Lindsay v Health Care Complaints Commission

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:
Lindsay v Health Care Complaints Commission [2010] NSWCA 194

FILE NUMBER(S):
2008/290113

HEARING DATE(S):
5-7 July 2010

JUDGMENT DATE:
19 August 2010

PARTIES:
David Charles Lindsay (Appellant)
Health Care Complaints Commission (Respondent)

JUDGMENT OF:
Giles JA Young JA Sackville AJA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Medical Tribunal of New South Wales

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
40020/06

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Judge Walmsley SC, Dr V Sutton, Dr P Anderson and Ms A Collier

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
20 August 2008

COUNSEL:
Appellant in person
G Farmer (Respondent)

SOLICITORS:
Appellant in person
K Mobbs, HCCC (Respondent)

CATCHWORDS:
MEDICAL TRIBUNAL – disciplinary proceedings – whether s 37 of the Medical Practice Act 1992 in its pre-2008 form, permits the Tribunal to find that examples of unsatisfactory conduct cumulatively justify a finding of “professional misconduct” – whether a finding of impairment necessarily leads the Tribunal to the decision that a medical practitioner is not competent to practice medicine. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS – whether the Tribunal denied an unrepresented medical practitioner procedural fairness by limiting cross-examination of witnesses and rejecting questions as irrelevant – whether the Tribunal denied procedural fairness by limiting the evidence that the medical practitioner could adduce where the medical practitioner failed to comply with directions - whether Tribunal gave medical practitioner adequate warning that his conduct during the hearing could be taken into account in making findings. NON-PUBLICATION ORDER – whether Court of Appeal should modify the non-publication order made by the Tribunal.

LEGISLATION CITED:
Civil Procedure Act 2005, s 72 (1)
Evidence Act 1995, ss 11, 26
Health Care Complaints Act 1993, s 42
Health Practitioner Regulation (Adoption of National Law) Act 2009
Health Practitioner Regulation Amendment Act 2010
Medical Practice Act 1992, ss 2A, 36, 37, 39, 41, 51, 60, 61, 62, 64, 89, 90, 91, 147, 148, 154, 165, Sch 2 (cl6),
Medical Practice Amendment Act 2008
Medical Practitioners Act 1938, s 27(1)
Supreme Court Act 1970, s 69
Medical Practice Regulation 1998
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld)

CATEGORY:
Principal judgment

CASES CITED:
Angaston and District Hospital v Thamm (1987) 47 SASR 177
Australian Gas Light Co v Valuer-General (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126
Bannister v Walton (1993) 30 NSWLR 699
Caladine v The Commissioner, New South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission [2007] NSWCA 362
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Gad v Health Care Complaints Commission [2002] NSWCA 111
Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304
Health Care Complaints Commission v A Medical Practitioner [2001] NSWCA 158
Health Care Complaints Commission v Karalasingham [2007] NSWCA 267
Health Care Complaints Commission v Wingate [2007] NSWCA 326; 70 NSWLR 323
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499
Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Timania Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 155; 221 ALR 823
Jobst v Inglis (1986) 41 SASR 399
Kassem v Crossley [2000] NSWCA 276
Lindsay v Health Care Complaints Commission…

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Details
Case
[2010] NSWCA 194
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a medical practitioner, Dr Lindsay, who was found by the Medical Tribunal of New South Wales to have engaged in professional misconduct. The Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC) had referred a complaint to the Tribunal, which ultimately led to findings of unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct against Dr Lindsay. Dr Lindsay appealed these findings to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, arguing that the Tribunal had erred in law and had denied him procedural fairness.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied section 37 of the *Medical Practice Act 1992* (in its pre-2008 form) to find that cumulative instances of unsatisfactory conduct amounted to professional misconduct, and whether a finding of impairment necessarily equated to a finding of incompetence to practice. Furthermore, the Court had to determine if Dr Lindsay had been denied procedural fairness through limitations placed on his cross-examination of witnesses, the rejection of his evidence as irrelevant, and insufficient warning that his conduct during the hearing could be considered in the Tribunal's findings. The Court also considered whether a non-publication order made by the Tribunal should be modified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Dr Lindsay's appeal and a related application. It reasoned that the Tribunal was entitled to consider the cumulative effect of unsatisfactory conduct to reach a finding of professional misconduct under the relevant legislation. The Court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in its approach to the issue of impairment and competence. Regarding procedural fairness, the Court held that while the Tribunal had initially failed to provide adequate warning about considering Dr Lindsay's in-court conduct, it had subsequently rectified this by explicitly informing him that his demeanour could be taken into account. The Court found that the limitations on cross-examination and the rejection of evidence were within the Tribunal's discretion and did not amount to a denial of procedural fairness, particularly given Dr Lindsay's failure to comply with directions. The Court did, however, amend the non-publication order to allow for the publication of the names of witnesses, complainants, and the medical practitioner.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1)The appeal under s 90 of the Medical Practice Act 1992 is dismissed.

