Irving v Pfingst

Case [2021] QCA 280


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Irving v Pfingst & Anor [2021] QCA 280

PARTIES:

TERRY IRVING
(appellant)
v
HELEN MAREE PFINGST
(first respondent)
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 10781 of 2020
SC No 234 of 1999

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2020] QSC 280 (Brown J)

DELIVERED ON:

14 December 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

18 March 2021

JUDGES:

Fraser, McMurdo and Mullins JJA

ORDERS:

1.   Allow the appeal.

2.   Set aside the orders numbered 1 and 3 made on 18 September 2020.

3.   Give judgment for the appellant against the respondents, on the claim for the malicious prosecution of the Accessory Charge, for damages to be assessed.

4.   Remit the proceeding to the Trial Division for that assessment of damages, and for consideration of the order or orders for costs which should be made for the proceeding in the Trial division.

5.   Otherwise dismiss the appellant’s claim against the respondents.

6.   Parties to provide written submissions as to the costs of the proceeding in this Court, not to exceed four pages in length, within 14 days of the delivery of this judgment.

CATCHWORDS:

TORTS – ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS – MALICIOUS PROSECUTION – where the appellant was charged by the respondent as an accessory after the fact to the armed robbery of a bank – where the accessory charge was particularised as having been committed by a Mr Suthers as the principal offender – where there was evidence that the respondent suspected the appellant was the robber –– where the accessory charge provided the basis for the ongoing detention of the appellant while the respondent pursued investigations of the appellant as the robber – whether the respondent honestly believed there was a proper case for prosecution of the appellant as an accessory after the fact when the respondent, at the same time, suspected that the appellant had robbed the bank – whether the accessory charge was laid without reasonable probable cause – whether the appellant proved malice in the respondent charging him as an accessory

EVIDENCE – ADMISSIBILITY – OPINION EVIDENCE – EXPERT OPINION – where the appellant was convicted of armed robbery – where the appellant successfully appealed the conviction – where the prosecution entered a nolle prosequi – where before being charged with armed robbery the appellant had been charged by the respondent police officer with being an accessory after the fact to the armed robbery – where the appellant brought a claim for damages for malicious prosecution in respect of the accessory charge and in respect of the armed robbery charge – where the appellant had conversations with the respondent police officer and another police officer over a period of three and one-half hours – where the respondent and the other police officer made notes of these conversations immediately after they concluded – where the appellant alleged that the conversations were secretly recorded, that the tape was never disclosed, and the…

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AGLC
Irving v Pfingst [2021] QCA 280
Case
[2021] QCA 280
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Irving v Pfingst involved the appellant, Mr Irving, who brought an action against the respondent, Ms Pfingst, a police officer, for malicious prosecution. The dispute centred on whether Ms Pfingst had acted with malice in charging Mr Irving as an accessory after the fact to the armed robbery of a bank, and whether she had reasonable and probable cause to do so when she concurrently suspected him of being the principal offender. The Queensland Court of Appeal heard the appeal.

The primary legal issues were whether Ms Pfingst honestly believed there was a proper case for prosecution of Mr Irving as an accessory after the fact and if the accessory charge was laid without reasonable and probable cause. Additionally, the Court had to consider whether Mr Irving proved malice in the charging process and whether the trial judge correctly admitted or excluded certain evidence, including an expert report and a transcript of an interview.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge’s conclusions on the Accessory Charge were incorrect. The judge had failed to appreciate the strict requirements of the Accessory Charge, which necessitated proof that Mr Irving knew Suthers had committed the robbery and that he assisted Suthers to evade punishment. The judge's findings were demonstrated to be wrong by the evidence and an understanding of the different bases of criminal responsibility. As for the evidence, the Court held that while some parts of the expert report were correctly excluded, the exclusion of other parts containing reference to research in the field was improper and detracted from the effect of the report. The Court also found that the trial judge erred in excluding the transcript from evidence due to its unreliability. These errors amounted to substantial wrongs warranting a new trial.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside certain orders, and gave judgment for the appellant on the malicious prosecution claim for the Accessory Charge. The case was remitted for assessment of damages and consideration of costs. The parties were directed to submit written costs submissions within 14 days of the judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Allow the appeal.

2. Set aside the orders numbered 1 and 3 made on 18 September 2020.

3. Give judgment for the appellant against the respondents, on the claim for the malicious prosecution of the Accessory Charge, for damages to be assessed.

4. Remit the proceeding to the Trial Division for that assessment of damages, and for consideration of the order or orders for costs which should be made for the proceeding in the Trial division.

5. Otherwise dismiss the appellant’s claim against the respondents.

6. Parties to provide written submissions as to the costs of the proceeding in this Court, not to exceed four pages in length, within 14 days of the delivery of this judgment.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The trial judge rejected an argument that Ms Pfingst had laid the Accessory Charge in order to ensure that Mr Irving remained in custody while she built a case against him “as the principal offender or for one of the other robberies that were being investigated by Operation 3UP.”[84] Her Honour repeated her finding that Ms Pfingst considered that there was sufficient evidence to support the Accessory Charge and that it warranted prosecution.[85] The judge accepted Ms Pfingst’s denial that she had charged Mr Irving so that she could further investigate the robbery. Her Honour said: “I accept her evidence in that regard. There is no incompatibility with Mr Irving being charged with the Accessory Charge where there is evidence to lay that charge and continuing to investigate him in relation to his involvement in the robbery.”[86][84]Judgment [287].[85]Judgment [290].[86]Judgment [295].Conclusions on the Accessory Charge The challenge to the trial judge’s conclusions on the Accessory Charge meets the difficulty that the trial judge reached those conclusions having seen and heard the evidence and having formed an impression that Ms Pfingst was honest and reliable in her testimony. An appellate court should not interfere with a judge’s findings of fact unless they are demonstrated to be wrong by “incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony”, or they are “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences”.[87][87]Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679 at 687; [2016] HCA 22 at [43] per French CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ, citing Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 128 [28]-[29]; Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479-481; [1993] HCA 78; Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357 at 381 [76]. However, in this case the judge’s critical findings of fact are demonstrated to be wrong by a review of the evidence, including the evidence of Ms Pfingst, and by an understanding of the different bases of criminal responsibility which the judge discussed. The starting point is that the Accessory Charge was unambiguous in defining the case which the prosecution would have had to prove. The prosecution would have required proof that Suthers was the person who robbed the bank, and that Mr Irving did something to assist Suthers in order to enable to Suthers to escape punishment for doing so. The charge would also have required proof that Mr Irving knew that it was Suthers who had robbed the bank. The terms of the charge did not allow for the possibility that Suthers was a party to the offence of the robbery of the bank, not as a person who did the act which constituted that offence (s 7(1)(a)), but as otherwise a party who was deemed to have committed the offence by s 7(1)(b), (c) or (d) or s 8 of the Code. Nor did the charge allow for the possibility that the criminal responsibility of Mr Irving was as a co-offender in the robbery offence (by s 7 or s 8), rather than as a person who had committed the distinct offence of being an accessory after the fact.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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