Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 672

Citation: Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 672
Parties: NATHAN CATALANO, MAUREEN & NATHAN CATALANO AS TRUSTEES OF THE EQUICAP PTY LIMITED PROVIDENT FUND (ABN 70 739 750 546) and FINE FOOD SOLUTIONZ PTY LTD (ABN 83 134 923 005) v MANAGING AUSTRALIAN DESTINATIONS PTY LIMITED (ABN 58 070 373 689), BYRON KURTH, JUY HEPNER, THE GOURMET DIM SIM COMPANY PTY LIMITED (ACN 156 541 712) and BEN LYDEN
File number: NSD 715 of 2012
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 10 July 2013
Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS LAW – oppression – remedies – winding up – deferral of order 

EVIDENCE – privilege against self-incrimination – certificate granted in respect to possible contravention by disqualified person managing a corporation

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – findings as to credit – observations of demeanour whilst not in witness box – need for caution

Legislation: Corporations Act2001 (Cth) ss 9, 206A, 206B, 232, 233, 234, 601AB
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 128
Cases cited:

Ample Source International Ltd v Bonython Metals Group Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1484, 285 ALR 488
Byrne v A J Byrne Pty Limited [2012] NSWSC 667
Chaina v Alvaro Homes Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 353
Chase Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd v North Sydney Brick and Tile Co Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 1
Doyle v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2005] HCA 78, 227 CLR 18
Dynasty Pty Ltd v Coombs (1995) 138 ALR 64, 13 ACLC 1290
Edwards v Idaville Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 1
Fitzpatrick v Cheal [2012] NSWSC 261, 264 FLR 313
Gerrard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2011] NSWSC 1156
Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304
Ground and Foundation Supports Pty Ltd v GFS Management Services Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 306, 21 ACLC 506
Harding Investments Pty Ltd v PMP Shareholdings Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 567, 282 ALR 229
HNA Irish Nominee Ltd v Kinghorn [2012] FCA 228, 290 ALR 372
Hogg v Dymock (1993) 11 ACSR 14
John J Starr (Real Estate) Pty Ltd v Robert R Andrew (A’Asia) Pty Ltd (1991) 6 ACSR 63
Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services [2011] HCA 11, 243 CLR 361
Lindsay v Health Care Complaints Commission [2010] NSWCA 194
Morgan v 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 692
Nassar v Innovative Precasters Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 342, 71 ACSR 343
Queensland Co-Operative Milling Association Ltd v Hutchison (1976) 2 ACLR 188
Re Bright Pine Mills Pty Ltd [1969] VR 1002
Re City Meat Co Pty Ltd (1983) 8 ACLR 673
Re G Jeffery (Mens Store) Pty Ltd; Re G Jeffery Ltd (1984) 9 ACLR 193
ReM Dalley & Co Pty Ltd (1968) 1 ACLR 489
Re Quest Exploration Pty Ltd (1992) 6 ACSR 659
Sanford v Sanford Courier Service Pty Ltd

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 672
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd (No 2) involved Nathan Catalano and others against Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd, a company. The dispute pertained to claims of oppression by the shareholders against the company, and the court was tasked with determining the appropriate remedies. The legal issues included whether the conduct of the shareholders amounted to oppression, and if so, the fair value of the shares in question.

The court examined the evidence and observations regarding the demeanour of the witnesses, particularly Mr Nathan Catalano and Mr Hepner. While the court acknowledged the importance of demeanour in assessing credibility, it cautioned against placing undue reliance on observations made outside the witness box. The court held that the exclusion of Mr Kurth from the management and decisions of Fine Food Solutionz constituted oppression, and when considering the overall conduct of the Catalano camp, it amounted to commercial unfairness towards Messrs Kurth and Hepner.

