DNF17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DNF17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 2626

MIGRATION – Decision by Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Whether time should be extended to applicant to file an application for judicial review – whether applicant’s explanation for delay in filing application satisfactory – whether application for judicial review has sufficient prospects of success such that it would be in the interests of justice to extend time – application for extension of time refused.

Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.417, 477
Cases Cited:
DNF17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2626
DNG17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2628
DNH17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2630
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Limited v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344
SZNYE v Minister for immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110
SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91
SZOZG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 756
M211of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCAFC 293
Daniel v Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCA 21
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
VWFW v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 29
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51
Re Commonwealth of Australia;  Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 177 ALR 491
Applicant: DNF17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2483 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Emmett
Hearing date: 27 October 2017
Date of Last Submission: 27 October 2017
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 27 October 2017

REPRESENTATION

Applicant appeared in person with an interpreter
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr Liam Dennis
MinterEllison
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2483 of 2017

DNF17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for an extension of time pursuant to s.477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) to seek judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 21 November 2013.

  2. The applicant is the daughter of the two applicants in proceeding DKX17 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2627 (“DKX17”). The applicant is also the sister of the applicants in each of the proceedings DNG17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2628 (“DNG17”) and DNH17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2630 (“DNH17”). All of the applicants have made independent claims and have been the subject of individual…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 2626
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The applicant, a citizen of Fiji, had sought a protection visa, which was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed this decision, and subsequently, the Minister decided not to intervene. The applicant then sought an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether to grant the applicant an extension of time to file her application for judicial review. This required the court to consider whether the applicant's explanation for the delay was satisfactory and whether the proposed application had sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension in the interests of justice.

In determining the application, the court applied the principles outlined in *Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks*. The court noted that an extension of time can only be granted if it is necessary to do justice between the parties, requiring consideration of the history of the matter, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences of granting or refusing the extension. Crucially, the court also had regard to the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions. The court found that the applicant's explanation for the significant delay in filing the application was not satisfactory, and importantly, that the applicant did not have an arguable case for relief. The court considered that the applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice within the prescribed time was a strong indicator that she had no case.

