Jennifer Glover, Separate Representative v Director, Child Protection Litigation & Ors
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CHILDRENS COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Jennifer Glover, Separate Representative v Director, Child Protection Litigation & Ors [2016] QChC 16
PARTIES:
JENNIFER GLOVER, SEPARATE REPRESENTATIVE
Appellant
v
DIRECTOR, CHILD PROTECTION LITIGATION
First Respondent
&
LA
Second Respondent
&
SL
Third Respondent
&
TL
Fourth Respondent
FILE NO/S:
1720/16
DIVISION:
Childrens Court of Queensland
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
DELIVERED ON:
4 November 2016
DELIVERED AT:
Southport
HEARING DATE:
20 October 2016, at Brisbane
JUDGE:
Bowskill QC DCJ
ORDER:
The appeal is allowed. Orders proposed, as set out in paragraph [101] of the reasons. The appellant is to provide an order in those terms, subject to any party wishing to be heard in relation to the wording of the orders.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL – STANDING– CHILD PROTECTION ACT 1999 – whether a separate representative appointed under s 110 of the Child Protection Act 1999 has standing to bring an appeal against a decision on an application for a child protection order under s 117 of that Act
APPEAL – ERROR OF LAW – CHILD PROTECTION ACT 1999 – where the Childrens Court constituted by a magistrate granted leave to amend an application from previously seeking long term guardianship of two children, to seeking short term custody, of one year and two years, respectively, and then made child protection orders in those terms – where the applicant Department and mother consented to the orders being made without hearing further evidence, but the separate representative did not – whether the learned Magistrate erred in failing to give adequate reasons for the decision to make the orders – whether the learned Magistrate failed to take into account material considerations
APPEAL AND REHEARING – NATURE OF THE APPEAL – CHILD PROTECTION ACT 1999 – whether the Childrens Court constituted by a judge, exercising appellate jurisdiction, may hear the matter afresh – whether the matter ought be remitted to the same or a different magistrate
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In this case, the appellant, Jennifer Glover, acting as the separate representative for two children, appealed against the decision of the Children’s Court which had made child protection orders in respect of the children. The respondents were the Director of Child Protection and others. The central issue before the court was whether the Children's Court constituted by a magistrate erred in failing to give adequate reasons for making the child protection orders, and whether it failed to take into account material considerations. The court also needed to determine whether the Children's Court constituted by a judge, exercising appellate jurisdiction, could hear the matter afresh.
The court found that the Children's Court did not provide adequate reasons for its decision, which constituted an error of law. It was held that a court must state adequate reasons for its decision to avoid leaving the losing party with a justifiable sense of grievance and to facilitate the right of appeal. The court must refer to relevant evidence, set out material findings of fact, and provide reasons for its conclusions. The court in this case did not sufficiently articulate the essential grounds upon which the decision rested, thus failing to meet the requirements for adequate reasons. The court also failed to address the separate representative's concerns and the children's need for emotional security and stability, which were material considerations that should have been taken into account.
The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Children's Court for reconsideration. The appellant was to provide an order in the terms proposed in the reasons, subject to any party wishing to be heard in relation to the wording of the orders.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal is allowed. Orders proposed, as set out in paragraph [101] of the reasons. The appellant is to provide an order in those terms, subject to any party wishing to be heard in relation to the wording of the orders.
