Minister for Immigration v Yucesan
[2008] FMCA 317
•19 March 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION v YUCESAN & ANOR | [2008] FMCA 317 |
| MIGRATION – Visa – Prospective Marriage (Temporary) (Class TO) visa – principles of statutory interpretation – purpose – purposive approach – context – extrinsic materials – words of cl.300.214 of Schedule 2 have to be interpreted in their legislative context – the true meaning of cl.300.214 is a question of law. WORDS & PHRASES – “Meet” – “met” – whether parties have to meet face-to-face – whether parties can meet by internet or video telephony – communication by Skype – no reviewable error. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.4,359C, 476 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), ss.15AA, 15 AB Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth), s.13 Migration Regulations1994 (Cth), cl.300.214 of schedule 2 Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1996 No 211 |
| Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd; Collector of Customs v Pressure Tankers Pty Ltd (1993) 115 ALR 1 referred to Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Cohen (2001) 177 ALR 473 referred to Saraswati v The Queen (1990-1991) 172 CLR 1 referred to NAQF v Minister for Immigration (2003) 130 FCR 456 referred to An v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 97 followed Chang v Laidley Shire Council [2007] HCA 37 followed Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZAYW (2005) 145 FCR 523; [2005] FCAFC 154 referred to CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club (1997) 187 CLR 384 followed Communications Electrical Electronic Energy Information Postal Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2007] FCAFC 132 referred to Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 referred to Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert (1997) 186 CLR 389 referred to |
| Applicant: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION |
| First Respondent: | DEMET YUCESAN |
| Second Respondent: | MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2398 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Scarlett FM |
| Hearing date: | 15 November 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 15 November 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 19 March 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr G.J. Johnson |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Australian Government Solicitor |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr N. Poynder |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Thomas Booler & Co |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2398 of 2007
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION |
Applicant
And
| DEMET YUCESAN |
First Respondent
| MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Application
This is an application by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship for review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal. On 25th June 2007 the Tribunal made this decision:
The Tribunal remits the application for a Prospective Marriage (Temporary) (Class TO) visa for reconsideration, with the direction that the visa applicant meets the following criteria for a Subclass 300 (Prospective Marriage) visa:
· cl.300.211 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations;
· cl.300.212 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations;
· cl.300.213 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations;
· cl.300.214 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations;
· cl.300.215 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations;
· cl.300.216 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations; and
· cl.300.221 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.
The Minister claims that the purported decision of the Tribunal is infected by jurisdictional error in that the Tribunal misconstrued Clause 300.214 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994.
The particulars of that claim are that the Tribunal erred in finding that the clause, which is one of the criteria prescribed by the Regulations as having to be satisfied at the time of the application for a subclass 300 (Prospective Marriage) visa and provides for a requirement that the “parties have met and are known to each other personally”, can be satisfied by “non physical person-to-person interactions”, such as contact by “letter, telephone or internet”.
The Minister claims that the Tribunal erred in failing to find that the clause requires “the parties” to have met in person.
Background
The visa applicant, Hasan Ilhan, applied to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship for a Prospective Marriage (Temporary) (Class TO) visa on 3rd January 2006. He is a citizen of Turkey who lives in Turkey. The review applicant, Demet Yucesan, is an Australian citizen who was born in Australia. She lives in Sydney.
The review applicant stated that her family and Mr Ilhan’s family were close friends and she was introduced to him through their families, as is the Turkish custom. The review applicant stated that she had seen photographs of Mr Ilhan and they communicated by SMS, email and telephone. They became engaged on 14th November 2005 and planned to marry on 7th April 2006.
A delegate of the Minister refused the application for a visa on 3rd April 2006. The delegate found that the application did not meet the requirements of subclass 300.215, that the parties have met and are known to each other. The delegate considered that the word “met” meant a physical meeting, saying:
I do not consider, on the basis of the conflicting statements provided and the evidence of the sponsor’s movement record that the applicant and the sponsor have physically met.
I do not consider internet, telephone and SMS communication meet the ordinary definition of met.[1]
[1] Court book at 38
The review applicant, who is the visa applicant’s sponsor and the first respondent to the application brought in this court, applied to the Migration Review Tribunal on 8th June 2006 for a review of the delegate’s decision. With her application, she provided a letter dated 5th June 2006, in which she said:
Further to the decision made by your department, I say that I may not have met the applicant in person, but that does not mean I have not met my fiancé through photos and the internet. The word “meeting” or “met” in Turkish has a double meaning. It not only means a “physical” connection it can also mean “non-physical” as well.
