BEL18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BEL18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 2103

Appeal from: BEL18 & Anor v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 1606
File number: VID 751 of 2018
Judge: MIDDLETON J
Date of judgment: 21 December 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – fast track reviewable decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (‘Authority’) under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal from judicial review of the Authority’s decision by the Federal Circuit Court – whether the Authority fell into jurisdictional error by proceeding in circumstances where the audio recording of the visa applicant’s interview before the Minister’s delegate was incomplete, or whether the Authority was unreasonable in proceeding in such circumstances – no jurisdictional error demonstrated – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 48A, 473CB, 473CC, 473DC

Migration Regulations1994 (Cth) reg 4.43

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593; [2003] FCAFC 184

CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641

DYK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 222

ETA067 v Republic of Nauru (2018) 92 ALJR 1003; [2018] HCA 46

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 92 ALJR 780; [2018] HCA 34

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475; [2017] FCAFC 210

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 92 ALJR 713; [2018] HCA 30

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 92 ALJR 481; [2018] HCA 16

Date of hearing: 27 August 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 95
Counsel for the Appellants: Ms G Costello
Solicitor for the Appellants: Kajaliny Ranjith Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Appellant: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 751 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BEL18

First Appellant

BEM18

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MIDDLETON J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 DECEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

2.Order 1 made by Justice Murphy on 25 June 2018 be vacated.

3.The First Respondent, by himself or his Department, officers, delegates or agents be restrained from removing the Appellants from Australia before 4:00pm on 1 February 2019.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MIDDLETON J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 24 June 2018, BEL18 (the ‘First Appellant’) and BEM18 (the ‘Second Appellant’) (together, the ‘Appellants’), appealed to the Federal Court from a judgment delivered by the Federal Circuit Court (the ‘FCC’) on 21 June 2018.  The…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 2103
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal involves citizens of Sri Lanka, the Appellant and her daughter, who sought protection visas from Australia. The appeal was brought against the Minister for Home Affairs, the second respondent, and the Immigration Assessment Authority, the first respondent. The primary issue before the court was whether the Authority fell into jurisdictional error or was otherwise unreasonable in proceeding with the Appellant's visa application when the audio recording of the interview with the Minister's delegate was incomplete. The Appellant argued that the Authority should have either re-interviewed her or sought new information from her to address the incomplete recording. The court found that the Authority did not fall into any jurisdictional error and was not otherwise unreasonable in proceeding with the application under the circumstances presented.

The court reasoned that the fast-track review process undertaken by the Authority is essentially a de novo review conducted on the papers, subject to certain legislative limitations. The Authority was required to consider the reasons for the Minister's decision and any other review material provided to it. Given the Appellant's ill health, late pregnancy, and translation issues during the original interview, the Authority was not legally unreasonable or lacking in natural justice by not re-interviewing her or seeking new information. The Appellant's arguments did not demonstrate any appealable error in the Federal Circuit Court's findings or the Authority's decisions. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal with costs, vacate a previous order made by Justice Murphy, and restrain the Minister from removing the Appellants from Australia before a specified date. The orders were to be entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