The application for an extension of time was refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The background of the matter, the applicant’s claims, and a summary of the Tribunal’s decision record are accurately summarised in paragraphs 3 to 14 of the first respondent’s submissions as follows:“B FACTUAL BACKGROUND3. The applicant is a citizen of Fiji who arrived in Australia on 14 January 2006 as the holder of a Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visa which was granted on the basis that she was a dependent of her father (CB 138). The applicant made an application for a protection visa which was received on 2 July 2012 (CB 1). That application was a combined application including the applicant's parents and siblings but she subsequently made a separate application for a protection visa on 22 February 2013 (CB 105). On 28 March 2013, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the delegate) refused to grant the applicant a protection visa (CB 138). 4. The applicant sought review of the delegate's decision before the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) by application dated 18 April 2013 (CB 158). The applicant appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal on 10 September 2013. The Tribunal made its decision on 21 November 2013, affirming the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa (CB 190).5. In accordance with the Tribunal's recommendation the matter was referred for Ministerial Intervention (CB 200–201: [79]; CB 206). By letter dated 13 July 2017, the applicant was notified that the Minister had decided that it would not be in the public interest to intervene (CB 218). C THE APPLICANT'S CLAIMS6. The applicant claimed to fear harm at the hands of indigenous Fijians on the basis of her Indian race and Hindu religion. The applicant also claimed to fear being the victim of sexual assault and that she would have nowhere to live and no source of income. 7. In support of those claims, the applicant recounted that her family lived on a farm which was leased from indigenous Fijians and her family had been victims of robbery, vandalism, assault, and harassment. In 2008, the family's lease on the farm expired after the applicant's father refused to pay a bribe and the lease was not renewed. Their family home was destroyed in flooding and they have nothing to go back to. The applicant also claimed to have been harassed and assaulted at school and college. D TRIBUNAL DECISION8. The Tribunal accepted much of the applicant's account but rejected her claims because they did not give rise to a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm. The Tribunal found that the applicant and her family's evidence was consistent and credible (CB 193: [32]). The Tribunal accepted that the applicant and members of her family had been harassed and assaulted. While the Tribunal noted the applicant's claim that she was targeted because of her Hindu religion, the Tribunal found that their motives related to her Indian race and their desire for her family's land (CB 194: [34], [37]).9. While the Tribunal accepted the applicant had a subjective fear of harm (CB 194: [35]), the Tribunal found that the fear was not well-founded for the following reasons (CB 194: [36]):(a) she would not return to Sabeto (CB 195: [38]);(b) the landowners have already retaken her family's land (CB 195: [39]); (c) country information suggests that the situation for Fijian Indians has improved (CB 195: [40]); and (d) given the passage of time and the absence of evidence about their current intentions, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant would be harmed by those who targeted her at school and college (CB 195: [43]).10. Having regard to country information, the Tribunal concluded the applicant would not face harm on account of her race (CB 197: [51]–[52]). Further, the Tribunal noted the applicant agreed Hindus 'did have the right to follow their religion and practise their rituals now' (CB 193: [26]) and found that she would not suffer harm for this reason (CB 197: [56]). 11. The Tribunal found that there was a remote chance that the applicant would face harm as a result of crime (CB 198: [58]). Having regard to country information and the applicant's relationship with her family, the Tribunal found that the chance of her being the victim of sexual assault was remote (CB 198: [61]–[62]). The Tribunal did not accept that any inability to marry amounted to serious harm (CB 199: [64]). 12. The Tribunal also found that any hardship the applicant experienced would not be 'directed at her…for a Convention reason' (CB 199: [68]). For those reasons, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claims and concluded she did not satisfy the refugee criterion (CB 199: [69]–[70]). 13. In the context of complementary protection, the Tribunal made specific findings addressing the applicant's claims. The Tribunal made the following key findings:(a) any financial hardship would not amount to significant harm (CB 200: [73]);(b) for the reasons given in relation to the refugee criterion, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant would face significant harm at the hands of villagers from Sabeto (CB 200: [74]);(c) any crime the applicant may face would not amount to significant harm (CB 200: [75]);(d) any inability to marry would not amount to significant harm (CB 200: [76]); and(e) having regard to country information, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant would face significant harm as a Fijian Indian (CB 200: [77]). 14. For these reasons, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not satisfy the complementary protection criterion (CB 200: [78]).”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I accept that there is prejudice to the applicant in refusing to extend time to seek judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. However, in balancing the interests of both parties and the overall interests of justice, I also have regard to the significant public interest in the finality of administrative decisions. The relevant principles are referred to in Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 177 ALR 491, in which McHugh J stated at [15]-[17] as follows:“15. An extension of time for seeking relief against a decision or judgment can only be granted if it is necessary to do justice between the parties. That means that it is necessary to have regard to the history of the matter, the conduct of both parties, the nature of the litigation and the consequences for the parties of a grant or refusal of the extension. Where an applicant seeks the issue of the constitutional or prerogative writs, a further factor must be considered. Those writs are directed at the acts or decisions of public bodies or officials, and the public interest requires that there be an end to litigation about the efficacy of such acts or decisions. In that respect, the present case, although important to the applicant, is not as important as many other cases. Nevertheless, the applicant is seeking the quashing of a decision of the AIRC made 17 months before he filed his application for relief in this Court.16. Independently of the merits of the case, I find it difficult to see how a person who, with knowledge of the decision, delays 17 months before seeking relief could ever be granted an extension of time to quash such a decision unless some conduct of the respondent or the public body or official had brought about the delay. As the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said in Ratnam v Cumarasamy, “[t]he rules of court must prima facie be obeyed.” The time for seeking certiorari is six times, and the time for seeking mandamus is twice, the period in which an application for special leave to appeal to this Court can be brought against a judgment or decision. The periods for applying for certiorari and mandamus give a person affected by an adverse decision or judgment ample time in which to commence proceedings in this Court. In all but very exceptional cases, they should be rigidly applied when, as here, more than one year has elapsed between the decision and the commencement of proceedings in this Court.17. An applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice is not a ground for extending the time for seeking mandamus or the ancillary writ of certiorari. Upon the expiry of the time for the issue of a constitutional writ against a decision or judgment, the respondent has a vested right to retain the judgment or decision. Its rights should not be dependent on whether the applicant can at some future time obtain a favourable legal opinion that he or she has an arguable case. In addition, the efficacy of public acts, decisions and judgments cannot be the hostage of an applicant's search for favourable legal advice. In all but exceptional cases, the inability of an applicant to obtain favourable advice within the two month period for mandamus and the six month period for certiorari is a strong indicator that he or she has no case for relief. That is the case here. The applicant has no arguable case for relief. If it should turn out that, by reason of negligent advice, an applicant was deprived of the right to quash a decision or to have it made or to have some duty carried out, the applicant will have his or her remedy against the lawyer or lawyers concerned.”(Emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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