I was introduced to my fiancé by way of photos and family introductions. Respective families arrange engagements and the marriages. As previously advised maintained communication by way of telephone, email and mobile SMS messages.[2]
[2] Court Book at 46
Application to the Migration Review Tribunal
The Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing on 9th May 2007. The applicant attended the hearing, accompanied by her parents and two family friends. She produced some documentary evidence, including photographs and email print-outs.
After the hearing, the Tribunal on 18th May 2007, asking for additional information under the provisions of s.359(2) of the Migration Act 1958. The information that the Tribunal sought included a Notice of Intended Marriage signed and dated by an authorized marriage celebrant indicating the date and place of the planned wedding ceremony.
The review applicant forwarded to the Tribunal a Notice of Intended marriage signed by Unal Vardar, a minister of religion and authorized marriage celebrant, showing that a marriage ceremony had been arranged for 20th October 2007.
The Migration Review Tribunal Decision
The Tribunal handed down its decision on 4th July 2007. The effect of the decision was that the Tribunal had decided to remit the application for the visa to the Minister’s delegate, requiring the delegate to reconsider the application.[3]
[3] A copy of the Tribunal Decision Record appears at pages 63 to 69 of the Court Book
The Decision Record sets out the Claims and Evidence, including the evidence given at the hearing. Mr Ilhan gave evidence by telephone. The Tribunal recorded this evidence:
Asked about the circumstances in which they came to know of each other, the applicants confirmed their account of having been introduced through their families. A witness, Tijen Akdogan, stated that she was the visa applicant’s cousin and that she had mentioned the review applicant to him as a possible match during a visit she made to Turkey in 2005. The applicants stated that they are in regular contact by telephone, MSN-messaging and emails and that they have maintained this contact over two years.[4]
[4] Court Book at 66
The Tribunal’s Findings and Reasons can be found at pages 67 and 68 of the Court Book. The Tribunal was satisfied that the requirements of clauses 300.211, 300.212 and 300.213 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations had been met. As to the requirements of Clause 300.214, the Tribunal had this to say:
Clause 300.214 requires that at the time of application the parties have met and are known to each other personally. The Tribunal finds that at the time of application the parties had not met in person. The Tribunal notes, however, that the term ‘met’ is capable of differing interpretations and that it may go beyond the sense of meeting face-to-face by including less direct forms of contact such as letter, telephone or internet. The validity of such an interpretation is reinforced by rapid developments in communication technology which facilitate cheap and easy messaging, including internet telephony and video telephony. While the Tribunal notes that on this issue PAM[5] prefers the more traditional interpretation, this is a policy interpretation only and not therefore binding on the Tribunal. The Tribunal is satisfied that the ordinary meaning of the words “met and known to each other personally” does not exclude non physical person-to-person interactions. In the present case, although the evidence concerning contact between the applicants is somewhat sparse the Tribunal is prepared to accept that at the time of application they had met, albeit indirectly, and that in the course of regular contacts they can be said to have come to know each other personally. The Tribunal accepts that they have maintained their level of contact since that time up to the time of decision. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the requirements of cl.300.214 of Schedule 2 are met.[6]
[5] Policy Advisory Manual
[6] Court Book at 67-68
The Tribunal went on to find that it was satisfied that the requirements of cl.300.215, cl.300.216, cl.300.221 and cl.300.221A of Schedule 2 had all been met. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the application for review must succeed. The Tribunal found that the appropriate course was to remit the application for the visa to the Department to consider the remaining criteria for a Subclass 300 visa.
Application for Judicial Review
The Minister brought an application for judicial review by means of an application and in affidavit in support filed on 3rd August 2007. The Minister seeks the following declaration and orders:
(1)A declaration that the purported decision of the second respondent[7] is not a privative clause decision, and is void and of no effect.
(2)A writ of certiorari directed to the second respondent removing into this Court the purported decision to be quashed.
(3)A writ of mandamus directed to the second respondent to determine the first respondent’s application for review according to law.
(4)Such other relief as the Court considers appropriate.
(5)Costs.
[7] The Migration Review Tribunal
Although no response appears to have been filed, the first respondent opposes the orders sought. The second respondent filed a submitting appearance.
Submissions
For the Minister, Mr Johnson submitted that the true meaning of clause 300.214 is a question of law and there is but one true construction of that requirement.[8] The criterion is a conjunctive one. It requires both that:
(1)“the parties have met”; and
(2)they “are known to each other personally”.
