FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 85
CONTRACT – whether party who has repudiated a contract may exercise an express power of termination conferred by the contract
TRADE PRACTICES – unconscionable conduct – injunction – no conduct contravening s 51AC established with consequence that s 87 not engaged – whether injunctive relief limited to reversing consequences of unconscionable conduct
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51AC, 87
Alghussein Establishment v Eton College [1988] 1 WLR 587
Banque Commerciale SA en Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279
Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187
Collins v Baltern (1767) 2 Wils 347
DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd (1978) 138 CLR 423
Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385
Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 810
Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] FCA 967
Jinright v Russell 123 Ga. App. 766; 182 SE 2d 328 at 330 (1971)
McKay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 257
Morris v Baron & Co [1918] AC 1
Nina’s Bar Bistro Ltd v MBE Corp (Sydney) Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 613
Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (in liq) (2003) 214 CLR 514
Shevill v Builders Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620
Stirling v Maitland & Boyd (1864) 5 B & S 840; 122 ER 1043
Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR
Tropac Timbers Pty Ltd v A-One Asphalt Pty Ltd [2005] QSC 378
Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277ALLPHONES RETAIL PTY LTD v HOY MOBILE PTY LTD
NSD 1007 of 2008
GOLDBERG, JACOBSON & PERRAM JJ
9 JULY 2009
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1007 of 2008
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: ALLPHONES RETAIL PTY LTD
AppellantAND: HOY MOBILE PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGES:
GOLDBERG, JACOBSON & PERRAM JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
9 JULY 2009
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed in part.
2.The declaration made in paragraph 1 of the order made on 16 June 2008 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be declared that:
The Respondent is entitled to terminate the Agreement pursuant to clause 9.3(viii) of the Franchise Agreement and upon the grounds set out in the Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Terminate Franchise Agreement, dated 28 August 2006 and that the Agreement was so terminated on 28 August 2006.
3.The orders made in paragraphs 5, 6 and 10 of the order made on 16 June 2008 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
The Applicant pay the Respondent 85% of the Respondent’s costs on a party/party basis.
4.The order made in paragraph 7 of the order made on 16 June 2008 be set aside and…
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- Case
- [2009] FCAFC 85
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that Hoy Mobile's pleadings did not sufficiently plead fraud, as they did not allege that Allphones was aware that it was not entitled to retain the funds in question. The court noted that a pleading of fraud must be clearly and distinctly particularised, in order to ensure procedural fairness and to avoid error or infelicity in drafting. The court also held that Allphones had effectively raised the issue of fraud in their defence, by contending that they had acted under a bona fide belief as to the proper construction of the agreement. The court found that the primary judge was entitled to reject this defence to the repudiation claim.
As a result of the court's decision, the appeal was allowed in part. The declaration made in the original order was set aside, and a new declaration was made that Hoy Mobile was entitled to terminate the agreement on the grounds set out in Allphones' notice of intention to terminate. The orders relating to costs were also varied, with Hoy Mobile ordered to pay Allphones a sum of money and Allphones ordered to pay Hoy Mobile a percentage of their costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed in part.
2. The declaration made in paragraph 1 of the order made on 16 June 2008 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be declared that:
The Respondent is entitled to terminate the Agreement pursuant to clause 9.3(viii) of the Franchise Agreement and upon the grounds set out in the Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Terminate Franchise Agreement, dated 28 August 2006 and that the Agreement was so terminated on 28 August 2006.
3. The orders made in paragraphs 5, 6 and 10 of the order made on 16 June 2008 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
The Applicant pay the Respondent 85% of the Respondent’s costs on a party/party basis.
4. The order made in paragraph 7 of the order made on 16 June 2008 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
The Respondent pay the Applicant the sum of $42,919.98
5. The respondent pay the appellant 85% of the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Hoy Mobile submitted that, properly construed, the pleadings did contain an allegation of fraud. Even if that were not so, however, it submitted that as part of Allphones’ defence to Hoy Mobile’s claims of repudiation, Allphones had expressly contended that it had acted under a bona fide belief as to the proper construction of the agreement. The primary judge was entitled to reject that defence to the repudiation claim. Thus, so viewed, it did not matter whether the fraud allegation was included in Hoy Mobile’s pleadings as Allphones had expressly made it an issue by raising the genuineness of its own beliefs in its defence. ConsiderationDid the Applicant plead fraud? Paragraph K11(d) of Hoy Mobile’s amended statement of claim says:At the time of giving the said notice the Respondent was not ready and willing to perform the Agreement in that it had been committing and was continuing with following repudiatory actions, breaches of essential terms, and breaches denying to the Applicant the substantial benefit of the Agreement.…(d)The Respondent has persistently failed to account for and withheld commissions as alleged in par F1 above and has persistently made unauthorised deductions from commission payments, as alleged in par F2 and F3 above. … Paragraphs F1, F2 and F3 appeared in the amended statement of claim under the heading “Skimming”. Paragraph F1 provides, in part, as follows:In breach of the terms and obligations alleged in paragraphs B1, B4 to B7 and B9 to B13, the Respondent has failed to account for, and has withheld from the Applicant, part of the agreed percentage (being 72.5%) or alternatively 100% of:(a) the MTSC commissions …, and(b) the MTAC commissions … . Particulars are provided to paragraph F1 which are extensive. For present purposes it is useful to note, as an example, a part of those particulars:From September 2003 until June 2005, the Respondent received from Optus $10 more than it disclosed to the Applicant that it had received in respect of activations facilitated by the Applicant in respect of new customers and “Churn” customers (“Churn” meaning customers transferring to Optus from another carrier) purchasing plans of a cost to the customer of $33 per month or higher. A number of other particulars were provided of a similar kind in relation to other carriers. Paragraphs F2 and F3 were to similar effect. It was submitted those paragraphs and particulars were a sufficient pleading of fraud. I do not agree. Order 12 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules requires any pleading of fraud to be properly particularised. That rule is a manifestation of the well-known principle that an allegation of fraud should be clearly and distinctly pleaded: Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (in liq) (2003) 214 CLR 514 at 534 [38] per McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ. It reflects the confluence of two ideas. The first is the notion that a pleading serves to afford the opposing party procedural fairness by informing it of the case it is obliged to meet. The second is that the making of a fraud allegation is a serious matter to be undertaken only on proper grounds. The requirement that fraud be pleaded distinctly ensures that those who are accused of it need be in no doubt about the matter. It likewise ensures that it is not pleaded in error or by drafting infelicity. In this case, none of the constituent elements of a pleading of fraud were present. Without an allegation that Allphones was aware that it was not entitled to retain the funds the pleading is simply incapable of being characterised in that way. The highest the matter can be put is that the heading “skimming” may carry a connotation of dishonesty. However, that possibility is not sufficiently clear to constitute a pleading of fraud. Did Allphones raise the issue?