Background
Background to the litigation
In terms of the sufficiency of reasons, the relevant principles were summarised in Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 29 (in the reasons of Muir JA, Holmes JA, as her Honour then was, and Daubney J, agreeing):“[57] A court from which an appeal lies must state adequate reasons for its decision. The failure to give sufficient reasons constitutes an error of law.[58] The rationale for the requirement that courts give reasons for their decisions provides some guidance as to the extent of the reasons required. The requirement has been explained, variously, as necessary: to avoid leaving the losing party with ‘a justifiable sense of grievance’ through not knowing or understanding why that party lost; to facilitate or not frustrate a right of appeal; as an attribute or incident of the judicial process; to afford natural justice or procedural fairness; to provide ‘the foundation for the acceptability of the decision by the parties and the public’ and to further ‘judicial accountability’.[59] The extent to which a trial judge must expose his or her reasoning for the conclusions reached will depend on the nature of the issues for determination and ‘the function to be served by the giving of reasons’. For that reason, what is required has been expressed in a variety of ways. For example, in Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd, Mahoney JA said:‘… And, in my opinion, it will ordinarily be sufficient if – to adapt the formula used in a different part of the law … by his reasons the judge apprises the parties of the broad outline and constituent facts of the reasoning on which he has acted.’[60] McHugh JA’s view was that reasons sufficient to meet the above requirements do not need to be lengthy or elaborate but ‘… it is necessary that the essential ground or grounds upon which the decision rests should be articulated’.[61] In Strabak v Newton, Samuels JA said:‘… What is necessary, it seems to me, is a basic explanation of the fundamental reasons which led the judge to his conclusion. There is no requirement, however, that reasons must incorporate an extended intellectual dissertation upon the chain of reasoning which authorises the judgment which is given.’[62] Woodward J, in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith, said that the decision maker:‘… should set out his understanding of the relevant law, any findings of fact on which his conclusions depend (especially if those facts have been in dispute), and the reasoning processes which led him to those conclusions.”[63] Meagher JA in Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW stated these propositions:‘… there are three fundamental elements of a statement of reasons, which it is useful to consider. First, a judge should refer to relevant evidence. There is no need to refer to the relevant evidence in detail, especially in circumstances where it is clear that the evidence has been considered. However, where certain evidence is important or critical to the proper determination of the matter and it is not referred to by the trial judge, an appellate court may infer that the trial judge overlooked the evidence or failed to give consideration to it: North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1995) 87 LGERA 435. Where conflicting evidence of a significant nature is given, the existence of both sets of evidence should be referred to.Secondly, a judge should set out any material findings of fact and any conclusions or ultimate findings of fact reached. The obvious extension of the principle in North Sydney Council is that, where findings of fact are not referred to, an appellate court may infer that the trial judge considered that finding to be immaterial. Where one set of evidence is accepted over a conflicting set of significant evidence, the trial judge should set out his findings as to how he comes to accept the one over the other. But that is not to say that a judge must make explicit findings on each disputed piece of evidence, especially if the inference as to what is found is appropriately clear: Selvanayagam v University of the West Indies [1983] 1 WLR 585; [1983] 1 All ER 824. Further, it may not be necessary to make findings on every argument or destroy every submission, particularly where the arguments advanced are numerous and of varying significance: Rajski v Bainton (Court of Appeal, 6 September 1991, unreported).Thirdly, a judge should provide reasons for making the relevant findings of fact (and conclusions) and reasons in applying the law to the facts found. Those reasons or the process of reasoning should be understandable and preferably logical as well.’[64] Whilst, in my respectful opinion, it would be inconsistent with authority to apply the three ‘fundamental elements’ rigidly, and I do not understand his Honour to be suggesting otherwise, they provide useful guidance for a determination of the sufficiency of reasons in the general run of cases.”[9][9] Footnotes omitted.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Section 104 of the Child Protection Act provides that:“(1)In exercising its jurisdiction or powers, the Childrens Court must have regard to the principles stated in sections 5A to 5C, to the extent the principles are relevant.(2) When making a decision under this Act, the Childrens Court must state its reasons for the decision.”[7][7] Emphasis added. Section 5A states that the “main principle for administering this Act is that the safety, wellbeing and best interests of a child are paramount”. Section 5B sets out a number of “general principles for ensuring the safety, wellbeing and best interests of a child”. Section 5C sets out additional principles for Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander children, which are not said to be relevant in this case. Section 59(1) of the Act confers a discretion on the Childrens Court to make a child protection order only if it is satisfied of the following things:“(a) the child is a child in need of protection and the order is appropriate and desirable for the child’s protection; and(b) there is a case plan for the child –(i) that has been developed or revised under part 3A; and(ii) that is appropriate for meeting the child’s assessed protection and care needs; and(iii)for an order granting long-term guardianship of the child – that includes living arrangements and contact arrangements for the child; and(c)if the making of the order has been contested –(i) a conference between the parties has been held or reasonable attempts to hold a conference have been made; or(ii)because of exceptional circumstances, it would be inappropriate to require the parties to hold a conference; and(d)the child’s wishes or views, if able to be ascertained, have been made known to the court; and(e)the protection sought to be achieved by the order is unlikely to be achieved by an order under this part on less intrusive terms.” I note also ss 59(3), (4) and (8), which provide:“(3) When deciding whether a case plan is appropriate under subsection (1)(b)(ii), it is not relevant whether or not all persons who participated in the development or revision of the plan agreed with the plan.