[8] Applicant’s Submissions filed 13 November 2007
For the parties to have “met” involves more than their merely having communicated in some way, or having come to know each other. He referred to the Concise Oxford Dictionary definition of the word “meet” which shows that the word has a number of meanings, but he submitted that “coming together at the same time and place”, or the idea of coming together face-to-face, are clearly amongst those meanings and the most common.
Mr Johnson submitted that the words of clause 300.214 have to be interpreted in their legislative context, and the meaning to be given to the word “met” is plainly that which will promote its purpose or object. He referred the court to s 13(1) of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 which applies the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 to the construction of legislative instruments. Section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act provides that:
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.
Further, s.15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act enables the use of extrinsic material to ascertain the purpose or object underlying legislation.
Mr Johnson submitted that the form of regulation 300.214 was substituted into the criteria for the subclass 300 visa by regulation 118 of SR 211 of 1996. The predecessor form of clause 300.214 read:
Unless the marriage has been arranged in accordance with traditional custom observed by the family of either or both of the parties, the parties are known to each other personally.
The explanatory statement for Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1996 no 211 (SR211 of 1996) says:
Subregulation 118.3 amends clause 300.214 by substituting a clause that requires that the parties to the proposed marriage have met and are known to each other personally. The purpose of this amendment is to curtail abuse of the previous provision for arranged marriages.
Counsel for the Minister submitted that the purpose of curtailing abuse of the previous provision for arranged marriages is plainly aided by requiring “the parties” (i.e. “the applicant and the prospective spouse”) to have physically met, or come into contact face-to-face.
Mr Johnson submitted that the Tribunal did not have regard to those considerations and made no effort to deal with the legislative history of the provision or its object or purpose. To conclude, as did the Tribunal, that the requirement contained in clause 300.214 can be met by such forms of contact as “letter, telephone or internet” is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the words of the clause and may obviously serve to frustrate its object or purpose. It is not enough that the parties know each other personally. They must have met in the physical face-to-face sense. That is the meaning, he submitted, that promotes the purpose or object of the clause.
Counsel for the first respondent, Mr Poynder, submitted that there was no error of law. The term “met” is not defined in the legislation. It is an ordinary non-technical word.
He submitted that the approach to determining the interpretation of words in a statute was considered by the Full Federal Court in Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd; Collector of Customs v Pressure Tankers Pty Ltd[9] :
[9] (1993) 115 ALR 1 at 9
The proper interpretation, construction and application of a statute to a given case raise issues which may be or involve questions of fact or law or mixed fact or law. Nevertheless there are five general propositions which emerge from the cases:
(1) The question of whether a word or phrase in a statute is to be given its ordinary meaning or some technical or other meaning is a question of law.[10]
(2) The ordinary meaning of a word or its non-technical meaning is a question of fact.
[10] Citations omitted
(3) The meaning of a technical legal term is a question of law.
(4) The effect or construction of a term whose meaning or interpretation is established is a question of law.
(5) The question whether facts fully found fall within the provision of a statutory enactment properly construed is generally a question of law.
Mr Poynder went on to submit that the meaning of ordinary, non-technical words is a question of fact and not therefore amenable to jurisdictional error (see Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Cohen.[11]).
[11] (2001) 177 ALR 473 at [35]-[38]
Mr Poynder submitted that the Tribunal asked itself the correct question, whether the first respondent had “met” Mr Ilhan. Even if the Tribunal erroneously reasoned that the first respondent had met him despite never having seen him face-to-face, this was only an error of fact and was not, therefore, jurisdictional error.
In any event, even if the word “met” is a question of law, Mr Poynder submitted that the Tribunal did not misconstrue the word by applying it to a situation where the parties had only been in contact by letter, telephone and the internet. The starting point when determining the meaning of a legislative provision is its ‘ordinary meaning”, ascertained by the text itself, but also taking into account the context of the text and the purpose or object underlying the legislation.[12] A court cannot depart from the “ordinary meaning” of a legislative provision simply because that meaning produces anomalies.
[12] Acts Interpretation Act, s 15AB(1)(a), also Saraswati v The Queen (1990-1991) 172 CLR 1 at 22 (per McHugh J)
Mr Poynder referred the Court to the Macquarie Dictionary[13] where there are several definitions of the word “meet” and contended that the definitions are not exclusively of each other, so that a definition such as “to come into personal acquaintance with” does not necessarily require face-to-face contact.
