WORKERS COMPENSATION - Commonwealth employee - calculation of "normal weekly earnings" for employee invalided in 1985 - regime in Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act1988 (Cth) to take account of salary increases subsequent to invalidation.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - meaning of phrase "increment in a range of salary" in s 8 of Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act1988 (Cth) - whether it encompasses increases negotiated in an Australian workplace agreement under Workplace Relations Act1996 (Cth) - purposive construction - legislative intent - "equity of the statute".
Senior Executive Service (Salaries and Specific Conditions) Award 1995 Continuous Improvement in the Australian Public Service Enterprise Agreement 1995-96
2. the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
A 22 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
COMCARE APPLICANT
AND:
STEPHEN THOMPSON RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
FINN J
DATE:
15 JUNE 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN CANBERRA)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In introducing the chapter on "The Equity of the Statute" in Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol 2B, 5th Ed, it is stated:
"§54.01The spirit of a statute as a guide to its interpretation
People often speak with illustrative particularity when their object is to communicate a general principle or idea. If a court believes this has happened in a legislative text, it will implement the general principle by applying the statutory rule to situations other than those particularly mentioned in the statute. In this circumstance it is said that the decision is…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Comcare v Thompson [2000] FCA 790
Case
[2000] FCA 790
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Comcare v Thompson involved Mr Thompson, an employee of the Commonwealth, who sought to have salary increases obtained by other Senior Executive Service (SES) officers via individually negotiated Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) factored into his compensation after suffering a compensable injury. The dispute was reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and ultimately determined by the Federal Court of Australia. The central legal issue was whether section 8(6)(c) of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (Cth) could accommodate salary increases resulting from AWAs, particularly whether these increases should be considered "increments in a range of salary, wages or pay" for the purposes of compensation. The AAT initially ruled that Mr Thompson's compensation should reflect the salary increases negotiated by subsequent SES officers, finding that the term "increment" in the Act should be interpreted broadly to include any salary increase.
The Federal Court, however, disagreed with the AAT's broad interpretation of "increment". It held that the term should not be extended beyond its ordinary meaning as it would defeat the purpose of the Act. The Court found that the AAT had not adequately considered the statutory context and the specific wording of the Act, which suggested a narrower interpretation of "increment". Consequently, the Court set aside the AAT's decision and remitted the matter back for redetermination, emphasising that the Act's purpose and object should guide its interpretation. The Court did not provide a definitive answer on the compensation issue but directed the AAT to reconsider the matter in light of its interpretation of the statutory language.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. the decision of the Tribunal be set aside;
2. the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
FINN J
19. On 6 July 1999, Mr Thompson applied to the AAT for review of the decision of 1 July 1999.The Tribunal's Decision The issue for the Tribunal was whether s 8(6) - and in particular s 8(6)(c) - of the SRC Act could accommodate itself to salary increases obtained by SES officers as a result of individually negotiated AWAs. The Tribunal recognised that since the introduction of the AWA system the occupants of Mr Thompson's former position had negotiated salaries that replaced the previous "cross the board" fixed salary system embodying incremental increases. Candidly the Tribunal acknowledged that "[s]ubsection 8(6)(c) of the SRC Act was not drafted with this system of wage fixing in mind. It has not been amended to accommodate the change." But it likewise asked whether, if s 8(6)(c) did not admit of a construction that included increases in pay that had been individually negotiated, then was Mr Thompson's "compensation to be 'frozen' as a consequence of the introduction of AWAs?" Resorting to the concept of "legitimate" or "reasonable expectation", the Tribunal found that, had he remained in his position, Mr Thompson would have had the expectation that his remuneration would be based on an AWA and it was likely that he would have obtained an AWA as favourable as that negotiated by his successors. From this it found that the best evidence of the increases in salary he was likely to have received was "the salary currently being paid to the occupant of the position". It then asked whether, for the purposes of s 8(6)(c) of the SRC Act, those increases fell within the meaning of "increment in a range of salary, wages or pay". By the taking of two steps, it found that it did. The first step involved the interpretation of "increment". The Tribunal reasoned:"36. The Macquarie Dictionary provides the following meanings of 'increment': 1. Something added or gained; an addition or increase. 2. Profit. 3. The act or process of progression within a graduated scale of salaries, designed to reward an employee for increases in skill or experience. The last meaning clearly incorporates the term of art that the word 'increment' has assumed in the APS. The definition of 'increment' is broad enough to bear the meaning of any increase in salary, wage or pay. That the drafters of the SRC Act envisaged a particular meaning to be attributed to it is not reason enough for the word to be given only that restricted meaning when it can bear a wider meaning more beneficial to the applicant." It was emboldened to take the step of ascribing the wider meaning to the word:"37. The SRC Act is a remedial statute beneficial in nature. His Honour Justice McHugh observed in Saraswati v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1 at 21 that if the literal or grammatical meaning of a provision does not give effect to the purpose of the legislation, that meaning cannot be regarded as 'the ordinary meaning' and cannot prevail. In circumstances whereby 'cross the board' graduated increments in salaries are, so far as the position is concerned, a thing of the past, such a restricted meaning would be contrary to the spirit of the Act. The SRC Act must be construed such that the purpose and object of the Act will be served (see DP Blow in Re Spurr and Comcare (1999) 28 AAR 424 at 428)."