TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Mind Your Own Property Pty Ltd to application under section 92 of the Act by MYOB Technology Pty Ltd for removal of trade mark number 1323071 (36) – MIND YOUR OWN PROPERTY - in the name of Mind Your Own Property Pty Ltd
Delegate: Nicholas Smith Representation: Opponent: Bradley Maguire, Director
Applicant: Siobhan Ryan of Counsel instructed by Ian Drew of Davies Collison CaveDecision: 2018 ATMO 34
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) - section 96 opposition to s 92(4)(b) application for removal - Removal Opponent’s evidence does not show use of the Trade Mark during the relevant period or obstacle to use – exercise of Registrar’s discretion not appropriate – Trade Mark to be removed from the RegisterBackground
This decision is pursuant to an application made on 3 June 2016 under s 92(4)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘Act’) by MYOB Technology Pty Ltd (‘Applicant’) to remove the trade mark detailed below from the Register of Trade Marks. The application is made in respect of all of the services for which the trade mark is registered, that is, the application is for complete removal of the trade mark.
Registration No. 1323071 Filing date 29 September 2009 Services Class 36: Real property management; time-share property management; accommodation letting agency; advisory services relating to real estate ownership; advisory services relating to real estate leasing; agency services for the leasing of real estate property; budget account services; computerised banking services; computerised financial services; computerised transfer of funds; conducting of financial transactions; consultation services relating to real estate; estate agencies; estate agency; estate agent services; financial analysis; financial services; information services relating to real estate; insurance agency services; insurance arranging services; insurance brokerage; insurance brokering; insurance for property owners; insurance management services; insurance services relating to property; insurance services relating to real estate; internet banking; investment information; land leasing services; leasing of accommodation; leasing of apartments; leasing of buildings; leasing of farms; leasing of freehold property; leasing of houses; leasing of office space; leasing of property; leasing of real estate; leasing of shopping premises; letting of apartments; letting of office accommodation; letting of showrooms; loan services; loan services for property investment; management of property; management of real estate; monitoring of real estate; monitoring of leased property being real estate; property leasing (real estate property only); property portfolio management; provision of financial information; provision of information in relation to real estate; provision of information relating to financial services; provision of information relating to mortgages; provision of information relating to property (real estate); provision of information relating to real estate; provision of real estate loans; real estate administration; real estate advisory services; real estate agencies; real estate agency services; real estate agents services; real estate assessment (financial); real estate consultancy; real estate insurance services; real estate investment; real estate investment advice; real estate investment management; real estate investment services; real…
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- Case
- [2018] ATMO 34
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Hearing Officer was whether the Opponent had established use of the trade mark in the relevant period, either through actual use or circumstances constituting an obstacle to use, as required by section 100 of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth). If use could not be established, the Hearing Officer also had to consider whether to exercise discretion under section 101(3) of the Act to allow the trade mark to remain on the Register despite the lack of use.