[13] online edition, http:>
He submitted that the extrinsic materials referred to by counsel for the Minister did not support the contention that “met” only means “met face-to-face”. The re-wording of clause 300.214 in 1996 was not plainly done to ensure that parties had physically met or had come into face-to-face contact. He submitted that the explanatory memorandum gave the express reason for the amendment as “to curtail abuse of the previous provision for arranged marriages’. It was not clear how including a new phrase “have met and’ could contribute to his intention, but it was furthered by removing the exception “Unless the marriage has been arranged in accordance with traditional custom observed by the family of either or both parties”. The reason for the amendment was plainly to remove the exception for arranged marriages.
Mr Poynder also submitted that there was nothing elsewhere to suggest that the purpose or object underlying the legislation is furthered by interpreting “met” as meaning “met face-to-face”. The statement of objects in s.4 of the Migration Act is extremely general and it is not possible to identify form the Act as a whole any purpose or underlying object with such precision as would enable one to say that a particular provision would or would not promote that purpose or object (see NAQF v Minister for Immigration[14]
[14] (2003) 130 FCR 456 at [71] (Lindgren J)
In a submission in reply, Mr Johnson of counsel contended that the first respondent’s submission that the meaning of the word “met” was a question of fact and that no question of jurisdictional error arises is misconceived. The true construction of clause 300.214 is a question of law, as is the meaning to be given to the word “met” in the context in which it appears.
Mr Johnson relies on the following authorities:
·An v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 97 at [2]-[7] per Lindgren J and [82]-[83] per Emmett J;
·Chang v Laidley Shire Council [2007] HCA 37 at [41]-[44];
·Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZAYW (2005) 145 FCR 523 at [59]-[65];
·CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408;
·Communications Electrical Electronic Energy Information Postal Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2007] FCAFC 132 at [202];
·Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381-382 [69]-[71] 384, [78]; and
·Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert (1997) 186 CLR 389 at 395-397.
Conclusions
The decision in An v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship was an appeal heard by the Full Court of the Federal Court from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court. Pascoe CFM had dismissed the applicants’ application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal.
The relevant issue concerned the Federal Magistrates Court’s finding that the Tribunal’s conclusion that an appointment was not “exceptional” was properly a finding of fact. Lindgren J stated these principles:
4.First, although the ordinary meaning or common understanding that a simple non-technical English word conveys in the community is a matter of fact (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Cohen (2001) 177 ALR 473 at [35] per McHugh J and cases there cited), indeed a matter of fact of which judicial notice may be taken, this is often an insufficient proposition on which cases can be decided…
5.Second, whether facts fully found answer a statutory description or statutory criteria, properly construed, may be exclusively a question of law…
6.Third, minds may, without legal error, differ on the question whether facts that are at law capable of doing so, fall within or outside words that are used in a statute according to their ordinary or common understanding…
7.…It is necessary to carry out the legal task of exploring the meaning of the word in the particular regulatory context in which it occurs with a view to identifying, if it can be done, what is the ‘usual’ or ‘ordinary’ case that was in contemplation against which exceptionality is to be measured.[15]
[15] [2007] FCAFC 97 at [4]-[7]
In that same case, Emmett J held:
The meaning of a word in a statute or statutory instrument is a question of law, to be determined by reference to the context of the word in the statute or instrument or instrument and the purpose or object of the provision within the statute or instrument. Ordinarily, of course, a word in a statute or instrument is given its meaning in ordinary English. That is a matter of fact of which judicial notice might be taken by reference to dictionaries and the like. However, once the meaning of a word is determined, the question of whether the particular circumstances of the case fall within that word is one of fact for the relevant decision maker: so long as the finding made by the decision maker is open to it on the material before it, there would be no error of law that would constitute jurisdictional error.[16]
[16] [2007] FCAFC 97 at [83]
In Chang v Laidley Shire Council Kirby J had this to say about advances in statutory interpretation:
Traditionally, the English law and its derivatives (including in Australia) adopted a fairly strict, textual, literal, or “grammatical” approach to interpretation.[17] However, in more recent years, in part because of a growing understanding of how ideas and purposes are actually communicated by words, this Court, English courts and other courts of high authority throughout the common law world have embraced a broader, contextual reading of statutory language and other texts having legal effects.
