Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG v Conga Foods Pty Ltd

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG to application under regulation 17A.48C of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 by Conga Foods Pty Ltd for cessation of protection of Protected International Trade Mark number 1634828 (International Registration number 1208920) (29, 30, 31, 32, 33) - SOL&MAR (Figurative) - in the name of Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG

Delegate: Nicholas Smith
Representation: Opponent: Jeremy Herz of Herbert Smith Freehills
Applicant: Sonia Stewart of Counsel instructed by Clayton Utz
Decision: 2020 ATMO 54
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – Opposition to an application under regulation 17A.48C for cessation of protection - Opponent’s evidence does not show any use of the Trade Mark during the relevant period nor validly particularised obstacle to use. Exercise of discretion not appropriate. Protection of International Trade Mark to cease.

Background

  1. This decision is pursuant to an application made on 14 December 2018 under ss 92(4)(a) and 92(4)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘Act’) by Conga Foods Pty Ltd (‘Applicant’) to cease protection of the protected international trade mark detailed below[1].  The application is made in respect of all of the goods for which protection has been extended to Australia, that is, the application is for complete cessation of protection the trade mark.

    [1] Technically an application to cease protection of an International Registration Designating Australia (‘IRDA’) is to be made pursuant to reg 17A.48C of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (‘Regulations’). However reg 17A.48D provides that Part 9 of the Act (being the part of the Act dealing with an application for removal) applies in relation to an application for cessation of protection and in particular, reg 17A.48D(f) provides that an application under s 92 to remove a trade mark is taken to be a reference to an application for cessation of protection.

Registration No. 1634828
Lodgement date 8 November 2013
Priority date 8 May 2013
Goods Class 29: Meat and meat products, poultry and poultry products, game and game products, sausage and sausage products, fish and fish products, sea food (not living) and products therefrom, mollusca and crustacean (not living) and products therefrom, meat extracts, fish extracts, poultry extracts, game extracts and vegetable extracts, fruits and vegetables, also pickled sweet and/or sour, fruit and vegetable preserves, fruit and vegetable pulp, potato products of all kind (included in this class), all aforementioned goods also preserved, cooked, dried and/or frozen; delicatessen fish, especially bismarck herrings, rollmops, fried herrings, matjes herrings, coalfish in oil, smoked salmon, smoked fish fillets, caviar, prawns and crab meat in brine and/or sauce; antipasti, essentially consisting of meat and/or fish and/or sea food and/or poultry and/or game and/or sausage and/or vegetable and/or fruits and/or cheese (included in this class); salads based on meat, fish, poultry, game, sausage, sea food, vegetables and/or fruits; semi-processed meals, ready-to-serve meals and frozen foods, especially exclusively or essentially consisting of meat, fish, poultry, game,…
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Details
Case
[2020] ATMO 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for removal of a trade mark from the Register due to non-use, brought by Conga Foods Pty Ltd (the Applicant) against Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG (the Opponent). The dispute arose because the Opponent had not used its trade mark in Australia during the relevant period. The hearing officer, Nicholas Smith, was tasked with determining whether the Opponent had established grounds to oppose the removal or if the Registrar should exercise discretion to allow the trade mark to remain on the Register.

The primary legal issues before the hearing officer were whether the Opponent had used the trade mark in Australia during the relevant period, or if there were obstacles to its use that would justify its continued registration. The Opponent also sought to rely on the Registrar's discretion under section 101(3) of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth) to prevent removal. A further issue was whether the Opponent had adequately particularised its grounds for opposition, particularly in relation to relying on obstacles to use under section 100(3)(c) of the Act.