Regarding the valuation of the shares, the court referred to established principles in valuing shares in oppression cases, emphasizing the need to fix a fair value based on the circumstances. The court determined that the fair value of the shares should be the value they would have had at the date of the proceedings, had there been no oppressive conduct. Ultimately, the court ordered the parties to bring in Short Minutes of Orders to give effect to these reasons within 28 days.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties bring in Short Minutes of Orders to give effect to these reasons within 28 days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As a very general observation, it is concluded that Mr Hepner gave his evidence in an honest and forthright fashion. There is far less reason, it is concluded, to question Mr Hepner’s evidence as opposed to that of Mr Nathan Catalano. Observations as to demeanour – but not whilst giving evidence On many occasions findings as to credit are founded, in part, upon a trial judge’s observations of a witness whilst in the witness box. On few occasions, reference is also made by a trial judge to observations of a witness whilst in court when another is giving evidence. Such a question arose in the present proceeding. Observations were made as to the reaction (for example) of Mr Nathan Catalano to some of the evidence being given by Mr Hepner. Those reactions included obvious rejection and perhaps disbelief as to the evidence of Mr Hepner. Whether reliance could be placed upon such observations was a question raised with Counsel during the course of submissions – it then being uncertain whether such observations may or could assist in resolving the submissions otherwise being made as to the credit of witnesses. Both Counsel expressed a degree of caution as to the reliance that should be placed upon such observations. One factor alone which would support an approach of caution is the fact that a trial judge may well observe conduct occurring behind the bar table and hence not observed by either the instructing solicitors or Counsel. An ability to make meaningful submissions, except possibly on instructions, would thus be limited. The difficulties in such circumstances were canvassed in part by Kirby P (as his Honour then was) in Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304 at 313-314 as follows: 6. By conventional theory, the observations made by a trial judge of the appearance and demeanour of a witness giving evidence are not only available to be used in the determination of a dispute but amount to important ingredients of the decision-making process. They normally provide the primary decision-maker a distinct advance which controls, and even limits, the exercise by the appellate court of its statutory functions in an appeal by way of re-hearing …Justice is not truly blind. A decision-maker (whether judge or magistrate), sitting in a courtroom is not blinkered. The decision-maker observes the drama which is played out in the well of the courtroom. As Jacobs J remarked in [Jobst v Inglis (1986) 41 SASR 399] parties and witnesses frequently sit in court and grimace, frown, laugh and otherwise display facial and body language which it is virtually impossible for the decision-maker to fail to see. Burt CJ said, on his retirement, that he had whiled away the boring parts of cases by counting the panels at the back of his courtroom. Judges without panels are usually confined, when attention strays from parties, witnesses or their representatives, to observing those seated before them. It is impossible, in the geographical layout of a courtroom to do much else. The appearance of a witness as he or she approaches the witness-box may properly be taken into account where agility and ease of movement are in contest. To require otherwise would be to require a division of the mind quite unrealistic in the case of a jury and equally artificial for judicial officers. In this modern age, the suggestion that a form of transmogrification of the witness occurs by administration of the oath (or taking the affirmation) so that body language and facial features or other elements of the demeanour can be taken into account thereafter but not a moment before, would involve a rigidity and artificiality which the law should reject. So long as the conventional theory reigns that observations of a party or other witness are an important and legitimate element in curial decision-making, it is appropriate to permit at least the observations to be taken into account which occur inside the courtroom. However this conclusion leaves the question of notification to the parties and their representatives where the observations have occurred, as here, outside the actual period of the trial and when the person being observed is at the back of the court behind the representatives of the parties who thus have no opportunity to observe the features in question and by interrogation, evidence or advocacy, to persuade the decision-maker to a different view about them than has been formed;7. So far as the duty to alert the parties or their representatives of such matters is concerned, it involves, as Davidson J acknowledged in Hodge v Williams [(1947) 47 SR (NSW) 489 at 492], the drawing of “a very fine line between what is proper and improper”. Or between what is essential and unnecessary. Inevitably, the point at which that line will be drawn depends upon the circumstances of the case. Matters relevant will include the opportunity which the parties have had to respond to the considerations in question; the significance of those considerations for the decision under challenge; and the apparent importance which the decision-maker attaches to the undisclosed material in reaching the decision. Courts have offered various formulae to describe the way in which the “fine line” is to be drawn in a hard case …

