Child and Adolescent Health Service v Mabior

Link copied
Case Copied 83 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   CHILD AND ADOLESCENT HEALTH SERVICE -v- SUNDAY JOHN MABIOR by next friend MARY KELEI [2019] WASCA 151

CORAM:   QUINLAN CJ

MURPHY JA

PRITCHARD JA

HEARD:   19-20 MARCH 2019

DELIVERED          :   27 SEPTEMBER 2019

FILE NO/S:   CACV 21 of 2018

BETWEEN:   CHILD AND ADOLESCENT HEALTH SERVICE

Appellant

AND

SUNDAY JOHN MABIOR by next friend MARY KELEI

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   DERRICK DCJ

Citation: MABIOR by her Next Friend MARY KELEI -v- CHILD AND ADOLESCENT HEALTH SERVICE [2018] WADC 12

File Number             :   CIV 3062 of 2008


Catchwords:

Tort - Negligence - Medical negligence - Allegation of failure of doctors to recognise that patient had sepsis - Whether patient was suffering from sepsis - Challenge to findings of fact - Advantages of trial judge - Whether adequate reasons for findings of fact

Negligence - Breach of duty of care - Standard of care for health professionals - Whether act or omission in accordance with a practice widely accepted by peers as competent professional practice - Requirement for evidence of a practice

Legislation:

Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B, s 5PB

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : Mr G R Donaldson SC
Respondent : Mr T Lampropoulos SC

Solicitors:

Appellant : Panetta Mcgrath Lawyers
Respondent : Maurice Blackburn

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Abalos v Australian Postal Commission [1990] HCA 47; (1990) 171 CLR 167

Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1

Brett v Rees [2009] WASCA 159

Browne v Dunne (1894) 6 R 67

Chief Executive Officer, Department for Child Protection and Family Support v IGR [2019] WASCA 20

Christos v Curtin University of Technology [2017] WASCA 110

Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 49 FCR 211

Dobler v Halverson [2007] NSWCA 335; (2007) 70 NSWLR 151

DRA Industries Pty Ltd v Kuredale Pty Ltd [2018] WASCA 17

Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2013] HCA 25; (2013) 250 CLR 392

Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28

Lightfoot v Rockingham Wild Encounters Pty Ltd [2018] WASCA 205

Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705

McKenna v New England & Hunter Local Health District [2013] NSWCA 476

New England & Hunter Local Health District v McKenna [2014] HCA 44; (2014) 253 CLR 270

Smart v Power [2019] WASCA 106

South Western Sydney Local Health District v Gould [2018] NSWCA 69; (2018) 97 NSWLR 513

Sparks v Hobson [2018] NSWCA 29; (2018) 361 ALR 115

Sydney South West Area Health Service v MD [2009] NSWCA 343; (2009) 260 ALR 702

Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9; (2014) 253 CLR 531

Western Australia v Watson [1990] WAR 248

Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12

X and Y (by her tutor X) v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26

Table of Contents

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Child and Adolescent Health Service v Mabior and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] WASCA 151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was brought by the Child and Adolescent Health Service against Mabior, concerning an allegation of medical negligence related to the treatment of the respondent, a child, who had sustained burns. The crux of the dispute was whether the doctors failed to recognise that the child had sepsis, leading to an alleged deterioration in her condition. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The court was tasked with determining several legal issues. These included whether the trial judge had erred in fact and law by not considering certain medical evidence and by preferring the opinions of some experts over others. The court also needed to decide if the trial judge had properly interpreted the standard of care required of health professionals and whether the hospital had adequately demonstrated adherence to practices widely accepted by peers as competent professional practice.

