FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gregg v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited
[2016] FCA 1470
File number: NSD 553 of 2016 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 1 November 2016 Catchwords: DEFAMATION – trial by jury – whether to be ordered – Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 39, 40 – whether limitations to power to order trial by jury under s 40 – whether “expedient” under s 40 to order trial by jury
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where application for trial by jury filed out of time fixed in case management orders and without explanation for delay – Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether granting trial by jury consistent with overarching purpose and party’s duties under s 37M – whether in the interests of justice to grant trial by jury
Legislation: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT)
Constitution s 80
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 184, 233
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4J
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 11, 21, 22, 30
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 39, 40
Federal Court Rules 2011 r 16.02
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Limited (2009) 238 CLR 304
Daniels v State of New South Wales (No 6) [2015] NSWSC 1074
Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691
McDermott v Collien (1953) 87 CLR 154
Owners of “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404
Ra v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2009) 182 FCR 148
Rejfek v McElroy (1964) 112 CLR 517
Roozendaal v Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Limited (2015) 232 FCR 487
Tamaya Resources Limited (in Liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2016) 332 ALR 199
Date of hearing: 1 November 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 44 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr B McClintock SC with Ms ST Chrysanthou Solicitor for the Applicant: Mark O’Brien Legal Counsel for the Respondents: Ms LE Barnett Solicitor for the Respondents: Banki Haddock Fiora ORDERS
NSD 553 of 2016 BETWEEN: PETER GREGG
Applicant
AND: FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LIMITED (ACN 003 357 720)
First Respondent
THE AGE COMPANY PTY LTD (004 262 702)
Second Respondent
THE FEDERAL CAPITAL PRESS OF AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 008 394 063
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondents’ interlocutory application dated 5 October 2016 be dismissed.
2.The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory hearing.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
On 5 October 2016, the respondents, Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited, The Age Company Pty Limited and The Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Limited, filed an interlocutory application for an order under s 40 of the Federal Court of…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1470
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the respondents had made a considered decision not to apply for a trial by jury after they had had a fair and sufficient opportunity to consider that question on or before 15 July 2016, pursuant to order 3 made on 12 May 2016. The court also found that it was not necessary for the court to resolve the many disputed arguments as to whether these proceedings should have been heard by a jury, which each of the parties addressed on the particular factual circumstances of this matter. The court emphasised the importance of the giving of an explanation by a party who seeks a favourable exercise of a discretion to be afforded a further forensic opportunity to do something in the proceedings that the party had not done or failed to do earlier. The court held that the explanation offered by the respondents was deficient because Ms Banton could not explain why she did not know of the Chilean audit issues until she was told by Mr Basford. The court found that it was not in the interests of justice to grant the trial by jury in this case.
The final orders of the court were that the respondents’ interlocutory application dated 5 October 2016 be dismissed and that the respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory hearing.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondents’ interlocutory application dated 5 October 2016 be dismissed.
2. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory hearing.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondents also argued that the factual decision as to how ordinary reasonable readers of the matters complained of would have understood them in relation to whether those publications convey the alleged defamatory meanings on which Mr Gregg relies would be best determined by a jury.Consideration I have come to the firm conclusion that this is not an appropriate case in which to exercise my discretion to grant the respondents’ application for a jury trial. That is because I am satisfied that the respondents made a considered decision not to apply for a trial by jury after they had had a fair and sufficient opportunity to consider that question on or before 15 July 2016, pursuant to order 3 made on 12 May 2016. In exercising the Court’s case management powers, Pt VB of the Federal Court Act imposes obligations on the Court, the parties and their lawyers to facilitate the achievement of the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions prescribed in s 37M(1), namely, to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. While it is true, as the respondents argued, that the Rules do not prescribe any particular time by which an application under s 40 may be made, order 3 made on 12 May 2016 did. In Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at 215 [103], Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said that:Generally speaking, where a discretion is sought to be exercised in favour of one party and to the disadvantage of another, an explanation will be called for. (emphasis added) In Tamaya Resources Limited (in Liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2016) 332 ALR 199 at 226 [154]-[157], Gilmour, Perram and Beach JJ emphasised the importance of the giving of an explanation by a party who seeks a favourable exercise of a discretion to be afforded a further forensic opportunity to do something in the proceedings that the party had not done or failed to do earlier. They said:[154]Just what explanation is called for will necessarily depend upon the particular case. The explanation will be given by, or on behalf of, the moving party. Affidavit evidence may or may not be necessary. In Cement Australia [Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261], for example, as the explanation was that the error was one of judgment by senior counsel for the ACCC, a statement by him from the bar table, to which no objection was taken, was accepted by the Court as sufficient. [155]It must be borne in mind that the explanation required is that of the moving party, not merely their solicitor or counsel. The client may very well know of matters relevant to the explanation for delay which are not known by the lawyers. [156]Evidence as to the explanation for delay will often be given by an applicant’s solicitor from their own knowledge but that may, in some cases, not be sufficient. This is such a case. The primary judge was correct to conclude that the explanation offered by Tamaya was deficient because Ms Banton could not explain why she did not know of the Chilean audit issues until she was told by Mr Basford. Her Honour’s approach does not involve any error of principle. [157]We observe, in this respect, that in Aon the plurality had regard to letters which were in the possession of the ANU one year or so before proceedings commenced and which bore on the issues the subject of the amendment application as relevant to the consideration of the adequacy of the explanation for the delay: Aon at [54] and [106]. (emphasis added)