alcohol problems, and he would assist her on many occasions, particularly by providing her with accommodation when she had nowhere else to stay. In this case, the first consideration is whether there is a relevant relationship in accordance with the legislation. The aggrieved, in her application, stated the respondent was her former de facto.
The respondent denies the allegation of a relevant – that he was in a relevant relationship in accordance with the legislation in paragraph 18. In her application, the aggrieved states the respondent is her former de facto partner and states the relationship was from August 23^rd to July 2024. In her statement to police dated the 25^th of August 1924, the aggrieved states the respondent was engaged as her lawyer in August 2023, and they began an intimate relationship some three weeks later. That is inconsistent with the allegation that he raped her on that day. She stated that they had dated on an off for about eight months. This is also somewhat at odds with her application when it’s said they were in a de facto relationship for some 11 months.
[NM] attested, in an affidavit affirmed on the 30^th of September 2024, that the applicant had a close connection to the respondent; however, when he asked her if she was a relationship in about May 2024, the response was, “Oh no. I’m training as his PA. He’s just really a great guy who tries to help everyone.” That’s paragraph 9. She also said that she really like the respondent’s son and would couch surf at the respondent’s place when she had nowhere to go. [NM] said that, in August 2024, the respondent changed her position and made a number of allegations against the respondent and stated they were in a domestic relationship.
[NM] goes on to state that he has found the respondent to be an honest man who is always willing to help and, in fact, did help him. [EN], in an affidavit affirmed on the 31^st of October 2024, attested the applicant, in May 2024, said she was sleeping in her car and had – as she had nowhere else to go. That was in paragraph 10. [EN] also attested that the applicant stated that she had been abused by the respondent, who she described as a creepy lawyer, and she had tried to report it to the police.
The aggrieved stated that she broke off the relationship in late December 2023. Again, this is at odds with – she stated previously in her application; however, the aggrieved said that she moved back in with the aggrieved in January 2024. The respondent denies any intimate relationship at any time and believed they were just good friends. In paragraph 18 of his affidavit, affirmed on the 7^th of November 2024, the respondent attests that he thought the applicant thought of him as a mentor, giving not only legal advice and representation but also general advice. He accepts that he allowed her to stay at the residence on a number of occasions, particularly when she had nowhere else to go.
[JS], in an affidavit affirmed on the 30^th of September 2024, attests that she was at the respondent’s office for legal advice in November 2020. You weren’t relying on that, were you?
MR KINGSTON: Sorry, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: [JS]: was that one of the ‑ ‑ ‑
MR KINGSTON: No.
HIS HONOUR: Okay. [RS], in an affidavit affirmed on the 1^st of October 2024, attested he is a neighbour and friend of the respondent and has coffee and cigarettes with him every day around 10 am and 3 pm. He attests that, on occasion, he would see the applicant at the respondent’s place when she was couch surfing. He said she was usually drunk. On one occasion, he said the applicant touched his – that’s [RS]’s – leg inappropriately. He asked the respondent why he put up with the applicant, to which he responded, “She’s got nowhere else to go, and she’s got no friends.”
[RS] also stated that the respondent had succeeded on many occasions to get the applicant into a shelter or in a motel or house, was instrumental in getting her re-admitted to the psychiatric unit at Belmont Hospital. That’s in paragraph 9. [RS] also said that he never saw any form of intimacy between the applicant and the respondent.
[DM], in an affidavit affirmed on the 30^th of September 2024 ‑ ‑ ‑
MR KINGSTON: Sorry, your Honour. I’d ‑ ‑ ‑
HIS HONOUR: You weren’t relying on that either, sorry. Yes. [AH], in an affidavit affirmed on the 30^th of October 2024, attested he is a good friend of the respondent, and the respondent told him about the difficulties he was having dealing with the applicant. He said that she would just turn up and – when she had nowhere else to go and was brought to his place by police when they had nowhere else to take her. He also attests that, since he met the applicant in October 2023, he never saw any indication of the applicant and the respondent being anything but friends. There’s also, in the exhibit CM125, CM10, reference to the aggrieved couch surfing and also, in CM14, staying at the respondent’s granny flat, which would indicate some form of independent accommodation.
On – one of the issues that’s been resisted is the issue of the sex act – and I’ll just refer it as that – on the tape. In relation to that, I accept the aggrieved’s version of events in relation to the matter. There are two competing version of events that are not necessarily mutually exclusive; however, having said that, that one incident does not result in a relevant relationship of itself being made. There – people can have sex on a number of occasions without being in a relevant relationship. There has to be a number of other factors. The applicant has given varying versions of the relationship. It’s denied by the applicant. The preponderance of the witnesses is such that it favours the respondent, but there was no evidence, such as going out together, having joint bank accounts, talking about their future, becoming engaged or having any future plans specifically.
On all of the evidence before me, I’m not satisfied there was a relevant relationship in accordance with the legislation. Perhaps, due to her mental health and alcohol issues, the aggrieved mistook the respondent’s willingness to assist her and provide her with accommodation when she had nowhere to go and also with the incident on the – that’s been recorded and viewed that as a form of relationship, which, clearly, it would’ve been a relationship of some description but not a relationship in accordance with the Act.
Let me finally say, after perusing the whole of the material and hearing the evidence of the actions of the respondent towards the aggrieved, particularly when he was representing her on legal matters, while they may have been based on genuine compassion and caring, were totally imprudent and lacked good judgment. Notwithstanding that, as I’ve found there is no relevant relationship, I do not to consider the other matters, and the application is dismissed.”
(emphasis added)
What is the relevant legislative context governing a decision to grant a protection order?
Section 37 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 prescribes when a court may make a protection order. Relevantly, it states:
(1)A court may make a protection order against a person (the respondent) for the benefit of another person (the aggrieved) if the court is satisfied that—
(a)a relevant relationship exists between the aggrieved and the respondent; and
(b)the respondent has committed domestic violence against the aggrieved; and
Note—
See the examples of the type of behaviour that constitutes domestic violence in sections 8, 11 and 12, which define the terms domestic violence, emotional or psychological abuse and economic abuse.
(c)the protection order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence.
(2)In deciding whether a protection order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence—
(a)the court must consider—
(i) the principles mentioned in section 4; and
…”
A relevant relationship is defined in s 13 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 as an intimate personal relationship or a family relationship or an informal care relationship.
Section 14 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 defines an intimate personal relationship as a spousal relationship or an engagement relationship or a couple relationship.
Section 15 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 defines a spousal relationship in a way that includes a de facto spousal relationship.
Section 18 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 states:
“18Meaning of couple relationship
(1)A couple relationship exists between 2 persons if the persons have or had a relationship as a couple.
(2)In deciding whether a couple relationship exists, a court may have regard to the following—
(a)     the circumstances of the relationship between the persons, including, for example—
(i)the degree of trust between the persons; and
(ii)the level of each person’s dependence on, and commitment to, the other person;
(b)     the length of time for which the relationship has existed or did exist;
(c)     the frequency of contact between the persons;
(d)     the degree of intimacy between the persons.
(3)Without limiting subsection (2), the court may consider the following factors in deciding whether a couple relationship exists—
(a)     whether the trust, dependence or commitment is or was of the same level;
(b)     whether 1 of the persons is or was financially dependent on the other;
(c)     whether the persons jointly own or owned any property;
(d)     whether the persons have or had joint bank accounts;
(e)     whether the relationship involves or involved a relationship of a sexual nature;
(f)     whether the relationship is or was exclusive.
(4)A couple relationship may exist even if the court makes a negative finding in relation to any or all of the factors mentioned in subsection (3).
(5)A couple relationship may exist between 2 persons whether the persons are of the same or a different gender.
(6)A couple relationship does not exist merely because 2 persons date or dated each other on a number of occasions.”

Sections 18(2) and (3) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 is not an exhaustive list of the relevant considerations. Whether a couple relationship exists is a matter of fact to be determined on the available evidence.
Section 20 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 deals with the meaning of an informal care relationship. Section 20(1) provides that an informal care relationship exists between two persons if one of them is or was dependent on the other person for help in an activity of daily living. It provides examples of help in an activity of daily living as dressing or other personal grooming of a person, preparing a person’s meals or helping a person with eating meals, shopping for a person’s groceries and telephoning a specialist to make a medical appointment for a person.
Section 8 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 identifies the meaning of domestic violence.
A court hearing an application for a protection order is not bound by the rules of evidence or any practices or procedures applying to courts of record, and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities: s 145 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012.
What is the nature of the appeal?
A person who is aggrieved by a decision to make a domestic violence order may appeal against that decision: s 164(a) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012. A “domestic violence order” is defined to encompass a protection order: ss 5 and 23(2) and the schedule of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012.
