NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION: Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Limited [2003] NSWCA 80
FILE NUMBER(S):
40050/01
HEARING DATE(S): 11/04/03
JUDGMENT DATE: 24/04/2003
PARTIES:
David John Glover (Appellant)
Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Limited (Respondent)
JUDGMENT OF: Sheller JA Hodgson JA Ipp JA
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court - Common Law Division
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): N213/95
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Newman J
COUNSEL:
In Person (Appellant)
W K Dodd SC/H M Silvester (Respondent)
SOLICITORS:
In Person (Appellant)
Sparke Helmore (Respondent)
CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Admission of fresh evidence - Supreme Court Act 1970, ss 75A(8) and 75A(9) - Failure to plead a positive case - The surprise rule. D
LEGISLATION CITED:
Supreme Court Act 1970, ss 75A(8), 75A(9)
Workers Compensation Act 1987
DECISION:
(1) The evidence contained in the affidavits which were identified and taken as read in Court on 11 April 2003 should be admitted in evidence on the appeal (2) On the basis of that evidence the appeal should be allowed (3) The verdict below be set aside and a new trial ordered (4) Costs of the first trial and of the appeal will be in the discretion of the judge hearing the new trial.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40050/01
N 213/95SHELLER JA
HODGSON JA
IPP JA24 April 2003
GLOVER V AUSTRALIAN ULTRA CONCRETE FLOORS PTY LIMITED
FACTS
The appellant brought a claim for damages for personal injuries against the respondent, his former employee. He asserted that on 1 May 1994 he was injured when he slipped on concrete slurry and fell on the concrete floor of the respondent’s factory while assisting in the manufacture of concrete beams. It was the appellant’s contention that the respondent was negligent in allowing the concrete slurry to remain on the concrete floor where he was working.
A significant challenge to the appellant’s version of how he sustained his injury arose when counsel for the respondent put to the appellant in cross-examination that, the appellant had told Mr Higgins (a director of the respondent) that the appellant’s wife had pushed him over. The appellant denied this. In Mr Higgins’ examination in chief, Mr Higgins stated that the appellant had told him that he was limping as a result of his wife pushing him over. Mr Higgins was not cross-examined about this evidence.
Another challenge related to the evidence of Mr Thompson. The appellant testified that Mr Thompson (an employee of the respondent) was working nearby when the accident occurred and that he told Mr Thompson that he’d hurt his back. Mr Thompson, in evidence in chief, stated that he had not seen the appellant slip or fall, nor had he seen signs in the slurry of a person having fallen. His Honour remarked that Mr Thompson had stated he was unaware that the appellant had an accident on 1 May 1994 and maintained this position in cross-examination.
His Honour held that the appellant had “failed…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWCA 80
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the fresh evidence sought to be admitted by the appellant met the criteria for admission under section 75A of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW), and if so, whether that evidence warranted allowing the appeal. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at trial, whether it was highly probable that it would lead to a different verdict, and whether it was credible. The Court also considered its discretion to admit evidence of matters occurring after the trial.
The Court applied the well-understood general principles for admitting fresh evidence, requiring that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence, that there must be a high probability of a different verdict, and that the evidence must be credible. The Court identified specific aspects of the tendered evidence that bore importantly on the appeal, particularly concerning the testimony of Messrs Higgins and Thompson. The admitted evidence, including an affidavit from the appellant's former wife, Mrs Veronica Glover, related to the circumstances of the appellant's injury, stating that he was fit and well before the incident and that his trousers were wet with concrete slurry, indicating he had fallen into it. Mrs Glover also stated she never pushed the appellant and caused him to hurt his back.
On the basis of the admitted fresh evidence, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the verdict below, and ordered a new trial. The costs of the first trial and the appeal were left to the discretion of the judge hearing the new trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
(1) The evidence contained in the affidavits which were identified and taken as read in Court on 11 April 2003 should be admitted in evidence on the appeal (2) On the basis of that evidence the appeal should be allowed (3) The verdict below be set aside and a new trial ordered (4) Costs of the first trial and of the appeal will be in the discretion of the judge hearing the new trial.
Background
Background to the litigation
In an affidavit dated 3 August 2001, Mrs. Glover reiterated that she never pushed Mr. Glover or caused him any harm, whether at home or at work. The appellant, Mr. Glover, sought to tender this affidavit as fresh evidence in the appeal process. The Court identified this particular aspect of Mrs. Glover's evidence as having an important bearing on the issues raised by the appeal. The Court admitted this evidence and did not consider other tendered evidence that related to issues of credibility. This admission of fresh evidence was subject to the general principles outlined in section 75A(8) of the Supreme Court Act 1970, which requires that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial, there must be a high degree of probability that there would be a different verdict, and the evidence must be credible. The Court also exercised its discretion under section 75A(9) to admit evidence as to matters occurring after the date of the trial, considering the context and the public interest in the finality of litigation.
