Connors v State of Queensland

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Connors v State of Queensland & Ors [2023] QDC 216

PARTIES:

KATHRYN TERESE CONNORS

(applicant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first defendant)
and
RODNEY CARL CRAMP
(second defendant)
and
ORBA PTY LTD
(ACN 010 307 865)
As trustee for the trustee for the CRAMP FAMILY TRUST t/as EMERLITE ELECTRICAL SERVICES

(ABN 92 593 055 848)

FILE NO:

658/18

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

DELIVERED ON:

29 November 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

8 November 2023

JUDGE:

Farr SC, DCJ

ORDERS:

1. The application for leave to proceed under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (UCPR) rule 389(2) is refused.

2.   The parties be heard on costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COURT SUPERVISION – DORMANT PROCEEDINGS – GENERALLY - where the applicant seeks the leave of the Court to take a step in the proceeding – where it has been about four years since a step has been taken – where the first defendant neither consents nor opposes the application – where the second defendant opposes the application – where the third defendant was wound up a year prior to the application being filed – where the applicant claimed an unspecified amount of wages for an alleged malicious prosecution – where the applicant worked as both a contractor through her own company and as an employee for the second defendant’s company, the third defendant – where two months after cessation of the employment the second defendant made a complaint to police that the applicant had stolen funds from the third defendant – where the applicant participated in a record of interview before being charged with stealing as a servant – where the charge was later dismissed at a committal hearing – where the applicant claims she was maliciously prosecuted by all of the defendants and attacks the bone fides of two police officers – whether the applicant has satisfied the Court to the requisite standard that this is an appropriate matter to exercise the discretion to allow an action to proceed despite the general prohibition against an action continuing in which no step has been taken for two years.

LEGISLATION:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) 1999 (Qld), r 5, r 389

CASES:

A v New South Wales [2007] 230 CLR 500
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor
(1996) 186 CLR 541
Freeman v National Australia Bank
[2006] QCA 329
Hall v RH & CE McColl Pty Ltd
[2007] QCA 182
Lilyville Pty Ltd v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd [1999] QSC 372
Oldmeadow v Trevorrow [2023] QSC 38
Rigato Farms Pty Ltd v Ridolfi
[2000] QCA 292; [2001] 2 Qd R 455
Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation Limited
[2000] QCA 178
Ure v Robertson
[2017] QCA 20

COUNSEL:

C Duplock for the applicant
D Favell for the first defendant

R Cameron for the second defendant

SOLICITORS:

Alex Mandry Legal Group for the applicant
Crown Law for the first defendant

Hillhouse Legal Partners for the second defendant


Introduction

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Details
Case
[2023] QDC 216
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Connors v State of Queensland involves the applicant seeking leave to proceed with her claim for malicious prosecution against several defendants, including the State of Queensland, after a significant delay in the proceedings. The applicant alleges that she was maliciously prosecuted by all of the defendants and attacks the integrity of two police officers. The defendants have variously opposed or not opposed the application. The third defendant was wound up a year before the application was filed.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the applicant had satisfied the requisite standard to exercise the court's discretion to allow the action to proceed despite the prohibition against actions continuing in which no step has been taken for two years. The court considered factors including the length of time since the cause of action arose, the applicant's prospects of success, the extent of the delay, and whether the delay had caused prejudice to the defendants.

The court found that the applicant had not adequately explained the significant delay in commencing the litigation and taking steps in the proceedings. While the applicant pointed to difficulties in funding her legal defence and changing solicitors as reasons for the delay, the court found these explanations unsatisfactory. The court also found that the applicant's prospects of success were not strong given the reliance on her memory and the absence of documentary evidence to support her case. Furthermore, the court accepted the second defendant's submission that the delay would have significant cost consequences for him if the proceedings were to continue.

Accordingly, the court refused the applicant's application for leave to proceed. The parties were to be heard on the issue of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to proceed under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (UCPR) rule 389(2) is refused.

