Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd v Kok

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd v Kok, in the matter of Kok  [2003] FCA 90

BANKRUPTCY – petition – petition for sequestration order – existence of debt – release of securities – effect of deed of release between receiver and creditor – whether release of securities for consideration released personal covenant of debtor.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)

Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Limited (1954) 91 CLR 112 applied
Grundy v Ley [1984] 2 NSWLR 467 considered

IN THE MATTER OF BERNARD CORNELIS KOK;  COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT BANK OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED v BERNARD CORNELIS KOK

NO. N 7200 OF 2002

BEAUMONT J
14 FEBRUARY 2003
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 7200 OF 2002

IN THE MATTER OF:

BERNARD CORNELIS KOK

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT BANK OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED
APPLICANT

AND:

BERNARD CORNELIS KOK
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 FEBRUARY 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        A sequestration order is made against the estate of the respondent debtor.

2.        Costs reserved.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 7200 OF 2002

IN THE MATTER OF:

BERNARD CORNELIS KOK

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT BANK OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED
APPLICANT

AND:

BERNARD CORNELIS KOK
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE:

14 FEBRUARY 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEAUMONT J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. By its creditor’s petition presented on 4 July 2002, Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Limited (“the applicant creditor”) has applied under s 43 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”) for a sequestration order against the estate of Bernard Cornelis Kok (“the respondent debtor”).

  2. The applicant creditor claims, and I am satisfied of it, that on 11 June 2002, the respondent debtor committed an act of bankruptcy by failing to comply with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice served on him on 18 May 2002 in connection with the balance of a judgment debt of $23,951.92 including interest due under a final judgment recovered in a Local Court in the sum of $27,691.36 (having allowed for the receipt of the sum of $5,000 on 12 February 2002 in the circumstances explained below).

  3. The respondent debtor appeared in person and opposed the petition on one substantive ground, explained below. 

  4. I am satisfied that the applicant creditor has proved all formal statutory requirements.  I note also that the respondent debtor has stated (and there is no dispute) that he has no assets and as an unemployed pensioner is unable to pay the judgment debt. 

    BACKGROUND FACTS

  5. In order to explain the ground of the respondent debtor’s opposition, it will be necessary to explain some of its background (none of which is, or could be, disputed) as follows.

  6. On 24 May 1995, the respondent debtor and Winnie Sina Kok-Sinisa, Sione Lava Leota and Satua Leota applied to the applicant creditor for accommodation in the form of a…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 90
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Limited, acting as the creditor, filed an application for sequestration against the respondent debtor, Kok. The respondent, who had no assets and was unemployed, opposed the application on the basis that the creditor had colluded with the liquidator of a partnership that included him, and had improperly released the security interests held over the partnership’s assets. The dispute centred on whether the creditor's actions in releasing the securities without fully discharging the debtor's personal liability constituted a legal defence to the sequestration application.

The court examined whether the release of the securities by the creditor was valid and whether it legally discharged the respondent’s personal liability. It found that the general words in the release did not extend to the personal liability of the debtor, as such liability was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the release. The court further held that the discharge of the securities did not automatically release the debtor's personal liability, as per the precedent in Grundy v Lea. Given the respondent’s insolvency and the lack of a legal defence to the sequestration application, the court exercised its discretion to make a sequestration order against the debtor’s estate.

The court issued a sequestration order against the debtor’s estate and reserved costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. A sequestration order is made against the estate of the respondent debtor.