The Commissioner of Police must be served with the appeal and has a right to appear and be heard: ss 165 and 167 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012. In this case, the Respondent’s Amended Outline of Argument filed 25 July 2025 states that RJL has provided no evidence that she served the Police Commissioner or the Magistrates Court of Queensland – Kingaroy Registry with a copy of the Notice of Appeal. The relevance of the submission about service on the Magistrates Court is not apparent. As for service of the Police Commissioner, on my review of the file, it is evident that the Police Commissioner is aware of the appeal and does not wish to appear or be heard.
The appeal is to be decided on the evidence and proceedings before the Magistrates Court below, unless the appellate Court makes an order to the contrary: s 168 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012.
I recognise that it has been said that the legislation is far from clear in its identification of the nature of the appeal: DU v Jackson (DCJ) [2024] QCA 122, [74]. In my view, the nature of this appeal is a rehearing on the record: ss 168 and 142(2) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 and rr 783, 785 and 765 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). In this respect, I agree with the analyses of his Honour Judge McGill in GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248 at [1] – [3], His Honour Judge Horneman-Wren QC in ACP v McAuliffe [2017] QDC 294 at [5] – [12] and His Honour Judge Moynihan KC in HBY v WBI & Anor [2020] QDC 81 at [16] – [18].
If I am wrong about that, it is of no consequence in the determination of this appeal. That is because, whether this is an appeal in the strict sense or an appeal by way of rehearing:
(a)the Court is required to reconsider the conclusions of fact reached by the learned Magistrate: DU v Jackson (DCJ) [2024] QCA 122, [45];
(b)the onus is on RJL to show there is some error in the decision under appeal: Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172, [23]; Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission & Ors [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194, 202-4 [11]-[17]; DU v Jackson (DCJ) [2024] QCA 122, [45].
(c)there has been no change to the law that is of relevance to the determination of this appeal: see Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd [1976] HCA 62; (1976) 135 CLR 616, 619-20; DU v Jackson (DCJ) [2024] QCA 122, [45].
This Court is required to conduct a real review of the proceedings below, including the Magistrate’s reasons, and make its own determination of relevant facts in issue from the material, including any inferences to be drawn: Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118, 125-7 [22]-[25]. The Court must recognise the natural limitations that exist in any appellate Court proceeding wholly on the record, including the advantage that the learned Magistrate had of seeing and hearing the witnesses: Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118, 126-7 [25]. That said, the fact that this Court did not have the opportunity to observe the witnesses as they gave their evidence does not relieve the Court of its obligation to reach its own conclusions on the evidence: Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118, 126-9 [25]-[31]. In this case, I have had the opportunity to hear the witnesses as the Appeal Record includes the audio recording of the proceeding in the Magistrates Court and I have listened to that recording.
The powers of this Court to interfere with the orders below are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the material, the decision that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error: Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission & Ors [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194, 202-4 [11]-[17]; OMD v Queensland Police Service & Anor [2021] QDC 282, [23]-[26].
Where an alleged error involves the exercise of a discretion, error of the kind explained in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-5 must be demonstrated before the appeal can succeed. As was observed in that case:
“If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then this determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so.”
Care must be exercised to identify the character of the judicial determination that is under consideration in the appeal. There is no one rule for all issues in all appeals under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012: OMD v Queensland Police Service & Anor [2021] QDC 282, [27].
While s 37(1) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 confers a discretion on the Court to make a protection order, a decision to make a protection order should not be treated as a discretionary judgment in all respects.
Section 37(1) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 provides three threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the discretion will arise. The matters in ss 37(1)(a) and (b) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 articulate a fixed rule for application to the facts. As such, the principles in House v The King about discretionary errors do not apply to an appeal in respect of a Magistrate’s conclusion on either of those threshold conditions.
In contrast, s 37(1)(c) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 calls for the formation of an opinion about whether, on the facts proved, a protection order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved. This gives rise to a discretionary decision because the assessment of what is necessary to protect the aggrieved is one that calls for formation of an opinion based on a value judgment. That threshold condition, and the exercise of the ultimate discretion to make a protection order, are each discretionary decisions to which the principles in House v The King apply: Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513, 518; OMD v Queensland Police Service & Anor [2021] QDC 282, [27]-[31].
The Court may confirm or vary the decision the subject of the appeal or may set the decision aside and either substitute another decision or remit the matter to the court below: s 169(1) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012. The decision of this Court is final and conclusive: s 169(2) of Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012.
What are the grounds of appeal?
The notice of appeal filed on behalf of RJL identifies the following five grounds of appeal:
· “The Magistrate erred in finding no relevant relationship despite evidence of cohabitation, a sexual relationship, financial interdependence, exchange of gifts and ongoing mutual engagement, contrary to s. 14 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)
·     Judge stated he believed I lived in a granny flat despite that never being presented to the court by myself or the defendant. And is incorrect the property has no granny flat.
·     Failure to consider breaches of the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) by the Respondent, which demonstrated continued risk to the Appellant
·     The Magistrate relied on improper and illegal testimony for [NM] and [EN] (professional witnesses), who had no personal knowledge of the relationship or the abuse. Their testimony was inadmissible, as they violated confidentiality laws and privacy laws.
·     Inconsistency in the Magistrates Court’s approach, where a Temporary Protection Order was granted based on risk but the final order was dismissed despite continued breaches and evidence of ongoing risk.”
Other documents filed by RJL appear to raise additional grounds of appeal.
I have considered the whole Appeal Record and carefully analysed each piece of evidence relied on, and each argument advanced, by RJL. However, in these reasons I have not dealt specifically with points that are not reasonably arguable, are plainly irrelevant to the determination of the appeal or are immaterial points of detail.
In that respect, I note that some of the alleged errors relate to issues not addressed by the learned Magistrate, namely:
(a)whether MCP has committed domestic violence against RJL; and
(b)whether a protection order is necessary or desirable to protect RJL from domestic violence.
Those questions were not considered by the learned Magistrate. Given the learned Magistrate’s found there was no relevant relationship, there was no need for the learned Magistrate to make findings on those issues.
In this case, the key question for me is whether there is an error that vitiates the learned Magistrate’s finding that there was no relevant relationship. If such an error is established, the appropriate course would be to remit the matter to the learned Magistrate to deal with the application according to law.
Before turning to consider the key issue, I first wish to address some preliminary procedural issues. Although the procedural issues do not have direct relevance to the key issue, in this case I consider it appropriate to address them because:
(a)the preliminary issues were raised by MCP in his Outline of Argument;
(b)despite some issues having been addressed by me at mentions, the issues were maintained, and the subject of additional submissions made by MCP, in his Amended Outline of Submissions;
(c)the procedural issues are addressed by RJL in her reply to MCP’s Outline of Argument and Amended Outline of Argument, in which RJL raises concerns about fairness with respect to the procedural history and the potential for the procedural issues to infect a fair hearing; and
(d)the issues are relevant to the exercise of my discretion with respect to an award of costs.
What preliminary issues are raised by MCP?
MCP’s Outline of Argument raises three preliminary matters, namely:
(a)the Police Commissioner has not been served with a copy of the Notice of Appeal as required under s 165 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012;
(b)RJL has not sufficiently particularised the grounds of appeal; and
(c)there are relevant procedural deficits with the appeal.
These issues were maintained by MCP in the Respondent’s Amended Outline of Argument even though:
(a)at a mention of the appeal, I indicated that I considered the grounds of appeal to be sufficiently particularised; and
(b)MCP was aware of correspondence from the Police Commissioner demonstrating that the Police Commissioner was aware of the appeal and did not wish to appear or be heard.
Before addressing each of those allegations, it assists to record what occurred in the lead up to the determination of the appeal.
What occurred in the lead up to the determination of the appeal?
This appeal was commenced on 21 February 2025 when RJL filed a Notice of Appeal and an additional document that is also titled “Notice of Appeal”.
The Notice of Appeal contains five grounds of appeal and an additional paragraph that says:
“Please see the attached statement for full details of the grounds of appeal.”
The second document that was filed titled “Notice of Appeal” sets out a concise, logical statement of the factual conclusions upon which RJL contends the Court should proceed that are different from and additional to the findings made in the decision of the learned Magistrate. The document also contains submissions that explain the basis for the different and additional findings. In some respects, it refers to evidence that is not before the Court, but reliance is also placed on evidence that is before the Court. The document identifies relevant statutory provisions.
Both documents were filed by RJL on 21 February 2025. An affidavit of Mr Ward filed on 12 March 2025 establishes that RJL engaged a process server to personally serve these documents on MCP. Service occurred on 6 March 2025.
On 7 March 2025, MCP filed a Notice of Address for Service. That document identified that MCP was representing himself in the appeal.