2. The parties be heard on costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The third defendant was wound up in September 2022 at which time liquidators were appointed.[2][2]Exhibit RCC-1 to affidavit of Rodney Carl Cramp filed 6 November 2023 (document 20).Background On 22 February 2018, the plaintiff commenced the proceeding by way of Claim and Statement of Claim.[3] An unspecified amount of damages was sought for an alleged malicious prosecution.[3]Court document 1. Between 2003 and 2012, the applicant undertook work for the second defendant’s company, the third defendant. She worked as both a contractor (through her own company) and as an employee. In August 2012, the applicant ceased working for the third defendant. In October 2012, the second defendant made a complaint to the police that the plaintiff had stolen funds from the third defendant. On 25 April 2013, the plaintiff participated in a record of interview before later being charged with stealing as a servant. On 9 December 2014, the charge was dismissed at a committal hearing in the Magistrates Court. The applicant claims that she was maliciously prosecuted by all of the defendants. In the case of the State, the plaintiff’s claim attacks the bone fides of two police officers: Officers Urquhart and Powell. In order to succeed, the applicant will relevantly need to show that the prosecutor/s (i.e., those who caused the charge to be brought):[4](a)acted maliciously in initiating or maintaining the charge; and(b)acted without reasonable and probable cause.[4]A v New South Wales [2007] 230 CLR 500 at [1].Legal principles Rule 389 of the UCPR provides as follows:“389 Continuation of proceeding after delay(1)If no step has been taken in a proceeding for 1 year from the time the last step was taken, a party who wants to proceed must, before taking any step in the proceeding, give a month’s notice to every other party of the party’s intention to proceed.(2)If no step has been taken in a proceeding for 2 years from the time the last step was taken, a new step may not be taken without the order of the court, which may be made either with or without notice.(3)For this rule, an application in which no order has been made is not taken to be a step.” In Ure v Robertson,[5] Bond J (as his Honour then was) (with whom Gotterson and Morrison JJA agreed) said this with respect to r 389:“[38]The evident intention of r 389 is that a stay should be imposed on proceedings in certain circumstances and to require any person who seeks to lift the stay to approach the Court to seek an order. The policy is to ensure that proceedings which are significantly delayed come to the attention of the Court so that they can be dealt with appropriately: see Thompson v Kirk [1995] 1 Qd R 463 at 464 per Derrington J.”[5][2017] QCA 20. In Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation Limited,[6] Atkinson J (with whom McMurdo P and McPherson JA agreed) set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account for an application seeking leave to take a step:[6][2000] QCA 178.“When the Court is considering whether or not to dismiss an action for want of prosecution or whether to give leave to proceed under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (“UCPR”) r 389, there are a number of factors that the Court will take into account in determining whether the interests of justice require a case to be dismissed. These include:(1)how long ago the events alleged in the statement of claim occurred and what delay there was before the litigation was commenced;(2)how long ago the litigation was commenced or causes of action were added;(3)what prospects the plaintiff has of success in the action;(4)whether or not there has been disobedience of Court orders or directions;(5)whether or not the litigation has been characterised by periods of delay;(6)whether the delay is attributable to the plaintiff, the defendant or both the plaintiff and the defendant;(7)whether or not the impecuniosity of the plaintiff has been responsible for the pace of the litigation and whether the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff’s impecuniosity;(8)whether the litigation between the parties would be concluded by the striking out of the plaintiff’s claim;(9)how far the litigation has progressed;(10)whether or not the delay has been caused by the plaintiff’s lawyers being dilatory. Such dilatoriness will not necessarily be sheeted home to the client but it may be. Delay for which an applicant for leave to proceed is responsible is regarded as more difficult to explain than delay by his or her legal advisers;(11)whether there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay; and (12)whether or not the delay has resulted in prejudice to the defendant leading to an inability to ensure a fair trial.The court’s discretion is, however, not fettered by rigid rules but should take into account all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case including the consideration that ordinary members of the community are entitled to get on with their lives and plan their affairs without having the continuing threat of litigation and its consequences hanging over them.”(citations omitted)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