2. Costs reserved.

Background

Background to the litigation

I am satisfied that the applicant creditor has proved all formal statutory requirements. I note also that the respondent debtor has stated (and there is no dispute) that he has no assets and as an unemployed pensioner is unable to pay the judgment debt. BACKGROUND FACTS In order to explain the ground of the respondent debtor’s opposition, it will be necessary to explain some of its background (none of which is, or could be, disputed) as follows. On 24 May 1995, the respondent debtor and Winnie Sina Kok-Sinisa, Sione Lava Leota and Satua Leota applied to the applicant creditor for accommodation in the form of a loan of $85,000, agreed by the applicant creditor in July 1995 to be made available for the following purposes:“Purchase dry-cleaning and laundromat business to cost $215,000Less equity contribution $130,000Balance $85,000 Instalments of $1,950 (later $1,465) covering both principal and interest were to be payable monthly, commencing in August 1995, with any balance and interest payable in July 2000. The borrowers’ liability was expressed to be joint and several. The loan was to be secured by registered bills of sale and equitable mortgages over the assets (including leases) of the borrowers’ laundromat and dry-cleaning businesses. Those securities were granted on 4 August 1995. The securities, which also included personal covenants by the borrowers to repay the loan and interest, were expressed to be immediately enforceable in certain events, including default in repayment, or appointment of a receiver, or any change in the composition of the partnership. The securities also contained a provision (cl F(21)) to the effect that, in any event, as “a separate and independent stipulation”, the borrowers agreed to be liable “as sole or principle debtor” in the events there specified. The securities further authorised (cl F(24)) the applicant creditor to release the borrowers (etcetera) without affecting liability under the security. By June 2001, loan repayments were $4,395 in arrears. By letter dated 29 June 2001, the applicant creditor threatened to obtain a monetary judgment against the borrowers. By letter dated 20 August 2001, the applicant creditor, noting that the borrowers were in default, demanded payment of $26,147.73 within seven days. Although the applicant creditor was not then informed, in September 2001 an application was made by the borrowers to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for an order dissolving their partnership. On 13 September 2001, that court made by consent that order together with orders that the partnership business be wound up under the court’s direction; that William James Hamilton be appointed receiver and manager of the partnership, with power to carry on its business; that the borrowers deliver to the receiver the assets of the partnership; and that the receiver be paid such remuneration as the court deemed appropriate. On 13 September 2001, the receiver informed the applicant creditor by facsimile of his appointment, and that he had advertised the businesses for sale, and requested the applicant creditor’s “payout figure” under the securities which, he believed, was approximately $25,000.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BEAUMONT J
The respondent debtor has expressed his opposition in this way:“AThat the Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Limited committed collusion with the liquidator (annexure ‘E’) of the former partnership (being the four respondent debtors) and ... , as follows:(1)By releasing the Registered Bills of Sale of the former operations/business (being a laundromat shop and a dry-cleaning shop) owned [by] the four respondent debtors.(2)By releasing the mortgages of lease over 141 and 143 Avoca Street, Randwick NSW.(3)By accepting $5000 (five thousand dollars) in lieu of number one and two while registered valuations show a value of not less than $71,940 (seventy one thousand, nine hundred and forty dollars) (annexure ‘D’) and as high as $130,000 to $180,000 (one hundred and eighty thousand dollars) (annexure ‘C’).(4)The applicant creditor has had 100 per cent security over the property of the first, second, third and fourth respondent debtors.”CONCLUSION ON THE ISSUE RAISED IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION In my opinion, the issue now sought to be agitated by the respondent debtor can constitute no answer in law to the petition. In the first place, it is a settled principle of interpretation that general words in an instrument of release are limited always to that thing, or those things, which were specially in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the release was given (see Grant v John Grant and Sons Pty Limited (1954) 91 CLR 112 at 126). As the correspondence cited previously indicates, what was specially in contemplation between the receiver and the applicant creditor was, as the receiver stated in his letter dated 25 January 2002, whether the receiver could obtain from the Supreme Court a declaration that his costs had priority over the securities held by the applicant creditor. It was that issue, one of priority of security, which was then compromised. The personal liability of the borrowers stood outside this settlement and, of course, they were not parties to the arrangement between the applicant creditor and the receiver. Nor, in my view, did the discharge of the securities, without more, operate to release that liability (see Grundy v Lea (1984) 2 NSWLR 467 per Kearney J at 473).DISCRETION Finally, in all the circumstances, including the respondent’s concession that he is insolvent, there is, in my view, no discretionary consideration why I should refuse to make a sequestration order.ORDER Accordingly I make the following orders:1. A sequestration order is made against the estate of the respondent debtor.2.Costs reserved.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BEAUMONT J

The court found that the release of the securities by the Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd (the Bank) and the receiver was limited to resolving the priority of security over the assets of the partnership. This was in line with the principle that general words in an instrument of release are limited to what was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of release. The court noted that the receiver and the Bank were focused on obtaining a declaration from the Supreme Court regarding the priority of security, and this was the matter that was compromised. The personal liability of the borrowers remained unaffected by this arrangement as they were not parties to the compromise.

Furthermore, the court held that the discharge of the securities did not release the personal liability of the borrowers. This was based on the authority of Grundy v Lea, where it was held that the discharge of securities without more does not release the personal liability of the borrowers. The court observed that the borrowers' personal liability remained as they were not parties to the arrangement between the Bank and the receiver.

Lastly, the court concluded that there were no discretionary considerations to prevent the making of a sequestration order against the respondent debtor's estate. The respondent had conceded his insolvency, and the court found no reason to refuse the sequestration order in the circumstances. The court ordered that a sequestration order be made against the estate of the respondent debtor, and reserved costs.