On 19 March 2025, RJL filed an affidavit requesting the entire evidence file from the Magistrates Court, including all documents, exhibits, affidavits, witness statements and any other materials submitted by herself, MCP or any witnesses, be transferred to the District Court appeal record. The affidavit identified an intention to rely on:
“the full record of the case, to allow the presiding judge to review all relevant materials for a fair and comprehensive assessment of the appeal.”
That affidavit made it clear that the request included, but was not limited to:
(a)physical documents submitted by herself, MCP and any witnesses;
(b)USB drives or other electronic storage devices containing video files, audio recordings, or other materials presented during the trial; and
(c)exhibits, including any physical or digital evidence relevant to the case.
On that same day, RJL filed an affidavit setting out additional grounds of appeal.
On 24 March 2025, RJL filed a document titled “Application to Settle the Appeal Record” in which she identified her intention to rely on:
·“Trial Transcript
·Audio Recordings of the Court Trial
·Affidavit of the Respondent, [MCP]
·Affidavit of the Appellant, including attached Police Statements
·Ruling of Judge Sinclair dated 18 November 2024
·Video Evidence titled IMG-00237
·Witness Affidavits”
Having herself obtained a copy of the transcript of the hearing held in the Magistrates Court at Kingaroy on 24 January 2025, RJL attached it to an affidavit filed on 24 March 2025 and requested its inclusion in the appeal record book.
A further affidavit of Mr Ward filed on 7 May 2025 establishes that RJL arranged personal service on MCP of each of the documents that were filed by RJL between 21 February 2025 and 24 March 2025. Personal service occurred on 1 April 2025.
From my review of the file, it is apparent that all actions taken by RJL with respect to the appeal, including her requests for transcripts and fee waivers, have been recorded in documents filed by RJL and served on MCP in a timely manner. The documents that RJL requested be included in the Appeal Record Book were on the court file, which was available for inspection.
By 30 May 2025, the only document that had been filed by MCP was the Notice of Address for Service. On that evening, registry staff at the Kingaroy Magistrates and District Court wrote to MCP as follows:
“We refer to the appeal currently listed before the Kingaroy District Court and enclose a copy of the Practice Directions. We would be pleased if you would comply with the practice directions and ensure all paperwork is completed and filed prior to the next District Court sittings to allow for this matter to be listed during the sittings. This matter will be mentioned at the callover for the sittings.”
The email attached a copy of Practice Direction Number 7 of 2020. This appeal was due to be mentioned before me at a callover on 5 June 2025.
On Sunday 1 June 2025, MCP sent an email to [email protected]. In the email, MCP indicated that he was representing himself in the appeal. He also indicated that, having consulted another legal practitioner with greater experience in these matters than himself, it was their consensus that:
“a)the Appellant is not a legal practitioner and is self-represented;
b)the Appellant suffers serious mental health issues, as she conceded in the court of first instance;
c)the Appellant appears to have very limited understanding of the law;
d)the Appellant appears to have very limited understanding of Appeal processes and the principles governing how a de novo Appeal is determined;
e)the Appellant appears to base her arguments on non-existent evidence and/or purported new evidence and/or new legal arguments not presented in the court at first instance;
f)the Appellant’s purported ‘Grounds of Appeal – Outline of Argument’ document was deficient and/or non-compliant in that:
i.it did not comply with the requirements provided pursuant to the District Court of Queensland Practice Direction 7 of 2020;
ii.did not provide a concise, logical statement of any factual conclusions upon which the Appellant contended that the District Court Judge should proceed upon which are different from or additional to the findings made in the decision under Appeal;
iii.did not provide reasons why the District Court Judge should form a factual conclusion sought;
iv.did not provide precise references to the evidence relied upon in connection with each disputed factual conclusion;
v.did not provide a concise logical summary of submissions;
vi.did not provide references to all statutory provisions, citation of authorities and passages and previous decisions or other material relied upon;
vii.did not provide a list of all documents including exhibits which the Appellant wished to rely upon;
viii.that due to the lack of sufficient particularisation, it was impossible to provide a substantive response;
ix.that the Appellant is using a legitimate legal process for an illegitimate purpose; and,
x.that the Appeal would be struck out.”
With reference to the above matters, MCP asserted that it was not possible and unnecessary to provide an outline of argument.
The correspondence also says:
“In light of your correspondence of 30 MAY 2025, and Pursuant to Direction 4 of Practice Direction Number 7 of 2020, I respectfully request that the Registrar make Directions that:
1.Within 14 days the Appellant file and serve an amended Notice of Appeal and an amended Grounds of Appeal – Outline of Argument that is compliant;
2.Within 14 days of being served with the Appellant’s amended Notice of Appeal and amended Grounds of Appeal – Outline of Argument that is compliant, the Respondent File and Serve a Response;
3.That the time in relation to the filing of the documents be extended or abridged.
Should this require the Registrar constituting the Court for the purposes of the hearing and determining an Application for such directions pursuant to rule 452(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (“UCPR”) please make arrangements and provide notice as a matter of urgency.”

This email correspondence was copied to RJL and to my associate. The email made no reference to whether MCP obtained consent of RJL to correspond with the Court about matters of substance.
On 5 June 2025, at a callover of the matter, RJL and MCP appeared by telephone. On that occasion, MCP mentioned the correspondence that was sent to the Kingaroy courthouse and indicated that no response had been received. In response to my query about whether he had taken the step of filing an application in pending proceeding, MCP again indicated that he had written to the Registrar. He submitted that RJL’s Outline of Argument was so deficient that he was not able to respond to it. I listed the matter for mention on 21 July 2025.
It appears from the file that on 25 June 2025, the Kingaroy Magistrates and District Court emailed a copy of the Notice of Appeal to the Police Commissioner.
Prior to the mention of this appeal on 21 July 2025, having not yet filed an Outline of Argument, MCP emailed his Outline of Argument to the Registry. Although the email was copied to RJL, it was also copied to my associate without RJL’s consent.
At the mention on 21 July 2025, RJL and MCP appeared in person. MCP confirmed that he was self-represented. At that mention, RJL:
(a)confirmed my impression that the five-page document that is titled “Notice of Appeal” is intended to be her Outline of Argument; and
(b)indicated that she had only just received a copy of MCP’s Outline of Argument.
I gave MCP leave to file his Outline of Argument and adjourned the matter for further mention on 23 July 2025.
At the mention on 23 July 2025, RJL and MCP appeared in person. At that stage, MCP was still representing himself.
At that time, I questioned RJL about an issue raised by MCP about service of the Notice of Appeal on the Police Commissioner. It is apparent from RJL’s answers to me that she had made numerous attempts to undertake service. RJL made enquiries with the Queensland Police Service about how to affect service, including with a legal branch of the Queensland Police Service. Assistance was not forthcoming. I am satisfied that RJL made all reasonable endeavours to undertake the necessary service herself.
Both parties indicated that they were content to have the matter heard on the papers. To facilitate a hearing on the papers, I ordered that:
(a)MCP file and serve a document noting all references to evidence relied on in support of facts referred to in his outline of argument and all cases and publications referred to by 4 pm on Friday 25 July; and
(b)RJL file a reply to the MCP’s Outline of Argument by 10 am on Wednesday 30 July 2025.
On 23 July 2025, Kingaroy Magistrates and District Court received an email from the Queensland Police Service indicating that the Commissioner of Police did not wish to be heard in the appeal.
On 24 July 2025, a copy of the emails evidencing that the Commissioner of Police was aware of the matter and did not wish to be heard was provided to the parties.
On 24 July 2025, MCP filed a Notice of Address for Service, which records that, from that date, MCP was represented by the law firm at which he is a solicitor.
On 25 July 2025, MCP (through his representation) filed an Amended Outline of Argument. The Amended Outline of Argument was not confined to addressing the matters the subject of the order made by me on 23 July 2025.
On 29 July 2025, RJL filed a reply to MCP’s Outline of Argument. In that document, RJL submits, amongst other things:
“[MCP] failed to file a formal and (sic) Response within the required time frame and is now appearing to bypass the rules by sending unsigned, unfiled emails directly to the courthouse and the Judge’s Associate. These improper backchannel communications have no legal standing, and their very submission highlights the Respondent’s disregard for the Court’s rules and authority. In a domestic violence matter – where fairness, integrity, and strict adherence to process are paramount – such conduct must not be overlooked.
…
I feel my Notice of Appeal is clear and concise. [MCP], a legal practitioner, claims he “cannot respond” or that it is “an impossible task”, yet he has effectively done so by sending backchannel emails directly to the Judge’s Associate – filled with baseless assertions that I am now required to address. If he truly could not respond legally, what is the purpose of this material? This is not only a perceived tactic to avoid accountability and delay proceedings, but also conduct that disrespects both the process and this Court – behaviour wholly unacceptable in a matter as serious as this domestic violence case.
