Uhrle v R - [2016] NZSC 64

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 38/2016
[2016] NZSC 64

BETWEEN	CECILIA VICTORIA UHRLE Applicant
AND	THE QUEEN Respondent

Court:	Elias CJ, William Young and Arnold JJ
Counsel:	G N E Bradford for Applicant K S Grau for Respondent
Judgment:	13 June 2016

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

The applicant and three male co-accused were found guilty of murder following a jury trial. It is not necessary that we detail the events leading up to the victim’s death, which were described by the Court of Appeal as “chaotic”.[1] It is sufficient to say that the three males assaulted the victim, and his death resulted. Although the applicant went with the co-accused to the scene of the attack, she left at a comparatively early stage. In imposing sentence, the trial Judge, Cooper J, said that he thought it likely that the jury had convicted her by applying s 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961.[2]
[1]Uhrle v R [2015] NZCA 412 (Winkelmann, Lang and Wylie JJ) at [4].
[2]R v Uhrle [2013] NZHC 922 at [13].
The applicant seeks leave to appeal on the ground that the jury was misdirected on the issue of party liability. In relation to s 66(2), Cooper J relevantly instructed the jury that, before the applicant could be convicted of murder or manslaughter, the Crown had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the commission of either murder or manslaughter was known to the applicant to be a probable consequence of prosecuting the common purpose. The applicant submits that such a direction is inconsistent with the decisions of the United Kingdom Supreme Court and the Privy Council in two appeals heard together, R v Jogee and Ruddock v R,[3] and accordingly, the applicant’s conviction cannot stand.
[3]R v Jogee, Ruddock v R [2016] UKSC 8, [2016] UKPC 7, [2016] 2 WLR 681.
The basis for this submission is that the United Kingdom Supreme Court concluded in these two cases that the judgment of the Privy Council in Chan Wing‑Siu v R[4] had laid down a new principle which was inconsistent with previous common law authority and with the fundamental precepts of criminal liability. That new principle was that if two people (A and B) set out to commit an offence (offence 1), and in the course of committing offence 1, A commits another offence (offence 2), B will be guilty of offence 2 if he or she foresaw offence 2’s commission as a possibility, even if he or she did not intend it. The United Kingdom Supreme Court held that there must be an intention to commit the particular offence (that is, offence 2), rather than simply foresight of it as a possibility. Such foresight might be evidence of the requisite intention, but was not by itself sufficient to establish liability.
[4]Chan Wing-Siu v R [1985] AC 168 (PC).
However, in New Zealand the position is covered by…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Uhrle v R

Details

AGLC: Uhrle v R [2016] NZSC 64
Case: [2016] NZSC 64
Decision Date: 13 June 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New Zealand dealt with an application for leave to appeal by Cecilia Victoria Uhrle against a conviction for murder. Uhrle and three co-accused were found guilty following a jury trial for the murder of a victim who was assaulted by the co-accused, resulting in his death. The applicant was present at the scene but left early. The trial judge imposed sentence based on the jury's likely application of section 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961, which concerns party liability. Uhrle sought leave to appeal on the ground that the jury was misdirected on the issue of party liability under section 66(2). The applicant argued that the jury direction was inconsistent with recent decisions from the United Kingdom Supreme Court and the Privy Council.

The court considered whether the trial judge's direction to the jury was in line with New Zealand law, particularly section 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961. The court noted that section 66(2) differs from the principle established in the United Kingdom cases, as it imposes liability if the commission of an offence was known to be a probable consequence of prosecuting the common purpose, rather than requiring an intention to commit the offence. The court concluded that the trial judge's direction was consistent with the language of section 66(2) and that there was no justification to reconsider the analysis in Ahsin v R. The application did not raise an issue of general or public importance, and the court found no risk of a substantial miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed the application for leave to appeal, affirming the conviction. The court held that the trial judge's direction to the jury was in accordance with the requirements of section 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961 and that the applicant's argument was unarguable. The decision underscores the distinction between New Zealand law and the principles established in the United Kingdom cases regarding party liability.

Orders