BEL18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BEL18 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR [2018] FCCA 1606

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Extension of time – application filed 162 days late – significant delay – ministerial intervention sought instead of judicial review – discretionary considerations – first applicant relied on advice from Department of Immigration caseworker – gave birth shortly prior to decision by Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) – required an interpreter and other assistance in managing her migration matters – not legally represented prior to 5 March 2018 – had insufficient information prior to obtaining legal advice – did not understand consequences of not filing application for judicial review in time – delay explicable – Minister did not claim prejudice from delay – applicants’ grounds of review reasonably arguable – MZABO distinguished – Vu distinguished – extension of time allowed.

MIGRATION – Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) visas – applicants claimed to fear harm from authorities by reason of association to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) – no evidence of adverse attention from authorities – IAA not accepting applicants’ claimed links to LTTE – IAA affirming delegate’s decision – whether IAA acted legally unreasonably – IAA discretion to get information considered –first applicant claimed inaccurate interpretation during IAA interview – no indication from first applicant of any inaccurate interpretation or misunderstanding during IAA interview – whether IAA constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction – applicants unable to specify jurisdictional error by delegate as would enable IAA to reach a state of satisfaction under the Migration Act – whether IAA failed to have regard to material evidence before it – whether IAA failed to have regard to an integer of applicants’ claim – IAA not accepting first applicant’s husband was a person of interest – IAA therefore not required to make a specific finding in relation to first applicant’s husband’s evidence – such a specific finding subsumed in IAA’s general findings about applicants’ husband – application for judicial review dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5(1), 48A, 48B, 417, 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473CC(2)(a), 473CC(2)(b), 473DB(1)(a),(b), 473DC, 473DC(1), 473DC(1)(a), 473DC(2), 473DD, 473DE, 473EA(1), 473GA, 473GB, 476, 477(1),477(2), 477(3)(a), 477(3)(ca), Part 7AA

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.4.43
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.44.05

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593
BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 169
CDZ16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCA 967
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 58 ALR 305
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

MZABO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 980

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 1606
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The applicants, Sri Lankan citizens, sought Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visas, claiming they feared harm in Sri Lanka due to associations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The IAA had affirmed a delegate's decision to refuse their visa applications. The applicants filed their substantive application for judicial review 162 days out of time, prompting an application for an extension of time.

The court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, whether to grant an extension of time for the applicants to file their application for judicial review, considering the significant delay and the circumstances surrounding it. Secondly, the court had to consider whether the IAA had acted legally unreasonably in its assessment of the applicants' claims, specifically in relation to the IAA's discretion to obtain further information and its consideration of the evidence before it.

In relation to the extension of time, the court found that the delay was explicable. The first applicant had given birth shortly before the IAA's decision, required an interpreter and assistance with her migration matters, and was not legally represented until after the deadline for filing the judicial review application. She lacked sufficient information and did not understand the consequences of the delay. The Minister did not claim prejudice from the delay, and the grounds of review were considered reasonably arguable. Consequently, the court exercised its discretion under s.477(2) of the Migration Act to extend the time for filing the application. Regarding the substantive application, the court dismissed each of the three grounds of review, finding that the IAA had not acted illegally unreasonably. The court noted that the IAA was not required to make a specific finding regarding the first applicant's husband's evidence, as such a finding was subsumed within the IAA's general findings about the applicants' claims.