2. Order 1 made by Justice Murphy on 25 June 2018 be vacated.

3. The First Respondent, by himself or his Department, officers, delegates or agents be restrained from removing the Appellants from Australia before 4:00pm on 1 February 2019.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In my view, this appeal can be determined by an examination of the precise facts and circumstances that confronted and were known by the Authority and subsequently the FCC, and on that basis, the appeal should be dismissed. Whilst some interesting legal issues were raised by the Appellants relating to the question of remittal and relief, they do not arise when the facts and circumstances confronting the Authority are carefully considered and determined.RELEVANT BACKGROUND The Appellants are citizens of Sri Lanka. The First Appellant is the mother of the Second Appellant. On 23 November 2016, the Appellants applied for SHEVs. Only the First Appellant made claims to be owed protection obligations; the Second Appellant relied on her membership of the First Appellant’s family. For the remainder of these reasons, the First Appellant will be referred to as the ‘Appellant’. On 23 November 2016 the Appellant applied for a SHEV. The Appellant’s application originally included the husband of the Appellant, but the Appellant was advised by the Minister’s delegate that the application for her husband was not valid under s 48A of the Act as he had previously been refused the grant of a protection visa. The Appellant was treated as a “fast track applicant” within the meaning of s 5(1) of the Act. The Appellant applied for a SHEV because if she returned to Sri Lanka in the reasonably foreseeable future, she claimed she would face a real chance of serious or significant harm at the hands of the Sri Lankan authorities on account of her status as, among other things:(1)a Tamil woman whose brother, husband and other relatives had been involved with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the ‘LTTE’); and(2)a failed asylum seeker. On 27 February 2017, the Minister’s delegate interviewed the Appellant (the ‘Interview’). The Interview was conducted by telephone. The Appellant, an Anglicare caseworker (the ‘Caseworker’), and Ms Rhonda Western of MDA Ltd were located in Biloela, Queensland. The Minister’s delegate and an interpreter were located in Brisbane. And the Appellant’s migration agent, Mr Nick Adler of Playfair Migration (the ‘Migration Agent’), was located in Sydney. The Interview was conducted by telephone because the Appellant was eight months pregnant at the time and was unable to travel from her residence to Brisbane. There is no suggestion that the Appellant or her representatives requested an adjournment or postponement of the Interview. At the time, no complaint was made about the way in which the Interview was conducted save for some initial difficulties with the interpreter. At the time of the Interview, the Appellant was also suffering a migraine and had an illness for which she had attended hospital the night before. The nature of her illness and the effect of the migraine was unclear. There is no evidence about this before the Court, nor was there before the FCC or the Authority. During the course of the Interview, the phone connection momentarily dropped out and the audio recording malfunctioned temporarily. As a result, part of the Interview in which the Appellant was questioned about her claims was not recorded. The extent of this malfunction is unclear, a matter to which I will return. What is clear is that the Minister’s delegate heard all parts of the Interview including the part that was not recorded, and there is no reason to believe that the whole of the Interview was not considered by the Minister’s delegate. Significantly, the attack in this appeal is made upon the Authority, not the Minister.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 9 May 2017, the Minister refused to grant a SHEV to the Appellant (the ‘Minister’s decision’). The Minister accepted that:(1)the Appellant and her family were adversely affected by the civil war in Sri Lanka and, in particular, the Appellant sustained shrapnel wounds and her parents were seriously mistreated by the authorities; and(2)the Appellant’s brother was forced to assist the LTTE. However, the Minister did not accept that the Appellant herself was ever perceived by the Sri Lankan authorities to have had any involvement with the LTTE. Among other things, the Minister did not accept the Appellant’s claims about her husband’s involvement with the LTTE. Nor did the Minister accept that, at the time of her departure from Sri Lanka, the Appellant had any profile of interest to the authorities. In this regard, the Minister noted that the Appellant and her family had left Sri Lanka in 2001 and travelled to India lawfully with passports and visas. Given the findings about the Sri Lankan authorities’ lack of interest in the Appellant, the Minister did not accept that, as a failed asylum seeker or as a relative of a person with prior involvement with the LTTE, the Appellant would face a real chance of serious or significant harm in Sri Lanka on any return there in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Minister was therefore not satisfied that the Appellant was, for the purposes of s 36(2) of the Act, a person in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations. On 12 May 2017, the Migration Agent sent an email to the Authority requesting a transcript of the Interview. The Migration Agent said that the Appellant wanted:the release of the full written and audio transcript of her SHEV interview.…to request an extension on her submission based on the inaccurate information relayed by the interpreter during the [SHEV Interview] which formed the foundation of the refusal of her SHEV application. It was also requested that the full written transcript be emailed and a copy of the audio recording be posted to the Caseworker. On 15 May 2017, the Authority telephoned the Migration Agent regarding the 12 May 2017 correspondence. That conversation was recorded in a case file note dated 16 May 2017. At that point in time, the Migration Agent was not a formally recognised representative of the Appellant. In respect of the request for the transcript and audio of the Interview, the Authority reiterated that such particulars cannot be sent to a third party without the authorisation of the Appellant. The Migration Agent was further advised that if the Appellant sought access to these documents, that request would need to come directly from the Appellant herself. On 8 June 2017, the Caseworker wrote a letter to the Authority on behalf of the Appellant which stated that the Appellant “would like to question some of the responses noted in the [Minister’s decision] as they did not believe that these were responses [the Appellant] had provided at the interview”. On the same day, the Caseworker also sent a letter by email to the Authority requesting an extension of time to respond to the referral to the Authority and noting that the Appellant wanted to question the Minister’s decision “due to a perceived translation error” during the Interview.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In respect of this, the Appellant submitted that the Authority, by not considering the husband’s evidence regarding CID inquiries as to his whereabouts, constructively failed to consider the Appellant’s claim to fearing harm for reason of her husband’s involvement in the LTTE. The Appellant submitted, contrary to the reasoning of the FCC, there were no independent grounds for the Authority to reject the claim. The Appellant claimed that the Authority’s only reasons for rejecting the claim that the husband attracted adverse interest from the Sri Lankan authorities were that (a) he travelled in and out of Sri Lanka; and (b) his family had continued to live openly in Sri Lanka and had not attracted adverse interest. It was submitted that the Authority failed to carry out its statutory task because it did not consider this part of the review material referred to it, and as part of the review material, it was a mandatory consideration.CONSIDERATIONGround 1 I can find no appealable error attending to the FCC’s finding that it was not legally unreasonable for the Authority not to exercise, or not to consider exercising, the power in s 473DC(3) to get new information from or re-interview the Appellant or alternatively remit the matter (if empowered) to the Minister. In my view, the alleged failures of the Authority do not have the character of being legally unreasonable, of lacking a rational foundation, of lacking an evident and intelligible justification, or of being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious or lacking in common sense. I also do not consider that the Authority failed to carry out its statutory task, or failed to accord natural justice. All the matters raised by the Appellant under this ground of appeal interrelate. As I have indicated, the facts and circumstances confronting and known by the Authority need to be carefully addressed in determining the reasonableness of its decision not to get new information from or re-interview the Appellant and in concordance, whether the Authority fulfilled its statutory responsibilities and accorded natural justice. At the outset it is important to recall that the very nature of the fast track process – which is essentially a process undertaken ‘on the papers’ before the Authority, subject to well-defined exceptions – does not entail an oral hearing, or necessarily involve an applicant being given an opportunity to present their case again. Here, the de novo hearing did not exist to give the Authority an opportunity to be impressed by the Appellant’s arguments in person, to clarify any area of confusion or misunderstanding, or form an opinion based on observation because of the Appellant’s ill health, late pregnancy, and the translation issues. Whilst it is a de novo hearing, it is subject to the limitations imposed by the legislature. Those limitations require the Authority to consider the reasons for the Minister’s decision and make an assessment based upon those reasons and any other ‘review material’ provided to the Authority pursuant to s 473CB(1) of the Act.