DKX17 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DKX17 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 2627

MIGRATION – Decision by Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – whether time should be extended to applicant to file an application for judicial review – whether applicant’s explanation for delay in filing application satisfactory – whether application for judicial review has sufficient prospects of success such that it would be in the interests of justice to extend time – application for extension of time refused.

Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.417, 477
Cases Cited:
DNF17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2626
DNG17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2628
DNH17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2630
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Limited v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344
SZNYE v Minister for immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110
SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91
SZOZG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 756
M211of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCAFC 293
Daniel v Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCA 21
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
VWFW v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 29
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51
Re Commonwealth of Australia;  Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 177 ALR 491
First Applicant: DKX17
Second Applicant: DKY17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2423 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Emmett
Hearing date: 27 October 2017
Date of Last Submission: 27 October 2017
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 27 October 2017

REPRESENTATION

Applicants appeared in person with an interpreter
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr Liam Dennis
MinterEllison
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2423 of 2017

DKX17

First Applicant

DKY17

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for an extension of time pursuant to s.477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) to seek judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 21 November 2013.

  2. The first applicant and the second applicant are husband and wife and are referred to in these reasons as the applicants or the first applicant or second applicant. 

  3. The applicants have three children, all of whom have made independent claims, and all of whom have been the subject of individual decisions by the Tribunal, refusing them protection visas. The applicants in all the family’s proceedings are referred to collectively as The Applicants.…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 2627
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, citizens of Fiji, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) which affirmed a delegate's refusal to grant them protection visas. The applicants had claimed fear of harm based on their Indian race, general crime in Fiji, extortion, and lack of housing and income, with the second applicant also fearing sexual assault. The Tribunal had accepted much of their account, including past persecution and subjective fear, but ultimately rejected their claims, finding they did not give rise to a real chance of serious or significant harm, and that their fears were not well-founded based on country information and specific findings. The Minister had also previously decided not to intervene in their favour.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether to grant the applicants an extension of time to file their application for judicial review. This required the court to consider whether the applicants' explanation for the delay was satisfactory, and whether their application had sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension in the interests of justice. The court also had to balance the prejudice to the applicants against the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions.

In determining the application for an extension of time, Emmett J applied the principles articulated in *Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks*. His Honour noted that an extension can only be granted if necessary to do justice between the parties, requiring consideration of the history of the matter, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences of the decision. Crucially, for applications seeking relief against public bodies, the public interest in the finality of litigation is a significant factor. Emmett J referred to the principle that rules of court must be obeyed and that ample time is generally provided for such applications. He also highlighted that an applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice is not typically a ground for extending time, and that the efficacy of public acts cannot be held hostage by an applicant's search for legal advice.