I respectfully submit that this so-called “Outline of Argument” has no legal standing or evidentiary weight and was not filed in accordance with the rules. Its improper submission and the Respondent’s ongoing failure to follow procedure should be taken into account as part of the Respondent’s ongoing disregard for the proper administration of justice. I find it upsetting that I am placed in the position of responding to unofficial, unfiled, and unsigned material – particularly after MCP had a proper opportunity to file a Response and failed to do so.”
Is RJL’s failure to serve the Police Commissioner fatal?
As I have mentioned, MCP’s Outline of Argument identifies that there is no evidence that RJL has served the Police Commissioner as required under s 165 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012.
MCP’s Amended Outline of Argument refers to MCP’s email sent on 1 June 2025 (referred to in paragraph [62] above), and further emails sent in that regard on 16 and 24 June 2025 and says:
“2.6Rather than respond to the repeated and properly made requests for directions, and having regard to the correspondence from the Associate received 24 July 2025, Registrar Nash appears to have independently and unilaterally sent a copy of the Appeal to QPS on behalf of the Appellant the next day 25 June 2025. The Respondent’s request was never answered.
2.7The Respondent will consider referring the Registrar to the Attorney General for investigation of the circumstances surrounding these events.”
Having raised the issue, neither MCP nor his legal representative provide submissions of any assistance regarding whether RJL’s failure is an irregularity that may be excused or a failure that renders the appeal incompetent. The submissions in paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7 are irrelevant (and inappropriate).
Although there is no evidence that RJL has attended to service on the Police Commissioner, I am satisfied that:
(a)RJL made every reasonable attempt to affect service;
(b)the Police Commissioner is aware of the appeal;
(c)the Police Commissioner does not wish to be heard in the appeal; and
(d)to the extent that the service must be undertaken by RJL, the irregularity has no substantive effect and results in no prejudice.
In any event, given the appeal will be dismissed, it is unnecessary for me to determine whether RJL’s failure is an irregularity that may be excused or a failure that renders the appeal incompetent.
Has RJL sufficiently particularised the grounds of appeal?
In his Outline of Argument and Amended outline of Argument, MCP takes issue with the adequacy of particulars with respect to the grounds of appeal.
MCP’s Outline of Argument states:
“3. The Appellant has filed several different documents that provide, inter alia, ‘Grounds of Appeal’ that are deficient and/or non-compliant pursuant to the District Court of Queensland Practice Direction 7 of 2020 in that:
i.they do not provide a concise, logical statement of any factual conclusions upon which the Appellant contended that the District Court Judge should proceed upon which are different from or additional to the findings made in the decision under Appeal;
ii.they do not provide reasons why the District Court Judge should form a factual conclusion sought;
iii.they do not provide precise references to the evidence relied upon in connection with each disputed factual conclusion;
iv.they do not provide a concise logical summary of submissions;
v.they do not provide references to all statutory provisions, citation of authorities and passages and previous decisions or other material relied upon; and,
vi.they do not provide a list of all documents including exhibits which the Appellant wished to rely upon.
4.The Appellant’s documentation lacked sufficient particularisation making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Respondent to provide any substantive response.
5.The Appellant Filed and Served three (3) Affidavits which appear, prima facie, to be ‘Outlines of Argument’ and ‘Applications’.
In addition, MCP’s Amended Outline of Argument refers to MCP’s email sent on 1 June 2025 (referred to in paragraph [62] above), and further emails sent in that regard on 16 and 24 June 2025 and says:
“2.6Rather than respond to the repeated and properly made requests for directions, and having regard to the correspondence from the Associate received 24 July 2025, Registrar Nash appears to have independently and unilaterally sent a copy of the Appeal to QPS on behalf of the Appellant the next day 25 June 2025. The Respondent’s request was never answered.
2.7The Respondent will consider referring the Registrar to the Attorney General for investigation of the circumstances surrounding these events.”
The file does not reveal any action taken by the staff at Kingaroy Courthouse in response to the email sent by MCP in this regard on 1 June 2025. It is unsurprising that the directions were not made in circumstances where:
(a)MCP’s correspondence was sent to a general email address at the Courthouse on Sunday 1 June 2025;
(b)it is clear from the correspondence that MCP was aware of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 and, as such, it was reasonable for the Registrar to anticipate that, in due course when the Kingaroy registry was open, if MCP wished to pursue the application for directions, MCP would file an application of the type alluded to in his correspondence or would otherwise raise the matter with the Court at the upcoming callover on 5 June 2025;
(c)MCP did not file any application and, as such, there was no application before the Court for the Registrar to hear and decide under r 452 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999;
(d)MCP is a practising solicitor and, as such, even when appearing as a self-represented litigant, he could reasonably be assumed to know that rule 22.5 of the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2023 states:
“A solicitor must not, outside an ex parte application or a hearing of which an opponent has had proper notice, communicate in the opponent’s absence with the court concerning any matter of substance in connection with current proceedings unless:
22.5.1.the court has first communicated with the solicitor in such a way as to require the solicitor to respond to the court; or
22.5.2.the opponent has consented beforehand to the solicitor communicating with the court in a specific manner notified to the opponent by the solicitor.”
(e)although the email was also copied to RJL and to my associate, it made no reference to whether MCP obtained the consent of RJL to correspond with the Court about matters of substance. (It has since become apparent that no such consent was obtained. This is a matter that, justifiably, has caused RJL a sense of grievance.)
Leaving aside previous inaction by court staff about this issue, I do not accept the substance of the allegations made by MCP. When one considers all the documents that RJL served on MCP prior to 1 June 2025 collectively, one can readily identify:
(a)concise, logical statements of the factual conclusions upon which RJL contends the Court should proceed that are different from and additional to the findings made in the decision of the learned Magistrate;
(b)submissions that explain the basis for the different and additional findings sought by RJL;
(c)the evidence on which RJL relies; and
(d)the relevant statutory provisions and case law on which RJL relies.
Further, I do not accept MCP’s contentions from his correspondence of 1 June 2025 that:
(a)due to the lack of sufficient particularisation, it was impossible to provide a substantive response;
(b)RJL is using a legitimate legal process for an illegitimate purpose; and
(c)the Appeal should have been summarily struck out.
Are there procedural deficits with the appeal that are determinative?
MCP’s Outline of Argument states:
“6.The Appellant does not appear to have Filed an Appeals Book and the Respondent is not aware of any Certificate of Readiness having been Filed by the Appellant.”
MCP does not explain the relevance of this submission. He does not assert that any such procedural deficits result in any prejudice to him.
I am not persuaded that MCP’s submissions have any relevance given:
(a)as is recorded in Practice Direction Number 7 of 2020:
(i)the purpose of the Practice Direction is to assist the District Court, the profession and unrepresented litigants in the efficient determination of Appeals;
(ii)the Practice Direction operates subject to any direction given in a particular proceedings by a Judge;
(b)when one considers all the documents that RJL served on MCP prior to 1 June 2025 collectively, one can readily identify the evidence that RJL requested be included in the Appeal Record Book;
(c)the Appeal Record Book was available for inspection on the District Court file and it contains all the documents requested by RJL, including printed and audio transcripts of the hearing before the learned Magistrate on 24 January 2025; and
(d)even though no Certificate of Readiness had been filed, both parties agreed that it was convenient for the matter to proceed to a hearing on the papers, and, as such, I made an order that the appeal be heard in that manner.
Is there a material error in the finding that there is no relevant relationship?
The Notice of Appeal filed by RJL states:
· “The Magistrate erred in finding no relevant relationship despite evidence of cohabitation, a sexual relationship, financial interdependence, exchange of gifts and ongoing mutual engagement, contrary to s. 14 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)
·     Judge stated he believed I lived in a granny flat despite that never being presented to the court by myself or the defendant. And is incorrect the property has no granny flat.
·     …
·     “The Magistrate relied on improper and illegal testimony for [NM] and [EN] (professional witnesses), who had no personal knowledge of the relationship or the abuse. Their testimony was inadmissible, as they violated confidentiality laws and privacy laws.”
RJL’s submissions raise four contentions, namely:
(a)the learned Magistrate failed to consider whether the relationship was an “intimate personal relationship”, not limited to a de facto relationship, under s 13 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 and, as such, erred in finding that no relevant relationship existed;
(b)the learned Magistrate erred in finding that RJL lived in a granny flat as there is no evidence that such a structure existed at MCP’s residence;
(c)the learned Magistrate erred in relying on inadmissible evidence;
(d)evidence of a relevant relationship is established by:
(i)a video recording:
(A) that reveals RJL entering MCP’s bedroom, without objection, at a time when MCP was naked; and
(B) on which one can hear a discussion about RJL’s side of the bed and MCP requesting RJL to perform sexual acts;
(ii)witness testimonies and police reports confirming cohabitation;
(iii)emails in which MCP begs RJL to come home and demonstrating a personal relationship beyond a professional context; and
(iv)the decision of Magistrate Sinclair.
