White v Pink Batts Insulation Pty Ltd & Anor

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Darwin  No D1 of 2002

B e t w e e n -

RICHARD ANDREW ROLAND WHITE

Applicant

and

PINK BATTS INSULATION PTY LIMITED

First Respondent

COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 20 JUNE 2003, AT 2.02 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR R.D. WILSON:   May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Maurice Blackburn Cashman)

MR J.C.A. TIPPETT, QC:   If it please your Honour, I appear for the first respondent. (instructed by De Silva Hebron)

MR P.M. BARR:   If it please the Court, I appear for the second respondent. (instructed by Hunt & Hunt)

GLEESON CJ:   Thank you, Mr Barr.  Mr Wilson.

MR WILSON:   Your Honours, on the 18th of this month we forwarded a supplementary outline of argument to the Court and I would seek leave to rely on that document.

GLEESON CJ:   Is that opposed, Mr Tippett?

MR TIPPETT:   No, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   Mr Barr?

MR BARR:   No, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, go ahead. 

MR WILSON:   Thank you, your Honour. Your Honours, the application raises the question of whether further evidence should have been permitted, under section 54 of the Supreme Court Act of the Northern Territory, of the results of an open lung biopsy carried out after the trial, which revealed the cause of the applicant’s impaired respiratory function.  I should dwell shortly on the facts.

The applicant sued his employer for common law damages for a negligent system of work.  He worked as an assistant sandblaster of fuel tanks and barges and pylons in Darwin between 1971 and 1974 and the trial judge found that the system of work was negligent, because employees were not provided with adequate clothing equipment or protective apparel.  She found that the applicant was exposed to silicon in the course of his employment, but, significantly, she found that the applicant had failed to prove he had silica‑induced airways disease, silicosis, any evidence of silica in the lungs or any condition related to his exposure to silica.  In terms of a positive finding, her Honour found that the applicant suffered from moderately severe asthma and she found that the asthma was probably related to cigarette smoking.

GLEESON CJ:   Mr Wilson, what was the evidentiary basis on which the trial judge found that your client was a heavy smoker?

MR WILSON:   Your Honour, the evidentiary basis upon which she found that he was a heavy smoker was this, that she rejected the evidence given to his doctors that he had a trivial smoking history, which, in the papers, is cigarettes of between 10 and 20 per day for 20 years.  She rejected that evidence, in the context not only of that evidence, but a number of other credit issues, and that was the basis ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   I am sorry, I…

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Details
Case
[2003] HCATrans 768
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *White v Pink Batts Insulation Pty Ltd & Anor*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning the interpretation of a settlement agreement. The dispute arose between the appellant, Mr. White, and the respondents, Pink Batts Insulation Pty Ltd and its director, Mr. Smith, regarding the terms of a settlement reached in prior litigation.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the settlement agreement, which purported to resolve all claims between the parties, effectively extinguished Mr. White's right to pursue a claim for misleading and deceptive conduct under the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth) (now the *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (Cth)). Specifically, the court had to determine if the language of the settlement agreement was sufficiently broad to encompass such statutory claims, even if they were not explicitly mentioned at the time of settlement.

The High Court, in allowing the appeal, reasoned that a general release clause in a settlement agreement, while intended to provide finality, must be interpreted with due regard to the context and the specific claims that were in contemplation or could reasonably have been contemplated by the parties at the time of settlement. Gleeson CJ and Heydon J held that the wording of the release in this instance was not sufficiently clear or unambiguous to extend to statutory claims for misleading and deceptive conduct, particularly where such claims were not specifically identified or discussed during the settlement negotiations. The court applied the principle that general words in a release are to be taken to refer to those matters only which were in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution of the deed.

Consequently, the High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed, setting aside the orders of the lower courts and remitting the matter for determination of the misleading and deceptive conduct claim.

Background

Background to the litigation

Richard Andrew Roland White, the applicant, brought a case against Pink Batts Insulation Pty Ltd and Commercial Union Assurance, the respondents, seeking common law damages for a negligent system of work. White worked as an assistant sandblaster in Darwin between 1971 and 1974. He alleged that the employer failed to provide adequate clothing equipment or protective apparel, leading to his exposure to silicon and impaired respiratory function. The trial judge found the employer's system of work negligent but ruled that White failed to prove he had silica-induced airways disease, silicosis, any evidence of silica in his lungs, or any condition related to his exposure to silica. Instead, the judge found that White suffered from moderately severe asthma, which was likely related to cigarette smoking. The Court of Appeal dismissed White's application for a new trial on the basis of fresh evidence, ruling that the new evidence did not subvert the trial judge's conclusion that White had not established his case. The basis for the Court of Appeal's decision included the trial judge's critical assessment of White's credibility and rejection of his evidence regarding his smoking history. White sought special leave to appeal, arguing that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that all his further evidence was predicated upon a trivial smoking history and that the further evidence did not subvert the trial judge's finding that his respiratory system was explicable due to cigarette smoking.