The court refused the application for an extension of time. Emmett J found that the applicants had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay in filing their application for judicial review. Furthermore, having regard to the applicants' inability to obtain favourable legal advice within the prescribed timeframes and the lack of any conduct by the respondent that contributed to the delay, the court concluded that the applicants did not have an arguable case for relief. Consequently, it was not in the interests of justice to extend the time for them to seek judicial review, particularly given the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The background of the matter, the applicants’ claims, and a summary of the Tribunal’s decision record are accurately summarised in paragraphs 3 to 12 of the first respondent’s submissions as follows:“B FACTUAL BACKGROUND3. The applicants are citizens of Fiji who arrived in Australia on 14 January 2006 as holders of Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visas (CB 121). On 2 July 2012, the applicants made combined applications for protection visas which included their three children (CB 1). However, the applicants' children subsequently made separate applications for protection visas on 22 February 2013. On 28 March 2013, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the delegate) refused to grant the applicants protection visas (CB 120). 4. The applicants sought review of the delegate's decision before the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) by application dated 18 April 2013 (CB 159). The applicants appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal on 10 September 2013 (CB 207). The Tribunal made its decision on 21 November 2013, affirming the decision not to grant the applicants protection visas (CB 229).5. In accordance with the Tribunal's recommendation the matters were referred for Ministerial Intervention (CB 239: [73]; CB 245). By letter dated 13 July 2017, the applicants were notified that the Minister had decided that it would not be in the public interest to intervene (CB 257). C THE APPLICANTS’ CLAIMS6. The applicants claimed to fear harm at the hands of their former landowners and indigenous Fijians on the basis of their Indian race. They also claimed to fear general crime in Fiji, being the victims of extortion, and that they would have nowhere to live and no source of income. The second applicant also claimed to fear being the victim of sexual assault. 7. In support of those claims, the applicants recounted that their family lived on a farm which was leased from indigenous Fijians and their family had been victims of robbery, vandalism, assault, and harassment. In 2008, the family's lease on the farm expired after the first applicant refused to pay a bribe and the lease was not renewed. Their family home was destroyed in flooding and they have nothing to go back to. D TRIBUNAL DECISION8. The Tribunal accepted much of the applicants' account but rejected their claims because they did not give rise to a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm. The Tribunal found that the applicants' evidence was compelling and persuasive and accepted they suffered intimidation, threats and violence amounting to persecution in the past and that they had a subjective fear of harm (CB 233: [30]). 9. However, having regard to country information (CB 233–234: [31]–[36]), the Tribunal found that the applicants' fear was not well‑founded for the following reasons (CB 234: [37]):(a) they would not return to Sabeto (CB 235: [39], [44]);(b) the landowners have already retaken the family's land (CB 235: [40]); (c) country information suggests that the situation for Fijian Indians has improved (CB 235: [41]); and(d) the first applicant was able to visit Fiji without incident (CB 235: [42]).10. Having regard to country information, the Tribunal concluded the applicants would not face harm on account of their race (CB 237: [53]). Having regard to country information and the second applicant's relationship with her family, the Tribunal found that the chance of her being the victim of sexual assault was remote (CB 237: [57]). The Tribunal did not accept the applicants would face extortion including on account of having lived overseas or being perceived as wealthy (CB 238: [61]). The Tribunal also found that any hardship the applicants may experience would not be 'directed at them…for a Convention reason' (CB 238: [64]). For those reasons, the Tribunal rejected the applicants' claims and concluded they did not satisfy the refugee criterion (CB 238–239: [65]–[66]). 11. In the context of complementary protection, the Tribunal made specific findings addressing the applicants' claims. The Tribunal made the following key findings:(a) any financial hardship would not amount to significant harm (CB 23900: [69]);(b) for the reasons given in relation to the refugee criterion, the Tribunal did not accept the applicants would face significant harm at the hands of villagers from Sabeto (CB 239: [70]);(c) there was no real risk of the applicants suffering significant harm on account of crime including extortion attempts (CB 239: [71]); and(d) having regard to country information, the Tribunal did not accept the applicants would face significant harm as Fijian Indians (CB 239: [72]).12. For these reasons, the Tribunal found that the applicants did not satisfy the complementary protection criterion (CB 239: [75]).”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I accept that there is prejudice to the applicants in refusing to extend time to seek judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. However, in balancing the interests of both parties and the overall interests of justice, I also have regard to the significant public interest in the finality of administrative decisions. The relevant principles are referred to in Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 177 ALR 491, in which McHugh J stated at [15]-[17] as follows:“15. An extension of time for seeking relief against a decision or judgment can only be granted if it is necessary to do justice between the parties. That means that it is necessary to have regard to the history of the matter, the conduct of both parties, the nature of the litigation and the consequences for the parties of a grant or refusal of the extension. Where an applicant seeks the issue of the constitutional or prerogative writs, a further factor must be considered. Those writs are directed at the acts or decisions of public bodies or officials, and the public interest requires that there be an end to litigation about the efficacy of such acts or decisions. In that respect, the present case, although important to the applicant, is not as important as many other cases. Nevertheless, the applicant is seeking the quashing of a decision of the AIRC made 17 months before he filed his application for relief in this Court.16. Independently of the merits of the case, I find it difficult to see how a person who, with knowledge of the decision, delays 17 months before seeking relief could ever be granted an extension of time to quash such a decision unless some conduct of the respondent or the public body or official had brought about the delay. As the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said in Ratnam v Cumarasamy, "[t]he rules of court must prima facie be obeyed". The time for seeking certiorari is six times, and the time for seeking mandamus is twice, the period in which an application for special leave to appeal to this Court can be brought against a judgment or decision. The periods for applying for certiorari and mandamus give a person affected by an adverse decision or judgment ample time in which to commence proceedings in this Court. In all but very exceptional cases, they should be rigidly applied when, as here, more than one year has elapsed between the decision and the commencement of proceedings in this Court.17. An applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice is not a ground for extending the time for seeking mandamus or the ancillary writ of certiorari. Upon the expiry of the time for the issue of a constitutional writ against a decision or judgment, the respondent has a vested right to retain the judgment or decision. Its rights should not be dependent on whether the applicant can at some future time obtain a favourable legal opinion that he or she has an arguable case. In addition, the efficacy of public acts, decisions and judgments cannot be the hostage of an applicant's search for favourable legal advice. In all but exceptional cases, the inability of an applicant to obtain favourable advice within the two month period for mandamus and the six month period for certiorari is a strong indicator that he or she has no case for relief. That is the case here. The applicant has no arguable case for relief. If it should turn out that, by reason of negligent advice, an applicant was deprived of the right to quash a decision or to have it made or to have some duty carried out, the applicant will have his or her remedy against the lawyer or lawyers concerned.” (Emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established