(4) The court must not make a child protection order unless a copy of the child’s case plan and, if it is a revised case plan, a copy of the report about the last revision under section 51X have been filed in the court.…(8)Before the court extends or makes a further child protection order granting custody or short-term guardianship of the child, the court must have regard to the child’s need for emotional security and stability.” The express requirement in s 104(2) for the court to state its reasons when making a decision under the Child Protection Act reflects a fundamental obligation of the exercise of a judicial function.[8][8]Wainohu v State of New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 at [55], [57] and [58] per French CJ and Kiefel J and at [92] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ. In terms of the sufficiency of reasons, the relevant principles were summarised in Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 29 (in the reasons of Muir JA, Holmes JA, as her Honour then was, and Daubney J, agreeing):“[57] A court from which an appeal lies must state adequate reasons for its decision. The failure to give sufficient reasons constitutes an error of law.[58] The rationale for the requirement that courts give reasons for their decisions provides some guidance as to the extent of the reasons required. The requirement has been explained, variously, as necessary: to avoid leaving the losing party with ‘a justifiable sense of grievance’ through not knowing or understanding why that party lost; to facilitate or not frustrate a right of appeal; as an attribute or incident of the judicial process; to afford natural justice or procedural fairness; to provide ‘the foundation for the acceptability of the decision by the parties and the public’ and to further ‘judicial accountability’.[59] The extent to which a trial judge must expose his or her reasoning for the conclusions reached will depend on the nature of the issues for determination and ‘the function to be served by the giving of reasons’. For that reason, what is required has been expressed in a variety of ways. For example, in Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd, Mahoney JA said:‘… And, in my opinion, it will ordinarily be sufficient if – to adapt the formula used in a different part of the law … by his reasons the judge apprises the parties of the broad outline and constituent facts of the reasoning on which he has acted.’[60] McHugh JA’s view was that reasons sufficient to meet the above requirements do not need to be lengthy or elaborate but ‘… it is necessary that the essential ground or grounds upon which the decision rests should be articulated’.[61] In Strabak v Newton, Samuels JA said:‘… What is necessary, it seems to me, is a basic explanation of the fundamental reasons which led the judge to his conclusion. There is no requirement, however, that reasons must incorporate an extended intellectual dissertation upon the chain of reasoning which authorises the judgment which is given.’[62] Woodward J, in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith, said that the decision maker:‘… should set out his understanding of the relevant law, any findings of fact on which his conclusions depend (especially if those facts have been in dispute), and the reasoning processes which led him to those conclusions.”[63] Meagher JA in Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW stated these propositions:‘… there are three fundamental elements of a statement of reasons, which it is useful to consider. First, a judge should refer to relevant evidence. There is no need to refer to the relevant evidence in detail, especially in circumstances where it is clear that the evidence has been considered. However, where certain evidence is important or critical to the proper determination of the matter and it is not referred to by the trial judge, an appellate court may infer that the trial judge overlooked the evidence or failed to give consideration to it: North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1995) 87 LGERA 435. Where conflicting evidence of a significant nature is given, the existence of both sets of evidence should be referred to.Secondly, a judge should set out any material findings of fact and any conclusions or ultimate findings of fact reached. The obvious extension of the principle in North Sydney Council is that, where findings of fact are not referred to, an appellate court may infer that the trial judge considered that finding to be immaterial. Where one set of evidence is accepted over a conflicting set of significant evidence, the trial judge should set out his findings as to how he comes to accept the one over the other. But that is not to say that a judge must make explicit findings on each disputed piece of evidence, especially if the inference as to what is found is appropriately clear: Selvanayagam v University of the West Indies [1983] 1 WLR 585; [1983] 1 All ER 824. Further, it may not be necessary to make findings on every argument or destroy every submission, particularly where the arguments advanced are numerous and of varying significance: Rajski v Bainton (Court of Appeal, 6 September 1991, unreported).Thirdly, a judge should provide reasons for making the relevant findings of fact (and conclusions) and reasons in applying the law to the facts found. Those reasons or the process of reasoning should be understandable and preferably logical as well.’[64] Whilst, in my respectful opinion, it would be inconsistent with authority to apply the three ‘fundamental elements’ rigidly, and I do not understand his Honour to be suggesting otherwise, they provide useful guidance for a determination of the sufficiency of reasons in the general run of cases.”[9][9] Footnotes omitted.