The Hearing Officer found that the Opponent had failed to establish use of the trade mark. While the Opponent had invested in software development and used the trade mark in preliminary discussions with a software developer, these actions were considered to be merely preparatory and did not demonstrate an objective commitment to supplying the registered services under the trade mark. The software was ultimately released under a different brand name, "Rentify," and the Opponent's intention to use the trade mark was conditional on the success of that initial launch, which did not constitute an objective commitment. Consequently, the Hearing Officer declined to exercise discretion under section 101(3), finding that the Opponent's limited private commercial interest was insufficient to outweigh the public interest in the integrity of the Register and the lack of any established reputation in the trade mark.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer directed that the trade mark be removed from the Register in respect of all services for which it was registered, one month from the date of the decision, with provisions for a stay in the event of an appeal. Costs were awarded against the Opponent in favour of the Applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Applicant’s evidence in this matter consists of a declaration made on 2 May 2017, by Ian Anthony Drew, a Registered Trade Marks Attorney and Principal of Davies Collison Cave Pty Ltd, the Opponent’s representative with Exhibits IAD-1 to IAD-8 (‘Drew Declaration’). The Drew Declaration provides no evidence about the Applicant. Rather it contains the following:·A number of printouts of the websites for and during the non-use period obtained through use of the WayBackMachine. None of them show any use of the Trade Mark.·Extracts from corporate records in Australia and New Zealand of companies connected to Mr Maguire.Discussion To successfully oppose the Application under s 92(b) of the Act the Opponent must establish that it has used the Trade Mark pursuant to s 100 of the Act (either through use or circumstances that were an obstacle to use) or, in the event that the Opponent fails to establish such use, the Registrar exercises its discretion under s 101(3) to decide that the Trade Mark should not be removed from the Register.Use of the Trade Mark in the relevant period19. I find that the Opponent failed to establish that the Trade Mark was applied to a software product that provides the Registered Services during the relevant period; indeed the only software referred to in Maguire 1 was released under the brand name ‘Rentify’ after the non-use period. While the Opponent may have spent substantial funds on the development of the software program, such expenditure does not amount to use of the Trade Mark, or indeed prove intention to use the Trade Mark (noting that the software was ultimately released as Rentify).20. However it is not necessary that there be an actual dealing in the Registered Services for there to be Trade Mark use. In Lomas v Winton Shire Council [2002] FCAFC 413 the Full Court said (emphasis added): It may even be possible to establish use where the mark has been used in an advertisement of goods in the course of trade in circumstances where there is an existing intention to offer or supply goods bearing the mark in trade or there is an actual trade or offer to trade in the goods bearing the mark - Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Phillip Morris Ltd and Anor [No. 2] [1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414 at 433-4. However, where there is no actual trade or offer to trade in goods bearing the relevant mark in Australia or any existing intention to offer or supply such goods in trade, but merely preliminary discussions and negotiations about whether the mark would be so used, there is no use so as to constitute ownership of the mark (see Moorgate Tobacco (No.2) at 434). [7][7] Lomas v Winton Shire Council [2002] FCAFC 413, [39].21. In Woolly Bull Enterprises Pty Ltd v Reynolds (‘Woolly Bull’) Drummond J at first instance stated (emphasis added): Further, where such a commitment of the goods has occurred, there will be “an existing intention etc”, sufficient to show use of the mark in Australia where the mark has been used, in advertising in this country their future availability for purchase here, though none of the goods earmarked for export to Australia have yet arrived. Deane J did not say that a subjective intention of the owner of the mark to use the mark in trade at some time in the future was, without more, sufficient to show use of a mark. What he said was that such an intention, if accompanied by objective proofs of that intention in the form of evidence of action by the mark owner to commit goods bearing the mark to actual trade in Australia, would suffice to show use of the mark here at the time in question, though no marked goods had yet been offered for sale in this country.