FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Blakeley v National Australia Bank [2017] FCA 835
File number: WAD 75 of 2017 Judge: BARKER J Date of judgment: 25 July 2017 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and R 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – whether applicants have reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting proceeding – where applicants and respondent executed forbearance deed – whether respondent released from applicants’ claims under terms of deed
BANKRUPTCY – whether first applicant has standing – where first applicant declared bankrupt and discharged from bankruptcy – where claims against respondent vested in Official Trustee upon bankruptcy pursuant to s 58(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Legislation: Australian Consumer Law
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 58(1), s 116(2)(g)(i)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 127, 127(4), 129, 198E(1), 601AD(1A), 601AD(2)Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2)
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) R 26.01
Cases cited: Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Limited v Kok [2003] FCA 90
Faulkner v Bluett (1981) 52 FLR 115; [1981] FCA 3
Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113; [1936] HCA 41
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2017] FCAFC 92
Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1708Date of hearing: 4 July 2017 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Counsel for the First Applicant: The First Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms K Link Solicitor for the Respondent: Norton Rose Fulbright Australia ORDERS
WAD 75 of 2017 BETWEEN: HAROLD THOMAS JAMES BLAKELEY
First Applicant
HAROLD THOMAS JAMES BLAKELEY TRUSTEE FOR HTJB FAMILY TRUST
Second Applicant
HAROLD THOMAS JAMES BLAKELEY TRUSTEE FOR HAROLD THOMAS JAMES BLACKELEY FAMILY TRUST
Third Applicant
AND: NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK
Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JULY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Summary judgment be entered for the respondent against the applicants.
2.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application and the proceeding, to be assessed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BARKER J:
On 22 February 2017, Mr Harold Thomas James Blakeley, on his own behalf and purportedly as trustee for HTJB Family Trust and purportedly as trustee for the Harold Thomas James Blakeley Family Trust, respectively the named first applicant, second applicant and third applicant (together, the applicants), commenced this proceeding against the National Australia Bank Limited, in which they claim damages in respect of alleged unconscionable conduct by the Bank and other conduct of the Bank alleged to contravene the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) and the Australian Consumer Law.
In a…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 835
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Summary judgment be entered for the respondent against the applicants.
2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application and the proceeding, to be assessed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The forbearance deed was executed as a deed. Mr Blakeley signed as a director and company secretary on behalf of PMHB, in his own capacity, and as trustee for the Blakeley Family Trust, in accordance with s 127 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and also signed in his own capacity and as trustee for the HTJB Family Trust. While Mr Blakeley now submits that the forbearance deed is not relevant to the claims he has identified in the proceeding, including in the statement of claim as set out above, I am unable to accept the submission. Plainly the various claims he wishes to pursue against the Bank fall within the language of cl 10 of the forbearance deed, namely, claims “in respect of each of the Facilities, Securities and Guarantees” as those terms are further defined in cl 1.1 of the forbearance deed, as set out above. Clause 10 of the forbearance deed makes it clear that the Bank may plead the deed as “an absolute bar and defence to any claim brought by the [applicants] in respect of” any claim in relation to facilities, securities and guarantees. I accept the submission made on behalf of the Bank that the release is binding on subsequent trustees of the Blakeley Family Trust, including Mr Blakeley, if he is indeed now the trustee of the Blakeley Family Trust, having regard to cl 1.2(m) of the forbearance deed. The claims that the applicants wish to pursue concerning unconscionable conduct, deceptive and misleading conduct, failure to abide by the law relating to quiet enjoyment and other alleged contraventions of Commonwealth legislation would all arise in connection with the Bank’s exercise of its rights pursuant to the facilities, securities and guarantees as defined by the forbearance deed. They are all claims within the contemplation of the parties at the time when the release was given and are covered by the release. See Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Limited v Kok [2003] FCA 90. The conditions precedent set out at cl 2.1 of the forbearance deed have been satisfied or waived, as indeed have the conditions precedent to the variation letter dated 11 April 2013 and the variation letter dated 27 May 2013, as is apparent from the affidavit of Ms Christine Teresa Facius, dated 2 May 2017, at [8] to [10] upon which the Bank relies. While in his submissions Mr Blakeley also asserts that the forbearance deed may, in effect, be ignored because it was executed by the applicants in circumstances of duress and undue influence, there is no evidence advanced by the applicants to support the allegation. It is, as the Bank submits, mere assertion. I accept the submission made on behalf of the Bank that such an allegation is, in any event, inconsistent with:(1)the express acknowledgements in the forbearance deed that the borrowers and guarantors (as defined in the forbearance deed) entered into the deed:(a)'having first obtained independent legal advice': clause 3(j)(i) of the forbearance deed; and(b)'willingly and without reliance on any written or verbal statement or communication by or on behalf of [the Bank]': clause 3(j)(iii) of the forbearance deed; and(2)the terms of the variation letters dated 11 April 2013 and 27 May 2013, which record variations to the terms of the forbearance deed requested by the applicants: Ms Facius’ affidavit, CTF-3 and CTF-4.