Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Allegations of contraventions of Fair Work Act 2009 – proceedings commenced almost 10 months after applicant signed Deed of Release – whether Deed binding – whether Deed bar to proceedings – summary dismissal application – whether no reasonable prospect of success.
Pursuant to s.17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 and r.13.10(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 there be judgment for the respondent and the applicant’s application and statement of claim filed 10 October 2017 be summarily dismissed.
Any application for costs along with brief written submissions (no more than 4 pages) be filed and served within 14 days of this order.
Any response to an application for costs along with brief written submissions (no more than 4 pages) be filed and served 14 days thereafter.
AND THE COURT NOTES:
A.Any application for costs will be determined on the papers unless otherwise requested in submissions.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE
MLG 2174 of 2017
NEIL FRANCIS JAMES DOYLE
Applicant
And
OIL BASINS LIMITED (ACN 006 024 764)
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(as corrected)
On 10 October 2017 Neil Francis James Doyle (“the applicant”) commenced proceedings in the Fair Work Division of the Court against Oil Basins Limited (ACN 006 024 764 (“the respondent”).
The applicant’s solicitors filed an initiating application supported by a statement of claim on 10 October 2017. The proceedings were given a first Court date of 3 November 2017.
On 16 October 2017 a response accompanied by a defence to the statement of claim was filed on behalf of the respondent.
The following day, 17 October 2017 the respondent’s solicitors filed an application in a case supported by an affidavit of Mr Carl Francis Dumbrell who is a chartered accountant and non-executive director of the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Doyle v Oil Basins Limited [2017] FCCA 2758
Case
[2017] FCCA 2758
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This matter came before Judge O'Sullivan of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia concerning an application for summary judgment. The specific details of the parties and the nature of the dispute are not provided in the extract.
The court was required to determine whether the respondent had a reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding, or conversely, whether the applicant had a reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding, in accordance with section 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 2001 (Cth) and Rule 13.10 of the Rules. The court also considered the correct interpretation of "no reasonable prospect of success" as distinct from a defence or proceeding being "hopeless" or "bound to fail".
In reaching its decision, the court referred to section 17A(3) of the FCCA Act, which clarifies that a proceeding or defence need not be hopeless or bound to fail to have no reasonable prospect of success. The court noted that the approach taken in cases dealing with section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 is generally considered apposite. The court cited *Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia* (2010) 241 CLR 118, where it was held that the Federal Court may exercise its power under section 31A only if satisfied that there is "no reasonable prospect" of success. The court emphasised that while the power to dismiss an action summarily should not be exercised lightly, its application should not be confined to cases that would have fallen within earlier, different procedural regimes, to avoid defeating the evident legislative purpose.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Section 17A of the FCCA Act states:Summary judgment(1)The Federal Circuit Court of Australia may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(2)The Federal Circuit Court of Australia may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or(b)bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Federal Circuit Court of Australia has apart from this section. The test to be applied where the respondent’s application, a summary dismissal application, is whether or not an application has a reasonable prospect of success, not whether the application is “doomed to fail”. That is made clear by section 17A(3) as set out above. Rule 13.10 of the Rules provides:Disposal by summary dismissalThe Court may order that a proceeding be stayed, or dismissed generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceeding, if the Court is satisfied that:(a)the party prosecuting the proceeding or claim for relief has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or claim; or(b)the proceeding or claim for relief is frivolous or vexatious; or(c)the proceeding or claim for relief is an abuse of the process of the Court.Note: For additional powers of the Court in relation to family law proceedings that are frivolous or vexatious, see sections 102QB and 118 of the Family Law Act. The relevant provision of the Rules of this Court follow those sections of the FCCA Act which are in the same terms as section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (“the Federal Court Act”). The approach taken in cases dealing with section 31A of the Federal Court Act are generally seen as apposite in dealing with cases under section 17A of the FCCA Act. In Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118, what was required by section 31A of the Federal Court Act was set out by their Honours Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ, as follows:…The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is “no reasonable prospect” of success. Of course, it may readily be accepted that the power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly. But the elucidation of what amounts to “no reasonable prospect” can best proceed in the same way as content has been given, through a succession of decided cases, to other generally expressed statutory phrases, such as the phrase “just and equitable” when it is used to identify a ground for winding up a company. At this point in the development of the understanding of the expression and its application, it is sufficient, but important, to emphasise that the evident legislative purpose revealed by the text of the provision will be defeated if its application is read as confined to cases of a kind which fell within earlier, different, procedural regimes.