Specifically, this Court has accepted that it is an error of interpretive approach to take a word or phrase in legislation and to read that word or phrase divorced from its immediately surrounding provisions (and any other relevant indicia of meaning such as legislative history, stated purposes and admissible extrinsic materials. Once it was thought necessary that there should be an ‘ambiguity’ in the word before that wider search was proper, or even permissible. Recent authority of this Court has rejected that requirement.[18]
[17] footnotes deleted
[18] [2007] HCA 37 at [43]-[44]
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZAYW[19] the question raised was whether a hearing was held “in private” as required by s.429 of the Migration Act. Weinberg J in his judgment made a few preliminary remarks about statutory construction:
There has been a marked change in the approach to statutory construction over the past 30 years or so. The so-called ‘literal’ approach has been abandoned in favour of what is now often described as a purposive and contextual approach.
60In Palgo Holdings Pty Ltd v Gowans (2005) 215 ALR 253 at 262, Kirby J set out “three interpretive principles: that he regarded as governing modern statutory interpretation: ‘purpose’, ‘context’ and the greater regard now had to extrinsic materials.
61In Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 410 at 424, McHugh JA, as his Honour then was, observed that a search for the grammatical meaning of the words in the statute ‘still constitutes the starting point’. His Honour noted, however, that if that meaning did not give effect tot the purpose of the statute, it could not prevail. It had to give way to the construction that would promote the purpose or object of the Act. So much is clear, in any event from s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).
62Of course, the form of purposive construction required by s 15AA provides no ‘warrant for redrafting legislation nearer to an assumed desire of the legislature’: Comcare v Thompson (2000) 100 FCR 375 at [40] per Finn J…
[19] (2005) 145 FCR 523; [2005] FCAFC 154
His Honour went on to warn:
It goes without saying that this focus upon a purposive approach does not authorise the courts to legislate a meaning to promote the purpose or object underlying a statute unless that meaning can properly be discerned from the words of the Act itself.[20]
[20] (2005) 145 FCR at 523
As to the use of extrinsic materials, in CIC Insurance Limited v Bankstown Football Club Limited[21] Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ held:
It is well settled that at common law, apart from any reliance upon s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), the court may have regard to reports of law reform bodies to ascertain the mischief which a statute is intended to cure.[22]
[21] (1995-1997) 187 CLR 384
[22] (1995-1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408
The decision of the High Court in Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority[23] urges a purposive approach to statutory interpretation:
Furthermore, a court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision.[24]
[23] (1998) 194 CLR 355
[24] (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [71]
Mr Johnson submits that the question to be asked is “What is the meaning of a word in this statutory context?” That, he submitted, is a question of law.
Conclusions
I am satisfied from the above authorities that the words of clause 300.214 have to be interpreted in their legislative context, and the meaning to be given to the word “met” is plainly that which will promote its purpose or object. The true meaning of cl.300.214 is a question of law (see An v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship at [83]).
To consider the use of the word “met” in its statutory context, it is useful to consider extrinsic material (see Chang v Laidley Shire Council at [44]; CIC Insurance v Bankstown Football Club at 408; Acts Interpretation Act, s.15AB). It is permissible, and indeed useful, to consider the explanatory statement for Migration Regulations (Amendment)1996 no 211 (SR211 of 1996) (previously quoted):
Subregulation 118.3 amends clause 300.214 by substituting a clause that requires that the parties to the proposed marriage have met and are known to each other personally. The purpose of this amendment is to curtail abuse of the previous provision for arranged marriages.
Again, the Court considers the legislative history of the provision (Chang v Laidley Shire Council at [44]). The now-superseded wording of cl.300.214 was:
Unless the marriage has been arranged in accordance with traditional custom observed by the family of either or both of the parties, the parties are known to each other personally.
For the Minister, it is submitted that the requirement for the parties to have met must mean meeting physically, face-to-face, in order to achieve the purpose of the clause, which is to curtail abuse of the previous provision for arranged marriages. However, it does not follow that the meaning of meeting face-to-face is necessary to prevent the abuse of the previous provision for arranged marriages.
In my view, it can be argued that meeting by internet or video telephony is at least as effective way for parties to meet and form an opinion about each other’s compatibility as a future marriage partner as the current phenomenon of “speed dating”. The face-to-face meeting for five or so minutes in speed dating would meet the definition of “met” argued by counsel for the Minister, but a lengthy series of conversations over “Skype”[25] would not.
[25] A software program that allows people to make free calls to others over the Internet for an unlimited period.
I am satisfied that the Tribunal did not fall into error when it found that it was satisfied that the ordinary meaning of the words “met and known to each other personally” did not exclude non physical person-to-person interactions.
As there is no jurisdictional error, it follows that the Tribunal decision is a privative clause decision and orders in the nature of certiorari and mandamus are not available.
The application will be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (522) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Scarlett FM
Associate: S.Polley
Date: 10 March 2008
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