Criminal Law—Murder—Complicity—Common purpose to assault victim—Death—Direction that jury might convict if satisfied accused contemplated that intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm possible incident of joint enterprise.
Headnote
Three youths decided to go to a park to bash someone. One went with a hammer and another with a stick. Two of the youths were experienced in kick boxing. At the park two of them attacked a man who was standing near the top of a high cliff. They kicked him and beat him with the stick. Then the other youth side kicked the man in the chest which caused him to fall into a puddle in the rocks 3-5 m from the edge of the cliff. The youths then left. Next day the man's body was found in the sea at the bottom of the cliff. At the trial of two of the youths for murder the judge directed the jury in relation to common purpose that the prosecution had to establish beyond reasonable doubt a common intention on the part of the three youths to bash someone, that an act on the part of one of them which caused death was done with the intention of inflicting grievous bodily harm on the deceased, and that the accused either shared the common intention of inflicting grievous bodily harm or contemplated the infliction of grievous bodily harm by one or other of them was a possible incident in the common criminal enterprise. The accused were convicted.
Held that the judge had correctly directed the jury in relation to common purpose.
Per curiam. The doctrine of common purpose applies where a venture is undertaken by more than one person acting in concert in pursuit of a common criminal design. The liability which attaches to the traditional classifications of accessory before the fact and principal in the second degree may be enough to establish the guilt of a secondary party: in the case of an accessory before the fact where that party counsels or procures the commission of the crime and in the case of a principal in the second degree where that party, being present at the scene, aids or abets its commission. But the complicity of a secondary party may also be established by reason of a common purpose shared with the principal offender or with that offender and others. Such a common purpose arises where a person reaches an understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement between that person and another or others that they will commit a crime. The undertaking or arrangement need not be express and may be inferred from all the circumstances. If one or other of the parties does, or they do between them, in accordance with the continuing understanding or arrangement, all those things which are necessary to constitute the crime, they are all equally guilty…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
McAuliffe v The Queen [1995] HCA 37
Case
[1995] HCA 37
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
McAuliffe appealed his conviction for armed robbery to the High Court of Australia. The central issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant, specifically a confession made to police. The prosecution sought to rely on this confession, but the appellant argued it was improperly obtained and should have been excluded by the trial judge.
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in admitting the confession into evidence. This involved considering the principles governing the admissibility of confessions, particularly where there are allegations of unfairness or impropriety in the manner of obtaining them. The court had to balance the probative value of the confession against the potential prejudice to the appellant and the need to uphold the integrity of the criminal justice system.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, affirmed the principles established in *R v Swaffield* and *Bales v The Queen*, which govern the admissibility of confessions. The court held that a confession is inadmissible if it was obtained by means of untrue representations made by police, or by violence or other ill-treatment. Furthermore, a confession is inadmissible if, in the circumstances, it would be unfair to the accused to use it. Applying these principles, the court found that the confession in this case was not improperly obtained and that the trial judge had correctly exercised their discretion in admitting it. The appeal was therefore dismissed.