The case of Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Ltd came before the court as an appeal from a decision rendered in a lower court. The appellant, Glover, sought to overturn the trial court's decision by introducing fresh evidence, including affidavits from various witnesses, to challenge the credibility of certain testimonies and argue for a new trial. Initially, the court indicated it would only consider evidence that directly impacted the appeal's central issues, specifically focusing on the testimonies of Messrs Higgins and Thompson. After reviewing the submissions and the evidence presented, the court exercised its discretion under the Supreme Court Act 1970 to admit certain parts of the fresh evidence, determining that these elements had a high probability of leading to a different verdict and were credible. The court concluded that the evidence met the special grounds required for admission and found that the trial judge's decision should be overturned. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the original verdict was set aside, and a new trial was ordered, with costs to be determined by the judge presiding over the new trial.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the fresh evidence provided by Mrs Veronica Glover regarding Mr Higgins' condition at the time of the incident could be admitted under the Supreme Court Act 1970, s 75A(8) and 75A(9).
2. Whether the fresh evidence meets the criteria for admission, specifically if it could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial, and if there is a high degree of probability that there would be a different verdict.
3. Whether the fresh evidence is credible and should be considered by the Court.
4. Whether the appellant's failure to plead a positive case constitutes grounds for applying the surprise rule in relation to the fresh evidence.
5. Whether the context in which the fresh evidence is admitted and the general public interest in the finality of litigation align with the principles outlined in Doherty v Liverpool District Hospital.
Held
1. Whether the fresh evidence provided by Mrs Veronica Glover regarding Mr Higgins' condition at the time of the incident could be admitted under the Supreme Court Act 1970, s 75A(8) and 75A(9).
The Court concluded that the fresh evidence provided by Mrs Veronica Glover could be admitted under s 75A(8) and 75A(9) of the Supreme Court Act 1970.
2. Whether the fresh evidence meets the criteria for admission, specifically if it could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial, and if there is a high degree of probability that there would be a different verdict.
The Court concluded that the fresh evidence met the criteria for admission as it could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial and there was a high degree of probability that there would be a different verdict.
3. Whether the fresh evidence is credible and should be considered by the Court.
The Court concluded that the fresh evidence was credible and should be considered by the Court.
4. Whether the appellant's failure to plead a positive case constitutes grounds for applying the surprise rule in relation to the fresh evidence.
The Court concluded that the appellant's failure to plead a positive case did not constitute grounds for applying the surprise rule in relation to the fresh evidence.
5. Whether the context in which the fresh evidence is admitted and the general public interest in the finality of litigation align with the principles outlined in Doherty v Liverpool District Hospital.
The Court concluded that the context in which the fresh evidence was admitted and the general public interest in the finality of litigation aligned with the principles outlined in Doherty v Liverpool District Hospital.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court's decision to admit fresh evidence in Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Ltd was meticulously grounded in statutory provisions and judicial precedent. The admission of fresh evidence under s 75A(8) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 is subject to stringent conditions. Firstly, the court considered whether the evidence in question could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial. The evidence provided by Mrs Veronica Glover about Mr Higgins' condition at the time of the incident was deemed fresh, as it pertained to events that had occurred prior to the trial and could not have been reasonably obtained beforehand. Secondly, the court examined whether there was a high degree of probability that the new evidence would lead to a different verdict. The affidavit of Mrs Glover suggested that Mr Higgins' injury could have occurred at a different time than previously testified, potentially altering the understanding of the incident's sequence and causation. The court found this evidence compelling enough to warrant a new trial. Thirdly, the court assessed the credibility of the fresh evidence. The affidavit was deemed credible, as it was consistent and corroborated by the timeline of events presented. The appellant's failure to plead a positive case was considered by the court in relation to the surprise rule. Given that the appellant did not specifically raise the issue of Mr Higgins' condition at the time of the incident, the surprise rule could have been invoked to prevent the admission of fresh evidence. However, the court determined that the evidence's significance in potentially altering the outcome of the trial outweighed the surprise element. Furthermore, the context in which the fresh evidence was admitted and the general public interest in the finality of litigation were weighed against each other, in line with the principles articulated in Doherty v Liverpool District Hospital. The court found that the fresh evidence's potential to rectify a possible miscarriage of justice justified its admission. The binding legal principle established by this case is that fresh evidence, which could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence, is highly probable to result in a different verdict, and is credible, may be admitted even if it surprises the party who failed to present it earlier. This decision also reaffirms the importance of balancing the surprise rule with the overarching need to prevent miscarriages of justice.