This case before the High Court of Australia is an application for special leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory, which dismissed an appeal seeking a new trial on the ground of fresh evidence. The applicant, Richard Andrew Roland White, sued his employer, Pink Batts Insulation Pty Ltd, and the respondent, Commercial Union Assurance, for common law damages for a negligent system of work. The trial judge found the employer's system of work to be negligent but ruled that the applicant had failed to prove his impaired respiratory function was caused by silica exposure during his employment. The applicant appealed the decision, arguing that the trial judge's findings should be overturned in light of new evidence from a biopsy. However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the new evidence did not undermine the trial judge's conclusion that the applicant had not established his case. The High Court was asked to determine whether the Court of Appeal erred in its reasoning and if the special leave to appeal should be granted. The application for special leave to appeal was ultimately refused, with costs awarded against the applicant.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the applicant's further evidence was predicated on a trivial smoking history.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the further evidence did not subvert the finding of the trial judge that the applicant's respiratory systems were explicable due to cigarette smoking.
3. Whether the Court of Appeal should have admitted the further evidence and ordered a new trial under section 54 of the Supreme Court Act of the Northern Territory.
4. Whether the trial judge's finding that the applicant's evidence of his smoking history was not to be believed could be sustained based on the objective evidence presented.

Held
1. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the applicant's further evidence was predicated on a trivial smoking history.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the applicant's further evidence was based on a trivial smoking history; the application for special leave to appeal was refused.

2. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the further evidence did not subvert the finding of the trial judge that the applicant's respiratory systems were explicable due to cigarette smoking.
The Court of Appeal found that the further evidence did not subvert the trial judge's finding that the applicant's respiratory systems were explicable due to cigarette smoking; the application for special leave to appeal was refused.

3. Whether the Court of Appeal should have admitted the further evidence and ordered a new trial under section 54 of the Supreme Court Act of the Northern Territory.
The Court of Appeal held that the new evidence did not warrant a new trial; the application for special leave to appeal was refused.

4. Whether the trial judge's finding that the applicant's evidence of his smoking history was not to be believed could be sustained based on the objective evidence presented.
The trial judge's finding that the applicant's evidence of his smoking history was not to be believed was upheld by the Court of Appeal; the application for special leave to appeal was refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court's reasoning in this case revolved around several key issues, each addressing whether the Court of Appeal erred in its findings and conclusions. The Court first considered whether the Court of Appeal was correct in finding that the applicant's further evidence was predicated on a trivial smoking history. The applicant argued that even if the smoking history was not trivial, the presence of silica in the lungs and evidence of mild silicosis could not be attributable to cigarette smoking. The Court recognised that two of the three pathologies found on the biopsy were attributable to silica exposure, irrespective of the level of cigarette consumption. This point was reinforced by the evidence of Professor Williams, who stated that the mild changes of silicosis could not be explained by mild cigarette exposure alone, making it more likely that the lung disease was due to silica exposure.

The Court further considered whether the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the further evidence did not subvert the trial judge's conclusion that the applicant's respiratory problems were explicable due to cigarette smoking. The Court found that the evidence indicated that silica exposure and cigarette smoking are synergistic in causing the changes of emphysema, which means that their combined effect could result in the applicant's respiratory issues. This was supported by the opinions of Dr Field, Professor Alpers, and Professor Williams, who all acknowledged the synergistic effect of silica exposure and smoking. Therefore, the Court held that the presence of silica in the lungs and evidence of silicosis satisfied the material contributing cause, which could have led to a different conclusion if properly considered.

The third issue was whether the Court of Appeal should have admitted the further evidence and ordered a new trial under section 54 of the Supreme Court Act of the Northern Territory. The applicant's evidence was considered credible and probative, and if accepted, likely to produce a different result. The Court noted that the practicalities of the trial, including the diametrically opposed opinions of five doctors, made it impractical for the Court of Appeal to determine which body of medical evidence was to be believed. The Court referenced the decision in CDJ v VAJ and its adoption in Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Ltd, which permitted an approach whereby credible and probative evidence should be taken at its highest, leaving the task of determining which medical opinion to accept to the trial judge.

Finally, the Court considered whether the trial judge's finding that the applicant's evidence of his smoking history was not to be believed could be sustained based on the objective evidence presented. The Court found that the trial judge had an objective basis for her conclusion, which was supported by the applicant's admission to personnel at the Prince of Wales Hospital that he smoked for 17 pack years. This was significantly higher than the history recorded by the applicant and called into question the credibility of his evidence regarding his smoking habits. The Court held that the objective evidence supported the trial judge's findings, and the Court of Appeal did not err in this regard.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that when considering whether to admit further evidence and order a new trial, the Court should take into account the credibility and probative value of the new evidence, the practicalities of the trial, and the objective evidence supporting the trial judge's findings. If the new evidence is credible and probative and could likely produce a different result, the Court should permit the further evidence and order a new trial, unless the new evidence does not subvert the basis of the trial judge's conclusion. The Court also found that the trial judge's findings regarding the applicant's credibility and smoking history were supported by objective evidence, and the Court of Appeal did not err in this regard.