GLEESON CJ GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ
A APPELLANT
AND
STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES & ANOR RESPONDENTS
A v State of New South Wales [2007] HCA 10 21 March 2007 S59/2006
ORDER
1. Appeal allowed in part;
2.Vary paragraph 1 of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 2 September 2005 by adding the words "with costs" after "dismissed";
3.Set aside paragraphs 2 to 7 of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 2 September 2005 and, in their place, order that the cross-appeal be dismissed with costs; and
4.The respondents to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation
D F Jackson QC with A P Stenmark SC and J C Sheller for the appellant (instructed by Greg Walsh & Co)
M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales with P J Saidi and J C Chapman for the first and second respondents (instructed by Crown Solicitor for New South Wales)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
A v State of New South Wales
Torts – Malicious prosecution – Whether prosecutor acted without reasonable and probable cause – Public rather than private prosecution – Applicant acquitted of offence charged – Prosecutor had no personal knowledge of the facts underlying the charge – Whether prosecutor did not honestly form the view that there was a proper case for prosecution or whether the prosecutor formed that view on an insufficient basis.
Torts – Malicious prosecution – Whether prosecutor acted maliciously – Whether the sole or dominant purpose of the prosecutor was other than the proper invocation of the criminal law.
Words and phrases – "malicious prosecution", "malice", "absence of reasonable and probable cause".
GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ. This appeal raises issues concerning two of the four elements of the tort of malicious prosecution. For a plaintiff to succeed in an action for damages for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must establish:
(1)that proceedings of the kind to which the tort applies (generally, as in this case, criminal proceedings) were initiated against the plaintiff by the defendant;
(2)that the proceedings terminated in favour of the plaintiff;
(3)that the defendant, in initiating or maintaining the proceedings acted maliciously; and
(4)that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause[1].
[1]Bullen & Leake, Precedents of Pleadings, 3rd ed (1868) at 350-356.
At a jury trial, the third of those issues is for the jury; the fourth is for the judge, although it may be necessary for the judge to obtain the decision of the jury upon a disputed matter of fact relevant to the issue. Many of the decided cases have involved argument as to the circumstances in…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading A v New South Wales
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
A v State of New South Wales [2007] HCA 10
Case
[2007] HCA 10
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia by an applicant, A, against the State of New South Wales and a Detective Constable Floros. The dispute arose from a claim of malicious prosecution following the applicant's acquittal of charges laid against him. The primary judge had found in favour of the applicant regarding one charge but not the other, awarding damages. However, the Court of Appeal had reversed this finding, leading to the present appeal.
The High Court was required to determine whether the prosecutor, Detective Constable Floros, acted without reasonable and probable cause and whether he acted maliciously in laying and maintaining the prosecution against the applicant. Specifically, the court considered whether the prosecutor honestly formed the view that there was a proper case for prosecution or whether this view was based on an insufficient foundation, and whether the sole or dominant purpose of the prosecutor was other than the proper invocation of the criminal law.
The High Court's reasoning focused on the findings of the primary judge, Cooper DCJ, who had found that Detective Constable Floros acted maliciously. The primary judge inferred this malice from statements made by Detective Constable Floros to a Mr Walsh, which suggested that the charges were laid not to bring a wrongdoer to justice, but to succumb to pressure from the Child Protection Enforcement Agency due to the applicant's employment within the Police Service. The primary judge found that the prosecutor had acted with an improper purpose. The Court of Appeal had reversed this finding of malice, but the High Court considered the primary judge's interpretation of the evidence to be open and permissible.
The High Court allowed the appeal in part. It varied the orders of the Court of Appeal to include costs for the applicant in relation to the appeal to the Court of Appeal. It also set aside other paragraphs of the Court of Appeal's orders and substituted an order dismissing the cross-appeal with costs. Finally, the respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to the High Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
[By unanimous joint judgment]1. Appeal allowed in part; 2. Vary paragraph 1 of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 2 September 2005 by adding the words "with costs" after "dismissed"; 3. Set aside paragraphs 2 to 7 of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 2 September 2005 and, in their place, order that the cross-appeal be dismissed with costs; and 4. The respondents to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
GLEESON CJ
CJ, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ
The soundness in law of that proposition was contested in the Court of Appeal, but what is of immediate importance is the way it was reflected in the judge's findings of fact.The decision of the primary judge Cooper DCJ dismissed the appellant's action insofar as it related to the charge concerning D, but found in favour of the appellant in relation to the charge concerning C. Because the Director of Public Prosecutions took over the proceedings on 6 April 2001, the judge held that the appellant was entitled to damages to compensate him for the consequences of the laying of the charge involving C on 9 March 2001 and the maintenance of the prosecution up to 16 May 2001, which was regarded as allowing for a reasonable period for the Director to consider his position after taking over the proceedings. The judge assessed compensatory damages at $20,000 and increased this sum to $25,000 by way of aggravated compensatory damages. He awarded exemplary damages in an amount of $5,000. After an amount for pre-judgment interest was added, there was judgment for the appellant, against the first and second respondents, for $31,250. In his reasons, Cooper DCJ dealt first with the issue of malice. Relying principally upon inferences he drew from the statements made by the second respondent to Mr Walsh, he said:"For reasons previously given it is beyond doubt that there were a number of pressures both family and professional upon Detective Constable Floros. It is also beyond doubt that [this] investigation was alone among the many he was then conducting in respect of which he was receiving repeated phone calls. Evidence was adduced by Counsel for the State that this investigation was being monitored by officers of the Child Protection Enforcement Agency because it had been reported to them by reason of the plaintiff's employment by the Police Service. The plaintiff has comfortably satisfied me on the balance of probabilities that Detective Constable Floros laid both charges against the plaintiff not for the purpose of bringing a wrongdoer to justice, but for the improper purpose of succumbing to the pressure from officers of the Child Protection Enforcement Agency to charge the plaintiff because he worked for the Police Service. Accordingly, the plaintiff has satisfied me that Detective Constable Floros acted maliciously." That finding was reversed by the Court of Appeal. The finding related to both charges. The second respondent denied the conversations, but Cooper DCJ accepted the evidence of Mr Walsh, which was supported by file notes. The statements made by the second respondent to Mr Walsh were treated by the judge as relating to the charges concerning both D and C. That interpretation was not inevitable, but it was open. In the conduct of the trial, there does not appear to have been any suggestion that what was said applied only to the charge concerning C. In dealing with the issue of malice, Cooper DCJ repeated what he had earlier said in his general review of the law concerning malicious prosecution, that is to say, that it is not enough that there be a prima facie case in the sense of information which, if accepted, would establish the elements of the charge, and that the person laying the charge must have the belief, based upon reasonable grounds, that the allegations are probably true.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
GLEESON CJ,
CJ, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