Hearing: 4 July 2013 and 11 March 2014

Court:

Elias CJ, McGrath, William Young, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ

Counsel:

C W J Stevenson and E A Hall for Ahsin
R M Lithgow QC and E A Hall for Rameka
J C Pike QC (on 11 March 2014), M F Laracy and
J E Mildenhall for Respondent

Judgment:

30 October 2014

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The appeals are allowed, the appellants’ convictions for murder are quashed and new trials are ordered.

REASONS

Para No.

Elias CJ [1]

McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ [45]

William Young J [205]

JAMIE NGAHUIA AHSIN v R AND RAELEEN MATEWAI NOYLE RAMEKA v R [2014] NZSC 153 [30 October 2014]

ELIAS CJ

[1] The appellants were convicted after trial of the murder of Paul Kumeroa. The Crown case was that they had either aided or encouraged the principal offender, Clarke McCallum, in an assault with murderous intent or had participated with him in an unlawful common purpose (a plan to assault members of a rival gang) in which killing with murderous intent was known to be a probable consequence. On these alternatives, they were liable as parties under s 66(1)(b) or (c) and s 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961. I agree with McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ that the appeal to this Court should be allowed because of inadequacies in the summing up of the trial Judge. On that matter, dispositive of the appeal, I state my reasons shortly because they do not differ in substance from the reasons delivered by McGrath J and because his full description of the summing up makes it unnecessary for me to set it out.

[2] In addition, I address two further grounds of appeal: whether withdrawal by a secondary party is properly treated as a defence; and the need for jury unanimity in a case put on alternative bases under the party provisions contained in s 66 of the Crimes Act. It is strictly unnecessary to determine these points because the appeal is to be allowed on another ground. Since the issues raised are ones of some difficulty, it might be thought that they are better left for a case where it is necessary to decide them. I indicate my position on each briefly because the case must be sent back for retrial where the points are likely to arise again, and because they are matters dealt with in reasons of other members of the Court with which I am not in complete agreement.

Background

[3] Clarke McCallum and Daniel Rippon are members of Black Power. Jamie Ahsin, one of the appellants, was in a relationship with Mr Rippon. The other appellant, Raeleen Rameka, was associated with Black Power and was a friend of Ms…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ahsin v R

Details

AGLC: Ahsin v R [2014] NZSC 153
Case: [2014] NZSC 153
Decision Date: 30 October 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Ahsin v R, the Supreme Court of New Zealand considered the appeals of two women convicted of the murder of Paul Kumeroa. The appellants argued that their convictions should be quashed on the grounds that the trial judge had failed to properly direct the jury on the elements of party liability under sections 66(1)(b) and (c) and 66(2) of the Crimes Act, and on the defence of withdrawal. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, quashed the convictions and ordered a retrial. The majority of the Court held that the trial judge’s summing up was inadequate because it did not properly differentiate between the bases of liability under s 66(1)(b) and (c) and s 66(2) and did not properly direct the jury on the requirement of jury unanimity. The majority also held that the trial judge had failed to properly direct the jury on the defence of withdrawal. William Young J dissented from the majority on the issue of withdrawal. He considered that the appellants’ actions were such that withdrawal was not possible under s 66(1)(b) and (c), and that the jury could not have properly considered the defence of withdrawal under s 66(2) because it was not properly directed by the trial judge.

Orders