Athwal v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Athwal v State of Queensland [2023] QCA 156

PARTIES:

KAMALJIT KAUR ATHWAL
(appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 12964 of 2022
SC No 1362 of 2021

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2022] QSC 209 (Brown J)

DELIVERED ON:

1 August 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

2 May 2023

JUDGES:

Mullins P and Dalton JA and Mitchell AJA

ORDER:

1.   The appeal is allowed.

2.   Order 1 made by the primary judge on 30 September 2022 is set aside and the following order is substituted:

It is declared that s 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) is inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and, by reason of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution, is therefore invalid.

3.   There is no order as to the costs of the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

HUMAN RIGHTS – DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION – CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS – INCONSISTENCY OF LAWS – where s 51(1) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) creates the offence of physically possessing a knife in a public place or school – where there are reasonable excuse provisions in ss 51(1) and (2) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) to physically possess a knife for a range of reasons not involving using the knife offensively or for self-defence – where s 51(4) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) specifically provided that it is a reasonable excuse to the offence in s 51(1) of that Act to physically possess a knife for genuine religious purposes – where s 51(4) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) specifically gives the example that a Sikh may possess a knife known as a kirpan to comply with their religious faith – where s 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) excludes the operation of s 51(4) of that Act to the extent that it involves physical possession of a knife in a school – where the appellant was a Sikh and, at first instance, brought an application to the Supreme Court for a declaration that s 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) was inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), and therefore invalid by operation of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution – where the primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for declaratory relief – whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the application at first instance – whether s 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) is inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14(3), s 35C(2)
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 7, s 32
Constitution (Cth), s 109
Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 7, s 8, s 13, s 19, s 20, s 48, s 53
Racial Discrimination Act 1975
(Cth), s 8, s 9, s 9(1A), s 10
Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), s 3(2), s 5, s 49A(1), s 50(1), s 51,…

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Details
Case
[2023] QCA 156
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Athwal v State of Queensland, the appellant, a Sikh individual, challenged the validity of section 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), which excludes the operation of section 51(4) of that Act to the extent that it involves physical possession of a knife in a school for genuine religious purposes. The appellant argued that this section was inconsistent with section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and, therefore, invalid by operation of section 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution. The primary judge dismissed the appellant's application for declaratory relief, and the appellant sought an appeal against this decision.

The central legal issue in this case was whether section 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) is inconsistent with section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The court examined the provisions of the Weapons Act and the Racial Discrimination Act to determine if the former discriminated against Sikhs in a manner that contravened the latter. The court also considered the meaning of freedom of religion and freedom of movement as protected by section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act.

The court concluded that the provisions of the Weapons Act do not discriminate against Sikhs. The court held that section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act does not guarantee absolute rights of freedom of movement and freedom of religion, but rather ensures that these rights are enjoyed to the same extent as persons of other ethnic origins. The court found that the prohibition on carrying knives in schools applies to all members of the community and does not discriminate against Sikhs, as the conduct in question is not part of other groups' religious beliefs. The court further held that section 51(5) of the Weapons Act is not a special measure within the meaning of section 8 of the Racial Discrimination Act. Therefore, the court found that section 51(5) of the Weapons Act is not inconsistent with section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act.

The appeal was allowed, and the order made by the primary judge was set aside. The court declared that section 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) is consistent with section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and, therefore, valid. There was no order as to the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. Order 1 made by the primary judge on 30 September 2022 is set aside and the following order is substituted:

It is declared that s 51(5) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) is inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and, by reason of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution, is therefore invalid.

