Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd

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5 CLR 647

BARRIER WHARFS LIMITED W. SCOTT FELL &COMPANY LIMITED

RESPONDENTS. DEFENDANTS,

ON APPEAL FROM A JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT. Contract-Absence of formal contract-Coutract contained in rs-Subsequent

correspondence, effect of.

The plaintiffs, who were wharf owners, were negotiating with the defend- ants, who were shipowners, for the use by the defendants' ships of the plaintiffs' wharf. The plaintiffs wrote :--" I beg to state that I am prepared to find accommodation for your steamers at our wharf, you to be charged six- pence per tou on all coal and coke landed there, provided you undertake to do all your business other than that with the B. Co. with us. I understand your coal contracts provide for approximately 50,000 tons exclusive of the B. Co. Tonnage dues as per printed schedule handed you to be charged. I take to provide a berth for your steamers at all times on the understanding

5 CLR 648

that reasonable notice, say two days, be given to our manager at Port Pirieuf expected arrivals. If this arrangement is acceptable to you I suggest that it be for a term of two years from 1st March next." The defendants replied - " We are anxious to do business with you if possible, and will endeavour to come to your figure provided you agree to waive tonnage dues on all our steamers loading and discharging at your wharf." Plaintiffs replied hope we shall be able to fix up our wharfage arrangements could not entertain the suggestion to waive the tonnage dues on your steamers visiting our wharf

Of course you are aware that a steamer paying at one wharf has not to pay at another; this could all be arranged to your satisfaction, I am sure." Defendants replied :-" We are willing to conclude with you for wharfage on the basis of sixpence per ton and will be glad if you will make a contract for our approval and signature," Plaintiffs replied :- " I note with pleasure that you have decided to accept the wharfage rate of sixpence per ton as per correspondence which has passed, and I will arrange a contract accordingly."

Held, that these letters did not constitute a binding contract between the parties.

Held, also, that, if the letters could be construed on their face as a contract, the subsequent correspondence and conduct of the parties showed that no binding contract was intended.

Judgment of Higgins J. affirmed.

APPEAL from judgment of Higgins J.

An action was brought in the High Court by the Barrier Wharfs Limited, a Victorian company owning a wharf at Port Pirie, South Australia, known as the Barrier Wharf, against W. Scott Fell &Co. Ltd., a New South Wales company carrying on business there as shipowners and merchants, claiming £2,540 damages for breach of contract. Paragraph 4 of the statement of claim was as follows By a contract made between the plain- tiffs and the defendants about the month of February 1906 (which said contract is partly…

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Details
Case
[1908] HCA 88
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Barrier Wharfs Limited (the plaintiffs) appealed to the Full Court of the High Court of Australia from a judgment of Higgins J. The dispute concerned whether a binding contract had been formed between the plaintiffs, who owned a wharf, and W. Scott Fell & Co. Ltd. (the defendants), who were shipowners. The plaintiffs claimed damages for breach of an alleged contract for the use of their wharf by the defendants' steamers. The alleged contract was said to be partly verbal and partly contained in a series of letters exchanged between the parties in January and February 1906.

The court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, whether the correspondence between the parties, when considered on its face, constituted a binding contract. Secondly, if the correspondence could be construed as a contract, whether the subsequent conduct and further correspondence of the parties demonstrated that no binding contract was intended to be concluded until a formal agreement was executed.

Higgins J. found that no binding contract had been formed. His Honour reasoned that while the parties had engaged in extensive negotiations and had agreed on the wharfage rate of sixpence per ton, they had not reached a final mutual assent on all essential terms. The correspondence indicated that the defendants were seeking to have all terms, including tonnage dues and other operational matters, set out in a formal contract for their Board's approval before being bound. The subsequent conduct, including the defendants' continued use of other wharves and their requests for further information and clarification regarding a formal agreement, further supported the conclusion that no binding contract was intended or had been concluded. The court applied the principle that for a contract to exist, there must be a clear intention to be bound, and the contemplation of a subsequent formal document is strong evidence that the parties did not intend to be bound by their prior negotiations.

The appeal was dismissed, and judgment was entered for the defendants with costs.

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