(2)The application under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 is dismissed.

(3)The appellant is to pay the costs of the respondent of the appeal under s 90 of the Medical Practice Act 1992 and of the application under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970.

(4) The non-publication order made by the Medical Tribunal of New South Wales on 28 April 2008 be amended, pursuant to the power conferred on this Court by s 91(1)(b) of the Medical Practice Act 1992, to the extent necessary to ensure that it does not prevent publication of the names of any witness, complainant or medical practitioner:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On Monday, 5 May 2008, the sixth day of the hearing, the Deputy Chairperson delivered a judgment addressing the use that the Tribunal could make of the appellant’s “in court conduct and demeanour”. His Honour said this:“I consider that it would be unfair to [the appellant], given that he has not been warned until in the course of the opening, and has not been represented, for us to take account of his conduct, until the matter was raised. However I now use this opportunity to draw [the appellant’s] attention to the right that the Tribunal undoubtedly has to take account of our observations of him in court from now on when he is and is not giving evidence. How he deals with that is a matter for him but it follows that having been put on notice, he must be taken as knowing that these observations may be made and taken account of and that he will, if he considers it appropriate, be at liberty to call evidence or make submissions or otherwise explain such evidence as the HCCC may rely on. At the same time, the Tribunal will expect that counsel for the HCCC will tell us what conduct it relies on at a time when it is still open to Dr Lindsay to bring forward such evidence as he might desire in order to explain it if he can.” (Emphasis added.) Thereafter, according to Mr Farmer’s submissions to this Court, reference was made in the hearing from time to time to the appellant’s conduct of his case. With one possible exception, the examples given by Mr Farmer could not be said to have put the appellant on notice that particular behaviour inside the Tribunal or in the conduct of his case could be taken into account on the issue of impairment. The possible exception is that Dr Allnutt was asked by Ms Adamson in his examination in chief (Day 21) whether written submissions made by the appellant to the Tribunal, apparently at some stage in those proceedings, were consistent with Dr Allnutt’s diagnosis of a paranoid personality disorder or persecutory delusions derived from a delusional disorder. Dr Allnutt answered in the affirmative, giving brief reasons. The Tribunal concluded taking evidence on Day 34 of the hearing (Monday, 23 June 2008). On that afternoon, so the transcript suggests, Ms Adamson provided the appellant and the Tribunal with the HCCC’s written submissions. These were very detailed, comprising 174 single spaced pages, with several schedules attached. Ms Adamson made her closing address to the Tribunal on Day 35 (Wednesday, 25 June 2008). In that address she spoke to her written submissions. The HCCC’s written submissions to the Tribunal included a section of four pages headed “General submission on impairment”. In this section (at [57]-[67]), the HCCC contended that the appellant’s conduct in the Tribunal was “further evidence of impairment”. The submissions specifically (at [61]) identified a number of aspects of the appellant’s conduct during the course of the hearing that were said to support a finding of impairment:“a.His making of allegations that persons or bodies are engaged or have engaged in a conspiracy against him, including the following:i.The Complainant, including its employees, or counsel appearing on its behalf in the proceedings;ii.The Medical Board;iii.His patients or persons who were potential patients;iv.Medical practitioners who have treated any of the patients or potential patients who have complained about him;v.Persons who have made a complaint about him;vi.Other persons who are colleagues or associates of iii, iv and v above;vii. Expert witnesses in the proceedings.b.His failure to accept that any of the complaints made against him which are alleged in the Complaint are genuinely based;c.His preoccupation with small slights;d.His readiness to infer that a complainant has been coached by the Complainant in formulating the complaint from use of common English words, such as ‘tone’, ‘manner’ etc. (instances of this are set out in a table in Schedule Three);e.His insistence that he has no psychiatric disorder, illness or impairment;f.His requests that