Signal v Berry

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV 2015-031-35 [2016] NZHC 1126

BETWEEN

ALLAN PHILLIP SIGNAL AND

PRUDENCE LEA SIGNAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE SIGNAL PROPERTY TRUST

Plaintiffs

AND

GEORGE LATHAM BERRY,

DAVID RICHARD TRAVERS SALTER, MICHAEL JOHN DE BUYZER AND DAVID MICHAEL JACKSON

First Defendants

AND

MICHAEL JOHN DE BUYZER Second Defendant

Hearing: 17 May 2016

Counsel:

A R Shaw for Plaintiffs
J Eckford for Defendants

Judgment:

27 May 2016

JUDGMENT OF BROWN J

[1]      The plaintiffs sue the defendants for negligence in the performance of legal services in connection with a subdivision of property at 125 Hickford Road, Foxton.

[2]      In particular the plaintiffs claim that the defendants failed to secure the issue of titles for the subdivision from Land Information New Zealand by 17 June 2011, the date of expiry of the local authority’s certificate to the plaintiffs under s 223 of the Resource Management Act 1991.   As a consequence it was necessary for the plaintiffs to seek a new resource consent which resulted in titles for the subdivision

not being available until 31 August 2013.

SIGNAL v BERRY & ORS [2016] NZHC 1126 [27 May 2016]

[3]      Liability is not in dispute and a defended hearing on quantum and some aspects of causation was allocated for three days commencing 14 March 2016.

[4]      Briefs   of   evidence   were   filed   and   served   by   the   plaintiffs   on

1 December 2015 and by the defendants on 15 January 2016.

[5]      By  memorandum  dated  3 March 2016  the  plaintiffs  gave  notice  of  their intention to seek leave to adduce evidence in rebuttal in the form of briefs of four additional new witnesses.

[6]      The defendants opposed the service of additional briefs by the plaintiffs. Contending that the plaintiffs’ description of the proposed briefs as “rebuttal evidence” was misconceived, the defendants submitted that the proper course was an application to the Court for leave to file supplementary briefs including an extension of time given that pleadings had closed on 3 November 2015.

[7]      Following   a   telephone   conference,   Mallon   J   issued   a   Minute   dated

7 March 2016 which stated:

[1]       I am not in a position to rule on the admissibility of the proposed further evidence from the plaintiffs.  It does, however, seem to me to be what would ordinarily be considered reply evidence.  I understand that it is not uncommon for a timetable to make provision for reply evidence but the timetable did not do so here.  It does not seem to me to be rebuttal evidence under s 98 of the Evidence Act since that section is concerned with evidence after a party’s case has closed. Therefore if leave is to be granted to the plaintiffs, it seems to me that this would probably need to be pursuant to rule 9.8.  Relevant to whether leave should be granted is that no provision was made for reply evidence, when not uncommonly it would be.  Also relevant will be any prejudice to the defendants.   The plaintiffs should therefore proceed to file…

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Details
Case
[2016] NZHC 1126
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiffs, Allan Phillip Signal and Prudence Lea Signal as trustees of the Signal Property Trust, sought to sue the defendants for professional negligence in connection with a subdivision of property at 125 Hickford Road, Foxton. They alleged that the defendants failed to secure titles for the subdivision, resulting in a delay that necessitated a new resource consent and caused a loss of $198,000. The parties agreed on liability, but disputed the amount of damages and causation. The High Court considered the plaintiffs' application for leave to file supplementary briefs from new witnesses. The plaintiffs argued that the new evidence was necessary to address a surprise assertion by a defendant’s witness, and that there would be no prejudice to the defendants as they would have had the plaintiffs’ briefs for eight months before the next fixture. The defendants opposed the application, arguing that the plaintiffs should have known about the witnesses and their evidence at the time of filing their primary briefs, and that the application was simply an attempt to bolster the plaintiffs' case.

The Court found that the new evidence was not rebuttal evidence, but rather reply evidence that should have been filed earlier. The Court considered the interests of justice and the significant prejudice that would have resulted if the new evidence had been led at the original fixture. However, the fixture had been vacated, and the new hearing date was almost six months away. The Court held that the defendants had sufficient time to respond to the new evidence, and that any additional expense could be reflected in the costs order following trial. The Court granted leave for the plaintiffs to lead evidence in the supplementary briefs, but declined to make a costs order on the application.

The Court ordered that the plaintiffs may lead evidence from the supplementary briefs, but that no order for costs would be made on the application.