FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BEL18 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 1606 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) visas – applicants claimed to fear harm from authorities by reason of association to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) – no evidence of adverse attention from authorities – IAA not accepting applicants’ claimed links to LTTE – IAA affirming delegate’s decision – whether IAA acted legally unreasonably – IAA discretion to get information considered –first applicant claimed inaccurate interpretation during IAA interview – no indication from first applicant of any inaccurate interpretation or misunderstanding during IAA interview – whether IAA constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction – applicants unable to specify jurisdictional error by delegate as would enable IAA to reach a state of satisfaction under the Migration Act – whether IAA failed to have regard to material evidence before it – whether IAA failed to have regard to an integer of applicants’ claim – IAA not accepting first applicant’s husband was a person of interest – IAA therefore not required to make a specific finding in relation to first applicant’s husband’s evidence – such a specific finding subsumed in IAA’s general findings about applicants’ husband – application for judicial review dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5(1), 48A, 48B, 417, 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473CC(2)(a), 473CC(2)(b), 473DB(1)(a),(b), 473DC, 473DC(1), 473DC(1)(a), 473DC(2), 473DD, 473DE, 473EA(1), 473GA, 473GB, 476, 477(1),477(2), 477(3)(a), 477(3)(ca), Part 7AA Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.4.43 |
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 1606
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, whether to grant an extension of time for the applicants to file their application for judicial review, considering the significant delay and the circumstances surrounding it. Secondly, the court had to consider whether the IAA had acted legally unreasonably in its assessment of the applicants' claims, specifically in relation to the IAA's discretion to obtain further information and its consideration of the evidence before it.
In relation to the extension of time, the court found that the delay was explicable. The first applicant had given birth shortly before the IAA's decision, required an interpreter and assistance with her migration matters, and was not legally represented until after the deadline for filing the judicial review application. She lacked sufficient information and did not understand the consequences of the delay. The Minister did not claim prejudice from the delay, and the grounds of review were considered reasonably arguable. Consequently, the court exercised its discretion under s.477(2) of the Migration Act to extend the time for filing the application. Regarding the substantive application, the court dismissed each of the three grounds of review, finding that the IAA had not acted illegally unreasonably. The court noted that the IAA was not required to make a specific finding regarding the first applicant's husband's evidence, as such a finding was subsumed within the IAA's general findings about the applicants' claims.
The court ordered that the time for filing the application for judicial review be extended to 12 March 2018. The substantive application was dismissed, with costs to be paid by the first applicant.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Regulation 4.43 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Migration Regulations) lists permissible and impermissible directions for the purposes of s.473CC(2)(b) of the Migration Act. The permissible directions include a direction that that the applicant satisfies the refugee or complimentary protection criteria.[55][55] Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg.4.43(2)(b) and (d) It was submitted by Counsel for the applicants that to conduct the review and make directions under reg.4.43, the IAA must make its own assessment of the applicant’s claims to meet the protection criteria. Counsel relied upon CDZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCA 967[56] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176, where the Full Court said:… A body such as the IAA, which is conducting an inquisitorial review process in which there is a claim for protection under s.36(2)(a) of the Act must not only consider and determine the case as articulated by the protection visa applicant, but also do so in relation to an unarticulated claim which is nevertheless raised clearly or squarely on the material before that review body (see NABE at [58]-[61] per Black CJ, French and Selway JJ).[57][56] CDZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCA 967, [6] (Logan J).[57] BBS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 176, [79] (Kenny, Tracey and Griffiths JJ). It was also submitted by Counsel for the applicants that it was significant that the applicant was not legally represented when her application was before the IAA. She had retained the Migration Agent when her application was before the Delegate for consideration. As a consequence it was submitted the applicant did not have assistance to make a Freedom of Information request or to receive the legal advice in relation to a review of the Delegate’s Decision. It was submitted by Counsel for the applicants that the failure by the IAA to consider exercising its discretion under s.473DC was unreasonable because it compromised the IAA’s capacity to exercise its jurisdiction. Counsel for the applicants submitted that what was required for the reasonable exercise of a power depends on the scope and purposes of the statute: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, per French CJ at [23] and [26] and Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [69] and [72]. Counsel for the applicants relied upon the decisions in two cases that considered the IAA’s discretion to get information. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210 the Full Court considered s.473C in circumstances where the IAA had found that an applicant could relocate to avoid harm. The Delegate had not raised the issue of relocation with the applicant. The Full Court noted that an assessment of the reasonableness of relocation required consideration of an applicant’s personal circumstances.[58] The IAA could only obtain information about the applicant’s personal circumstances from the applicant. By not exercising its discretion to seek new information the IAA “disabled itself” from considering whether it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate.[59] The Full Court said:[It] is not apparent how the conclusion not to consider the exercise of the discretionary power was reached in the present case, having regard to the facts and to the statutory purpose for which the discretion to get new information was directed”.[60][58] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210, [66] (Robertson, Murphy and Kerr JJ)[59] Ibid [82][60] Ibid [83]