numerous summons be issued to attend and to produce documents to persons, in circumstances where the width of the summons could reasonably be expected to intimidate such persons and dissuade them from giving evidence adverse to the respondent in the proceedings; and his pressing of such summons notwithstanding objection by:i. the Complainant (in respect of all of them);ii. the Crown Solicitor’s Office;iii. Avant Insurance; andiv. the Medical Board;g.His tendency to disparage persons by applying psychiatric diagnoses to them (including ‘psychopath’, ‘narcissistic’, ‘borderline’ or ‘sociopath’) without reasonable grounds;h.His statements to the effect that he believes in the concept of ‘symmetry’ which is variously applied to the following:i.Because senior counsel for the Complainant has accused him of professional misconduct and referred to his psychiatric condition, he is entitled to do the same to her.ii.Because patients have not, in his view, behaved appropriately towards him, he is entitled, if not obliged to discipline them by calling the police, or commencing proceedings against them or otherwise rebuking them;iii.If a patient behaves inappropriately, he becomes a ‘security guard’ for his practice;iv.Because his mental state is in question in the proceedings, he is entitled to examine and investigate the mental state of each of the witnesses.” (Citations to transcript and other sources omitted.)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Division 2 of Part 6 (ss 89-91) of the Act deals with appeals against actions of the Tribunal. Sections 90 and 91 relevantly provide as follows:90 Appeal against Tribunal’s decisions and actions “(1) A person about whom a complaint is referred to the Tribunal, or the complainant, may appeal to the Supreme Court against:(a)a decision of the Tribunal with respect to a point of law, or(b)the exercise of any power by the Tribunal under Division 4 (Disciplinary powers of Committees and Tribunal) of Part 4.…(3) The Supreme Court may stay any order made by the Tribunal, on such terms as the Court sees fit, until such time as the Court determines the appeal.91 Powers of Court on appeal(1) In determining the appeal, the Supreme Court may:(a)dismiss the appeal, or(b)make such order as it thinks proper having regard to the merits of the case and the public welfare, and in doing so may exercise any one or more of the powers of the Tribunal under this Act.(2) If the Court dismisses an appeal against an order of the Tribunal, the Court may by order direct that the Tribunal’s order is to be taken to include provision that an application for its review under Division 3 may not be made until after a specified time.”BACKGROUND The appellant was born in 1965 and graduated from the University of Sydney in 1989 with the degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery. After working successively as an intern, resident and registrar at several hospitals, he was employed from 1993 to 1996 as a general practitioner at the Sydney Skin Cancer Clinic. He subsequently opened his own practice and, except for a very short period, worked as a sole practitioner until his suspension in December 2007. From 1998, the appellant’s mother, Ms Glynne, worked at the practice as the financial controller. The Tribunal found that Ms Glynne performed a significant role in all aspects of the appellant’s practice, including dealing with numerous patient complaints. Although the appellant was not a specialist, many patients saw him as specialising in skin cancers. The appellant bulk billed – that is, he accepted the patients’ Medicare benefits by way of assignment as full payment for his services. The appellant’s clinic was open six days per week and on weekdays he would typically see between forty and sixty patients. The clinic had three examination rooms, allowing the appellant to see three patients at once. The clinic’s staff usually consisted of two full time receptionists as well as Ms Glynne. The practice’s records were not computerised and, as the Tribunal found, the appellant frequently failed to record properly the treatment he had provided or the advice given to the patient. Over the years, the appellant attracted a number of complaints from patients. According to the Tribunal (at [32]), by 2005, complaints were coming in “at an alarming rate”. In the usual course, Ms Glynne would handle complaints as they were made. She would frequently instruct the appellant’s then solicitor as to what to say and he would then “write to the Board, or the HCCC [Health Care Complaints Commission], usually in a somewhat bombastic style, invariably denying the patient’s version of events”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established