A convenient starting point for the determination of this application is to assess the relevance of the matters listed by Atkinson J in Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation Pty Ltd:(a)the parties agree that the cause of action arose on the date that the Magistrate dismissed the charge at committal i.e., 9 December 2014. That of course is now some nine years ago. The Statement of Claim however refers to relevant events that occurred up to 15 years ago. That is a very long time ago. Furthermore, the applicant did not commence this litigation until 22 February 2018, some three years two months after the cause of action arose. That delay has not been adequately explained. I do not accept the applicant’s submission that such a delay is understandable given that “it is a difficult process to be prosecuted and no blame for instructing her solicitors until mid-2016 to seek compensation should be taken”;(b)there is little by way of evidence before the Court to allow an assessment of the applicant’s prospects of success. As I have already indicated, proving a claim of malicious prosecution is a difficult task. It seems to me that much would depend on whether the court was persuaded that the verbal agreement between the second defendant and the applicant in 2008 occurred in the terms alleged. That issue would appear to involve a straight up contest of credibility. If the alleged 2009 documentary amendment to the 2008 agreement was produced in evidence, that would undoubtedly improve the applicant’s prospects of success provided it proved to be genuine. Unfortunately for the applicant however, there is no evidence before the court that such document is still in existence (if it ever was) and can be produced to the Court. The consequence of the absence of that document is that the accuracy of the memories of the second defendant and the applicant will be a crucial issue for determination at trial;(c)the delay in this matter is in no way attributable to the defendants;(d)there has been no disobedience of court orders or directions;(e)there has been some reference to the applicant’s difficulty in being able to fund the litigation, including a reference to the quantum of legal fees she had to pay to fund her defence of the criminal prosecution. However, there is very little evidence linking this issue of her funding problems with the delay. I note in fact that the applicant’s sister originally paid that sum of $24,600 for legal expenses on behalf of the applicant and that the applicant only reimbursed her sister after the sale of a property;(f)given the extensive time delay in this matter, if this application fails the litigation would be concluded as the statutory time limit has long passed. Additionally, and of some relevance, is the fact that the litigation has not progressed very far to the present time;(g)the affidavit material demonstrates that the delay since the last step in the proceeding has been due, in part, to the changing of solicitors and from the engagement and subsequent withdrawal of three barristers. There is no evidence that the applicant was responsible for the withdrawal of the barristers and her desire to have the original solicitor reengaged after that solicitor moved to South Australia is reasonable and understandable.Having said that, the history of this matter since the last step was taken is littered with extended periods of inactivity that have not been explained. Perhaps the most significant was from 5 October 2022 when Mr Clutterbuck provided an advice to 19 June 2023 when the applicant prepared instructions to prepare an affidavit detailing the reasons for the delay as well as the three and a half months that followed until this application was filed.[20] No explanation has been provided as to why it took almost a year from then to file this application.A further lengthy period of inactivity occurred between July 2021 when Ms Yates advised she would accept the brief and April 2022 when Ms Yates advised that she could no longer act in the matter. No satisfactory explanation for that period of inactivity has been provided. Whilst that delay may be in part due to the inactity of the lawyers themselves, I note that the applicant has attested that in mid 2021 she was advised that Ms Yates was available to be briefed in the matter, yet her next contact with her solicitor wasn’t until January 2022. The applicant then emailed her solicitor on 31 March 2022 to ‘arrange a time to collect my files from their office’. It was only after this that Ms Yates advised that she could no longer act in the matter.[21] (h)the second defendant has attested that given he is 75 years of age, his memory is not as it once was and whilst he was confident in the instructions he gave his solicitors in 2018, he no longer has the same degree of confidence. He submits therefore that the trial would be unfair as it would involve the court assessing the quality of the memories of each of the second defendant and the applicant. The second defendant also alleges that due to the delay in this matter, he has not turned his mind to this matter for some years, which in turn may further adversely impact his memory.On this point I do not accept the applicant’s submission that the outcome of the trial would depend largely on documentary evidence with only minimal contest as to oral agreements.On the material before the Court, the applicant’s prospects of success would depend heavily on the Court accepting the applicant’s evidence that a verbal agreement in the terms she alleges was reached between her and the second defendant in 2008 and then amended, as explained by the applicant, relatively shortly thereafter.Notwithstanding that the applicant attests that the amended agreement was in writing and signed by the second defendant (a fact denied by the second defendant) she has produced no evidence to suggest that the document still exists. It can therefore not be the subject of any forensic examination. On the material before the court, the 2008 verbal agreement and the 2009 amendment would appear to be extremely important if not crucial pieces of evidence on the applicant’s case. Given that acceptance of such agreements could only (as things presently stand) occur if the court accepted the accuracy of the applicant’s memory notwithstanding the first defendant’s evidence to the contrary, I am not persuaded that the applicant’s case has reasonable prospects of success. Furthermore, given the extraordinarily lengthy period of time that has passed since relevant events, another issue arises which in my view also potentially impacts on the fairness of any trial. The second defendant’s position is that he did not act with malice when he made a complaint to police. To overcome that evidence, the applicant would also have to persuade the Court that the second defendant had not simply forgotten about the verbal agreement made approximately six years prior to his complaint to police. That in turn means that the second defendant would be required to remember, at trial, what he remembered at the time he made the complaint. That is a function of memory which undoubtedly becomes more difficult as time passes; and(i)I accept the second defendant’s submission that the delay in this matter will have significant cost consequences for him if it was to proceed.[20]This application was filed on 25 September 2023.[21] Affidavit of applicant filed 9 September 2023 at paras [83] – [90].Conclusion

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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