Hakea Holdings Pty Ltd v Neon Underwriting Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hakea Holdings Pty Ltd v Neon Underwriting Limited for and on behalf of the Underwriting Members of Lloyds Syndicate 2468 [2023] FCAFC 34

Appeal from: Hakea Holdings Pty Ltd v McGrath (No 2) [2022] FCA 995
File number: NSD 804 of 2022
Judgment of: COLVIN, BUTTON AND JACKMAN JJ
Date of judgment: 10 March 2023
Catchwords: INSURANCE - Directors and Officers liability insurance - where policy excludes liability for loss in connection with a claim arising out of or attributable to or in connection with any director gaining any personal profit or advantage to which he or she was not legally entitled - where exclusion subject to a proviso that it shall only apply if such profit or advantage is established by admission or adjudication in any proceedings - where appellants allege error by primary judge in finding that exclusion clause applies - consideration of meaning of personal advantage - consideration of meaning of not legally entitled - where alleged contravention of s 182(1) and s 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - consideration of United States cases regarding exclusion clause - where policy is a claims made policy - where insurer contends primary judge should have found that claim was not made in period of insurance - where demand made on the director by email notification - whether email notification received by the director within the period of insurance - consideration of meaning of received - appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180, 182, 459E

Evidence Act1995 (Cth) s 161

Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 54

Cases cited:

Alstrin v St Paul Mercury Insurance Co 179 F.Supp. 2d 376 (2002)

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2002] NSWSC 171

Brown & Lacounte LLP v Westport Insurance Corporation 307 F.3d 660 (2002)

Chew v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 626

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337

Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500

Doyle v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2005] HCA 78; (2005) 227 CLR 18

Doyle v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2005] WASCA 17

Drayton v Martin (1996) 67 FCR 1

FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Australian Hospital Care Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 38; (2001) 204 CLR 641

Impact Funding Solutions Ltd v AIG Europe Insurance Ltd [2016] UKSC 57; [2017] AC 73

Jarvis Christian College v National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 197 F.3d 742 (1999)

King v McKean & Park [2002] VSC 350; (2002) 12 ANZ Ins Cas 61‑534

LCA Marrickville Pty Limited v Swiss Re International SE [2022] FCAFC 17; (2022) 290 FCR 435

Lewis v Nortex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] NSWSC 1143

National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175

Nicholls v Zurich American Insurance Group 244 F.Supp 2d 1144 (2003)

Quintano v BW Rose Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 793

Re St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co & Guardian Insurance…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 34
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Hakea Holdings Pty Ltd v Neon Underwriting Ltd involves the interpretation and application of a Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy. Hakea Holdings Pty Ltd (Hakea) sought indemnification from Neon Underwriting Ltd (Neon) for liabilities incurred by Mr McGrath, a director of Hakea. Neon denied coverage, asserting that an exclusion clause in the policy barred indemnity due to Mr McGrath's alleged personal profit or advantage gained through unlawful conduct. The primary judge ruled in favour of Neon, finding that the exclusion clause applied. Hakea appealed this decision, arguing that the exclusion clause did not apply because it required the personal profit or advantage to be established by admission or adjudication in proceedings. The appeal centred on the interpretation of terms in the insurance policy, particularly the exclusion clause and the definition of 'received'.

The court had to decide whether the exclusion clause in the policy correctly applied to the facts of the case, and whether the primary judge's interpretation of the term 'received' was correct. This involved determining whether the term'received' in the context of the policy required the insured to have a subjective awareness of the content of the claim. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the claim against Mr McGrath was made within the period of insurance. The appeal also questioned whether the primary judge should have found that the claim was not made in the period of insurance, considering the nature of the policy as a claims-made policy and the timing of the email notification received by Mr McGrath.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in concluding that a claim was made against Mr McGrath during the period of insurance. The policy's definition of a 'Claim' as a 'written notice received' indicated that a claim was made when the written notice was delivered, regardless of whether Mr McGrath read or understood the content. The court also determined that the primary judge's interpretation of the term 'received' was consistent with the natural and ordinary meaning of the word, applied from the perspective of a reasonable businessperson. The appeal was dismissed, and the court ordered that both parties file written submissions regarding costs, limited to three pages, by specified dates.

The final orders included dismissing the appeal, requiring both parties to file written submissions on costs by a set date, and allowing the court to determine the question of costs on the papers unless otherwise ordered. Submissions were to be limited to three pages, and any necessary affidavits had to be confined to matters of evidence in support of the cost order sought.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. On or before 17 March 2023, each party do file and serve written submissions as to costs stating the terms of any order as to costs sought by that party and any affidavits confined to necessary matters of evidence in support of the cost order sought.

3. On or before 24 March 2023, each party do file and serve any written submissions and any affidavits strictly in response.

