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R v Jogee

R v Jogee

Case [2016] UKSC 8 18 February 2016

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Hilary Term

[2016] UKSC 8

[2016] UKPC 7

On appeal from: [2013] EWCA Crim 1433 and JCPC 0020 of 2015

JUDGMENT

R v Jogee (Appellant)
Ruddock (Appellant) v The Queen (Respondent)
(Jamaica)

From the Court of Appeal of Jamaica

before

Lord Neuberger, President
Lady Hale, Deputy President
Lord Hughes Lord Toulson Lord Thomas

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
18 February 2016
Heard on 27, 28 and 29 October 2015

Appellant (Jogee) Respondent

Felicity Gerry QC John McGuinness QC

Catarina Sjölin Duncan Atkinson
Adam Wagner
Diarmuid Laffan

(Instructed by Defence (Instructed by Crown

Law) Prosecution Service

Appeals and Review Unit)

Appellant (Ruddock) Respondent

Julian Knowles QC Howard Stevens QC

James Mehigan Rowan Pennington-Benton

(Instructed by Dorsey & (Instructed by Charles

Whitney (Europe) LLP) Russell Speechlys)

Intervener (Just for Kids

Law)
Francis FitzGibbon QC
Caoilfhionn Gallagher

Joanne Cecil

Daniella Waddoup

(Instructed by Just for

Kids Law)

Intervener (Joint

Enterprise Not Guilty by

Association)

Timothy Moloney QC

Jude Bunting

(Instructed by ITN

Solicitors)
LORD HUGHES AND LORD TOULSON: (with whom Lord Neuberger,
Lady Hale and Lord Thomas agree)
1. In the language of the criminal law a person who assists or encourages another to commit a crime is known as an accessory or secondary party. The actual perpetrator is known as a principal, even if his role may be subordinate to that of others. It is a fundamental principle of the criminal law that the accessory is guilty of the same offence as the principal. The reason is not difficult to see. He shares the physical act because even if it was not his hand which struck the blow, ransacked the house, smuggled the drugs or forged the cheque, he has encouraged or assisted those physical acts. Similarly he shares the culpability precisely because he encouraged or assisted the offence. No one doubts that if the principal and the accessory are together engaged on, for example, an armed robbery of a bank, the accessory who keeps guard outside is as guilty of the robbery as the principal who enters with a shotgun and extracts the money from the staff by threat of violence. Nor does anyone doubt that the same principle can apply where, as sometimes happens, the accessory is nowhere near the scene of the crime. The accessory who funded the bank robbery or provided the gun for the purpose is as guilty as those who are at the scene. Sometimes it may be impossible for the prosecution to prove whether a defendant was a principal or an accessory, but that does not matter so long as it can prove that he participated in the crime either as one or as the other. These basic principles are long established and uncontroversial.
2. In the last 20 years a new term has entered the lexicon of criminal lawyers: parasitic accessory liability. The expression was coined by Professor Sir John Smith in a lecture later published in the Law Quarterly Review (Criminal liability of accessories: law and law reform [1997] 113 LQR 453). He used…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Jogee

Details

AGLC: R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8
Case: [2016] UKSC 8
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the cases of R v Jogee and Ruddock v The Queen, the Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were asked to review the doctrine of parasitic accessory liability, which had been established in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen. This doctrine held that an accessory could be guilty of a crime beyond the one originally agreed upon, if the accessory foresaw the possibility of the crime being committed. The appellants argued that the doctrine was based on a flawed reading of earlier authorities and questionable policy arguments. The respondents, however, argued that the law as laid down in Chan Wing-Siu had been in place for 30 years and should remain unchanged.

The court found that the doctrine of parasitic accessory liability, as established in Chan Wing-Siu, was indeed based on a flawed reading of earlier authorities. The court held that foresight of a crime being committed is not the same as intending to assist or encourage the commission of that crime. The court found that the authorities relied upon in Chan Wing-Siu did not support the doctrine, and that the doctrine was not consistent with the principle that a secondary party must have the necessary mens rea for the crime they are being charged with.

The court held that the doctrine of parasitic accessory liability should be overruled, and that a secondary party must have the necessary mens rea for the crime they are being charged with, just like the principal. The court held that the error identified did not necessarily mean that all past convictions under the doctrine should be set aside, but that each case should be considered on its own merits.

In Jogee's case, the court held that there was a case fit to go to the jury that he had the mens rea for murder, and that he was therefore guilty of manslaughter at a minimum. In Ruddock's case, the court held that the appeal must be allowed on the ground that the Chan Wing-Siu principle is wrong.

Overall, the court's decision in these cases represents a significant change in the law regarding accessory liability, and will have implications for future cases involving joint criminal enterprises.

Orders