3. There is no order as to the costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 51(2)(d), in providing that it is a reasonable excuse to physically possess a knife for use for a lawful purpose, is to be understood having regard to the above provisions and the general object of the Weapons Act. In that context, it does not require that the lawful purpose involve the use of a knife as a tool (which would be captured by earlier provisions). The physical possession of a concealed kirpan as a symbol of a religious commitment would, at least ordinarily, constitute a use of the knife for a lawful purpose (namely, religious observance). By making specific provision that physical possession of a knife in a public place for genuine religious purposes is a reasonable excuse, s 51(4) removes any doubt about that question in relation to the physical possession of a kirpan in public places other than schools. However, it does not detract from the “use for a lawful purpose” for which s 51(2)(d) provides a reasonable excuse.Conclusion as to the application of s 51 to kirpans For the above reasons, a kirpan is a “knife” for the purposes of s 51 of the Weapons Act whether it is blunt or sharp and whether or not it is sewn into a pouch. But for the specific provision made by s 51(4) and s 51(5), possession of a kirpan in a public place or school for religious purposes, without any intention to use it either offensively or defensively to threaten injury or harm, would, at least ordinarily, constitute a reasonable excuse under s 51(2)(d) of the Weapons Act. However, s 51(4) specifically provides for physical possession of a kirpan in a public place other than a school for genuine religious purposes to be a reasonable excuse. Section 51(5) specifically provides that genuine religious purposes are not a reasonable excuse for physically possessing a knife in a school. Therefore, subject to the operation of s 10 of the RDA, physical possession of a kirpan by a Sikh in a school will constitute an offence against s 51(1) of the Weapons Act.Operation of s 10 of the RDA in this case Section 10 of the RDA does not give Sikhs or any other ethnic group the absolute rights of freedom of movement and freedom of religion. Rather, it gives Sikhs the enjoyment of those rights to the same extent as persons of other ethnic origins. The rights of freedom of movement and freedom of religion are to be exercised by all people in the community in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of the general criminal law. In my view, s 10 of the RDA will not be engaged when a general law prohibits certain conduct by all members of the community, even where that conduct may be the subject of religious belief only by persons of a particular ethnic origin. Such a law may only impact the religious activities of those persons, as prohibition of conduct that does not form any part of other groups’ religious beliefs will have no impact on the exercise of freedom of religion by persons in those other groups. However, that fact does not mean that persons of the particular ethnic origin whose religion advocates that specific conduct do not enjoy freedom of religion to the same extent as other persons in the community, who are likewise prohibited from engaging in that conduct. All groups enjoy freedom of movement and religion in a manner that conforms to the requirements of the general criminal law.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 8 of the RDA provides for exceptions to the application of pt II of that Act (in which s 10 is located), including in relation to certain “special measures” to which art 1(4) of the Convention applies. Article 1(4) of the Convention refers to certain special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals. There is no suggestion that s 51(5) of the Weapons Act is a special measure of the kind referred to in that paragraph of the Convention.Operation of s 109 of the Constitution and s 10 of the RDA Section 109 of the Constitution provides that, when a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid. Section 109 of the Constitution renders an inconsistent State law inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency.[30][30]Carter v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic) (1942) 66 CLR 557, 573, 582, 599. The operation of s 109 of the Constitution in relation to s 10 of the RDA has been considered in a series of decisions of the High Court of Australia.[31] The following general propositions may be taken from those decisions in relation to State laws which prohibit conduct in a way that affects the enjoyment of rights identified in art 5 of the Convention.[31]Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70; Mabo v The State of Queensland [No 1] (1988) 166 CLR 186; The State of Western Australia v The Commonwealth (Native Title Act Case) (1995) 183 CLR 373; The State of Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28; (2002) 213 CLR 1; Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28; (2013) 252 CLR 168. Section 10 was inserted into the RDA to give effect to art 2(1)(c) of the Convention and is designed to overcome inequality before the law based on race, colour or national or ethnic origin.[32] Section 10 may operate even though the relevant State law does not make a distinction expressly based on race, colour or national or ethnic origin and does not have a discriminatory purpose. Rather, the section is directed to the discriminatory operation and effect of the legislation. Section 10 is concerned with the unequal enjoyment of rights that should be conferred irrespective of race, colour or national or ethnic origin.[33][32]Maloney [10], [161], [201], [299].[33]Ward [105], [115]; Maloney [11], [65], [78], [112], [148], [200] - [201]. Section 10 of the RDA does not allow for persons of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin to enjoy a right to a more limited extent than other persons by reason of a State law if the difference is justifiable or proportionate to a legitimate end. If the law is not a special measure within the meaning of s 8(1) of the RDA, the conclusion that persons of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin enjoy a right to a more limited extent than others is sufficient to engage s 10 of the RDA.[34][34]Maloney [68], [112], [166], [214]. To engage s 10 of the RDA, it is not necessary to show that all persons of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin enjoy the relevant right to a more limited extent than others. Nor is it necessary to show that only persons of the particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin enjoy the relevant right to a more limited extent than others.[35] This point is illustrated by Maloney, where the State law prohibited possession of alcohol in a public place on Palm Island, whose residents were predominantly Aboriginal. The majority held that the State law would have been inconsistent with s 10 of the RDA had it not been a special measure. This was so notwithstanding that the law also applied to non‑Aboriginal persons on Palm Island and did not apply to regulate the conduct of Aboriginal persons outside of Palm Island.[35]Maloney [79] - [80], [112], [200], [331], [363].