Decision

Reasons for decision

Taken by itself, the extent to which Mr Kurth was initially excluded from the management of Fine Food Solutionz may thus not have made out a claim of oppression. But the later exclusion of Mr Kurth from decisions of central relevance to the business does evidence and make out a claim for oppression. Taken together with the other claims of oppression being made, the conclusion as to oppression by reason of his exclusion from the management of the company is only further reinforced.Conclusions Taken individually, one or other of the aspects of the dealings between those in the Catalano camp may thus not constitute oppression as to the interests of Messrs Kurth and Hepner. Other aspects of those dealings, it is respectfully concluded, do constitute oppression. That which is beyond doubt, however, is that the conduct of those in the Catalano camp – taken as a whole – constitutes oppression of the interests of Messrs Kurth and Hepner. Taken as a whole, it is concluded that those in the Catalano camp have treated Messrs Kurth and Hepner in a manner which can readily and objectively be described as “commercial unfairness”. When resolving the claims as to oppression advanced on behalf of Messrs Kurth and Hepner, the Court – it is considered – should not take “a narrow view” and consider individual aspects of conduct separate and discrete from the overall conduct of those said to have exerted oppression. That conclusion leaves open the remedy to the granted. Central to that question is the value to be given to the shares in Fine Food Solutionz.THE VALUATION OF THE SHARES Two separate issues were potentially presented for resolution, namely:·the general principles to be applied in valuing the shares in Fine Food Solutionz; and ·the facts going to that valuation. General principles When making an order for the purchase of shares, the task of the Court is to fix a price that represents a fair value in all the circumstances: Smith Martis Cork v Benjamin Corporation Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 153 at [71], 207 ALR 136 at 146 per Wilcox, Marshall and Jacobson JJ. General principles and some of the authorities as to the valuation of shares in oppression cases were summarised as follows by W B Campbell J in Queensland Co-Operative Milling Association Ltd v Hutchison (1976) 2 ACLR 188 at 192-193: In Meyer v Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society [1957] SC 110, the First Division of the Court of Session made an order pursuant to s 210 of the Companies Act 1948 (UK), corresponding to the Qld s 186, that certain respondents purchase the petitioners’ shares in a company at a price of £3/15/ - per share. In the circumstances of this case I think it important to set out the following passages from the judgments. In his reasons, Lord Sorn said, at 156: The conditions of the section being satisfied, there remains only the questions of remedy. In the circumstances of this case, it is manifest that the only appropriate remedy is to make the majority shareholder, that is to say, the society, purchase the petitioners’ shares at a fair valuation. … In arriving at a fair value, how should we go about it? I think we should look at the date when the proceedings were begun and ask ourselves what would have been a fair figure for the society to have paid at that date. In doing this, however, it must be remembered that the oppression had begun at an earlier date, with some resultant loss of share value, and what we must endeavour to do is to fix the value which the shares would then have had but for the effect of oppression. The decision was affirmed by the House of Lords on appeal (sub nom Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer [1959] AC 324), and Lord Keith of Avonholm said at 364: “It was contended that the value of £3.15s put upon the shares was excessive. I see no reason for altering this figure. Lord Sorn has, in my opinion, approached this matter on a correct principle, by considering what would have been the value of the shares at the commencement of the proceedings had it not been for the effect of the oppressive conduct of which complaint was made. This is clearly not a matter on which a calculation can be made with mathematical accuracy or by the application of strict accounting principles …”. Lord Denning said at 369: “One of the most useful orders mentioned in the section — which will enable the court to do justice to the injured shareholders — is to order the oppressor to buy their shares at a fair price: and a fair price would be, I think, the value which the shares would have had at the date of the petition, if there had been no oppression. Once the oppressor has bought the shares, the company can survive. It can continue to operate. That is a matter for him. It is, no doubt, true that an order of this kind gives to the oppressed shareholders what is in effect money compensation for the injury done to them: but I see no objection to this. The section gives a large discretion to the court and it is well exercised in making an oppressor make compensation to those who have suffered at his hands.” This method of fixing a fair price for shares ordered to be purchased under s 186 has been accepted ever since: see Re Associated Tool Industries Ltd [1964] ALR 73, per Joske J at 84… Wanstall SPJ agreed. See also: Sanford v Sanford Courier Service Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 549 at 562 per Waddell CJ in Eq.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.