JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: SAFFARI -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIA POLICE [2022] WASC 200
CORAM: ACTING MASTER STRK
HEARD: 16 JUNE 2021
DELIVERED : 15 JUNE 2022
FILE NO/S: CIV 3183 of 2019
BETWEEN: SHAHRIAR SAFFARI
Plaintiff
AND
WESTERN AUSTRALIA POLICE
First Defendant
STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Second Defendant
CHRIS DAWSON
Third Defendant
DANIEL TALBOT
Fourth Defendant
MAHER FLEYFEL
Fifth Defendant
ANDREW MACKAY
Sixth Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Applications for leave to bring strike out applications - Applications made out of time
Legislation:
Defamation Act 2005 (WA)
Limitation Act 2005 (WA)
Police Act 1892 (WA)
Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
Result:
Leave to bring strike out applications granted
Application to remove the first defendant as a party granted
Applications to strike out the substituted statement of claim granted
Leave to re-plead granted in part
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | In Person |
| First Defendant | : | JN Harman |
| Second Defendant | : | JN Harman |
| Third Defendant | : | JN Harman |
| Fourth Defendant | : | JN Harman |
| Fifth Defendant | : | N Malone |
| Sixth Defendant | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | In Person |
| First Defendant | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Second Defendant | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Third Defendant | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Fourth Defendant | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Fifth Defendant | : | Pragma Lawyers |
| Sixth Defendant | : | No appearance |
Cases referred to in decision:
A v The State of New South Wales [2007] HCA 10; (2007) 230 CLR 500
Albrecht v Commissioner of Police [2015] WASC 248
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union of Workers Western Australia Branch v Bell-A-Like Rottnest Pty Ltd [2005] WASCA 157
Banque Commerciale SA, En Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11; (1990) 169 CLR 279
Bride v Peat Marwick Mitchell [1989] WAR 383
Briggs v Curtis Quick & Associates [1999] WASCA 139
Calabro v The State of Western Australia (No 3) [2014] WASC 84
Calabro v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASC 418
Chaff and Hay Acquisition Committee v JA Hemphill and Sons Pty Ltd (1947) 74 CLR 375
Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward [1982] HCA 78; (1982) 154 CLR 25
Coe v Commonwealth (1979) 24 ALR 118
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Queensland Rail [2015] HCA 11; (2015) 256 CLR 171
Culleton v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2018] WASC 251
Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70; (1982) 148 CLR 658
Dart v Norwich Union Life Australia Ltd [2002] FCA 168
David Clarke Air Conditioning Pty Ltd v Quann [2016] WASC 73
Enever v The King (1906) 3 CLR 969
English v Vantage Holdings Group Pty Ltd [2021] WASCA 47
Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords [1997] HCA 8; (1997) 188 CLR 241
Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 39; (2012) 247 CLR 486
Gould v Mount Oxide Mines Ltd (in liq) [1916] HCA 81; (1916) 22 CLR 490
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- Case
- [2022] WASC 200
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the plaintiff's pleadings were defective as they failed to establish a factual basis for the existence of a duty of care owed by Sergeant Talbot to Mr Saffari. The court noted that the plaintiff did not identify a specific statutory duty that was allegedly breached, nor did he detail a particular instance of breach. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiff's claim of malicious prosecution was not substantiated, as there was no evidence of a malicious intent on the part of Sergeant Talbot. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient particulars to enable the identification of the publications in respect of which the action was brought. The court also accepted that a claim in negligence was outside the scope of the indorsement to the writ and that leave to amend would be required to include such a claim against Sergeant Talbot.
The court further determined that Sergeant Talbot was protected from personal liability under section 137(3) of the Police Act, which shields members of the Police Force from tort liability for actions taken without corruption or malice while performing their duties. In light of these findings, the court struck out the substituted statement of claim as it concerned Sergeant Talbot and the claim in negligence. The court also dismissed the claim for malicious prosecution against Sergeant Talbot. The court did not provide further orders in relation to the other defendants.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The plaintiff has not pleaded a factual basis for the existence of a duty of care and therefore the pleading is defective and incapable of sustaining a suggestion that Sergeant Talbot owed Mr Saffari a duty of care.[108] Nor has Mr Saffari pleaded a specific or identifiable instance of a breach of duty. The pleading at par 31 of the substituted statement of claim that Sergeant Talbot 'breached his statutory duty', does not suffice, particularly in circumstances where the statutory duty is not identified. [108] Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (252, 258, 266, 289). Again, I accept that a claim in negligence is outside of the scope of the indorsement to the writ, and leave to amend the writ is required to include a claim made for the tort of negligence as against Sergeant Talbot. Finally, I note that while counsel for Sergeant Talbot did not raise s 137(3) of the Police Act in this context, I understand that protection from personal liability would also extend to Sergeant Talbot by operation of that section. By the operation of s 137(3), an action in tort does not lie against a member of the Police Force for anything the member has done, without corruption or malice, while performing or purporting to perform the functions of a member of the Police Force, whether or not under a written or other law. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the substituted statement of claim as it concerns Sergeant Talbot and a claim in negligence should be struck out. The pleading as framed does not give rise to a cause of action as against Sergeant Talbot for malicious prosecution. I accept that the complaints raised by counsel for Sergeant Talbot summarised at [56] to [60] above constitute grounds for concluding that the pleadings do not disclose a reasonable cause of action against Sergeant Talbot for malicious prosecution. To constitute malice, the dominant purpose of Sergeant Talbot must be a purpose other than the proper invocation of the criminal law.[109] Mr Saffari does not identify a malicious purpose for the actions of Sergeant Talbot in laying charges against him. Among the complaints agitated on behalf of Sergeant Talbot, counsel submitted that Mr Saffari had failed to state sufficient particulars to enable the publications in respect of which the action is brought to be identified. I understood Mr Saffari to respond to the complaint concerning lack of identification in his submissions at pars 7 and 9. At par 7, Mr Saffari submitted:7.Paragraph 11(e) of the [first to fourth defendants' outline of submissions] is essentially about Saffari not providing evidence of his claims, but Saffari's understanding of the RSC is that no evidence is to be presented at this stage. a)The documents mentioned at paragraph 11(e) were previously provided by Saffari to all Defendants attached to a final letter of demand prior to these proceedings, notwithstanding that SSO can access the documents through their own clients whom in fact provided the documents to Saffari through FOI requests, although after several refusals and then redacted.