The hearing officer found that the Opponent had conceded non-use of the trade mark in Australia during the relevant period. The Opponent's argument that an intention to use the mark constituted use, based on principles from *Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd*, was rejected as the facts were not analogous to cases where intention was supported by concrete steps towards trade. The hearing officer also determined that the Opponent had failed to properly particularise its grounds for opposing removal based on obstacles to use, and even if considered, the evidence did not establish that commercial circumstances in Australia constituted such obstacles. Consequently, the hearing officer declined to exercise his discretion to allow the trade mark to remain on the Register, noting the lack of actual use, residual reputation, or concrete plans for future use in Australia, and ordered that protection of the registration cease.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Hertz Declaration contains, as exhibits, examples of the use of the Trade Mark by the Opponent outside Australia both in the form of in-store brochures and external marketing material. It also contains details of the very significant revenue the Opponent makes from the sale of products branded with the Trade Mark, albeit solely outside Australia. Applicant’s Evidence The Applicant has filed no evidence in this matter though I note from the Applicant’s Submissions that the Applicant is the holder of a number of registrations on the Register, for various foodstuffs in classes 29 and 30 consisting or containing the words ‘SOLE MARE’ for goods that are similar to the Registered Goods and that one of these registrations predates the Trade Mark.[8][8] Trade Mark Registration Nos. 619981, 1976323 and 1976328.Discussion To successfully oppose the application for removal of the Trade Mark the Opponent must establish that it used the Trade Mark pursuant to s 100 of the Act in the relevant period or that there was an obstacle to use in that period. In the event that the Opponent fails to establish such use, the Registrar may exercise its discretion under s 101(3) to decide that the Trade Mark should not be removed from the Register. In the present case the Herz Declaration concedes that the Opponent has failed to use the Trade Mark in Australia in the relevant period. The Opponent sought to argue that its intention to use the Trade Mark in Australia amounted to use, under the principles outlined in Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd[9]. The facts in the present case are in no way analogous to the cases referred to in the Opponent’s Submissions in which use was found arising from an intention supported by an evidence of action by the trader to commit goods bearing that mark to trade in Australia. The mere fact that the Opponent has purportedly registered a large number of trade mark registrations in Australia is not a sufficient basis to show actual use of a mark, as opposed to mere preliminary discussions. [9] (1984) 156 CLR 414, 433-4.Obstacles to use25. The Opponent in its evidence (and submissions) raises matters which could be regarded as obstacles to use of the Trade Mark in the relevant period, pursuant to s 100(3)(c) of the Act. The Applicant submits that I should not consider the matters relevant to s 100(3)(c) of the Act as the SGP does not explicitly identify s 100(3)(c) as a separate basis for opposing removal of the Trade Mark. 26. I agree with the Applicant’s Submissions. While reg 17A.48P of the Regulations provides that the Registrar may grant a request to amend a statement of grounds and particulars, no such request has been made in this case, nor have any submissions been made with respect to the requirements under reg 17A.48P. 27. The Opponent submits that is entitled to raise s 100(3)(c) as a separate basis since its SGP particularised as a basis for opposing the removal, s 92(4)(b), being good faith use during the relevant period. I do not understand the Opponent’s submission on this point. The relevant paragraph in the SGP is extracted below. I cannot conclude that this paragraph adequately signposts or gives any particulars to the s 100(3)(c) basis to oppose the removal of opposition since it expressly says that the mark was used or intended to be used and does not particularise either any obstacles to use or an intention to argue that there were obstacles to use. The Trade Mark has been used or intended to be used by the Opponent, or an authorised user, in good faith in respect of the goods for which the Trade Mark is registered, within the relevant non-use period of 14 November 2015 – 14 November 2018. Intention to use has been held to constitute use within the meaning of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). 28. While certain grounds that the Opponent subsequently argued were obstacles to use had been particularised as a basis for the Registrar to exercise its discretion, this does not change my view that I should not consider matters relevant to s 100(3)(c) of the Act. When particularising the basis for opposition for removal, it is necessary to particularise that basis, whether it is under s 100(3)(c) or as an exercise of discretion, not merely state facts in relation to basis that a party may later choose to rely on in respect of an unrelated basis not particularised in a statement of grounds and particulars. The purpose of a SGP in such a case is to place a removal applicant on notice that the opponent is seeking to rely on s 100(3)(c) of the Act. This was not done by the SGP in this proceeding. 29. Even if I were to consider whether the Opponent faced circumstances that amounted to an obstacle to use within s 100(3)(c), the EIS does not establish that such circumstances exist. The Opponent’s purported obstacles relate to the commercial circumstances in Australia, being the dominant position of Coles and Woolworths, and what are described as a challenging regulatory landscape. The claim of a challenging regulatory landscape does not appear to be supported by the documentary evidence exhibited to the Harz Declaration that describes the level of regulation as medium and the trend of such regulation being steady. The Opponent provides no direct evidence from its executives, or even documentary evidence in the form of memos or other internal documents that the Opponent’s failure to use the Trade Mark was caused by these purported obstacles. Furthermore there is no evidence of any causal link between such obstacles and the failure of the Opponent to use the Trade Mark in Australia.[10] [10] As required under s 100(3)(c) of the Act, see Woolly Bull Enterprises Pty Ltd v Reynolds [2001] FCA 261, 55.30. It is therefore necessary to consider whether the Registrar should exercise her discretion to allow the Trade Mark to remain on the Register.Registrar’s Discretion31. As noted in Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off the policy of the Act is to facilitate the removal of an unused trade mark, and the public interest of the integrity of the Register will generally demand the removal of an unused trade mark.[11] However, as indicated at paragraph 12, above, s 101(3) provides the Registrar with a discretion, which, in the words of Bennett J, is:[11] M Davison, I Horak Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off online edition, 2016 Thomson Reuters, [70.2505].a broad discretion to decide not to remove a trade mark from the Register or not to carve out some of the goods and services for which the mark is registered, even if s 92 grounds have been made out, if the Court [or Registrar] is satisfied that it is reasonable to do so. Irrespective of the lack of use of the trade marks on the removal goods and the removal services in the relevant period, there is a discretion not to alter the registrations.[12][12] Pioneer Computers Australia Pty Limited v Pioneer KK [2009] FCA 135, [167].Her Honour also noted:By amendment in 2006, s 101(4) was added to provide that without limiting the matters that the Registrar may take into account in deciding under s 101(3) not to remove a trade mark from the Register, the Registrar may take into account whether the trade mark has been used by the registered proprietor in respect of (a) similar goods or closely related services; or (b) similar services or closely related goods. …There is no limitation within s 101(3) on the discretion, nor any indication of the factors to be taken into account.[13][13] Ibid [171]-[172].

