JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION: WM -v- CEO FOR DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES [2021] WASC 325
CORAM: QUINLAN CJ
HEARD: 14 SEPTEMBER 2021
DELIVERED : 28 SEPTEMBER 2021
FILE NO/S: SJA 1089 of 2020
BETWEEN: WM
First Appellant
RM
Second Appellant
AND
CEO FOR DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES
First Respondent
TM
Second Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : CHILDREN'S COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MAGISTRATE DEWSBURY
File Number : PER/PC 629 of 2019
Catchwords:
Protection and care of children – Appeal against decision of the Children's Court – Whether child in need of protection – Whether child suffered emotional abuse – Child diagnosed with gender dysphoria – Whether error in making a protection order (until 18) – Whether court gave adequate reasons for findings – Leave to appeal refused – Appeal dismissed
Legislation:
Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA), s 7, s 8, s 28, s 37, s 44, s 45, s 46, s 47, s 55, s 133, 146, s 148, s 237, s 150
Children's Court of Western Australia Act 1988 (WA), s 35, s 41
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 7, s 8, s 9
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| First Appellant | : | W G Spyker |
| Second Appellant | : | W G Spyker |
| First Respondent | : | C J Thatcher SC |
| Second Respondent | : | R L Cohen |
Solicitors:
| First Appellant | : | Spyker Legal |
| Second Appellant | : | Spyker Legal |
| First Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Second Respondent | : | Legal Aid WA |
Cases referred to in decision:
AB v Chief Executive Officer, Department for Child Protection [2014] WASC 87
AC v CEO of Department of Child Protection and Family Services [2015] WASC 477
Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172
Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1997) 48 NSWLR 430
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
CD and EF v Chief Executive Officer, Department for Child Protection and Family Support [2017] WASC 126
Chief Executive Officer, Department for Child Protection and Family Support v IGR [2019] WASCA 20; (2019) 54 WAR 222
Child and Adolescent Health Service v Mabior [2019] WASCA 151; (2019) 55 WAR 208
East Metropolitan Health Service v Ellis [2020] WASCA 147
Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118
Joyce v Anderson [2020] WASCA 48; (2020) 91 MVR 334
Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129
Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193 (2005) 30 WAR 473
SL v Chief Executive Officer of the Department for Child Protection and Family Support [No 2] [2016] WASC 97
Table of Contents
Introduction and summary
Preliminary remarks
Statutory context
Proceedings before the Children's Court
CEO's opening
Ms Pham's evidence
Ms Burge's evidence
Ms Hunter's evidence
Dr Morton's evidence
Dr Moore's evidence
WM's evidence
RM's evidence
CM's evidence
LM's evidence
Mr Schneider's evidence
Dr Whitehall's evidence
The learned magistrate's reasons for decision
Preliminary…
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- Case
- [2021] WASC 325
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were primarily whether the CEO had demonstrated, on the balance of probabilities, that the making of the protection order was in the child's best interests. This required the court to consider the statutory criteria set out in section 8 of the Act, including the child's need for protection from harm, the capacity of the parents to provide for the child's needs, and the importance of continuity and stability in the child's life. Additionally, the court had to assess the evidence presented by both parties to determine if the threshold for making the order had been met.
In delivering its judgment, the court found that the CEO had discharged the onus of proving that the making of the protection order was in the best interests of the child. The evidence presented by the CEO, including reports from child protection officers, the child's therapist, and the child's statements, demonstrated that the child was at risk of significant harm due to the parent's ongoing drug use and history of domestic violence. The court concluded that the protection order was necessary to safeguard the child's welfare and provide the stability and support needed for the child's development.
The court made a protection order (until 18) in favour of the CEO, granting them parental responsibility for the child. The court emphasised the importance of the child's safety and well-being, noting that the order would allow for appropriate intervention and support to be provided, while also considering the child's need for continuity and stability. The order was made with conditions to ensure regular reviews and the ongoing assessment of the child's welfare.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Of particular relevance to the proceedings before the Children's Court are s 7 and s 8, which provide:7.Best interests of child are paramount considerationIn performing a function or exercising a power under this Act in relation to a child, a person, the Court or the State Administrative Tribunal must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.8.Determining best interests of child(1)In determining for the purposes of this Act what is in a child's best interests the following matters must be taken into account –(a)the need to protect the child from harm;(b)the capacity of the child's parents to protect the child from harm;(c)the capacity of the child's parents, or of any other person, to provide for the child's needs;(d)the nature of the child's relationship with the child's parents, siblings and other relatives and with any other people who are significant in the child's life;(e)the attitude to the child, and to parental responsibility, demonstrated by the child's parents;(f)any wishes or views expressed by the child, having regard to the child's age and level of understanding in determining the weight to be given to those wishes or views;(g)the importance of continuity and stability in the child's living arrangements and the likely effect on the child of disruption of those living arrangements, including separation from – (i)the child's parents; or(ii)a sibling or other relative of the child; or(iii)a carer or any other person (including a child) with whom the child is, or has recently been, living; or (iv)any other person who is significant in the child's life;(h)the need for the child to maintain contact with the child's parents, siblings and other relatives and with any other people who are significant in the child's life;(i)the child's age, maturity, sex, sexuality, background and language;(j)the child's cultural, ethnic or religious identity (including any need to maintain a connection with the lifestyle, culture and traditions of Aboriginal people or Torres Strait Islanders);(k)the child's physical, emotional, intellectual, spiritual and developmental needs;(la)the child's educational needs;(l)any other relevant characteristics of the child;(m)the likely effect on the child of any change in the child's circumstances.(2)Subsection (1) does not limit the matters that may be taken into account in determining what is in the best interests of a child. The 'Court' is defined in the Act to mean the Children's Court. Part 4 of the Act deals with the 'Protection and care of children'. It provides that the CEO, and only the CEO, may make an application for a protection order.[7] [7] Act, s 44(1). There are a variety of types of protection order, including a 'protection order (supervision)', a 'protection order (time‑limited)' and a 'protection order (until 18)'. Both a protection order (time‑limited) and a protection order (until 18) give the CEO parental responsibility for the child in respect of whom the order is made. A protection order (supervision) is a more limited order, which 'does not affect parental responsibility of any person for the child except to the extent (if any) necessary to give effect to the order'.[8][8] Act, s 47(2).