Did the learned Magistrate fail to consider whether the relationship was an “intimate personal relationship”, not limited to a de facto relationship?
RJL submits that the learned Magistrate wrongly focussed on whether the relationship met the definition of a de facto relationship instead of considering whether it met the broader definition of an intimate personal relationship under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012. She submits that even if de facto status was not met, the learned Magistrate should have acknowledged the evidence and correctly classified the relationship instead of dismissing the application.
In the ex tempore reasons for judgment, the learned Magistrate recorded that RJL had characterised the relationship as a de facto relationship. However, it is reasonable to infer that the learned Magistrate went on to consider the broader meaning of relevant relationship given his reasons:
(a)detail the evidence he accepted in relation to the circumstances of the relationship;
(b)include findings that relate to relevant factors that may be considered when determining whether there is a couple relationship under s 18 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012; and
(c)include a finding that the learned Magistrate was not satisfied that there was a relevant relationship in accordance with the legislation.
That inference is supported by consideration of the transcript, particularly where it records the submissions that were made by the parties immediately prior to delivery of the ex tempore reasons. The transcript includes the following exchanges during submissions:
“MR KINGSTON: Thank you, your Honour. Your Honour, if I can deal firstly with the application. The application filed the 20th of September 2024 addresses a number of alleged concerns. Most importantly, however, at page 4 of the relationship, it asserts that the relationship between [MCP] and [RJL] was a former de facto relationship. Your Honour, of course, is obligated under the Act to ascertain if there is a relevant relationship. The submission from this side of the bar table is that you will be not – you will not be satisfied that there is a relevant relationship other – sorry, that’s sufficient to ground an application for a domestic violence order, and much less make an order for a domestic violence order.
HIS HONOUR: Well, there’s a prerequisite, as you’re aware, and if I don’t find there’s a relevant relationship, then I can’t make the order.
MR KINGSTON: Your Honour, the only potential relationship that could be found is in section 18, which is a couple relationship.
HIS HONOUR: I’ve looked at that.”
(emphasis added)
In the circumstances outlined above, no error has been established.
Did the learned Magistrate err in finding that RJL lived in a granny flat?
RJL contends:
“The Judge’s ruling incorrectly stated that I lived in a “granny flat”, a claim never raised in court or any submitted materials.
Council records and online property listings prove that no such structure exists on the property, making this a clear factual error.”
There were no council records and online property listings before the learned Magistrate and leave was not sought to adduce additional evidence. Leaving this aside, RJL effectively contends that there is no evidence to support the learned Magistrate’s finding that RJL was staying in independent accommodation in the form of a granny flat.
With respect to this issue, MCP submits:
1.2 The Appellant submits incorrectly that claim of a ‘granny flat’ were ‘never raised in court or in any submitted materials’. The evidence was presented by way of the Appellant’s own statements to third parties (victim impact statement to QPS) as Exhibit CM-14 to the Affidavit of [MCP]; and the Appellant also made statements regarding: couch surfing; temporary accommodation; motels; and, homelessness, to third parties as exhibits: …”

I reject MCP’s submission that Exhibit CM-14 was “the Appellant’s own statements to third parties (victim impact statement to QPS)”. The submission is inaccurate.
Exhibit CM-14 is a media exhibit that was produced by MCP as an exhibit to his statement. It was not produced by RJL. Relevantly, in his statement, MCP refers to an incident on 8 January 2024 between RJL and another person (who I will refer to as SH) and says:
“89. On 11 February 2024 [RJL]’s Victim Impact statement was sent to prosecutor Sgt Barry Stevens.
(Exhibit CM-14)”
During RJL’s evidence, the following cross-examination occurred in relation to the victim impact statement:
“… As on the 14th of January, you recorded, with [MCP], some audio versions of a victim impact statement in relation to the assault by [SH], didn’t you?‑‑‑I believe so.
And as a consequence of that, statements were prepared and given to the Queensland Police Service?‑‑‑That’s correct.
You’ve seen those statements in the witness – in the evidence of Mr ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑Yes. [MCP] collated the statements, and I did read it before I signed it. That’s correct.
And you agree that that statement ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑Yes.
‑ ‑ ‑ is correct. Okay. Now, you asked [MCP] to assist you to get a domestic violence order against [SH], didn’t you?‑‑‑Uh, it sounds like I probably should have done. So yes.”
With respect to the audio version of the victim impact statement, MCP’s affidavit says:
“82. On 14 January 2024 [RJL] records two (2) short 3-4 minute audio versions of her Victim Impact Statement in relation to the [SH] attack at the mall.
(Exhibit CM-10)”
I have listened to the audio recordings that are exhibit CM-10. They contain a female voice that sounds to me to be that of RJL. On the recording, the person speaking says that she is RJL. The person speaking gives details of an attack on her by SH.
Exhibit CM-14 purports to contain a typed victim impact statement of RJL regarding the incident with SH on 8 January 2024. The typed statement in CM-14 is not signed by RJL. The unsigned copy in CM-14 was not shown to RJL during her cross-examination. She was not asked whether it was the same as the version that she signed, nor was she asked to verify the truth of the contents of CM-14.
Parts of the typed victim impact statement accord with the audio recording. Those parts include details of the attack sustained by her on 8 January 2024. However, the details of RJL’s living arrangements at the time differ.
The typed, unsigned statement produced by MCP as exhibit CM-14, states:
“My name is [RJL]. I am a 37 year old female born on [disclosed date]. The incident that I am referring to in this Victim Impact Statement only provides the impaction from the incident dating the 8th January 2024.
On the day of the attack, I was out shopping with [MCP] of [law firm]. I was staying temporarily in [MCP’s family’s] granny flat located in [address] on the day the attack took place.”
In the audio recording, there is no reference to RJL staying in a granny flat. Rather, in the audio recording, RJL says that a few days prior to making the audio recording she went to Woolworths with her lawyer MCP to do a big grocery shop. She says that they went shopping for food because she was “currently couch surfing at his”.
In my view, care needed to be taken before placing weight on the statement about a granny flat made in CM-14 given:
(a)the living arrangements described in CM-14 do not accord with the audio statement of RJL at CM-10;
(b)when RJL was asked whether she had read MCP’s affidavit, she said, “Not properly, no.”;
(c)although RJL confirmed that she had read a victim impact statement collated by MCP and signed it:
(i)exhibit CM-14 is not signed by RJL;
(ii)RJL was not shown exhibit CM-14, let alone asked to confirm it to be a true copy of the statement that she signed;
(iii)MCP does not give evidence, in his affidavit or elsewhere, that the copy of RJL’s victim impact statement that is exhibit CM-14 is the same as the one that she signed;
(d)at various times during her cross-examination, RJL made statements rejecting the veracity of documents exhibited to MCP’s statement and actions purportedly taken by him as her solicitor. For example, RJL rejected suggestions that the document at CP-3 was initialled by her and explained that she signed the last page but was given many documents to sign without reading. RJL also gave evidence that she was not aware of various actions apparently taken by MCP. She explained, “We were in a relationship. He just did things”.
That said:
(a)this is not a case where there was no evidence with respect to a granny flat; and
(b)a court hearing an application for a protection order is not bound by the rules of evidence: s 145 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012.
As such, while I might not be prepared to place any weight on the evidence, there is no demonstrated error in the learned Magistrate’s decision to do so. It was open to the learned Magistrate to rely on the evidence in the manner that he did.
Even if there was a relevant error in this respect, it is immaterial to the outcome for the reasons explained below.
Did the learned Magistrate err in relying on inadmissible evidence?
RJL takes issue with the learned Magistrate’s reliance on the evidence of NM and EN.
NM is a pathology collector working for Sullivan & Nicolaides. He met RJL in that role when she attended at Belmont Private Hospital. He gave evidence about several discussions with RJL while she was a patient at Belmont Private Hospital. One of the conversations occurred while NM was collecting pathology samples from RJL, and it was recorded by NM without her knowledge. NM exhibits the recording to his affidavit. It is apparent from NM’s affidavit that he has no personal knowledge of the nature of the relationship between RJL and MCP. His affidavit in large measure recounts things that he says he was told by RJL at a time when he was providing professional services to her at Belmont Private Hospital. NM attests to his belief about whether the things he was told were true. NM also expresses an opinion about the character of MCP, which is based on interactions NM had when he engaged MCP as his lawyer.
EN is a member of a charitable organisation that was established to provide help to the homeless and needy. He met RJL at an event organised by the charitable organisation and subsequently spoke to her on other occasions as part of the work of the organisation. It is apparent from EN’s affidavit that he has no personal knowledge of the nature of the relationship between RJL and MCP. EN simply recounts various things that he was told by RJL about MCP. He attests to contacting MCP, at a time when he did not otherwise know him, to tell him about the allegations that RJL had made about MCP. Following that initial contact, EN became friends with MCP and has engaged him for assistance with legal matters of his own.
