Jones v. Attorney-General (New Zealand) [2003] UKPC 48 (19 June 2003)
ADVANCE COPY
Privy Council Appeal No. 29 of 2002
Robert Edward JonesAppellant
v.
Her Majesty's Attorney-General sued on behalf of
New Zealand PoliceRespondent
FROM
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
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JUDGMENT OF THE LORDS OF THE JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL,
Delivered the 19th June 2003
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Present at the hearing:-
Lord Bingham of Cornhill
Lord Hutton
Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough
Lord Scott of Foscote
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry
[Delivered by Lord Bingham of Cornhill]
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Reversing a decision of Master Thomson, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand (Gault, Keith and Blanchard JJ) held on 13 August 2001 that summary judgment should be entered for the defendant (the Attorney-General) in this action brought against him by Sir Robert Jones as plaintiff. The order was made under Rule 136 of the High Court Rules which, as amended in 1998, permits judgment to be given against a plaintiff "(2) … if the defendant satisfies the court that none of the causes of action in the plaintiff's statement of claim can succeed". The plaintiff, now the appellant, challenges the Court of Appeal's decision, contending that the power to enter summary judgment for a defendant was not one which could properly be exercised in this case.
On the afternoon of Monday 24 January 2000 the appellant was driving westwards along Waione Street, Petone. With him in his new red Jaguar Daimler were his partner, and also his two sons whom he was taking to the airport to catch a flight to Sydney. The appellant crossed a bridge, where the eastward and westward carriageways were demarcated by a white line in the middle of the road, and then entered a section of the road where there was no white line but the two carriageways were separated by a concrete barrier. After he had driven some distance along this section Constable Dankl, following him in a marked police car, signalled to him to stop, which he did. The constable used her radio to ascertain the registration details of the appellant's car and then approached him to ask for sight of his driving licence. The appellant was unable to produce his driving licence and, in response to the constable's request, gave the constable his name and address and some personal details. The constable returned to her car to check on the accuracy of this information and as she did so the appellant drove off. She pursued his car with her red and blue lights still flashing and her siren sounding, and the appellant again stopped. There was an altercation between him and the constable, which ended with the appellant's partner driving on to the airport with his sons, leaving the appellant on the roadside, and the appellant going to the police station in a police car to make a complaint about the constable's conduct.
This very brief account of this incident omits reference to a number of points on…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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