Ra v Nationwide News Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ra v Nationwide News Pty Ltd

[2009] FCA 1308

PROCEDURE –– DEFAMATION –– jury trial –– ss 39 and 40 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) usual mode of trial in Federal Court by judge alone unless the Court otherwise orders –– proceeding for damages for injury to reputation by reason of publication of defamatory matter together with representations in contravention of s 53B of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) –– s 21 of Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) giving party right to elect for trial by jury unless Court otherwise orders –– whether Court should order that trial be heard by a jury –– factors that weigh in exercise of discretion –– matters where resolution will involve consideration of the moral and ethical values of community –– where substance of proceeding is claim for damages to reputation, court should have regard to the procedural law of the lex loci delicti and historical mode of trial by jury of such actions –– issues in defamation actions quintessentially more appropriate for resolution by a jury

PROCEDURE –– DEFAMATION –– jury trial –– ss 39 and 40 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) –– whether jury should consider Trade Practices Act allegations –– where representations identical or similar to defamatory imputations

PROCEDURE –– DEFAMATION –– jury trial –– s 40 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) –– whether court should order damages to be decided by the jury when s 22(3) of Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) requires hearing by judge –– procedural law of the lex loci delicti indicates policy preference to withhold consideration of damages from jury –– any damages for defamation and under s 82 should be decided by judge

JURY –– size of jury –– 4 or 12 members –– s 20 Jury Act 1977 –– where plaintiff or applicant is contentious or prominent person and matter complained of relates to allegations of criminal conduct and contentious moral issues –– need for a more representative spread of views of the community in larger jury

Held:  jury of 12 to try all issues except damages

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 53B
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 11, 39, 40, 41

Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 21, 22
Jury Act 1977 (NSW) s 20

Libel Act 1792 32 Geo 3 c 60 (Imp)

Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Limited (2000) 202 CLR 45 cited
Construction Industry Long Service Leave Board v Odco Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) ATPR ¶40-887 followed
Hawke v Tamworth Newspaper Co Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 699 discussed

Insurance Commissioner v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Limited (No 2) (1982) 49 ALR 714 cited
John Pfeiffer Pty Limited v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503 applied
Lang v Australian Consolidated Press Limited [1967] 1 NSWR 157 followed
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 cited
McDermott v Collien (1953) 87 CLR 154 discussed
O’Shaughnessy v Mirror Newspapers Limited [1969] 1 NSWR 421 discussed
O’Shaughnessy v Mirror Newspapers…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1308
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Ra v Nationwide News Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, Ms Ra, filed a defamation suit against the publisher, Nationwide News Pty Ltd. The case revolved around the publisher’s motion to have a jury decide the issues of liability, including whether the publications were defamatory and whether they contravened Section 53B of the Trade Practices Act. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining the appropriateness of a jury trial in this context, considering both the complexity of the questions posed to the jury and the legal principles underpinning defamation law.

The central legal issue before the court was whether it was appropriate to submit the factual questions involved in the defamation claim to a jury. The publishers argued that the defamation action should be tried by a jury, given its importance to reputation. However, Ms Ra contended that the extensive list of questions proposed by the publishers would unnecessarily prolong the trial. The court needed to balance the rights of the parties against the practicalities of conducting a trial, including the potential impact on the jury.

The court found that while a jury trial was appropriate for defamation cases due to the importance of reputation and the historical role of juries in such matters, the excessive number of questions proposed by the publishers was not necessary. The court held that it would be more suitable to leave the determination of defamation and the relevant defences to a jury, while reserving questions of damages and other legal issues for the trial judge. The court concluded that the jury would decide on the publication of the defamatory matters and the validity of the defences, while the trial judge would handle the remaining issues. The court ordered the parties to prepare short minutes of order to facilitate the trial process and set a date for further directions.

The court ordered that the parties bring in short minutes of order to give effect to these reasons and to prepare the matter for trial. The proceedings were to stand over to 19 November 2009 at 9:30 am for further directions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties bring in short minutes of order to give effect to these reasons and to prepare the matter for trial.

