DBA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DBA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1580

Appeal from: DBA16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 320
File number: NSD 337 of 2017
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 14 December 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) – appellant subject to fast track review process – whether IAA made a jurisdictional error by failing to consider updated country information – no jurisdictional error demonstrated – appeal dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Pts 7, 7AA, ss 5AA(1), 65, 473BA, 473CA, 473CB, 473CB(1)(c), 473DA(1), 473DB, 473DB(1), 473DC(1), 473DC(1)(b), 473DC(2), 473DC(3), 473FB

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 169

DBA16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 320

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 [2017] FCAFC 136

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Date of hearing: 3 August, 20 September, 14 December 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person, assisted by an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Kaplan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 337 of 2017
BETWEEN:

DBA16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 DECEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)

LEE J:

A        INTRODUCTION

  1. By notice of appeal filed on 13 March 2017, the appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court made in February 2017 to dismiss an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). 

  2. The IAA had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (subclass 790) (Visa). The evidence read on the appeal establishes that the appellant was, to use the words in s 5AA(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), an “unauthorised maritime arrival”, in that he entered Australia at an excised offshore place.  That happened because the vessel upon which the appellant was travelling to Australia was intercepted by a Royal Australian Navy ship on 7 April 2013, four nautical miles north of the Ashmore Islands.  Due to problems with the vessel’s engine, the naval ship…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1580
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerns an appeal against a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) which affirmed the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant the appellant a visa. The appellant claimed to be a refugee from Bangladesh, but the IAA found that he was not credible and that he did not meet the criteria for a refugee visa. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review of the IAA's decision, and the appellant now appeals to the Federal Court.

The legal issue in the appeal was whether the IAA made a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the most recent Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report on Bangladesh, which was released on 5 July 2016, instead of the report from 20 October 2014 that was used by the delegate. The appellant argued that this failure denied him natural justice, as required by Ministerial Direction Number 56 of 21 June 2013 under section 499 of the Migration Act 1958. However, the court found that the appellant had not raised this issue before the Federal Circuit Court, and that the Federal Court in its appellate jurisdiction does not have the power to review the decision of the IAA. Therefore, the ground of appeal alleging error by the IAA must fail.

The court noted that even if the appeal was characterised as suggesting error on behalf of the primary judge in failing to find jurisdictional error on behalf of the IAA, it would still face difficulties in establishing error when the argument on appeal was not advanced in the same way before the primary judge. The court also considered the relationship between the notice of appeal and the dealings between the Secretary of the Department and the IAA in providing material in respect of the decision made, as required by section 473CB of the Act. Ultimately, the court found no recognisable error in the approach taken by the primary judge and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. The entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Against this statutory background, I come to the circumstances of this appeal.B DECISION OF THE IAA AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT In July 2016, the delegate of the Minister made a decision to refuse to grant the Visa to the appellant. This was after the appellant appeared in an interview before the Minister’s delegate in April 2016 and after subsequent representations were made by the appellant’s former representative in May 2016. In accordance with the FTRP scheme I have described above, in August 2016, pursuant to s 473CA, the Minister referred the delegate’s decision to the IAA for review. The appellant was notified of the referral on that day and was advised that he could provide new information to the IAA, but that the IAA could only consider such information in limited circumstances. Shortly thereafter, the appellant provided a submission to the IAA and also provided a copy of the letter that he had sent to the Minister on 15 May 2014 in relation to the “data breach” incident which occurred in February 2014. In September 2016, the IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision. In doing so, the IAA acknowledged that the appellant’s claims had been “presented consistently since he was first interviewed on arrival in Australia”. Despite the consistent nature of the appellant’s claims, an adverse view was formed as to the appellant’s credibility, which rested on what was said to be a number of inconsistencies, discrepancies and implausibilities in the presentation of his material. Without seeking to be exhaustive, this included the following: (a)the IAA had difficulty accepting that the appellant’s impact on the respective positions of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League was so significant after being involved for no longer than two months, that local party members would have set out to kill him or have him imprisoned on a false murder charge; (b)the actions of the appellant in remaining at his usual place of residence and his workplace after November 2012 (when he was allegedly threatened with harm by the Awami League) until February 2013, were in tension with his claim that he had left both his village and Bangladesh in fear of his life;(c)the appellant’s explanation that the Awami League was not interested in him once the false murder charge had been brought against him; indeed, the appellant’s claim concerning the false charge was regarded as not being credible;(d)a charge sheet relied upon was not genuine and the appellant was said to be not telling the truth about the charges he claimed he faced;(e)an inherent inconsistency existed in the notion that it was too difficult for the Awami League to locate the appellant while he was staying with a relative five kilometres from his home, but that the Awami League would be able to locate him in the capital, Dhaka. The IAA assessed the appellant’s circumstances against the refugee criteria in the Act and was not satisfied that the appellant was subjected to harm or any threat of harm from the Awami League prior to his departure from Bangladesh, nor was it satisfied that the appellant faced a real risk of serious harm at the hands of the Awami League on the basis of his political opinion and activities.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As the primary judge found, the IAA was under no obligation to request or accept new information from the appellant, whether orally or in writing and even if requested to do so: see s 473DC(2). As to the oral interview, again, as the primary judge pointed out at [46], while the IAA has a discretion under s 473DC(1) and/or (3) to invite an applicant to an interview to give new information, it is plain that is has no duty to do so: see s 473DC(2). As the primary judge noted (at [46]):If the [IAA] were (sic) compelled to invite an applicant to an interview merely because his or her credibility is called into question, the result would be the [IAA] generally coming under an obligation to issue an invitation, as adverse credit findings are made in the majority of cases coming before the courts. That would not only be inconsistent with the text of s. 473DC(2), but would also defeat the purpose of the [FTRP].C CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL The only ground of appeal advanced before me is that: The IAA reviewer failed to refer to the revised DFAT Country Information Report on Bangladesh despite the fact that it was released on 5 July 2016 and replaced that of 20 October 2014 which was used by the DIBP assessor. Paragraphs 3.57 and 3.58 of the July 2016 report are relevant to the applicant. By failing to take account of the most up to date DFAT report as is required by Ministerial Direction Number 56 of 21 June 2013 under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 the IAA reviewer and the FCC judge denied the applicant natural justice.(Uncorrected) One can immediately see the challenge that faces the appellant in identifying recognisable error in the approach taken by the primary judge, given that the argument sought to be advanced on appeal was not one which was advanced directly below. It has the additional procedural difficulty in that this Court in its appellate jurisdiction does not have the power to review the decision of the IAA. For this reason alone, the ground of appeal alleging error by the IAA must fail. Having said this, if one was to characterise the appeal as suggesting error on behalf of the primary judge in failing to find jurisdictional error on behalf of the IAA, one returns to the difficulty mentioned above about how one establishes error when the argument on appeal was not advanced in the same way before the primary judge. When the matter came before me in August 2017, I was anxious to ascertain precisely what had happened in relation to the DFAT country information report, given its centrality to the way in which the appellant now puts the case. Additionally, this matter was first listed at a time when Part 7AA had not been the subject of any authoritative guidance by this Court, and further assistance was requested by way of submissions being made as to the relationship between the notice of appeal and the dealings between the Secretary of the Department and the IAA in providing material in respect of the decision made (see s 473CB of the Act). In any event, further evidence and submissions were filed.