SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Athwal v State of Queensland [2023] QCA 156
PARTIES:
KAMALJIT KAUR ATHWAL
(appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 12964 of 2022
SC No 1362 of 2021DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2022] QSC 209 (Brown J)DELIVERED ON:
1 August 2023
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
2 May 2023
JUDGES:
Mullins P and Dalton JA and Mitchell AJA
ORDER:
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. Order 1 made by the primary judge on 30 September 2022 is set aside and the following order is substituted:
It is declared that s 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) is inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and, by reason of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution, is therefore invalid.
3. There is no order as to the costs of the appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
HUMAN RIGHTS – DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION – CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS – INCONSISTENCY OF LAWS – where s 51(1) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) creates the offence of physically possessing a knife in a public place or school – where there are reasonable excuse provisions in ss 51(1) and (2) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) to physically possess a knife for a range of reasons not involving using the knife offensively or for self-defence – where s 51(4) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) specifically provided that it is a reasonable excuse to the offence in s 51(1) of that Act to physically possess a knife for genuine religious purposes – where s 51(4) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) specifically gives the example that a Sikh may possess a knife known as a kirpan to comply with their religious faith – where s 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) excludes the operation of s 51(4) of that Act to the extent that it involves physical possession of a knife in a school – where the appellant was a Sikh and, at first instance, brought an application to the Supreme Court for a declaration that s 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) was inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), and therefore invalid by operation of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution – where the primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for declaratory relief – whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the application at first instance – whether s 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) is inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14(3), s 35C(2)
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 7, s 32
Constitution (Cth), s 109
Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 7, s 8, s 13, s 19, s 20, s 48, s 53
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s 8, s 9, s 9(1A), s 10
Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), s 3(2), s 5, s 49A(1), s 50(1), s 51,…
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- Case
- [2023] QCA 156
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether section 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) is inconsistent with section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The court examined the provisions of the Weapons Act and the Racial Discrimination Act to determine if the former discriminated against Sikhs in a manner that contravened the latter. The court also considered the meaning of freedom of religion and freedom of movement as protected by section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act.
The court concluded that the provisions of the Weapons Act do not discriminate against Sikhs. The court held that section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act does not guarantee absolute rights of freedom of movement and freedom of religion, but rather ensures that these rights are enjoyed to the same extent as persons of other ethnic origins. The court found that the prohibition on carrying knives in schools applies to all members of the community and does not discriminate against Sikhs, as the conduct in question is not part of other groups' religious beliefs. The court further held that section 51(5) of the Weapons Act is not a special measure within the meaning of section 8 of the Racial Discrimination Act. Therefore, the court found that section 51(5) of the Weapons Act is not inconsistent with section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act.
The appeal was allowed, and the order made by the primary judge was set aside. The court declared that section 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) is consistent with section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and, therefore, valid. There was no order as to the costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. Order 1 made by the primary judge on 30 September 2022 is set aside and the following order is substituted:
It is declared that s 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) is inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and, by reason of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution, is therefore invalid.
3. There is no order as to the costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 8 of the RDA provides for exceptions to the application of pt II of that Act (in which s 10 is located), including in relation to certain “special measures” to which art 1(4) of the Convention applies. Article 1(4) of the Convention refers to certain special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals. There is no suggestion that s 51(5) of the Weapons Act is a special measure of the kind referred to in that paragraph of the Convention.Operation of s 109 of the Constitution and s 10 of the RDA Section 109 of the Constitution provides that, when a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid. Section 109 of the Constitution renders an inconsistent State law inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency.[30][30]Carter v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic) (1942) 66 CLR 557, 573, 582, 599. The operation of s 109 of the Constitution in relation to s 10 of the RDA has been considered in a series of decisions of the High Court of Australia.[31] The following general propositions may be taken from those decisions in relation to State laws which prohibit conduct in a way that affects the enjoyment of rights identified in art 5 of the Convention.[31]Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70; Mabo v The State of Queensland [No 1] (1988) 166 CLR 186; The State of Western Australia v The Commonwealth (Native Title Act Case) (1995) 183 CLR 373; The State of Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28; (2002) 213 CLR 1; Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28; (2013) 252 CLR 168. Section 10 was inserted into the RDA to give effect to art 2(1)(c) of the Convention and is designed to overcome inequality before the law based on race, colour or national or ethnic origin.[32] Section 10 may operate even though the relevant State law does not make a distinction expressly based on race, colour or national or ethnic origin and does not have a discriminatory purpose. Rather, the section is directed to the discriminatory operation and effect of the legislation. Section 10 is concerned with the unequal enjoyment of rights that should be conferred irrespective of race, colour or national or ethnic origin.[33][32]Maloney [10], [161], [201], [299].[33]Ward [105], [115]; Maloney [11], [65], [78], [112], [148], [200] - [201]. Section 10 of the RDA does not allow for persons of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin to enjoy a right to a more limited extent than other persons by reason of a State law if the difference is justifiable or proportionate to a legitimate end. If the law is not a special measure within the meaning of s 8(1) of the RDA, the conclusion that persons of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin enjoy a right to a more limited extent than others is sufficient to engage s 10 of the RDA.[34][34]Maloney [68], [112], [166], [214]. To engage s 10 of the RDA, it is not necessary to show that all persons of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin enjoy the relevant right to a more limited extent than others. Nor is it necessary to show that only persons of the particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin enjoy the relevant right to a more limited extent than others.[35] This point is illustrated by Maloney, where the State law prohibited possession of alcohol in a public place on Palm Island, whose residents were predominantly Aboriginal. The majority held that the State law would have been inconsistent with s 10 of the RDA had it not been a special measure. This was so notwithstanding that the law also applied to non‑Aboriginal persons on Palm Island and did not apply to regulate the conduct of Aboriginal persons outside of Palm Island.[35]Maloney [79] - [80], [112], [200], [331], [363].