Wood v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Wood v State of Queensland [2023] QSC 221

PARTIES:

IAN ANDREW WOOD

(plaintiff)

v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND

(defendant)

FILE NO/S:

SC No 6639 of 2022

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

5 October 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

6 July 2023

JUDGE:

Kelly J

ORDERS:

1.   The plaintiff is granted leave to amend the amended claim and the amended statement of claim to:

(i)      delete the claim for damages for pure mental harm;

(ii)     include a claim for battery on the basis that the particulars of the claim for battery relied upon by the plaintiff are contained in the document being the further and better particulars filed 3 November 2022;

(iii)   include claims for aggravated and punitive damages on the basis that the particulars of all matters relied upon by the plaintiff in respect of those claims are contained in the document being the further and better particulars filed 3 November 2022;

2.   The application filed 26 June 2023 is otherwise dismissed.

3.   I will hear the parties as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND OF PARTIES – PARTIES – GENERALLY – where the plaintiff commenced proceedings seeking relief in consequence of his having been arrested and charged with wilful damage and obstructing police – where the plaintiff initially named four defendants to the proceeding, namely “the Queensland Government (DJAG)”, “the Queensland Police Service”, Daniel Egan (the arresting officer) and Michael Lee (the police prosecutor) – where the plaintiff filed an amended claim and an amended statement of claim which removed the four original defendants and substituted the existing defendant, the State of Queensland – where the plaintiff later filed an interlocutory application seeking to reinclude Daniel Egan, Michael Lee, the Queensland Police Service and the complainant, Annaliese Dowdle, as defendants to the proceeding – whether the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the amended claim and amended statement of claim to include the proposed defendants

PROCEDURE – CIVL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COURT SUPERVISION – AMENDMENT – ORIGINATING PROCESS, PLEADINGS ETC – where the plaintiff also seeks to amend his claim to remove the claim for damages for pure mental harm and replace it with a claim for aggravated damages – whether the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the amended claim and amended statement of claim to include a claim for aggravated damages

PROCEDURE – CIVL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COURT SUPERVISION – AMENDMENT – ORIGINATING PROCESS, PLEADINGS ETC – where the plaintiff also seeks to amend his claim to include new causes of action including “battery, malfeasance in public office, exemplary damages, parasitic damages, and various forms of illegality” – whether the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the amended claim and amended statement of claim to include any new causes of action

Police Service and Administration Act 1990 (Qld), s 2.1,…

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Details
Case
[2023] QSC 221
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, Mr. Wood, initiated proceedings against the State of Queensland, seeking relief following his arrest and charges for wilful damage and obstructing police. The original defendants included "the Queensland Government (DJAG)", the "Queensland Police Service", Daniel Egan (the arresting officer), and Michael Lee (the police prosecutor). However, Mr. Wood later filed an amended claim and statement of claim, substituting the existing defendant, the State of Queensland. Subsequently, Mr. Wood filed an interlocutory application to reinclude the original defendants and add Annaliese Dowdle, the complainant, as a defendant. The court was required to determine whether Mr. Wood should be granted leave to amend the amended claim and statement of claim to include the proposed defendants and new causes of action.

The court noted that the application was made without supporting affidavits or proposed amended claims, which made it difficult to assess the merits of the proposed case. The court also highlighted that the application did not provide sufficient grounds to justify the joinder of the proposed defendants. Furthermore, the court found no basis to include Ms. Dowdle as a defendant, as she had no discretion to bring a prosecution against Mr. Wood. However, the court did grant leave for Mr. Wood to amend the claim to include claims for battery, aggravated and punitive damages, as the particulars of these claims were adequately supported by further and better particulars.

The court dismissed the application to reinclude the original defendants and add Ms. Dowdle as a defendant. The plaintiff was granted leave to amend the amended claim and statement of claim to delete the claim for damages for pure mental harm, include a claim for battery, and include claims for aggravated and punitive damages. The court reserved costs for further consideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The plaintiff is granted leave to amend the amended claim and the amended statement of claim to:

(i) delete the claim for damages for pure mental harm;

(ii) include a claim for battery on the basis that the particulars of the claim for battery relied upon by the plaintiff are contained in the document being the further and better particulars filed 3 November 2022;

(iii) include claims for aggravated and punitive damages on the basis that the particulars of all matters relied upon by the plaintiff in respect of those claims are contained in the document being the further and better particulars filed 3 November 2022;