The court ordered that the time for filing the application for judicial review be extended to 12 March 2018. The substantive application was dismissed, with costs to be paid by the first applicant.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The Substantive Application and the Extension of Time Application were filed on 12 March 2018. The decision of the IAA was made on 28 August 2017 (IAA Decision). Any application in relation to the IAA Decision should have been made within the 35 day period as specified in s.477(1) of the Migration Act. The applicants are therefore 162 days out of time. However, s.477(2) of the Migration Act provides that the Court may order that the 35 day period be extended. In relation to the Extension of Time Application, I have determined that pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act it is necessary in the administration of justice to extend the time for the applicants to file their application for judicial review of the IAA Decision to 12 March 2018, being the date upon which the application was originally filed in this Court. In relation to the Substantive Application, I have determined that each of the three grounds should be dismissed, with costs to be paid by the first applicant. The applicants are Sri Lankan citizens. The first applicant (applicant) arrived in Australia on 1 April 2013.[1] Prior to arriving in Australia the applicant had lived in Chennai, India since February 2001.[2] The applicant married her husband in Australia on 7 November 2014.[3] Her husband was also a Tamil asylum seeker.[4] The second applicant was born in Australia on 12 May 2015.[1] Court Book (CB) 41[2] CB 41[3] CB 36[4] CB 155 On 23 November 2016 the applicants applied for Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visas (protection visa).[5] The application for the protection visa originally included the husband of the applicant, however the applicant was advised by the First Respondent that the application for her husband was not valid under s.48A of the Migration Act as he had previously been refused the grant of a protection visa.[6] The applicants were “fast track applicants” within the meaning of s.5(1) of the Migration Act. The applicants’ application was supported by statements made by both the applicant[7] (Applicant’s Statement) and her husband[8] (Husband’s Statement) and a statutory declaration by her husband.[9] In the Applicant’s Statement the applicant said that she feared harm in Sri Lanka due to her family’s association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The applicant said that her older brother had been forcibly recruited into the LTTE, that the Sri Lankan Army had harassed her family, including sexually assaulting her mother. She also said that in 2000 her fiancé had been murdered by the Sri Lankan Army. In February 2001 the applicant and her family fled to India where she had lived until coming to Australia by boat in 2013.[5] CB 157–161[6] CB 151-154, and 259, [1][7] CB 122-126[8] CB 127-131[9] CB 132-133 The Husband’s Statement[10] said that he was forced to join the LTTE in 2001 and as a result the Sri Lankan Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the Sri Lankan Army had subsequently harassed him. The applicant’s husband said that from 2004 he spent most of his time overseas, however whenever he returned to Sri Lanka the CID would threaten him and ask him questions about his involvement with the LTTE. The applicant’s husband said that he fled Sri Lanka in 2011 after the harassment by the CID had escalated.[10] CB 127-131

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Regulation 4.43 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Migration Regulations) lists permissible and impermissible directions for the purposes of s.473CC(2)(b) of the Migration Act. The permissible directions include a direction that that the applicant satisfies the refugee or complimentary protection criteria.[55][55] Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg.4.43(2)(b) and (d) It was submitted by Counsel for the applicants that to conduct the review and make directions under reg.4.43, the IAA must make its own assessment of the applicant’s claims to meet the protection criteria. Counsel relied upon CDZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCA 967[56] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176, where the Full Court said:… A body such as the IAA, which is conducting an inquisitorial review process in which there is a claim for protection under s.36(2)(a) of the Act must not only consider and determine the case as articulated by the protection visa applicant, but also do so in relation to an unarticulated claim which is nevertheless raised clearly or squarely on the material before that review body (see NABE at [58]-[61] per Black CJ, French and Selway JJ).[57][56] CDZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCA 967, [6] (Logan J).[57] BBS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 176, [79] (Kenny, Tracey and Griffiths JJ). It was also submitted by Counsel for the applicants that it was significant that the applicant was not legally represented when her application was before the IAA. She had retained the Migration Agent when her application was before the Delegate for consideration. As a consequence it was submitted the applicant did not have assistance to make a Freedom of Information request or to receive the legal advice in relation to a review of the Delegate’s Decision. It was submitted by Counsel for the applicants that the failure by the IAA to consider exercising its discretion under s.473DC was unreasonable because it compromised the IAA’s capacity to exercise its jurisdiction. Counsel for the applicants submitted that what was required for the reasonable exercise of a power depends on the scope and purposes of the statute: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, per French CJ at [23] and [26] and Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [69] and [72]. Counsel for the applicants relied upon the decisions in two cases that considered the IAA’s discretion to get information. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210 the Full Court considered s.473C in circumstances where the IAA had found that an applicant could relocate to avoid harm. The Delegate had not raised the issue of relocation with the applicant. The Full Court noted that an assessment of the reasonableness of relocation required consideration of an applicant’s personal circumstances.[58] The IAA could only obtain information about the applicant’s personal circumstances from the applicant. By not exercising its discretion to seek new information the IAA “disabled itself” from considering whether it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate.[59] The Full Court said:[It] is not apparent how the conclusion not to consider the exercise of the discretionary power was reached in the present case, having regard to the facts and to the statutory purpose for which the discretion to get new information was directed”.[60][58] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210, [66] (Robertson, Murphy and Kerr JJ)[59] Ibid [82][60] Ibid [83]