The affidavits of NM and EN were witnessed by MCP. NM and EN each gave evidence at the hearing and attested to the truth of the contents of their affidavit.
RJL contends that the learned Magistrate erred in relying on the evidence given by NM and EN as their evidence was inadmissible because it violated confidentiality laws and privacy laws. In addition, RJL contends that NM and EN had no personal knowledge of the relationship and, as such, their evidence was irrelevant.
As I have already mentioned, a court hearing an application for a protection order is not bound by the rules of evidence. That said, I accept that care needed to be taken before placing weight on the evidence of NM and EN having regard to the matters raised by RJL, some of which have been raised for the first time in this appeal. RJL’s submission about the relevance of the evidence has particular force.
With those matters in mind, I turn to consider whether there is a demonstrated error.
The learned Magistrate’s ex tempore reasons for judgment refer to the evidence of NM and EN. It seems to me that this involved the learned Magistrate summarising the evidence advanced by MCP. It did not involve findings that the evidence was accepted or relied on.
The only finding made by the learned Magistrate about the evidence is that “the preponderance of the witnesses is such that it favours the respondent”. The learned Magistrate did not identify which witnesses he regarded to be witnesses whose evidence favoured the respondent. It seems to me that the learned Magistrate’s summary of the evidence of NM and EN is not one that could be fairly described as a summary of evidence favouring the respondent. The summary of the evidence of NM and EN is, at best, equivocal.
In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the alleged error has been demonstrated.
Even if there was a relevant error in this respect, it is immaterial to the outcome for the reasons explained below.
Does the evidence relied on by RJL demonstrate an error in the learned Magistrate’s finding that there was no relevant relationship?
RJL contends that she and MCP were in a relevant relationship between August 2023 and July 2024. At the time, RJL was about 36 and 37 years old and MCP was about 55 and 56 years old.
RJL contends that cohabitation, financial and emotional involvement is demonstrated by:
(a)a video recording showing MCP and RJL engaging in sexual activity and discussion over sharing a bed;
(b)witness testimonies and police reports confirming cohabitation;
(c)emails in which MCP begs RJL to come home and demonstrating a personal relationship beyond a professional context; and
(d)the decision of Magistrate Sinclair.
Having conducted a real review of all the evidence that was before the learned Magistrate, it seems uncontroversial between the parties that, at various times between August 2023 and July 2024, MCP provided RJL with legal assistance in his capacity as her solicitor. There is a dispute about whether the assistance was provided as a gift due to the existence of a relevant relationship. It is also not controversial that MCP provided RJL with accommodation.
With that in mind, I turn to each of the key pieces of evidence identified by RJL in her submissions.
The first key piece of evidence relied by on RJL is a video recording marked IMG-0237.
As I have mentioned, RJL contends that the video recording reveals MCP and RJL engaging in a sexual activity. During her cross-examination of MCP, RJL described the activity as inserting a vibrator in MCP’s anus.
At the hearing, MCP disputed RJL’s assertion that the video demonstrated sexual interaction.
In MCP’s statement, MCP attests to the fact that RJL is a former client of his legal firm and that she first contacted him on 29 August 2023. At paragraph 18 of his statement, MCP says:
“We never had an intimate relationship, at any stage. Over time, I believed that we had become good friends; that she thought of me as a mentor (sic) Giving not only legal advice and representation but also general advice.”
During the hearing, after video recording marked IMG-0237 was played, the transcript records the following during the cross-examination of MCP by RJL:
“AGGRIEVED: So earlier today, you were saying that there was absolutely no sexual relationship between us, no intimate relationship, no relationship other than lawyer/client. Is that correct?‑‑‑That is correct. We had no sexual, romantic or anything other relationship whatsoever.
You were just saying in that same sentence that I then crawled to one side of the bed. Why was I in your bedroom as a client?‑‑‑You were staying at my house - - -
Why?‑‑‑ - - - unwanted. I’d already been asking you to not come back. I had the police bringing you back in the early hours of the morning and saying, “well, we don’t want her.” And I’d already told you that you couldn’t stay. You turned up drunk driving. There was no way I was letting you go back into the car and go and kill some innocent person and you drank and drank and drank and you had a series of falls, and you hurt yourself. You attacked – it’s all in the affidavit [RJL]. You know exactly what happened.
Yeah, I do know exactly what happened. But again, you know, you’re saying there was no sexual relationship. What was – when we saw that video, the 00237, how do you explain that?‑‑‑Well, firstly, you don’t have the first hour of that where I’m explaining to you how adverse I am to people touching me, having been on my own for 15 years. You go on about being a nurse and a paramedic and you got your magic bag with the vitamin D cream and that it’ll all be okay. And I’ve just come back from [Dr] about my frozen shoulder and the burning down my side and I need to have magnesium supplement. And you say, “go and have a hot shower, it’s okay, I’ve got my magic magnesium cream.” Little did I know that while you were supposed to be facing out the door, you had your phone in your hand recording it and before you came and grab – rubbed the magnesium cream in, you put the phone down and secretly recorded it all. But that’s what it was, there was no sex act. Even you say in the video, “oh, jeez it’s not sexy ‑ ‑ ‑
[MCP], there’s ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ you geriatric old prick,” or whatever it was that you said in the video.
‑ ‑ ‑ there’s a vibrator in your anus?‑‑‑What – sorry, what’s that got to do with ‑ ‑ ‑
MR KINGSTON: Your Honour, that hasn’t been put to the witness at all.
WITNESS: What are you talking about now?
AGGRIEVED: That’s – that was in the video.
HIS HONOUR: You can put it to him now.
AGGRIEVED: Sorry.
HIS HONOUR: You can put it to him now. You can ask him.
AGGRIEVED: Yeah, I put it to you now, and if you’d like to rewatch it, uh, the video of our sex act was you with a vibrator in your anus.
HIS HONOUR: Do you agree or disagree?‑‑‑I disagree. There was ‑ ‑ ‑
AGGRIEVED: Would you like to ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑There was nothing invisible like that in the video. It was [RJL] putting ‑ ‑ ‑
It’s visible?‑‑‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ putting vitamin E, D and magnesium cream or something out of her paramedics bag.
May we, please, play it?
HIS HONOUR: Play it again.
RECORDING PLAYED
MR KINGSTON: Your Honour – pause at this stage. This at no stage appears in the material. It’s an inference that’s being asked to be drawn.
HIS HONOUR: Well, it was filed with that material
MR KINGSTON: Yes. But what I’m saying is that the ‑ ‑ ‑
WITNESS: Your Honour, this screen’s not working.
HIS HONOUR: [indistinct]
MR KINGSTON: Can we just pause it, please, your Honour.
AGGRIEVED: No, no, sorry. This is – we need 00237.
MR KINGSTON: Your Honour, I’m dealing with this – at no stage does the affidavit talk about there being a sex act with the insertion of a vibrator into [MCP’s] anus. This is, again, just new stuff. We’ve heard the evidence earlier, there was no suggestion of – I certainly couldn’t hear it, unless your Honour heard something different about putting a vibrator into his anus.
AGGRIEVED: Watch.
HIS HONOUR: Well, we’ll watch it all, but I didn’t and that’s why I was happy to play it again.
RECORDING PLAYED
WITNESS: I can’t see it.
HIS HONOUR: You can’t see it. You’ll have – yes. We’re going to turn on that screen as well. If you want, you can go back to Mr Kingston.
RECORDING PLAYED
AGGRIEVED: [MCP], would you agree that after re-watching it, that it was, in fact, a vibrator in your anus and not me rubbing some magic voodoo cream into you?‑‑‑Absolutely not. It was exactly as I described, your magnesium cream and you rubbing it down. Me lying on my left-hand side and you rubbing a special cream from my frozen shoulder right down the right-hand side of my body and tickling me as you went across my chest and the side of my belly.
HIS HONOUR: Any other questions.
AGGRIEVED: You could hear the vibrator, though, right?‑‑‑No, I could not. I
could ‑ ‑ ‑
No?‑‑‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ hear the fan going in the bathroom where I’d just come out of.
What about me saying do I angle it towards your belly button or your back. What’s that got to do with voodoo cream?‑‑‑I’m not sure what you mean by that.
It was mentioned in the tape?‑‑‑Yes.
Yes. I’m just trying to get some clarity on ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑On the way that you were rubbing the cream?
Okey dokey. Next. Is it true that you never met my children when we were in a relationship?‑‑‑We were never in a relationship.”
I have listened to the audio recording of this evidence and accept the transcript as accurate.
