DSN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DSN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCA 202

Appeal from: DSN16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1982
File number: NSD 1341 of 2019
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 12 March 2021
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether Immigration Assessment Authority erred in failing to evaluate  claim that Appellant faced risk if returned to Sri Lanka simply due to his Tamil ethnicity, as distinct from other specific and contextualised claims – that claim clearly advanced – inference drawn that claim overlooked, having regard to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323 – error not material given finding elsewhere in Authority’s reasons that merely being a Tamil did not itself give rise to a real chance of harm on return to Sri Lanka – no jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether Immigration Assessment Authority failed to give proper, realistic and genuine consideration to letter provided by the Appellant – Authority gave letter no weight – findings upon which conclusion based reasonably open – appeal dismissed

MIGRATION – where Appellant seeks to rely on a ground not advanced before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority lacked jurisdiction because the Appellant is not a fast track applicant – where proposed ground sought in same terms in BXT17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 9 – leave granted to rely on proposed ground – appeal dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where Appellant administratively allocated pseudonym in Federal Circuit Court of Australia in accordance with s 91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where pseudonym consisted of letters and numbers – application to vary pseudonym to a “human pseudonym” – no reason in principle precluding Court from allocating a “human pseudonym” if doing so in the interests of justice – application advanced only at the hearing of the appeal – granting application would potentially cause confusion by severing link between judgment on appeal and judgment below – lack of utility in granting application at late stage of appeal – application refused

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37AF(2)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 91X, 473CB, 473DB, 473DE

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510

Atkins v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 245

Atkins v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 159

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89; 261 FCR 503

BXT17 v Minister For Home Affairs & Anor [2021] FCAFC 9

CCW16 v Ministerfor Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2

CCW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1002

CLM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 170

DBE17 v Commonwealth of Australia [2018] FCA 1307

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 264 CLR 123

Minister…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 202
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DSN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, DSN16, appealed against the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) which rejected his application for a protection visa. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the appeal. The primary issues before the court were whether the IAA erred in failing to evaluate the appellant's claim that he faced a risk of harm simply due to his Tamil ethnicity, whether the IAA gave proper consideration to a letter provided by the appellant, and whether the IAA lacked jurisdiction due to the appellant not being a fast track applicant. Additionally, the court considered an application to vary the appellant's pseudonym.

The court held that any error in the IAA's failure to evaluate the appellant's risk based on his ethnicity was not material, as the IAA had found that merely being a Tamil did not give rise to a real chance of harm. The court found that the IAA's rejection of the appellant's claims, including those based on the provided letter, was based on reasonable findings. Regarding the jurisdictional issue, the court granted leave to the appellant to rely on the proposed ground but dismissed the appeal. The court also refused the application to vary the appellant's pseudonym, finding that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so at the appeal stage.

The court's orders included granting leave to the appellant to rely on the proposed Ground 3, dismissing the appeal, and setting out the costs provisions if any party applies for a different order. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent unless a different order was applied for and granted within seven days of the publication of the reasons.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to the Appellant to rely on his proposed Ground 3.

2. The appeal inclusive of Ground 3 be dismissed.

3. Unless either party applies for a different order within 7 days of the publication of these reasons, the Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs, as agreed or in default of agreement as assessed.

4. Any party proposing an alternative to that provided for in Order 3 shall file and serve submissions limited to 2 pages.

5. A party opposing such application shall file and serve responding submissions, limited to 2 pages within 7 days of having been served with the application.