2. The proceedings stand over to 19 November 2009 at 9.30am for directions.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

RARES J
The publisher’s motion sought a very extensive order under s 40 of the Federal Court Act containing many questions for the jury to consider. This was much more prolix than necessary. As Ms Ra argued that such a large number of questions, amounting, on her calculation, to over 300 for the jury to answer would make the trial unduly long. I am not satisfied that it is at all likely that the jury will be directed to answer so many questions. The issue of whether they should be asked any questions, and, if so, how many will be a matter to be determined at the trial. In some cases it is convenient to take the jury’s answers to questions whether particular imputations are conveyed and whether they are defamatory of the plaintiff as well as to interrogate them about individual aspects of the factual ingredients of each defence. In other cases, it is convenient to take a general verdict. It will be a matter for assessment at the trial, having regard to the way in which the issues at the trial are joined, whether the jury should be directed to answer questions and, if so, on what issues, or simply be asked to bring in their verdicts.CONCLUSION An order should be made under s 40 providing for a trial by a jury of 12 of all issues in the proceedings other than damages at common law or under any Act and any questions of law or questions that by an Act must not be decided by a jury. Thus, the jury will decide whether the publishers published each of the five alleged defamatory matters and made the representations alleged to contravene s 53B of the Trade Practices Act pleaded in the amended statement of claim about Ms Ra. If so, they will also determine whether any defence raised by the publishers has been established. That will leave for the trial judge the question whether Ms Ra is entitled to any damages and any other questions under the Defamation Act that ought be tried by a judge alone. In my opinion the costs of the motion for a jury should be the publishers’ costs in the proceedings. I will direct the parties to bring in short minutes of order to give effect to these reasons and to prepare the matter for trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RARES J

The publishers argued that a defamation action, quintessentially, ought be tried by jury and that all the issues of liability (including under s 53B) in this matter were essentially concerned with Ms Ra’s reputation.CONSIDERATION The concept of “reputation” in the law of defamation comprehends all aspects of a person’s standing in the community: Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton (2009) 254 ALR 606 at 616 [36] per French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ. The importance of the law of defamation in balancing the right of an individual to the protection of his or her reputation and the right commonly described as freedom of speech plays a crucial role in our democratic system of government. That balance is affected at common law by the operation of the defence of qualified privilege as elaborated in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, see at 565-576 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ. In times less free than those in which we now live, the charge of criminal libel was often employed as a means of censoring freedom of expression and opinion. Until the passage of Fox’s Libel Act in 1792 (32 Geo 3 c 60), the judges of England had asserted that it was their province to determine whether or not a matter was defamatory: R v Shipley (The Dean of St Asaph’s Case) (1784) 4 Doug 73 at 164-165 per Lord Mansfield CJ, as explained by Lord Blackburn in The Capital and Counties Bank v Henty (1882) 7 App Cas 741 at 772-776. But juries constantly defied them by refusing to convict on a direction by a judge that the matter complained of was libellous. Fox’s Libel Act squarely placed the decision of whether or not the matter complained of was a libel in the hands of the jury, and there it has remained in England to the present time, as it has until recent times in many of the Australian States. Lord Denning graphically explained, in his inimitable style, some of the history that informed the passage of Fox’s Libel Act in Landmarks in The Law (1984) at 284-294. One of the great virtues of having a jury try the substantial factual issues in a defamation action is that they represent the very audience to which the defamatory publication was addressed. In assessing whether or not a publication, first, is defamatory in the sense complained of and, secondly, has been defended under defences such as truth, honest opinion or fair report, a jury of ordinary reasonable people is able to evaluate the competing factual issues bringing to bear the moral and social standards that they share with the community at large. And, they are better placed than judicial officers to assess how ordinary reasonable people understand mass media publications. In Reader’s Digest Services Pty Limited v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500 at 505-506 Brennan J, with whom Gibbs CJ, Stephen, Murphy and Wilson JJ agreed said:“Where no true innuendo is pleaded and the published words clearly related to the plaintiff, the issue of libel or no libel can be determined by asking whether hypothetical referees -- Lord Selborne's reasonable men (Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty (1882) LR 7 App Cas 741, at p 745) or Lord Atkin's right-thinking members of society generally (Sim v. Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669, at p 671) or Lord Reid's ordinary men not avid for scandal (Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd. [1964] AC, at p 260)) -- would understand the published words in a defamatory sense. That simple question embraces two elements of the cause of action: the meaning of the words used (the imputation) and the defamatory character of the imputation. Whether the alleged libel is established depends upon the understanding of the hypothetical referees who are taken to have a uniform view of the meaning of the language used, and upon the standards, moral or social, by which they evaluate the imputation they understand to have been made. They are taken to share a moral or social standard by which to judge the defamatory character of that imputation (Byrne v. Deane [1937] 1 KB 818, at p. 833, being a standard common to society generally (Miller v. David (1874) LR 9 CP 118; Myroft v. Sleight (1921) 90 LJKB 883; Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons Ltd. [1930] 1 KB 467, at p. 479).” (emphasis added)