JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: WREFORD -v- LYLE [No 3] [2021] WASCA 20
CORAM: QUINLAN CJ
MURPHY JA
PRITCHARD JA
HEARD: 11 MAY 2020
DELIVERED : 11 FEBRUARY 2021
FILE NO/S: CACV 7 of 2019
BETWEEN: JOVANNA WREFORD
Appellant
AND
CRAIG MAXWELL LYLE
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: BRADDOCK DCJ
Citation: WREFORD -v- LYLE [2018] WADC 173
File Number : CIV 1795 of 2016
Catchwords:
Appeal – Negligence – Motor vehicle accident – Contributory negligence – Whether trial judge erred in assessing contributory negligence – Whether trial judge erred in assessing damages
Legislation:
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA)
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)
District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA)
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors' Contribution) Act 1947 (WA)
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA)
Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | Mr D R Clyne |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | Moray & Agnew Lawyers |
Cases referred to in decision:
Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498
Alford v Magee [1952] HCA 3; (1952) 85 CLR 437
Child and Adolescent Health Service v Mabior [2019] WASCA 151; (2019) 55 WAR 208
Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194
Den Hoedt v Barwick [2006] WASCA 196; (2006) 46 MVR 30
Durani v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 172
East Metropolitan Health Service v Ellis [2020] WASCA 147
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 4; (1981) 146 CLR 336
Fremantle Lawyers Pty Ltd v Sarich [2019] WASCA 48; (2019) 54 WAR 113
Gordon v Truong [2014] NSWCA 97; (2014) 66 MVR 241
House v R [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Husher v Husher [1999] HCA 47; (1999) 197 CLR 138
Joslyn v Berryman [2003] HCA 34; 214 CLR 552
Joyce v Anderson [2020] WASCA 48; (2020) 91 MVR 334
Lee Transport Co Ltd v Watson (1940) 64 CLR 1
Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 20; (1990) 169 CLR 638
March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506
O'Connor v Insurance Commission of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 95
Paul v Rendell (1981) 34 ALR 569
R v Fraser (1995) 65 SASR 260
Smith v Zhong [2015] WASCA 202; (2015) 49 WAR 215
State Government Insurance Commission v Hitchcock (Unreported, WASC (FC), WA Library No 970089A, 11 March 1997)
Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57
Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72; (1981) 150 CLR 402
Tomlinson v Tomlinson [1980] 1 All ER 593
University of Wollongong v Metwally [No 2] [1985] HCA…
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- Case
- [2021] WASCA 20
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge made any errors in the conduct of the trial and whether the assessment of damages was outside the limits of a sound discretionary judgment. The court had to consider whether Ms Wreford's complaints about her lawyers at trial could form the basis of an appeal and whether the total damages awarded were within the range of a sound discretionary judgment.
The court found that there were no errors of law or fact on the part of the trial judge that would justify an appeal. The court's appellate powers are confined to correcting errors, and the complaints about the conduct of the trial did not constitute such errors. Regarding the assessment of damages, the court held that an appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge's assessment unless there was a wrong principle of law applied, a misapprehension of the facts, or a wholly erroneous characterisation of the plaintiff's case. The total sum awarded was within the limits of a sound discretionary judgment, even if individual components of the award were questioned.
The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's decisions on both the conduct of the trial and the assessment of damages. The judgment emphasised the limited scope of appellate review in the absence of errors of law or fact and the deference owed to the trial judge's discretionary judgment in assessing damages for personal injury.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
That proposition applies with even more force in the court's appellate jurisdiction from the District Court in the latter's civil jurisdiction.[88] As we have already observed, if no additional evidence has been admitted in an appeal, this Court's powers are confined to the correction of error on the part of the trial judge. That is because the statutory provisions conferring the appellate powers, even in the case of an appeal by way of rehearing, are construed on the basis that the power is to be exercised for the correction of error.[89][88] District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA), s 79.[89] Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194 [14] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron & Hayne JJ). Thus, in the present appeal, it is only an error of law or fact on the part of the learned trial judge that can engage the court's appellate powers. In the absence of such an error, Ms Wreford's complaints as to the conduct of her case by her lawyers at trial (even if those complaints be justified), cannot enliven the court's power to set aside the learned trial judge's judgment. Thirdly, in relation to the appeal from the assessment of damages, while the grounds of appeal challenge individual components of the learned trial judge's assessment, it must be recalled that ultimately an appeal court's concern is whether the total sum is outside the limits of a sound discretionary judgment. The assessment of damages for personal injuries in an action for negligence is not an exact science. The process of assessment 'must be governed by considerations of practical common sense in the context of the facts of the particular case'.[90] As the Privy Council observed in Paul v Rendell:[91]The assessment of damages in actions for personal injuries is not a science. A judgment as to what constitutes proper compensation in money terms for pain, suffering or deprivation of amenities of life, can only be intuitive, and the assessment of future economic loss involves a double exercise in the art of prophesying not only what the future holds for the injured plaintiff but also what the future would have held for [them] if [they] had not been injured.[90] Van Gervan v Fenton[1992] HCA 54; (1992) 175 CLR 327, 343 (Deane & Dawson JJ).[91] Paul v Rendell(1981) 34 ALR 569, 571. In this way, an assessment of damages for personal injury has many of the characteristics of a discretionary judgment.[92] For this reason an appellate court must not interfere with a trial judge's assessment of damages 'unless satisfied that he or she applied a wrong principle of law, misapprehended the facts or made a wholly erroneous characterisation of the plaintiff's case'.[93] [92] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd[1981] HCA 4; (1981) 146 CLR 336, 381 (Mason J).[93] Den Hoedt v Barwick [2006] WASCA 196; (2006) 46 MVR 30 [96] (Buss JA). Beyond that, 'an appellate court is not justified in setting aside the trial judge's assessment on the ground that the damages are excessive or inadequate, unless the amount assessed is outside of the limits of what a sound discretionary judgment could reasonably adopt'.[94] Even where the appeal court concludes that the trial judge awarded too much or too little in relation to individual components of the award, the question is whether the total sum awarded is outside the limits of a sound discretionary judgment, and not whether some portion of that total sum standing alone would call for the court's intervention.[95][94] Smith v Zhong [2015] WASCA 202; (2015) 49 WAR 215 (Smith v Zhong) [96] (Murphy JA, Buss & Newnes JJA agreeing).[95] State Government Insurance Commission v Hitchcock (Unreported, WASC (FC), WA Library No 970089A, 11 March 1997), 13 ‑ 14; (Ipp J, Wallwork & White JJ agreeing); Smith v Zhong [120] (Murphy JA, Buss & Newnes JJA agreeing).