Mills v The Queen

Case [1986] HCA 71


HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gibbs C.J., Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ.

ADRIAN JOHN MILLS (S11 of 1986); PETER JOHN SINFIELD (S14 of 1986) and DEREK JAMES SINFIELD (S68 of 1986) v. THE QUEEN

2 December 1986

Decisions


GIBBS C.J., MASON, WILSON AND DAWSON JJ.: What I am about to say represents the judgment of my brother Mason, my brother Wilson, my brother Dawson and myself. Counsel for the applicants asked us to reconsider Johns (T.S.) v. The Queen (1980) 143 CLR 108 but the statement in that case of the law governing criminal liability for acts done in the course of carrying out a common criminal purpose has been accepted as correct in other jurisdictions and we see no reason to review it.

2. The law as there stated is not complex and should not give rise to the difficulties and complexities suggested in argument. In many cases it will be sufficient to direct the jury by adapting to the circumstances the simple formula mentioned by Sir Robin Cooke in Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen (1985) AC 168, at p 178:

"For instance, did the particular accused contemplate that in carrying out a common unlawful purpose one of his partners in the enterprise might use a knife or a loaded gun with the intention of causing really serious bodily harm?"
It should never be necessary to give the jury a direction as to the distinction between foundational crime and incidental crime and such a direction is more likely to be confusing than useful.

3. In the present case there were some imperfections in the summing up but we do not consider that any miscarriage of justice has been shown to have resulted. We agree with the conclusion reached by the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal and would refuse the applications for special leave to appeal.

DEANE J.: I agree that the applications for special leave to appeal of Derek Sinfield and Peter Sinfield should be refused. Regardless of what merit there may be in the criticism levelled against the summing up of the learned trial judge, it appears to me to be plain that at least in the case of those two applicants there was no miscarriage of justice. Indeed, it seems to me that, in the context of the overall evidence led at the trial, the summing up was not, on balance, unduly unfavourable to those two applicants.

2. The case of the applicant, Adrian Mills, seems to me to be different. It is reasonable to assume that the jury would have concluded that he was not one of the two persons who entered the premises at the time when the shootings occurred. The learned trial judge's directions about common purpose and joint intention appear to me to have been particularly significant in his case and I am not, at this stage, prepared to join in the decision of the other members of the Court that his application for special leave should be refused.

Orders


Special leave to appeal refused.
Details
AGLC
Mills v The Queen [1986] HCA 71
Case
[1986] HCA 71
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Mills v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Mills, against his conviction for murder. The applicant had been found guilty by a jury in the Supreme Court of Queensland and sentenced to life imprisonment. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence and the directions given by the trial judge to the jury.

The High Court was required to determine two principal legal issues. Firstly, whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the applicant's prior convictions, which the applicant argued was unfairly prejudicial. Secondly, the Court had to consider whether the trial judge's summing up to the jury adequately explained the concept of reasonable doubt and the onus of proof resting on the prosecution.

The Court, in a joint judgment, held that the admission of the prior convictions was indeed prejudicial and that the trial judge had failed to give a sufficiently strong warning to the jury to disregard this evidence when considering the applicant's guilt for the offence charged. Furthermore, the Court found that the summing up on the issue of reasonable doubt was inadequate, potentially misleading the jury as to the high standard of proof required for a criminal conviction. The legal principle applied was that evidence of prior convictions is generally inadmissible unless it has a specific relevance to the offence charged, and that a trial judge must ensure the jury understands the fundamental principles of criminal justice, including the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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