Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 81 min read

Court of Appeal

New South Wales

Case Title: Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd
Medium Neutral Citation: [2011] NSWCA 104
Hearing Date(s): 6 & 7 September 2010
Decision Date: 04 May 2011
Jurisdiction:
Before:

Campbell JA at [1], Macfarlan JA at [314], Young JA at [315]

Decision:

1. The parties are to confer promptly about the orders that are appropriate to give effect to these reasons for judgment.
2. If within 21 days of the date of delivery of these reasons for judgment the parties have agreed upon the orders that are appropriate, a minute of the orders signed on behalf of each party be provided to the Associate to Campbell JA.
3. If within 21 days of the date of delivery of these reasons for judgment the parties have not agreed upon the orders that are appropriate, within 24 days of the date of delivery of these reasons for judgment each party is to file in the registry and provide to the Associate of each judge comprising the bench for the hearing of this appeal, a draft of the orders that in the submission of that party are appropriate, together with written submissions in support of the making of those orders.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS - oppression - ss 232, 233 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - agreement in principle for separation of interests in business enterprise carried out in some respects but not others - oppression possible even if no breach of contract nor estoppel - oppression possible even if conduct is carried out in good faith - keeping the value of minority shareholding locked up can be oppression - reasonable offer to buy out the minority shareholding does not necessitate a conclusion of no oppression - whether court has power to grant relief concerning assets that corporate trustee held on trust - 'legitimate expectation' not appropriate and unhelpful in context of oppression remedy - appropriate remedy for oppression - principles for deciding time as at which value of share to be decided for compulsory buy-out order - CORPORATIONS - winding up - by court - s 461(f), (k) - compulsory buyout order preferable where serious commercial detriment arise from winding up of companies and where both parties submit compulsory buyout preferable

Legislation Cited:

Companies Act 1961
Companies Act 1961 (Vic)
Contracts Review Act 1980
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

Cases Cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27
Australasian Memory Pty Ltd v Brien [2000] HCA 30; (2000) 200 CLR 270
Beneficial Finance Corporation…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2011] NSWCA 104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a dispute between the Tomanovic interests and the Sayer interests regarding their commercial relationship and shareholdings in various companies, including Australian Financial Services Corporation Pty Ltd and One Australia Pty Ltd. The primary judge had dismissed proceedings brought by the Tomanovic interests seeking relief under sections 232 and 233 of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth) for oppression. The Tomanovic interests also appealed the dismissal of their cross-claim in separate common law proceedings concerning the repayment of a substantial sum of money.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the conduct of the Sayer interests constituted oppression of the Tomanovic interests, and if so, what relief was appropriate. Specifically, the court considered whether oppression could arise even in the absence of a breach of contract or estoppel, and whether such conduct could be oppressive even if carried out in good faith. The court also had to determine the power to grant relief concerning assets held by a corporate trustee on trust, and the appropriateness of the "legitimate expectation" test in oppression claims. Furthermore, the court was required to consider the principles for determining the valuation date for a compulsory buy-out order and whether such an order was preferable to winding up the companies.

The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal in part, found that circumstances justifying compulsory buy-out orders did exist, contrary to the primary judge's decision. The court clarified that oppression can occur even if there is no breach of contract or estoppel, and that good faith does not preclude a finding of oppression. The court also noted that keeping a minority shareholding's value locked up could constitute oppression, and that a reasonable offer to buy out the minority did not necessarily negate a claim of oppression. The court agreed with the primary judge that winding up the companies was not appropriate, particularly given the potential for serious commercial detriment.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the parties confer promptly to agree on the specific orders to give effect to the judgment. If agreement was not reached within 21 days, each party was to file draft orders and supporting submissions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties are to confer promptly about the orders that are appropriate to give effect to these reasons for judgment.

2. If within 21 days of the date of delivery of these reasons for judgment the parties have agreed upon the orders that are appropriate, a minute of the orders signed on behalf of each party be provided to the Associate to Campbell JA.

3. If within 21 days of the date of delivery of these reasons for judgment the parties have not agreed upon the orders that are appropriate, within 24 days of the date of delivery of these reasons for judgment each party is to file in the registry and provide to the Associate of each judge comprising the bench for the hearing of this appeal, a draft of the orders that in the submission of that party are appropriate, together with written submissions in support of the making of those orders.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the orders appealed against, the primary judge ordered that each of the Equity Proceedings be dismissed with costs: Tomanovic v Argyle HQ Pty Ltd; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd; Sayer v Tomanovic [2010] NSWSC 152. Following the Notice of Demand, the Sayer interests began proceedings in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court, seeking repayment of the $1,341,750 ( " the Common Law Proceedings " ). Those proceedings were transferred to the Equity Division, and the primary judge heard the Common Law Proceedings at the same time as he heard the Equity Proceedings. He held that the Tomanovic interests were obliged to repay the $1,341,750, and entered judgment for that sum plus interest, a total of $1,765,004.64. No appeal is brought from the judgment in the Common Law Proceedings. However, that judgment has been stayed pending the determination of the appeal from the Equity Proceedings, and some of the circumstances in which the $1,341,750 came to be paid to the Tomanovic interests need to be taken into account in the present appeal. In the course of attempting to establish a basis on which the separation of interests could occur, two documents (discussed in more detail below) known as the First Heads of Agreement and the Second Heads of Agreement had been executed. The Tomanovic interests filed a cross-claim in the Common Law Proceedings, contending that those documents were contractually binding, and seeking judgment for sums of money payable in accordance with their terms, or alternatively an order for specific performance of those documents. One basis on which the cross-claim contended that the documents were binding was that the Tomanovic interests were estopped from denying that the documents were binding. The judge dismissed that cross-claim. No appeal is brought from his decision in that respect. I have concluded, contrary to the decision below, that there are circumstances that justify the making of compulsory buy-out orders. I agree with the judge that an order for winding up is not appropriate. The judge found that Mr Tomanovic and Mr Sayer established "some form of commercial relationship in 1994", and that in 1999 they began a "loose partnership arrangement". Mr Tomanovic has at all relevant times controlled Australian Financial Services Corporation Pty Ltd (" AFSC "). Mr Sayer has at all relevant times controlled One Australia Pty Ltd (" One Australia "). These were the respective corporate vehicles that the men largely (though not exclusively) used to structure their loose partnership. Mr Sayer had, prior to 1999, operated a business under the name "Mortgage House of Australia" . It was sometimes referred to as "MHA". During the time relevant to the proceedings the business was divided into finance and non-finance sides. The finance side operated through several companies, of which Tomanovic interests and Sayer interests were shareholders, and Mr Tomanovic and Mr Sayer were both directors. The business of the finance side was explained by Mr Sayer, in evidence not contested by Mr Tomanovic, as including a retail business, and a wholesale and third party business. The retail business involved the sale of home loan products directly to customers. The wholesale business involved lending funds through the sale of home loan products to a small mortgage manager, which would re-brand that product with its own name and provide it to its own customers. The third party aspect of the business involved the payment of commissions to mortgage brokers who referred loans to the retail business.