| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA560/2023 [2024] NZCA 143 |
| BETWEEN | KA YIP WAN |
| AND | THE KING |
| Court: | Wylie, Mander and Jagose JJ |
Counsel: | H G de Groot for Applicant |
Judgment: | 1 May 2024 at 12 pm |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for an extension of time is declined.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Jagose J)
The applicant, Ka Yip Wan, seeks an extension of time to appeal against the judgment of Lang J in the High Court at Whangārei on 8 June 2017, in which the Judge imposed a sentence of 23 years’ imprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) of nine years and six months.[1] Mr Wan seeks to appeal the imposition of the minimum period of imprisonment only. Mr Wan had pleaded guilty to and charges of importing[2] and possessing methamphetamine.[3]
Background
[1]R v Wan [2017] NZHC 1255 [sentencing notes].
[2]Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 6(1)(a) and 6(2)(a). Maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
[3]Section 6(1)(f) and 6(2)(a). Maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
As a person convicted of an offence, Mr Wan may appeal against the sentence imposed for that offence,[4] by filing his notice of appeal “within 20 working days after the date of the sentence appealed against”.[5] His 25 September 2023 application for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal is brought some six years and four months after the date of his sentence.
Approach to extensions of time
[4]Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 244(1).
[5]Section 248(2).
This Court may extend the time allowed for filing a notice of appeal against sentence.[6] In determining whether to grant an extension, “[t]he touchstone is the interests of justice in the particular case”,[7] balancing the general interest in finality of decisions against the particular interest claimed by the applicant.[8] The issue commonly resolves to the reasons for the delay and the merits of the appeal.[9]
Submissions on application
[6]Section 248(4).
[7]R v Knight [1998] 1 NZLR 583 (CA) at 587, referring to the predecessor of s 248(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, s 388(2) of the Crimes Act 1961.
[8]Kriel v R [2024] NZCA 45 at [79]–[86], citing R v Knight, above n 6, and R v Lee [2006] 3 NZLR 42 (CA).
[9]Kriel, above n 8, at [87], citing Mikus v R [2011] NZCA 298 at [26], which cited R v Slavich [2008] NZCA 116 at [14].
For Mr Wan, Mr de Groot argues sentencing courts’ then “prevailing approach” inevitably or invariably to impose minimum periods of imprisonment for serious drug offending, coupled with Mr Wan’s “limited command of English and distress at the sentencing outcome”, meant he could not have made an informed decision about the exercise of his appeal rights at the time of sentencing. Should the application for an extension of time be granted, Mr de Groot would argue on appeal the sentencing…
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- Wan v The King [2024] NZCA 143
- Case
- [2024] NZCA 143
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the reasons for delay were sufficient to justify granting an extension and whether the merits of the proposed appeal were strong enough to warrant reconsideration of the sentence after such a long passage of time. The Court may extend the time allowed for filing a notice of appeal against sentence. In determining whether to grant an extension, the touchstone is the interests of justice in the particular case, balancing the general interest in finality of decisions against the particular interest claimed by the applicant. The issue commonly resolves to the reasons for the delay and the merits of the appeal.
Mr Wan’s reasons for delay were insufficient to justify granting an extension. He was told of his appeal rights within the period for their exercise. Even allowing for his immediate confusion and uncertainty after the 2017 sentence, his 2020 knowledge another prisoner was successful in appealing against imposition of a minimum period of imprisonment does not explain his delay in pursuing them. Even then, he appears not to have taken any material step until 2023. The merits of Mr Wan’s appeal were not strong. The sentencing Judge had not imposed the MPI as a matter of routine or in a mechanistic way but had considered Mr Wan’s parole eligibility inadequate for sentencing’s purposes, particularly because Mr Wan likely would be deported on release and would not return to New Zealand, meaning deterrence and accountability warranted imposition of a longer MPI than was offered by parole eligibility. Mr Wan’s reasons for delay and the merits of his appeal accordingly separately and together were insufficient justification to warrant reconsideration of his sentence after such a long passage of time. No special circumstance had been shown to justify any departure from the principle of finality; there was no special feature or features particular to the case that lead to the conclusion that in all the circumstances justice required that leave be given. The application for an extension of time was declined.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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