Decision

Reasons for decision

While considering the discretion in E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited Flick J stated:Although the ‘guiding principle behind the discretion is public interest, particularly in the integrity of the register’,[14] the private commercial interests of both [parties] remain matters which may be taken into account when exercising the discretion. Trade mark law, it has been recognised, is more complex than is suggested by the proposition that the supreme—or at least—a predominant interest is the maintenance of the integrity of the Register.[15] Speaking of the 1955 Act, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ there pointed out the balance struck by the legislation between various interests. Both the interests of the consuming public and the interests of traders have to be recognised.[16][14] Kowa Co Ltd v Organon [2005] FCA 1282, [92].[15] Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd [2000] HCA 12, [40].[16] E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited [2008] FCA 934, [210].33. Factors that have been found relevant to the consideration of whether to exercise the discretion include:·There had been no abandonment of the trade mark;·The registered proprietor of the mark still had a residual reputation in the mark;·There had been sales by the registered proprietor of goods for which removal was sought since the relevant period ended;·The applicant for removal had entered the market without having taken steps to ascertain from the Register whether anyone had a right to exclude their use of the mark;·The registered proprietor was not aware of the applicant’s sales under the mark.[17][17] Pioneer Computers Australia Pty Ltd v Pioneer KK [2009] FCA 135 at [169] citing E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1005 [202]-[203].34. In the present case the Trade Mark has never been used in Australia and hence there is no residual reputation of the Trade Mark in Australia or sales under the Trade Mark since the relevant period has ended. I am unpersuaded by the Opponent’s submission that I should consider the purported barriers to entry to the supermarket market in Australia in applying the discretion; I refer to my comments in paragraph 29 above referring to the lack of evidence of a causal link between purported commercial circumstances in Australia and the Opponent’s failure to use the Trade Mark. 35. The Opponent submits that I should exercise the discretion having regard to the overseas reputation of the Trade Mark, and its commercial interest. With respect to the second matter, as the Opponent has not used the Trade Mark in Australia at any time, and has not (on the evidence before the Registrar) announced any plans to use the Trade Mark in Australia, I am unpersuaded that the removal of the Trade Mark will result in any particular commercial disruption to the Opponent. As noted in paragraph 23 above I do not find the fact that the Opponent has spent a large amount of money registering trade marks in Australia a significant factor in the exercise of the discretion, especially in the case where there is no use of the mark or any concrete evidence (such as acquisitions of land or setting up of distribution centres) of the Opponent actually intending to use the Trade Mark in Australia at any future date. 36. While I note that the Opponent does have a significant international presence and consider that Australians living and travelling in any of the 29 countries in which the Opponent operates may have been exposed to the Trade Mark, I am unpersuaded that any public interest in the maintenance of a mark that has never been used in Australia outweighs the public interest in the integrity of the Register. 37. I note the that the Applicant has registered or applied to register several trade marks that are prima facie similar to the Trade Mark for similar goods[18] and hence it would have a private interest in the removal of the Trade Mark. Given the matters considered above I am not prepared to exercise the Registrar’s discretion to allow for the continuation of protection of the Trade Mark.[18] Trade Mark Registration Nos. 619981, 1976323 and 1976328.Decision38. I decide that the Opponent has not established its opposition to cessation of protection and protection of the Trade Mark should cease in respect of all of the goods for which it is registered.39. Accordingly, I direct that protection of registration 1634828 be ceased one month from the date of this decision. If the Registrar is served with a notice of appeal before then I direct that cessation of protection shall not occur until the appeal has either been discontinued or, in the event of a decision from the Court, that the registration be dealt with as the Court sees fit.40. The Registrar will notify the International Bureau of the cessation of protection of the Trade Mark at the conclusion of the appeal period if there is no appeal. If there is an appeal, at the conclusion of the appeal process the Registrar will advise the International Bureau if required. Costs41. The Applicant has been successful in relation to the application for cessation of protection of the Trade Mark and has requested its costs. I direct that costs in relation to trade mark registration no. 1634828 be awarded against the Opponent in accordance with Schedule 8 of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995.Nicholas Smith Hearing OfficerDelegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks15 April 2020

