FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DSN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCA 202
Appeal from: DSN16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1982 File number: NSD 1341 of 2019 Judge: KERR J Date of judgment: 12 March 2021 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether Immigration Assessment Authority erred in failing to evaluate claim that Appellant faced risk if returned to Sri Lanka simply due to his Tamil ethnicity, as distinct from other specific and contextualised claims – that claim clearly advanced – inference drawn that claim overlooked, having regard to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323 – error not material given finding elsewhere in Authority’s reasons that merely being a Tamil did not itself give rise to a real chance of harm on return to Sri Lanka – no jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed
MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether Immigration Assessment Authority failed to give proper, realistic and genuine consideration to letter provided by the Appellant – Authority gave letter no weight – findings upon which conclusion based reasonably open – appeal dismissed
MIGRATION – where Appellant seeks to rely on a ground not advanced before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority lacked jurisdiction because the Appellant is not a fast track applicant – where proposed ground sought in same terms in BXT17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 9 – leave granted to rely on proposed ground – appeal dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where Appellant administratively allocated pseudonym in Federal Circuit Court of Australia in accordance with s 91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where pseudonym consisted of letters and numbers – application to vary pseudonym to a “human pseudonym” – no reason in principle precluding Court from allocating a “human pseudonym” if doing so in the interests of justice – application advanced only at the hearing of the appeal – granting application would potentially cause confusion by severing link between judgment on appeal and judgment below – lack of utility in granting application at late stage of appeal – application refused
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37AF(2)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 91X, 473CB, 473DB, 473DE
Cases cited: Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510
Atkins v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 245
Atkins v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 159
AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89; 261 FCR 503
BXT17 v Minister For Home Affairs & Anor [2021] FCAFC 9
CCW16 v Ministerfor Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2
CCW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1002
CLM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 170
DBE17 v Commonwealth of Australia [2018] FCA 1307
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 264 CLR 123
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read DSN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2021] FCA 202
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that any error in the IAA's failure to evaluate the appellant's risk based on his ethnicity was not material, as the IAA had found that merely being a Tamil did not give rise to a real chance of harm. The court found that the IAA's rejection of the appellant's claims, including those based on the provided letter, was based on reasonable findings. Regarding the jurisdictional issue, the court granted leave to the appellant to rely on the proposed ground but dismissed the appeal. The court also refused the application to vary the appellant's pseudonym, finding that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so at the appeal stage.
The court's orders included granting leave to the appellant to rely on the proposed Ground 3, dismissing the appeal, and setting out the costs provisions if any party applies for a different order. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent unless a different order was applied for and granted within seven days of the publication of the reasons.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave be granted to the Appellant to rely on his proposed Ground 3.
2. The appeal inclusive of Ground 3 be dismissed.
3. Unless either party applies for a different order within 7 days of the publication of these reasons, the Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs, as agreed or in default of agreement as assessed.
4. Any party proposing an alternative to that provided for in Order 3 shall file and serve submissions limited to 2 pages.
5. A party opposing such application shall file and serve responding submissions, limited to 2 pages within 7 days of having been served with the application.
6. The question of costs if any such application is made be determined on the papers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel for the Minister, Mr Minson, advised the Court that the Minister did not oppose the Appellant being allocated an alternative pseudonym.Consideration of application for a human pseudonym Section 91X of the Migration Act prohibits the publication by this Court (and the High Court and Federal Circuit Court) of the name of any person who has applied for a protection visa, if the proceeding relates to that visa. Section 91X(2) provides that in those circumstances:(2)The court must not publish (in electronic form or otherwise), in relation to the proceeding, the person’s name. The constitutional validity of s 91X has never been authoritatively determined. However, in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476 (Plaintiff S157) the plurality (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) observed in a footnote to [44] that “[i]n the absence of any direct challenge, it will be assumed that s 91X is constitutionally valid”. It appears that no occasion to reconsider that observation has since arisen in the High Court. Mr Albert did not seek to put the constitutionality of s 91X in issue. I therefore proceed on the same assumption as did the plurality in Plaintiff S157. Section 91X imposes a duty on this Court (and all courts) to not publish the name of a person who has applied for a protection visa. I take it to be uncontentious that what the section prohibits is publication of the person’s real name as would permit their identification. The provision, as I read it, does not require the person’s name to be anonymised in any particular way. If this Court is satisfied that a mechanism other than the use of an administratively allocated set of letters and numbers is in the interests of justice then, pursuant to r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), it is open to the Court to order that an alternative pseudonym be substituted for the administratively allocated pseudonym: provided the alternative also complies with the terms of s 91X. I have no reason to doubt that the FCCA also has similar power. That course was followed, albeit without any analysis in support, in Atkins v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 245. However, there are countervailing pragmatic considerations suggesting that it would not be in the interests of justice so late in the appeal in this case for an alternative pseudonym to be substituted for that which was earlier administratively allocated. All of the materials filed in this matter have been filed in the name of DSN16. It is now too late to do anything about that circumstance. This Court has a duty to safeguard the public interest in open justice. It should be a rare instance where an application is made only at the appeal stage. Naming parties consistently at first instance and on appeal facilitates that objective. It allows anyone interested in the litigation history of a matter to link the reasons given by an appeal court to those from which the appeal has been brought and vice-versa. For those reasons, if such an order is to be sought the application should be made at the time of first filing or as shortly thereafter as is practicable.