4. Unless otherwise ordered, the question of costs will be determined on the papers after 24 March 2023.

5. Submissions filed in accordance with these orders shall not exceed three pages.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, we do not uphold the Notice of Contention.Conclusion and orders Hakea has not been successful in its appeal and Neon has not been successful on its Notice of Contention. Neon has been successful in the ultimate result. There should be an order that the appeal be dismissed. Both parties sought an opportunity after the determination of the outcome to address the Court on costs. There should be orders to provide for written submissions (limited to three pages) and any necessary affidavits. Unless otherwise ordered, the question of costs should be determined on the papers. This is an appeal from the judgment of Yates J in the matter of Hakea Holdings Pty Ltd vMcGrath (No 2) [2022] FCA 995. The learned primary judge found that Mr McGrath was liable to Hakea Holdings Pty Ltd (Hakea) for breach of his duty as a director of Hakea under s 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Mr McGrath is not a party to the appeal and there is no appeal from that finding. Mr McGrath was insured under a Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy for the period 23 January 2016 to 23 January 2017 (Policy), held by Hakea and underwritten by Neon Underwriting Limited for and on behalf of the underwriting members of Lloyds Syndicate 2468 (Neon). Neon was the active defendant in the Court below. The primary judge rejected Hakea's claim that Mr McGrath was entitled to be indemnified under the policy in relation to his liability. The learned primary judge found that Neon was entitled to rely on an exclusion clause in the policy, and the present appeal is brought from the primary judge's conclusion that that exclusion applies. The Policy is a 'claims made' policy of the nature described in FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Australian Hospital Care Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 38; (2001) 204 CLR 641 at [64]‑[68].Salient factual findings made by the primary judge As there is no appeal against any of the factual findings by the primary judge, and the appeal raises questions concerning the proper construction of the Policy, I summarise briefly the factual findings made at first instance. In addition to being a director of Hakea, Mr McGrath was also the sole director, shareholder, secretary and general manager of Denham Constructions Pty Ltd (Denham). On 12 October 2012, Denham entered into a contract with Hakea to design and construct a residential aged care facility on property owned by Hakea in Hamlyn Terrace in New South Wales (Building Contract). The Building Contract was a lump sum contract, and Denham could claim payment by progress claims as and when progress certificates were issued by the Superintendent. Denham was obliged to ensure that the work reached practical completion by a specified date, which was subsequently extended. Clause 39.11 of the Building Contract provided relevantly that if a party informs the other in writing that the party is insolvent or is financially unable to proceed with the contract, then the Principal may, without giving notice to show cause, exercise a contractual right to take out of Denham's hands the whole or part of the work remaining to be completed and suspend payment under the contract. The Building Contract also gave Hakea a right of termination of the contract if Denham committed a substantial breach and Hakea had given Denham a notice to show cause why Hakea should not exercise that right.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Neon also mounted an alternative argument, if, contrary to its reading of the primary judge's reasons, his Honour did conclude that Mr McGrath became aware of the 20 January 2017 email before 4.00 pm on 23 January 2017. It contended that any such finding was wrong on the basis that there was no evidence that Mr McGrath used the relevant email account between 9 September 2016 and 17 May 2017. Hakea did not make any submissions on this point.Consideration We reject the contention that the primary judge erred in concluding that a Claim was made against Mr McGrath during the relevant Period of Insurance. Determination of whether a Claim was made during the Period of Insurance involves applying the relevant provisions of the policy, correctly construed, to the facts of this case. Those facts were (at least on appeal) uncontroversial. The asserted email address was an operational email account. There was no malfunction of the account. Nor was there any email 'bounce back' or delivery failure notification. While the evidence was rather scant, it did show that Mr McGrath received and responded to an email sent to him at the asserted email address by Denham's liquidator within five days. There was no evidence as to when Mr McGrath became aware of, or read, the 20 January 2017 email and attached letter. The policy defines a Claim as a 'written notice received' that has certain characteristics (a demand for compensation, etc.). By its specificity, the definition of Claim provides a more useful starting point for the analysis than does the requirement in the Insuring Clause that the Claim be 'made'. Where there is a written notice that satisfies the definition of Claim, a Claim will have been made. Neon did not contend otherwise. The primary judge set out the relevant principles governing the construction of insurance contracts at [209]-[217] of his Honour's Reasons. No issue was taken with that summary on appeal. While repetition may make the observation trite, it is the words of the policy that are paramount. Particular terms of the policy are to be construed according to their natural and ordinary meaning, read in light of the contract as a whole, and having regard, where relevant and admissible, to surrounding circumstances within the scope of that expression in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 352 (Mason J). The language used in written commercial instruments, including policies of insurance, is to be interpreted from the perspective of a reasonable businessperson in the position of the parties. In the present case, no issue arises as to the role of surrounding circumstances. Both parties advanced their submissions wholly by reference to the terms of the policy, although Neon drew on what it suggested was a practice of such policies being rolled over from year to year. The definition of the word 'Claim' requires that the written notice has been 'received'; it says nothing about the insured having read, let alone read and absorbed the content of, the written communication. Yet, on Neon's construction, the recipient must have been consciously aware of the content and character of the written demand in order for it to have been 'received'. Unless 'received' is construed as incorporating this element of subjective appreciation, it is difficult to know what purpose mere awareness of the existence of the written notice might serve over and above what is achieved by mere delivery of the written demand, as in the former circumstance, the insured is no more aware of what is being claimed and on what basis, than an insured who has had delivery of, but not read, a written demand.