I have viewed the video recording marked IMG-0237. For most of the recording, little can be seen as the mobile phone camera is pointing at something non-descript. That is not true of the entire recording. Towards the start it is clear from what can be seen and heard on the video that RJL is entering the bedroom of MCP while MCP is naked. MCP is holding a device in his hand that has an appearance consistent with that of a vibrator. MCP has no opposition to RJL’s presence. There is also a section of the recording where MCP can be seen climbing onto the bed naked and lying on his side in RJL’s presence.
Although the balance of the vision on video recording marked IMG-0237 is of little assistance, several matters of relevance can be heard. They include:
(a)RJL asking about stuff that was on her side of the bed and MCP saying “you’re not coming in, you said” to which RJL responded along the lines “you asked me to so of course I would”;
(b)RJL asking, twice, if MCP wanted lube;
(c)a reference to difficulty finding the button, followed by a quiet, electrical humming noise;
(d)MCP saying that there is supposed to be two engines – one at the top and one at the bottom;
(e)RJL asking MCP if he just wants the head in or more;
(f)RJL commenting that she feels like she was aiming the wrong way and asking MCP if she needs to get more near his belly button or his back and MCP responding;
(g)reference to whether something will just stay and whether MCP will have to just push it out with assurance by MCP that it is fine; and
(h)RJL making a noise consistent with giving MCP a kiss followed by a statement that she loves MCP and that she was going back out to watch a programme on television.
Having regard to my review of the audio recording of MCP’s evidence at the hearing before the learned Magistrate and both the vision and audio aspects of the video recording of the interactions between MCP and RJL, I have serious reservations about MCP’s credibility and reliability. It seems to me that aspects of MCP’s evidence were framed to minimise damage to MCP’s reputation.
The video demonstrates that the relationship between RJL and MCP was not just that of solicitor and client as claimed by MCP. It demonstrates a level of familiarity and trust in the relationship such that:
(a)RJL enters MCP’s bedroom, without objection, at a time when MCP was naked; and
(b)MCP requests RJL to perform acts of a sexual nature.
The second category of evidence relied on by RJL is witness testimonies and police reports confirming cohabitation. I accept that there is a body of evidence that demonstrates that during the relevant period, RJL was, for intermittent periods, residing at MCP’s home.
The third aspect of the evidence relied on by RJL are emails in which MCP begs RJL to come home and other emails and messages that RJL says demonstrate a personal relationship beyond a professional context.
There are many documents in the evidence provided by RJL that demonstrate a relationship that is more than the purely professional relationship claimed by MCP.
One example is a recording relied on by RJL in which there is a conversation between MCP and RJL at a location that appears to be MCP’s bedroom. MCP can be heard telling RJL to get ready to go to dinner with him or sit in the backyard with the door locked. RJL asked what she was supposed to do and MCP responded that she should “sit and eat food and talk with people and drink and pretend you are okay just like I do”. RJL then refers to herself as MCP’s “spaz girlfriend” and that maybe MCP should just leave her there on the street. MCP responds to say that he would like her to come along. RJL responds about sitting there trying not to look like a “spaz”. MCP responds that RJL could “sit there quietly and say nothing and then you can’t be a spaz”. MCP becomes increasingly frustrated and yells at RJL to get up and threatens to drag her out in the backyard if she does not hurry up. He expresses frustration at RJL, says that he can’t keep dealing with this, and says “I will really start fucking smashing shit – I can’t deal with this”. In the recording, RJL appears to be making statements to try and goad MCP into accepting certain things about their relationship status and about his ownership of guns.

Another example is a video file named IMG-0888-1. It contains a recorded conversation between MCP and RJL, in which MCP talks about knowing RJL for eight months and not liking her because he knows her too well. It is reasonable to infer from the footage in combination with other evidence that I accept that the video is taken at a location that is MCP’s house. In the recording, MCP acknowledges that RJL is present at that location because she has a head injury. MCP says that he has to keep thinking about why it is that he keeps dedicating his time, money and resources to RJL. MCP says to RJL that it is like she is his retarded child or something. He says that he does not know what it is. MCP says, “we don’t have sex, we don’t have a relationship, you don’t love me but you say it all the time”. MCP describes RJL as anomaly and says he could not describe their relationship to anyone. He says the fact is that after lashing out the night before and losing control, pushing RJL against the bed and RJL falling and cracking her head, MCP is terrified for her safety and for his and that of his son. On the recording, MCP also says that he is concerned for his reputation.
This evidence is consistent with the existence of a relationship that cannot be correctly characterised as a purely professional relationship between solicitor and client.
The fourth aspect of the evidence relied on by RJL is a decision of Magistrate Sinclair delivered on 22 November 2024. RJL submits that in his decision, Magistrate Sinclair determined that there had been an exchange of gifts between RJL and MCP that were personal and were made in the context of a relationship.
The judgment relates to an application for summary judgment in respect of a claim brought by the incorporated law practice with which MCP is associated against RJL. The essence of the claim is that the law practice seeks payment for legal services that it provided to RJL. In the alternative, the application sought to have RJL’s defence struck out.
Relevantly, Magistrate Sinclair says:
“[87] The second half of the application seeks for the defence to be struck out on various grounds set out in the Plaintiffs r.444 letter.
[88]As to the ‘loans’ the defence is perfectly adequate. The pleading is that the sums were gifts from the Director and not loans from the Plaintiff. That is a complete denial of the asserted express agreement to repay.
[89]Rule 177 is referred to in the Plaintiff’s r.444 letter. That provides:
171 Striking out pleadings
(1) This rule applies if a pleading or part of a pleading—
(a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence; or
(b) has a tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding; or
(c) is unnecessary or scandalous; or
[90]I consider that certainly for the gifts it discloses a defence. Whether the sums were paid is not an issue. Who paid them and on what basis is. The trial on those issue should be simple enough.
[91]There is nothing scandalous about asserting that personal loans were a gift.
[92]The complaint is made that paragraph 3 of the defence does not plead a material fact. It reads:
3.**Nature of Relationship** Our relationship was intimate, and many items exchanged between us were gifts, not formal agreements. This includes personal items and a phone that [the Director] gifted me for my birthday.
[93]I find that paragraph 3 does plead a material fact when read with paragraphs 2, 4 & 5.
2.**Background** I was in a personal relationship with [the Director] from August 2023 until our breakup in July 2024 During this time we shared a bed at both [my address] and [his address].
4.**Claims Against Me** The claims against me regarding money allegedly owed arise from our personal relationship, nor from any formal agreements.
5.**Circumstances** These claims were initiated only after our breakup when [the Director] sought to collect payment for things that were given as gifts during our time together.”
I do not accept RJL’s submission about the effect of the decision of Magistrate Sinclair. A finding that RJL’s defence pleads material facts is not a finding accepting the existence of the pleaded fact.
Overall, on my review of all the evidence relied on by RJL, including RJL’s statements and other evidence such as video and audio recordings, emails and facebook messages, I am satisfied that RJL’s evidence readily establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that in addition to assisting RJL professionally as her lawyer,
(a)MCP had met RJL’s children;
(b)MCP and RJL had interactions that were social in nature, including interactions that were of a personal (and sexual) nature;
(c)MCP assisted RJL in respects other than just as her lawyer, including by:
(i)permitting RJL to live in his house with him from time to time during the period in question; and
(ii)providing RJL with general advice in a manner that extends beyond a professional solicitor and client context.
I accept that RJL honestly and genuinely believes that she was in an intimate relationship with MCP. On my review of the audio recording of the hearing, coupled with my observations from engaging with RJL in the appeal hearing, RJL impressed me as an earnest person who had difficulties with precisely identifying the timing of events but who is genuinely concerned about the risk that MCP poses to her safety. Given the contents of some of the audio recordings and correspondence from RJL to MCP in evidence before me, it seems to me that there is a legitimate foundation for RJL’s concerns.
That said, to succeed on the application, it was incumbent on RJL to demonstrate the existence of a relevant relationship under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012. I have considered RJL’s evidence in the context of ss 13 to 20 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012, paying careful regard to the meanings of intimate personal relationship, spousal relationship, couple relationship, family relationship and informal care relationship.
The evidence presented by RJL is not sufficient to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that there was a relevant relationship as that term is defined in the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012.
In the circumstances, there is no demonstrated error in the finding of the learned Magistrate.

Should there be an award of costs?

MCP seeks an order for costs on an indemnity basis in his favour.
What is the relevant legal framework governing a decision to order costs?
Costs are a creature of statute. They can only be awarded in the circumstances stipulated by the legislature: Knight & Anor v FP Special Assets Limited & Ors [1992] HCA 28; (1992) 174 CLR 178, 182-3; Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 235; [2008] 1 Qd R 304, 314 [34].
