WJS v Director of Child Protection Litigation

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CHILDRENS COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

WJS v Director of Child Protection Litigation & Anor [2020] QChC 3

PARTIES:

WJS

(Appellant)

v

DIRECTOR, CHILD PROTECTION LITIGATION

(First Respondent)

and

SARAH CLEELAND, SEPARATE REPRESENTATIVE

(Second Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

CCQ 2697/19

DIVISION:

Childrens Court of Queensland

PROCEEDING:

Appeal under section 117 Child Protection Act 1999

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

6 March 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 November 2019

JUDGE:

Loury QC DCJ

ORDER:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CHILDRENS COURT – CHILD PROTECTION ORDER – APPEAL – where a Child Protection Order, granting short term custody of a child, was made according to section 59 of the Child Protection Act – where the appellant appealed against the decision, alleging multiple errors – whether the learned Magistrate ought to have been satisfied the child was in need of protection.

Jennifer Glover, Separate Representative v Director, Child Protection Litigation & Ors [2016] QChC 16

Child Protection Act 1999 sections 5B, 9, 10, 59, 61, 104, 117, 120, 143

COUNSEL:

Self-represented for the Appellant
L. Stewart for the First Respondent
D. Firth for the Second Respondent

SOLICITORS:

Self-represented for the Appellant
Director of Public Prosecution (Queensland) for the First Respondent
Sarah Cleeland as the Second Respondent

  1. On 12 July 2019 a Child Protection Order, granting short term custody of S to the chief executive was made pursuant to section 59 of the Child Protection Act 1999 by a Childrens Court Magistrate. 

  1. The appellant, who was represented at that hearing, appeals against the decision of the Magistrate pursuant to section 117 of the Child Protection Act 1999. Section 120(2) of that Act states that such an appeal must be decided on the evidence and proceedings before the Childrens Court Magistrate. Section 120(3) provides for the appellate court to order that the appeal be heard afresh, in whole or in part. That discretion tends to indicate that the appeal should be conducted as a rehearing. In Jennifer Glover, Separate Representative v Director, Child Protection Litigation & Ors,[1] Bowskill DCJ (as she then was) said: 

    [1][2016] QChC 16 at [76] and [77].

“In my view, the proper construction of s 120(2), having regard to s 120(3), is that an appeal governed by s 120(2) is an appeal by way of rehearing, with the court having a discretion, if an application is made in this regard, to order that some or all of the evidence be heard afresh, or for further evidence to be relied on. The very presence of that discretion is one of the indicia that the appellate court is given a rehearing function.

The sense in which “rehearing” is used here is that the appellate court rehears the matter, as at the date of the appeal, not in the sense of a completely fresh hearing, but on the basis of the record of the evidence before the court below, subject to the discretion conferred by s 120(3).  The appellate court is obliged to give the judgment which in…

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Details
Case
[2020] QChC 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, WJS, challenged the decision of the Children’s Court to grant a Child Protection Order under section 59 of the Child Protection Act. This order placed the child in the temporary custody of the Director of Child Protection Litigation. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the Magistrate made any errors in arriving at the conclusion that the child required protection. WJS argued that the Magistrate failed to consider several relevant factors, including the child's welfare and the parents' ability to provide a stable environment.

The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the Magistrate erred in making the Child Protection Order. WJS contended that the Magistrate overlooked key evidence and failed to properly apply the statutory criteria. The appellant argued that the child was not in immediate danger and that the Magistrate should have considered alternative solutions before resorting to the removal of the child. The Court was required to assess the weight of the evidence presented and determine whether the Magistrate’s decision was reasonable and supported by the facts.

The Court of Appeal found that the Magistrate's decision was well-founded and that the order was appropriate given the circumstances. The Court held that the Magistrate had considered all relevant factors and had sufficient grounds to conclude that the child was in need of protection. The evidence demonstrated that the child faced significant risks if not removed from the appellant’s care, and the alternative measures proposed by WJS were deemed insufficient to mitigate these risks. The Court found no basis to overturn the Magistrate's decision, affirming that the order was in the best interests of the child.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Child Protection Order remained in place, continuing the temporary custody of the child with the Director of Child Protection Litigation. The Court of Appeal's decision underscored the importance of ensuring that children's welfare is prioritised, even when alternative arrangements are proposed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established