In its reasoning, the court found that the trial judge had not erred in considering the medical evidence and expert opinions. The court upheld the trial judge's assessment of the probative value of the various expert opinions and the relevance of the medical literature cited. The court further found that the trial judge had correctly applied the statutory provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 concerning the standard of care and the requirement for evidence of accepted practices. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, affirming the trial judge's findings and conclusions.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The grounds of appeal that were maintained at the hearing of the appeal are as follows (particulars omitted):1.The trial judge erred in law by failing to consider and determine an essential issue, being that for a child of the Respondent's… age who suffers partial thickness and deep dermal burns to less than 20% of her body, the chance of developing [ARDS] as a result of [SIRS] in the absence of sepsis is very low; Judgment [670]. The trial judge ought to have found that the fact that [the respondent] had partial thickness and deep dermal burns to less than 20% of her body, and had developed ARDS as a result of SIRS, was not relevant to whether on the evening of 10 December 2005 [the respondent] had sepsis.…2.The trial judge erred in fact in finding that for a child of [the respondent's] age who suffers partial thickness and deep dermal burns to less than 20% of her body, the chance of developing ARDS as a result of SIRS in the absence of sepsis is very low, was evidenced by the absence of such cases reported in the academic literature; Judgment [670]. The trial judge ought to have found that the fact that the absence of such cases being reported in academic literature was irrelevant to whether on the evening of 10 December 2005 [the respondent] had sepsis.…3.The trial judge erred in law and in fact in finding that that the expert medical paediatric burns specialists, Professors Harvey and Kimble, were not qualified to express an opinion as to whether it was more probable than not that [the respondent] suffered from sepsis on the evening of 10 December 2005 or less qualified than other expert medical witnesses, Dr Numa, Professor Kesson and Professor Starr; Judgment [672] - [673]. The trial judge ought to have found that the expert witnesses with the greatest relevant expertise to express an opinion as to whether [the respondent], with partial thickness and deep dermal burns to less than 20% of her body, had developed ARDS as a result of SIRS caused by sepsis, on the evening of 10 December 2005 were Professors Harvey and Kimble.…4.The trial judge erred in law in finding that Dr Numa's opinions were to be preferred to those of all other expert witnesses whose opinions differed; Judgment [675]. The trial judge ought to have found that Dr Numa's opinions were of no greater probative value in determining whether on the evening of 10 December 2005 [the respondent] had sepsis, than those of Professor Starr and of less probative value than those of Professors Kimble and Harvey.…5.The trial judge erred in fact in finding that the probative value of Professor Harvey's opinion as to the cause of [the respondent] suffering ARDS was adversely affected by Professor Harvey incorrectly recalling details of a case about which he gave evidence to support his opinion; Judgment [588] - [596]. The trial judge ought to have found that there was no basis to question any opinion of Professor Harvey. …6.The trial judge erred in law and in fact in finding that the Enterobacter infection of [the respondent's] right knee burn wound caused the release of cytokines into her bloodstream which caused SIRS which caused ARDS prior to the evening of 10 December 2005; Judgment [677]. The trial judge ought to have found that the respondent had not proved that Enterobacter infection of [the respondent's] right knee burn wound caused [the respondent's] ARDS prior to the evening of 10 December 2005.…7.The trial judge erred in law and in fact in finding that by the evening of 11 December 2005 there were several features which collectively were suggestive of [the respondent] having by the evening of 10 December 2005 a bacterial infection and sepsis and not SIRS without infection; Judgment [678]- [682]. The trial judge ought to have found that the respondent had not proved that by the evening of 11 December 2005 there were several features which collectively were suggestive of [the respondent] having by the evening of 10 December 2005 a bacterial infection and sepsis and not SIRS without infection.…8.[Not pursued]9.The trial judge erred in law and fact in finding that changes to [the respondent's] white blood cell count and neutrophil count on 12 and 13 December 2005 was indicative of her having sepsis on the evening of 10 December 2005; Judgment [685]. The trial judge ought to have found that changes to [the respondent's] white blood cell count and neutrophil count on 12 and 13 December 2005 were irrelevant.…10.The trial judge erred in law and fact in rejecting the evidence of Professor Starr that bacterial infection of the bloodstream caused by infection on the surface of the skin does not usually occur within the first 24 to 48 hours of infection on the surface of the skin; Judgment [694] - [695]. The trial judge ought to have found that bacterial infection of the bloodstream caused by infection on the surface of the skin does not usually occur within the first 24 to 48 hours of infection on the surface of the skin and that thereby it was unlikely that Enterobacter infection of [the respondent's] right knee burn wound caused [the respondent's] ARDS prior to the evening of 10 December 2005.…11.The trial judge erred in law and fact in finding that by the evening of 10 December 2005 or by 3.00am on 11 December 2005 [the respondent] had sepsis; Judgment [692]. The trial judge ought to have found that the respondent had not proved that that by these times [the respondent] had sepsis.…12.The trial judge erred in law in construing s 5PB(l) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 as requiring that the Appellant prove the existence of a practice that was widely accepted by the burns ward doctors' peers as competent professional practice, in accordance with which the Appellant's officers acted; Judgment [796].13.The trial judge erred in law and fact in finding that for the purpose of s 5PB(l) of the Civil Liability Act 2002, the burns ward doctors peers included Dr Numa and Professor Kesson; Judgment [715], [717] ‑ [743].…14.The trial judge erred in law and fact in finding that the alleged breaches of duty by the burns ward doctors prior to the evening of 10 December 2005 were negligent in that the treatment of [the respondent] prior to the evening of 10 December 2005 was contrary to practice widely accepted by the burns ward doctors' peers as competent professional practice; Judgment [793], [801]. The trial judge ought to have found that [the respondent's] treatment by the burns ward doctors prior to the evening of 10 December 2005 was not negligent.…15.The trial judge erred in law and fact in finding that the alleged breaches of duty by the burns ward doctors prior to 3.00am on 11 December 2005 were negligent in that the treatment of [the respondent] prior to 3.00am on 11 December 2005 was contrary to practice widely accepted by the burns ward doctors' peers as competent professional practice; Judgment [804]-[805]. The trial judge ought to have found that [the respondent's] treatment by the burns ward doctors to 3.00am on 11 December 2005 was not negligent.…16.The trial judge erred in fact in finding that prior to the respondent being admitted to the ICU no consideration was given by any of the doctors who had been responsible for her care and treatment to the possibility that deterioration in the respondents condition was due to sepsis as opposed to fluid overload; Judgment [794].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established