E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

E. & J. Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Pty Limited (No 2) [2008] FCA 1005

TRADE MARKS – non-use for 3 years – order for removal of trade mark – removal sought as from end of non-use period – order made with effect from date of decision

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), ss 79, 98, 101(2), 127
Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK), s 32(1)

E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan [2008] FCA 934 cited
Second Sight v Novell UK [1995] RPC 423 followed

E. & J. GALLO WINERY v LION NATHAN AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED

NSD 1950 OF 2007

FLICK J
27 JUNE 2008
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NSW DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1950 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

E. & J. GALLO WINERY
Applicant

AND:

LION NATHAN AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 JUNE 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE:

1.The Amended Application be dismissed.

2.The Applicant to pay the Respondent’s costs of the Amended Application.

3.The Registrar of Trade Marks remove the Australian Trade Mark No 787765 from the Register of Trade Marks.

4.The operation of Order 3 be stayed for:

(a)   21 days from the date hereof; or

(b)in the event that the Applicant/Cross-Respondent within that time files a Notice of Appeal, until determination of the appeal, on the Applicant/Cross-Respondent’s undertaking to pursue any such appeal with all due expedition.

5.The Cross-Respondent pay the Cross-Claimant’s costs of the Cross-Claim.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NSW DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1950 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

E. & J. GALLO WINERY
Applicant

AND:

LION NATHAN AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE:

27 JUNE 2008

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from Transcript)

  1. In this matter reasons for decision were published on 20 June 2008 (E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan [2008] FCA 934) and the matter was stood over to this morning for the purpose of making final orders disposing of the proceeding.

  2. There is agreement as to the form of the orders to be made with one exception. That exception is whether an order for the removal of the Gallo Winery trademark should be made as from today’s date (and that order stayed for 21 days) or whether the order for removal should take effect retrospectively as from 8 May 2007. That date was the conclusion of the three-year non-use period. The stay was properly not opposed presumably upon the basis of preserving the rights of Gallo Winery should it wish to appeal.

  3. The discretionary power to order removal of a mark is that conferred by s 101(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). No Australian decision has apparently addressed the question now posed by the competing submissions of Lion Nathan and Gallo Winery.

  4. It is considered that that discretionary power can only be exercised as from…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1005
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd, the dispute between the parties revolved around the interpretation and application of section 101(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). E & J Gallo Winery sought to remove Lion Nathan's trade mark from the Australian Register of Trade Marks due to alleged non-use, while Lion Nathan contended for a specific manner of exercising the power under section 101(2). The Federal Court was tasked with determining the legal issues arising from this contention.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether section 101(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) permits the Court to order the removal of a trade mark from the register as from the end of the non-use period. This involved interpreting the scope and effect of section 101(2) in light of the statutory language and other relevant provisions within the Act. The Court also considered whether the absence of retrospective effect language in section 101(2) precluded such an order. Furthermore, the Court examined whether other provisions within the Act, which explicitly provide for retrospective effect where intended, supported the conclusion that section 101(2) does not allow for retrospective orders.

The Court found that section 101(2) does not permit the Court to order the removal of a trade mark from the register as from the end of the non-use period. The Court reasoned that the absence of any indication in section 101(2) that the power may be exercised in the manner contended for by Lion Nathan, coupled with the explicit provisions in other sections of the Act that provide for retrospective effect where intended, supported this conclusion. The Court relied on the decision in Second Sight v Novell UK [1995] RPC 423, which held that a similar provision in the Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK) did not permit retrospective orders. The Court also noted that section 127 of the Act did not dictate a contrary conclusion and did not manifest a legislative intent for such orders to be the norm.

The Court held that the discretionary power conferred by section 101(2) should not be exercised in a manner that results in the removal of a mark as from the end of the non-use period. Consequently, the Court dismissed Lion Nathan's contention and clarified the scope of its power under section 101(2).

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FLICK J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FLICK J

Second, there is an absence of any indication in the terms of s 101(2) that the power may be exercised in the manner contended for by Lion Nathan. By way of contrast stand other provisions of the 1995 Act. Where the legislature has intended that action may be taken with effect from a particular date, it has expressly so provided. Reference may thus be made, by way of example, to s 79 which provides as follows:Renewal within 6 months after registration expires If, within 6 months after the registration of a trade mark has expired, a person asks the Registrar, in accordance with subsection 75(2), to renew the registration of the trade mark, the Registrar must renew the registration of the trade mark for 10 years from the day on which the registration expired. Reference may also be made to s 98 which provides as follows:Trade mark restored to Register if notice of opposition filed within extended time If: (a) the Registrar has removed a trade mark from the Register under subsection 97(1) because no notice of opposition was filed within the period provided under the regulations; and (b) the Registrar subsequently extends the period within which the notice may be filed; and (c) a notice of opposition is filed within the extended period; the Registrar must restore the trade mark to the Register. Also, the trade mark is taken not to have been removed from the Register. Neither of those provisions relate to the making of orders by this Court. But they do provide some support for the conclusion reached. Although no Australian decision has been cited to support the contention of Gallo Winery, reliance is placed upon Second Sight v Novell UK [1995] RPC 423. There in issue was s 32(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK) which provided as follows:Any person aggrieved … by any entry made in the register without sufficient cause or by any entry wrongly remaining on the register … may apply in the prescribed manner to the Court … or to the Registrar, and the tribunal may make such order for … expunging or varying the entry as the tribunal may think fit.Of that provision, Lightman J observed at 428–9:The issue is (by common consent) one of statutory construction of sections 26 and 32 in the context of the Trade Marks Act 1938 as a whole. Specific provision is made in the Trade Marks Act 1938 where an event or decision is to have retrospective effect (see: e.g. section 19). Likewise specific provision is made in the Trade Marks Act 1994 (see e.g. section 46(6)). I can find neither in the language used nor in principle any grounds upon which it can sensibly be held that such a determination under an application under section 26 or section 32 can have any retrospective effect. …This decision also provides some support for the conclusion reached. Lion Nathan did not point to any Australian decision in which an order of the kind that it now seeks has previously been made (even if the question of statutory construction now in issue was not debated). Section 127 does not dictate any contrary conclusion. Nor does s 127 manifest a legislative intent that normally the discretionary power conferred by s 101(2) should be exercised such that an order for the removal of a mark should take place as from the end of the non-use period.