6. The question of costs if any such application is made be determined on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Delegate rejected the Appellant’s protection claims. As has already been noted, that decision was (or purportedly was as the Appellant contends for in proposed Ground 3) automatically referred to the IAA for review.THE IAA DECISION The IAA expressed significant concern regarding the Appellant’s credibility. It rejected a number of his claims on the basis of a finding that his evidence was “vague”, “shifting” or “contradictory”. In brief summary, the IAA found as follows: ·It did not accept that the Appellant or his family were ever of interest to the CID, as “low level supporters of the TNA, a legitimate political party which now holds a significant number of seats in the national parliament”. ·It accepted that the Appellant and his father were “relatively low level” workers for the TNA. It further accepted that the Appellant was on two occasions manhandled and told not to do this work. However, it did not accept that he was subject to any additional harm or harassment. ·It did not accept that the Appellant’s mother was assaulted. ·It did not accept that the Appellant had been pursued since his departure as a result of his low level work for the TNA, and nor did it accept that he would be pursued if he were to continue such work in the future. ·It did accept that the Appellant had been harassed by home guards. However, it found that his description of those events was exaggerated. Specifically:37.Given the applicant’s vague and shifting evidence about the precise nature of the harassment and assaults he suffered and the reasons why he claims to have been singled out for this mistreatment, I consider that the applicant has exaggerated the events. I do not accept that he was subjected to a sustained and frequent pattern of serious harm by home guards for any of the reasons claimed – because of his ethnicity, his political opinion or activity, because of his association with his father including his father’s position in the community, because his family were wealthy farmers, or because a girl was killed by the applicant’s family’s tractor. I do not accept that the applicant was singled out and mistreated in a manner that other school students were not, because I do not accept the reasons for which the applicant claims that he was singled out. I accept that he may have [been] subject to some bullying and harassment in the context of ethnic and political tensions prevailing after the civil war, however, this finding is based on country information rather than any credible evidence presented by the applicant about the circumstances of his claimed mistreatment. I consider that any mistreatment suffered by the applicant was not serious harm. I am not satisfied that the applicant was, in the past subjected to serious harm amounting to persecution by home guards for any of the reasons in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act, and I am not satisfied that there is a real chance that he would be subjected to such harm if he returns to Sri Lanka in the foreseeable future. ·It accepted that the family’s farm equipment was damaged. However, it found that the motive for that event was “not at all clear”. ·The IAA referred to the letter the Appellant had provided the Delegate from Mr Alfred as follows:28.Various letters were submitted with the SHEV application from neighbours and the applicant’s immediate family members which repeat the basic information put forward by the applicant. I give these letters no greater weight than the applicant’s own evidence. They too are vague or speculative as to the events described and who was responsible … Included in the documents is a letter from a Richard Alfred to which, according to the representative’s submission, the delegate should have had specific regard. Mr Alfred says that he knows the applicant from Canberra and visited his family in Sri Lanka, where he witnessed damage to the applicant’s sister’s home; and essentially confirms the applicant’s account of what his mother and sister have told him about what has happened to them in his absence. I give no weight to this letter. I do not know who Mr Alfred is or the precise nature of his association with the applicant; there is no evidence of his travel to Sri Lanka; and at most, he simply repeats what he says he was told about the applicant’s family and their circumstances and the threats they perceive to the applicant’s life. Again, I do not consider that this letter provides independent corroboration of the applicant’s claim such as to overcome the many problems with applicant’s own evidence, nor does it establish the existence of a threat to the applicant’s life (which Mr Alfred says exists), in light of those problems. ·It did not accept that the family was subject to ongoing harassment, assault or “any kind of harm” after the Appellant’s departure. While it accepted that his house might have been damaged, it was: … not satisfied that this had anything to do with the ongoing pursuit of the applicant and his father for political or ethnic reasons, or reasons of personal enmity or jealousy, rather than a random opportunistic crime. ·It accepted that if returned, the Appellant might be arrested and charged for having departed Sri Lanka illegally. However, in the absence of him having any actual or imputed connection with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) he would as a result face at most a short period of pre-trial detention. That detention would flow from the non-discriminatory enforcement of a law of general application. Any poor prison conditions to which the Appellant might be subjected during that period would not be intended to cause harm. While some failed Tamil asylum seekers were mistreated on their return “the country information, considered as a whole, suggests that the key risk factor is whether a Tamil has actual or perceived links to the LTTE; merely being a Tamil, or a Tamil from the north or the east, or being a failed asylum seeker is not enough … to give rise to a real chance of harm on return”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the Minister, Mr Minson, advised the Court that the Minister did not oppose the Appellant being allocated an alternative pseudonym.Consideration of application for a human pseudonym Section 91X of the Migration Act prohibits the publication by this Court (and the High Court and Federal Circuit Court) of the name of any person who has applied for a protection visa, if the proceeding relates to that visa. Section 91X(2) provides that in those circumstances:(2)The court must not publish (in electronic form or otherwise), in relation to the proceeding, the person’s name. The constitutional validity of s 91X has never been authoritatively determined. However, in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476 (Plaintiff S157) the plurality (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) observed in a footnote to [44] that “[i]n the absence of any direct challenge, it will be assumed that s 91X is constitutionally valid”. It appears that no occasion to reconsider that observation has since arisen in the High Court. Mr Albert did not seek to put the constitutionality of s 91X in issue. I therefore proceed on the same assumption as did the plurality in Plaintiff S157. Section 91X imposes a duty on this Court (and all courts) to not publish the name of a person who has applied for a protection visa. I take it to be uncontentious that what the section prohibits is publication of the person’s real name as would permit their identification. The provision, as I read it, does not require the person’s name to be anonymised in any particular way. If this Court is satisfied that a mechanism other than the use of an administratively allocated set of letters and numbers is in the interests of justice then, pursuant to r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), it is open to the Court to order that an alternative pseudonym be substituted for the administratively allocated pseudonym: provided the alternative also complies with the terms of s 91X. I have no reason to doubt that the FCCA also has similar power. That course was followed, albeit without any analysis in support, in Atkins v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 245. However, there are countervailing pragmatic considerations suggesting that it would not be in the interests of justice so late in the appeal in this case for an alternative pseudonym to be substituted for that which was earlier administratively allocated. All of the materials filed in this matter have been filed in the name of DSN16. It is now too late to do anything about that circumstance. This Court has a duty to safeguard the public interest in open justice. It should be a rare instance where an application is made only at the appeal stage. Naming parties consistently at first instance and on appeal facilitates that objective. It allows anyone interested in the litigation history of a matter to link the reasons given by an appeal court to those from which the appeal has been brought and vice-versa. For those reasons, if such an order is to be sought the application should be made at the time of first filing or as shortly thereafter as is practicable.