[8][8] Woolly Bull Enterprises Pty Ltd v Reynolds [2001] FCA 261, [20].22. The Opponent relies heavily in its written submissions on the case of Buying Systems (Australia) Pty Ltd v Studio SRL[9] (‘Buying Systems’) where the Federal Court found that the Removal Opponent had used the mark through printing business cards, letter heads with the mark and solicited advertisements for magazines it wished to publish. As noted in Woolly Bull at [29], this was an objectively ascertainable commitment to offering to supply the magazine in trade. The Opponent’s submissions are that the various preparatory steps taken by the Opponent including the preparation of a software specification and use of the Trade Mark in communications with a software development company are analogous (given the changes in technology) to the steps taken by the removal opponent in Buying Systems. The Opponent submits that although the Opponent’s software was not (at least initially) released under the Trade Mark, what is relevant is that the intention once existed, during the relevant period. The Opponent asserts that the development of the software specifications displaying the Trade Mark amounts to objective evidence of an intention to use. [9] (1995) 30 IPR 517.23. I find that the conversations (and e-mails and documents) between the Opponent and Innovent Business Solutions Pty Ltd discussing the development of software under the Trade Mark (including the creation and use of a pen with the Trade Mark placed on it), do not satisfy the requirements under s 100(3) to show use of the Trade Mark in respect of the Registered Services. I do not accept the Opponent’s submission that s 100(3) of the Act is satisfied merely by evidence of an intention to use a trade mark at a particular time in the relevant period. More is required. 24. In Woolly Bull at [40] the Court made a distinction between merely investigating and planning to use a trade mark and objectively committing to use a trade mark. The former, whatever the subjective intention of the party is, does not amount to use for the purpose of s 100(3) of the Act. While the Opponent may have had a subjective intention, no doubt bona fide, to use the Trade Mark for the Registered Services, the actual steps taken in 2013 go no further then preliminary discussions with a potential supplier for the purpose of developing a software system that may have been (but ultimately was not) released under the Trade Mark. It had not committed itself to using the Trade Mark; it may have decided not to release the software or it may have decided (as it did) to release the software under a different trade mark. This circumstance differs from Buying Systems where the steps taken were arms-length approaches to potential customers, which resulted in use of the relevant trade mark after the non-use period. While the Opponent may have been committed to developing the software and at the time desired that (and thought it would be) it be released under the Trade Mark, this does not amount to an objective commitment to suppling the Registered Services (through the software) under the Trade Mark. The software did not exist at the time and indeed the software was developed by a third party and released several years later under the brand name ‘Rentify’[10]. [10] I note the Opponent’s submissions that the use of Rentify was as part of a preliminary launch. This is not relevant; rather the fact that the Opponent was able to launch the service under a different mark is a relevant in considering whether, during the conversations in 2013, the Opponent had objectively committed itself to launching the software under the Trade Mark. 25. An additional submission by the Applicant that supports the conclusion that there was no objective commitment to use the Trade Mark for the Registered Services (and hence no use), is that the Opponent gives evidence that the Trade Mark would only be used for the Registered Services if the initial launch of the software under the name ‘Rentify’ was successful. This amounts to a conditional commitment to using the Trade Mark, not an objective commitment to use the Trade Mark for the Registered Services.Obstacles to use26. The Opponent does not submit, not does its evidence raise matters which could be regarded as obstacles to use of the Trade Mark in the relevant period, pursuant to s 100(3)(c) of the Act. 27. As there is no use of the Trade Mark or obstacles to use, it is therefore necessary to consider whether the Registrar should exercise her discretion and not remove the Trade Mark from the Register.Registrar’s Discretion28. As noted in Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off the policy of the Act is to facilitate the removal of an unused trade mark, and the public interest of the integrity of the Register will generally demand the removal of an unused trade mark.[11] However, as indicated at paragraph 11, above, s 101(3) provides the Registrar with a discretion, which, in the words of Bennett J, is:[11] M Davison, I Horak Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off online edition, 2016 Thomson Reuters, [70.2505].a broad discretion to decide not to remove a trade mark from the Register or not to carve out some of the goods and services for which the mark is registered, even if s 92 grounds have been made out, if the Court [or Registrar] is satisfied that it is reasonable to do so. Irrespective of the lack of use of the trade marks on the removal goods and the removal services in the relevant period, there is a discretion not to alter the registrations.[12][12] Pioneer Computers Australia Pty Limited v Pioneer KK [2009] FCA 135, [167].Her Honour also noted:By amendment in 2006, s 101(4) was added to provide that without limiting the matters that the Registrar may take into account in deciding under s 101(3) not to remove a trade mark from the Register, the Registrar may take into account whether the trade mark has been used by the registered proprietor in respect of (a) similar goods or closely related services; or (b) similar services or closely related goods. …There is no limitation within s 101(3) on the discretion, nor any indication of the factors to be taken into account.[13][13] Ibid [171]-[172].