Section 169(1) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 sets out the powers of this Court as the appeal court deciding the appeal. It does not expressly include the power to award costs. That said, in my view there is a power to award costs: s 142(2) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 and rr 782, 785, 771 and chapter 17A of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld).
The power to award costs is governed by chapter 17A of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999. Within that chapter:
(a)r 680 provides that a party to a proceeding cannot recover any costs of the proceeding from another party other than under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 or an order of the court;
(b)r 681 relevantly provides that costs of a proceeding, including an application in a proceeding, are in the discretion of the court but follow the event, unless the court orders otherwise; and
(c)r 687 empowers the court to fix an amount for costs.
In the present case, the starting point is that the costs of the appeal follow the event unless ordered otherwise. The issue for my determination is whether I should order otherwise.
Should I exercise my discretion to make an order other than that the costs follow the event?
The discretion to order costs must be exercised judicially and consistently with the purpose of the power. Costs will generally follow the event unless there are special or exceptional circumstances that warrant depriving a successful party of its costs: Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Endresz; Racing Queensland Board v Endresz [No 2] [2024] QCA 123, [4], citing Orr v Director of Proceedings on Behalf of the Health Ombudsman [No 2] [2024] QCA 106 at [2]; Courtney v Chalfen [2021] QCA 25; Speets Investment Pty Ltd v Bencol Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] QCA 39; and Villan v The Body Corporate for The Winston (Cairns) Community Titles Scheme 37263 [No 2] [2024] QCA 54.
On the issue of costs, MCP’s Outline of Argument states:
“16. The Respondent submits that His Honour Magistrate Guttridge is a very experienced Judicial Officer and well regarded by His peers, practitioners and the general public. The learned Magistrate was prepared to determine the matter on the papers; however, the Appellant chose to proceed to Hearing.
17. The Respondent submits that the learned Magistrate was extremely generous in the assistance provided to the Appellant throughout the duration of the Hearing of 24 January 2025 and particularly in not making adverse finding against the Appellant regarding her reliability as a witness and the credibility of the evidence she presented which may have resulted in a successful costs application against her pursuant to section 157(2) of the Act.”
I do not cavil with the experience of the learned Magistrate and the regard in which he is held, but I do not accept that such matters are relevant to whether there should be an award of costs. That MCP seeks to advance such matters is reflective of the general lack of judgment that he has displayed throughout this appeal.
Although the learned Magistrate was prepared to determine the matter on the papers, RJL was entitled to a hearing during which she could cross-examine the witnesses called by MCP. In my view, MCP’s cross-examination raised legitimate matters for consideration, including the credibility and reliability of MCP’s evidence.
I do not accept MCP’s submission that the learned Magistrate was extremely generous in not making adverse finding against RJL regarding her reliability as a witness and the credibility of the evidence she presented. It is clear from the learned Magistrate’s reasons, the transcript of the hearing and the audio recording of the hearing that the learned Magistrate was concerned about RJL’s reliability. The learned Magistrate made relevant findings in that regard. It is equally apparent that, in the face of repeated and persistent urging by MCP’s representative, the learned Magistrate was not persuaded to make adverse findings about RJL’s credibility. That is unsurprising given the learned Magistrate accepted her version of the events depicted in the video recording marked IMG-0237.
In the circumstances, MCP’s submission does not persuade me that it is appropriate to order costs on an indemnity basis.
Further, and in any event, there is no evidence of any relevant costs incurred by MCP at the time that I listed the matter for hearing on the papers. As is apparent from the history of the appeal outlined above, MCP was self-represented until 24 July 2025. It was after this time that he engaged the law firm where he works to prepare the Amended Outline of Argument.
That begs the question: is appropriate to exercise the discretion to award indemnity costs having regard to MCP’s Amended Outline of Argument?
With respect to the issue of costs, MCP’s Amended Outline of Argument says:
“19. The Appellant was offered the opportunity to abandon the appeal during the Mention on Monday 21 July 2025 and the Respondent gave an undertaking that no costs application would be pressed.
20. The Court gave the Appellant 48 hours to contemplate their (sic) position; however, the Appellant informed the court during the mention on 23 July 2025 that they (sic) chose to continue the proceedings.
21. The Respondent, who is a solicitor and involved in other curial matters, was forced to engage representation to review the available materials and outline of argument. This did not include all the materials presented to the court at first instance with many exhibits having been filed by the Appellant in the original proceedings as a ‘media exhibit’ that may only be viewed at the courthouse with a court officer present. For these reasons, the Respondent’s representative was required to conduct after-hours consultations with the Respondent.
23.(sic) The Court also made Orders on 23 July 2025 regarding filing of materials by the Respondent, which required printing hundreds of pages of documents for the Court, and the Appellant, and for those documents to be served on the Appellant within 48 hours of the mention, i.e., 4:00 PM on 25 July 2025.
24. [The lawyer]’s Client Retainer with the Respondent estimated his total costs, including disbursements, as being in the range of $6,325.00 to $8,646.00”
At a review of the matter on 21 July 2025, I indicated to RJL that I had not completed my review of the appeal record book, but I had reviewed her evidence. I expressed preliminary views that, leaving aside MCP’s evidence, I held real concerns that RJL’s evidence was insufficient to demonstrate a relevant relationship under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012. I adjourned the matter for further mention on 23 July 2025 so that RJL might have an opportunity to consider the concerns I expressed and so that she might have a fair opportunity to consider MCP’s Outline of Argument that she had only just received. Before I adjourned, MCP indicated that if RJL decided not to proceed, he would not press his application for costs. The offer was of little value as, at that time, MCP was self-represented.
On 23 July 2025, RJL elected to proceed, but indicated that she was willing to have a hearing on the papers. It seemed to me that her election was informed by her genuinely held concerns for her own safety.
Having regard to the fact that RJL was agreeable to a hearing on the papers and acknowledging that at that time MCP was still self-represented, I am not persuaded that her election justifies an order of costs on the indemnity basis.
As for the matters raised in paragraphs 21 and 23 of MCP’s Amended Outline of Argument:
(a)I do not accept that MCP was “forced” to engage representation to review the available materials and outline of argument as:
(i)MCP had more than adequate opportunity to undertake the review before preparing his first Outline of Argument;
(ii)MCP voiced no opposition to the orders that I proposed to facilitate a hearing on the papers; and
(b)the additional materials requested by me were copies of papers and cases referenced in MCP’s Outline of Argument, some of which are not readily available to the public.
As for the lawyer’s retainer:
(a)there is no evidence of a legitimate client retainer with the lawyer, let alone one for the amounts asserted; and, in any event,
(b)having regard to the contents of the Amended Outline of Argument, I am not persuaded an indemnity costs order is appropriate given:
(i)the Amended Outline of Argument raises new arguments, without leave, including arguments that are:
(A)     unnecessarily inflammatory;
(B)     irrelevant to the issues in the appeal; and
(C)     inappropriate, such as the threats to refer the Registrar to the Attorney General; and
(ii)otherwise, the Amended Outline of Argument added nothing of substance that should not already have been identified in the original outline, such as the evidence relied on to support various submissions.
In all the circumstances, I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to order costs on an indemnity basis.
Further, even if there were legitimate legal costs that MCP could demonstrate, having regard to the inappropriate way MCP conducted himself in the proceeding, I consider this to be a case that would warrant depriving the successful party of its costs.
What are the orders?
My orders are as follows:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. Each party is to bear their own costs.

CITATION:	RJL v MCP [2025] QDC 117
PARTIES:	RJL (Appellant) v MCP (Respondent)
FILE NO/S:	D1 of 2025
DIVISION:	Appellate
PROCEEDING:	Appeal under s 164 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012
ORIGINATING COURT:	Magistrates Court at Kingaroy
DELIVERED ON:	Judgment delivered ex tempore on 1 August 2025 Reasons delivered on 22 August 2025
DELIVERED AT:	Kingaroy
HEARING DATE:	21 and 23 July 2025 and on the papers
JUDGE:	Kefford DCJ
ORDER:	1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. Each party is to bear their own costs.
CATCHWORDS:	DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE LAW – APPEAL – PROTECTION ORDER – where the learned Magistrate refused to make a protection order in favour of the appellant – whether the learned Magistrate erred in finding that there was no relationship – whether there should be an order as to costs in the exercise of the discretion
LEGISLATION:	Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) ss 5, 8, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 23, 37, 142, 145, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr 765, 783, 785
CASES:	ACP v McAuliffe [2017] QDC 294, approved Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172, applied Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd [1976] HCA 62; (1976) 135 CLR 616, applied Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission & Ors [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194, applied DU v Jackson (DCJ) [2024] QCA 122, considered Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118, applied GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248, approved HBY v WBI & Anor [2020] QDC 81, approved House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, applied Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513, applied OMD v Queensland Police Service & Anor [2021] QDC 282, approved
SOLICITORS:	Appellant self-represented Respondent self-represented