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Opponent’s evidence in this matter consists of a declaration made on 16 August 2019 by Jeremy Herz, Senior Associate with Herbert Smith Freehills, the Opponent’s representatives with Exhibits JDH-1 to JDH-12 (‘Herz Declaration’). The Herz Declaration conveys the following information:·The Opponent is a global supermarket chain that currently operates in 29 countries and employs over 350,000 people. The Opponent operates over 10,000 stores across Europe and the United States of America and is the 6th largest supermarket chain in the world by number of stores.·The Opponent uses the Trade Mark as one of its private label brands and has done so since December 2015. Its business model involves the sale of predominantly private label products, similar to its competitor Aldi. ·At the date of filing of the trade mark application, the declarant is instructed that the Opponent had an intention to use the Trade Mark or authorise the use of the Trade Mark in Australia, indeed it has filed over 1,000 trade mark applications in Australia. ·A related entity to the Opponent, Kaufland, has recently announced an intention to use the mark in Australia.·The Opponent has not commenced actual use of the Trade Mark in Australia because of circumstances that have been an obstacle to use. In particular there are high barriers to entry due to the dominance of the two largest players, Woolworths and Coles, and a challenging regulatory landscape in Australia. ·The Opponent has a significant reputation overseas and as such a large number of Australians would travel overseas, visit one of the Opponent’s supermarkets and be exposed to the Trade Mark. In addition the Opponent has promoted the Trade Mark across its social media platforms and its website which is regularly visited by Australian consumers. The Hertz Declaration contains, as exhibits, examples of the use of the Trade Mark by the Opponent outside Australia both in the form of in-store brochures and external marketing material. It also contains details of the very significant revenue the Opponent makes from the sale of products branded with the Trade Mark, albeit solely outside Australia. Applicant’s Evidence The Applicant has filed no evidence in this matter though I note from the Applicant’s Submissions that the Applicant is the holder of a number of registrations on the Register, for various foodstuffs in classes 29 and 30 consisting or containing the words ‘SOLE MARE’ for goods that are similar to the Registered Goods and that one of these registrations predates the Trade Mark.[8][8] Trade Mark Registration Nos. 619981, 1976323 and 1976328.Discussion To successfully oppose the application for removal of the Trade Mark the Opponent must establish that it used the Trade Mark pursuant to s 100 of the Act in the relevant period or that there was an obstacle to use in that period. In the event that the Opponent fails to establish such use, the Registrar may exercise its discretion under s 101(3) to decide that the Trade Mark should not be removed from the Register.