2. The application filed 26 June 2023 is otherwise dismissed.

3. I will hear the parties as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

There is no application made by the State of Queensland to strike out any part of the amended claim or the amended statement of claim. Relevant background to the interlocutory application The wilful damage charge concerned events which were alleged to have occurred at the Bellbowrie shopping centre at approximately 7.35 am on Friday 28 September 2018. It was alleged that Mr Wood keyed the entire front right and rear right panel of a parked car belonging to the complainant, Annaliese Dowdle.[1] Further allegations then led to the obstructing police charge. Broadly stated, it was alleged that, later on Friday 28 September 2018, Senior Constable Egan received a complaint from Ms Dowdle and located Mr Wood walking in a street near Ms Dowdle’s residence.[2] When located, Mr Wood was alleged to have been verbally aggressive and refused to stop.[3] On 15 October 2018, Senior Constable Egan arrested Mr Wood and placed him under arrest for wilful damage.[4] Following his arrest, Mr Wood was alleged to have become argumentative and non-compliant in his demeanour and thus alleged to have obstructed police.[5] Mr Wood was taken to the Indooroopilly Police Station. [1]Ex 5.[2]Notice of Intention to Defend of the Defendant filed 30 November 2023 [4].[3]Ibid [4(e)].[4]Ibid [6(f)].[5]Ibid [7(g)–(h)]. On 8 June 2022, Mr Wood commenced this proceeding against the four previously identified initial defendants. The statement of claim contained the following allegations: “1. On the 15th of October 2018, [Mr Wood] was arrested and charged with Wilful Damage and Obstruct Police by Daniel Egan of the QPS.2. During the arrest Daniel Egan assaulted [Mr Wood].3. [Mr Wood] was taken to the Indooroopilly Police Station where he was refused his basic human rights including the right to call a lawyer and the right to be questioned.4. [Mr Wood] was then charged with wilful damage and obstruct police5. The defendant then falsified a number of documents relating to the matter including the QP9.6. The defendant then deleted evidence relating to the matter namely the CCTV footage of the incident in contravention of the QPD retention and disposal schedule.7. The defendant took a fraudulent statement from the compliant.8. The defendant attempted to prosecute [Mr Wood] knowing the prosecution had no possibility of success.9. It is alleged that the defendant acted fraudulently in an attempt to have [Mr Wood] found guilty of charges he was, in fact innocent of.[Mr Wood] claims the following relief: Pure Mental Harm - $30,000,000.00Financial Loss – $500,000.00Malicious Prosecution - $60,000,000.00Assault - $250,000.00Fraud – $250,000.00Destruction of Evidence - $25,000,000.00False imprisonment - $10,000,000.00False Arrest - $15,000,000.00” It may be observed that the statement of claim, in numerous instances, made simple references to “the Defendant” notwithstanding that, at the time of its filing, there were four defendants. On 7 September 2022, Crown Law wrote to Mr Wood pursuant to r 444 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (‘UCPR’). That letter materially stated:“…5.On 8 June 2022, you commenced a proceeding by way of a Claim and Statement of Claim in the Brisbane Supreme Court. You have named the following four entities and persons as the defendants in the proceedings:(a) The Queensland Government (DJAG)(b) The Queensland Police Service(c) Daniel Egan(d) Michael LeeThe State’s Complaint(a)Proper defendant6.‘The Queensland Government (DJAG)’ and ‘the Queensland Police Service’ are not legal entities – they cannot sue or be sued. These entities are departments of the Crown, which can sue or be sued under the title ‘State of Queensland’ under section 8 of the Crown Proceedings Act1980…….7.Daniel Egan and Michael Lee are police officers. Under section 10.5(2) of the Police Service and Administration Act 1990, an officer does not incur civil liability for engaging, or the result of engaging, in conduct in an official capacity. Instead, liability (if any is proven) attaches to the Crown (ie. the State of Queensland). On this basis, officers Egan and Lee have been unnecessarily included as defendants in the proceeding.8.Further, the only relief the Court can give (in the circumstances of this case) is damages. Accordingly, it is not necessary for the officers to be defendants to the proceeding. Any damages the Court may award in your favour, if you are successful, would be damages against the State, not against the officers.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 15 June 2023, Crown Law sent a letter by email to Mr Wood which materially provided:“Dear Mr Wood…As explained in the r444 letter, there is no basis for including individual police officers in civil proceedings against the State of Queensland because under section 10.5(2) of the Police Service and Administration Act 1990, an officer does not incur civil liability for engaging, or the result of engaging, in conduct in an official capacity. Instead, liability (if any is proven) attaches to the Crown (ie. the State of Queensland). …In simple terms, s10.5 of the PSA ensures that a police officer does not incur civil liability for engaging, or for the result of engaging, in conduct in an official capacity. If that protection applies, liability attaches to the State, which may (meaning its (sic) discretionary) recover contribution from the officer. That right to contribution is restricted to cases where the conduct was engaged in other than in good faith, and with gross negligence. To clarify, contribution is a remedy available to the State, depending on the facts of a matter, and arises solely between the State and the relevant officer/s.Given the definitions of ‘civil liability (sic) and ‘engage in conduct in an official capacity’ in s10.5 of the PSA, it is clear that the immunity in that section is intended to extend to all tortious liability for conduct in connection with the officer’s role as a police officer. There is nothing in the language of s10.5 of the PSA that would support a more limited operation that excluded torts involving bad faith or malice. This position is supported by the State’s right to recover contribution, where the conduct engaged in was not in good faith or was grossly negligent.The reference to a lack of good faith demonstrates that Parliament intended s10.5 of the PSA to extend to tortious liability arising from conduct characterised as being in bad faith, such as malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office.….Intention to join complainant as a defendantIn your email of 26 May 2023, a copy of which is enclosed, you have said that ‘I’ll also be adding the complainant Ms Dowdle to the claim which I can do according to a v nsw’.There appears to be absolutely no basis on which Ms Dowdle should be a party to your claim. Ms Dowdle made a complaint to the police in relation to her car having been keyed at a shopping centre and provided a statement about the incident. It was Senior Constable Egan, upon viewing CCTV of the incident after the initial complaint was made, who formed the requisite ‘reasonable suspicion’ to arrest you without warrant. …In the circumstances, Ms Dowdle had no discretion to bring a prosecution against you – such discretion rested with Senior Constable Egan, and the police prosecution, once all evidence was obtained in relation to the offence, the subject of the complaint.”Consideration of issues raised by the interlocutory application The interlocutory application seeks orders pursuant to rr 375 and 376 of the UCPR. To the extent that the interlocutory application seeks the joinder of proposed defendants, the application calls for the exercise of a discretion and the merits of the case proposed to be advanced after joinder is a relevant consideration, at least where there are significant doubts attending the prospects of success of the proposed case.[25] In the present case, the interlocutory application was not supported by any affidavit and there is no proposed form of further amended claim or further amended statement of claim.[25]Kestrel Coal P/L v Longwall Roof Supports Ltd& Ors [2003] QSC 187 at [16], per Muir J; see also UCPR r 69(b).