FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ra v Nationwide News Pty Ltd
[2009] FCA 1308
PROCEDURE –– DEFAMATION –– jury trial –– ss 39 and 40 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) usual mode of trial in Federal Court by judge alone unless the Court otherwise orders –– proceeding for damages for injury to reputation by reason of publication of defamatory matter together with representations in contravention of s 53B of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) –– s 21 of Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) giving party right to elect for trial by jury unless Court otherwise orders –– whether Court should order that trial be heard by a jury –– factors that weigh in exercise of discretion –– matters where resolution will involve consideration of the moral and ethical values of community –– where substance of proceeding is claim for damages to reputation, court should have regard to the procedural law of the lex loci delicti and historical mode of trial by jury of such actions –– issues in defamation actions quintessentially more appropriate for resolution by a jury
PROCEDURE –– DEFAMATION –– jury trial –– ss 39 and 40 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) –– whether jury should consider Trade Practices Act allegations –– where representations identical or similar to defamatory imputations
PROCEDURE –– DEFAMATION –– jury trial –– s 40 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) –– whether court should order damages to be decided by the jury when s 22(3) of Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) requires hearing by judge –– procedural law of the lex loci delicti indicates policy preference to withhold consideration of damages from jury –– any damages for defamation and under s 82 should be decided by judge
JURY –– size of jury –– 4 or 12 members –– s 20 Jury Act 1977 –– where plaintiff or applicant is contentious or prominent person and matter complained of relates to allegations of criminal conduct and contentious moral issues –– need for a more representative spread of views of the community in larger jury
Held: jury of 12 to try all issues except damages
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 53B
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 11, 39, 40, 41Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 21, 22
Jury Act 1977 (NSW) s 20Libel Act 1792 32 Geo 3 c 60 (Imp)
Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Limited (2000) 202 CLR 45 cited
Construction Industry Long Service Leave Board v Odco Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) ATPR ¶40-887 followed
Hawke v Tamworth Newspaper Co Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 699 discussedInsurance Commissioner v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Limited (No 2) (1982) 49 ALR 714 cited
John Pfeiffer Pty Limited v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503 applied
Lang v Australian Consolidated Press Limited [1967] 1 NSWR 157 followed
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 cited
McDermott v Collien (1953) 87 CLR 154 discussed
O’Shaughnessy v Mirror Newspapers Limited [1969] 1 NSWR 421 discussed
O’Shaughnessy v Mirror Newspapers…
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- Case
- [2009] FCA 1308
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether it was appropriate to submit the factual questions involved in the defamation claim to a jury. The publishers argued that the defamation action should be tried by a jury, given its importance to reputation. However, Ms Ra contended that the extensive list of questions proposed by the publishers would unnecessarily prolong the trial. The court needed to balance the rights of the parties against the practicalities of conducting a trial, including the potential impact on the jury.
The court found that while a jury trial was appropriate for defamation cases due to the importance of reputation and the historical role of juries in such matters, the excessive number of questions proposed by the publishers was not necessary. The court held that it would be more suitable to leave the determination of defamation and the relevant defences to a jury, while reserving questions of damages and other legal issues for the trial judge. The court concluded that the jury would decide on the publication of the defamatory matters and the validity of the defences, while the trial judge would handle the remaining issues. The court ordered the parties to prepare short minutes of order to facilitate the trial process and set a date for further directions.
The court ordered that the parties bring in short minutes of order to give effect to these reasons and to prepare the matter for trial. The proceedings were to stand over to 19 November 2009 at 9:30 am for further directions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The parties bring in short minutes of order to give effect to these reasons and to prepare the matter for trial.
2. The proceedings stand over to 19 November 2009 at 9.30am for directions.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: RARES J
The publishers argued that a defamation action, quintessentially, ought be tried by jury and that all the issues of liability (including under s 53B) in this matter were essentially concerned with Ms Ra’s reputation.CONSIDERATION The concept of “reputation” in the law of defamation comprehends all aspects of a person’s standing in the community: Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton (2009) 254 ALR 606 at 616 [36] per French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ. The importance of the law of defamation in balancing the right of an individual to the protection of his or her reputation and the right commonly described as freedom of speech plays a crucial role in our democratic system of government. That balance is affected at common law by the operation of the defence of qualified privilege as elaborated in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, see at 565-576 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ. In times less free than those in which we now live, the charge of criminal libel was often employed as a means of censoring freedom of expression and opinion. Until the passage of Fox’s Libel Act in 1792 (32 Geo 3 c 60), the judges of England had asserted that it was their province to determine whether or not a matter was defamatory: R v Shipley (The Dean of St Asaph’s Case) (1784) 4 Doug 73 at 164-165 per Lord Mansfield CJ, as explained by Lord Blackburn in The Capital and Counties Bank v Henty (1882) 7 App Cas 741 at 772-776. But juries constantly defied them by refusing to convict on a direction by a judge that the matter complained of was libellous. Fox’s Libel Act squarely placed the decision of whether or not the matter complained of was a libel in the hands of the jury, and there it has remained in England to the present time, as it has until recent times in many of the Australian States. Lord Denning graphically explained, in his inimitable style, some of the history that informed the passage of Fox’s Libel Act in Landmarks in The Law (1984) at 284-294. One of the great virtues of having a jury try the substantial factual issues in a defamation action is that they represent the very audience to which the defamatory publication was addressed. In assessing whether or not a publication, first, is defamatory in the sense complained of and, secondly, has been defended under defences such as truth, honest opinion or fair report, a jury of ordinary reasonable people is able to evaluate the competing factual issues bringing to bear the moral and social standards that they share with the community at large. And, they are better placed than judicial officers to assess how ordinary reasonable people understand mass media publications. In Reader’s Digest Services Pty Limited v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500 at 505-506 Brennan J, with whom Gibbs CJ, Stephen, Murphy and Wilson JJ agreed said:“Where no true innuendo is pleaded and the published words clearly related to the plaintiff, the issue of libel or no libel can be determined by asking whether hypothetical referees -- Lord Selborne's reasonable men (Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty (1882) LR 7 App Cas 741, at p 745) or Lord Atkin's right-thinking members of society generally (Sim v. Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669, at p 671) or Lord Reid's ordinary men not avid for scandal (Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd. [1964] AC, at p 260)) -- would understand the published words in a defamatory sense. That simple question embraces two elements of the cause of action: the meaning of the words used (the imputation) and the defamatory character of the imputation. Whether the alleged libel is established depends upon the understanding of the hypothetical referees who are taken to have a uniform view of the meaning of the language used, and upon the standards, moral or social, by which they evaluate the imputation they understand to have been made. They are taken to share a moral or social standard by which to judge the defamatory character of that imputation (Byrne v. Deane [1937] 1 KB 818, at p. 833, being a standard common to society generally (Miller v. David (1874) LR 9 CP 118; Myroft v. Sleight (1921) 90 LJKB 883; Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons Ltd. [1930] 1 KB 467, at p. 479).” (emphasis added)