JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: FERMANIS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2007] WASCA 84
CORAM: STEYTLER P
ROBERTS-SMITH JA
McLURE JA
HEARD: 23 NOVEMBER 2006
DELIVERED : 23 APRIL 2007
FILE NO/S: CACR 179 of 2005
BETWEEN: PETER FERMANIS
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
FILE NO/S :CACR 187 of 2005
BETWEEN :CLIFFORD WILBUR MITCHELL
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
FILE NO/S :CACR 206 of 2005
BETWEEN :PETER FERMANIS
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
FILE NO/S :CACR 207 of 2005
BETWEEN :CLIFFORD WILBUR MITCHELL
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MACKNAY DCJ
File No :IND 1180 of 2002
Catchwords:
Appeal - Criminal law - Fraud - Jury unanimity - Where prosecution case run on several alternative basis - Unanimity required on all essential elements or ingredients of offence - Jurors must rely on same allegation of "deceit or fraudulent means" in deciding to convict - Trial Judge failed to give required direction - Unsafe convictions
Criminal law - Fraud - Criminal Code (WA) s 409(1) - Test for reliance
Successful appeal - Discretion to order retrial - Co-accused acquitted at trial - Inconsistent verdicts if convictions based on particular allegations - Strength of remainder of prosecution case - Health problems and age of one appellant - No retrial ordered
Legislation:
Criminal Code (WA), s 409(1)
Result:
Appeals against conviction allowed
No retrial ordered
Category: A
CACR 179 of 2005
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr M T Trowell QC & Mr S G Scott
Respondent: Mr M Mischin
Solicitors:
Appellant: Stables Scott
Respondent: State Director of Public Prosecutions
CACR 187 of 2005
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr M J McCusker QC & Ms B A Ayling
Respondent: Mr M Mischin
Solicitors:
Appellant: Legal Aid WA
Respondent: State Director of Public Prosecutions
CACR 206 of 2005
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr M T Trowell QC & Mr S G Scott
Respondent: Mr M Mischin
Solicitors:
Appellant: Stables Scott
Respondent: State Director of Public Prosecutions
CACR 207 of 2005
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr M J McCusker QC & Ms B A Ayling
Respondent: Mr M Mischin
Solicitors:
Appellant: Legal Aid WA
Respondent: State Director of Public Prosecutions
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Australian Steel & Mining Corporation Pty Ltd v Corben [1974] 2 NSWLR 202
Brown (1984) 79 Cr App R 115
Bruce v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 236
Chew v The Queen (1991) 4 WAR 21
Chew v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 626
Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) v Fowler (1984) 154 CLR 627
Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation Ltd (1997) 98 A Crim R 481
Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215
Hancock [1996] 2 Cr App R 554
Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459
Holland (1993) 68 A Crim R 176
Infirri (1981) 5 A Crim R 132
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- Case
- [2007] WASCA 84
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the jury must be unanimous in their agreement on the particular act(s) or omission(s) that constituted the deceit or fraudulent means in each count of the indictment. The court found that the trial judge’s failure to give the required direction resulted in an unsafe and unreliable verdict. The prosecution had presented several alternative acts or omissions that could satisfy the element of deceit or fraudulent means, but the jury was not directed to agree on which specific act(s) or omission(s) constituted the deceit or fraudulent means. This failure meant that the jury may have convicted based on different acts or omissions, leading to an unsafe verdict.
The appeal was successful, and the convictions were quashed. However, given the appellants' health problems and age, the court exercised its discretion not to order a retrial. This decision highlights the importance of ensuring that the jury is properly directed on the necessity of unanimous agreement on the specific acts or omissions that constitute the essential elements of the offence, particularly in cases where multiple acts or omissions are presented as alternative means of satisfying those elements.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In order to sustain a conviction the State is required only to establish the essential elements of the offence charged. It is not required to prove all provided particulars: Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation Ltd (1997) 98 A Crim R 481 at 484 ‑ 485. The offence of fraud is constituted by s 409(1) of the Criminal Code (WA) which provides that:"(1)Any person who, with intent to defraud, by deceit or any fraudulent means ‑ … (c)gains a benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, for any person;… is guilty of a crime … " Clause 5(2) of Sch 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) (given effect by s 85 of that Act) provides that it is sufficient to describe an offence in the words of the written law that creates it. Clause 6(10) of Sch 1 provides that a "charge that alleges an offence involving deceit, fraud or dishonesty … need not allege the details of the deceit, fraud or dishonesty". These provisions consequently permitted the broad generality of the terms in which each count against the appellants was framed, although s 131(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a court may order a prosecutor to give the accused further particulars of a charge. I have earlier said what were the particulars which were ultimately provided, on the second day of the trial. I have also outlined the manner in which the prosecutor put his case in closing and that in which the trial Judge summarised the prosecution case. It is plain, from what I have said, that the jury was left with a number of different acts or omissions which, the prosecutor contended, could satisfy the element, in each count, of "deceit or any fraudulent means". However, although the jury were told that any verdict must be unanimous, they were not told that they had to be unanimous in their agreement as to the particular act(s) or omission(s) found by them to amount to deceit or fraudulent means in each case. Since the hearing of the appeal, each of the parties has filed supplementary written submissions in respect of this ground. Both appellants submit that the acts or omissions particularised by the prosecutor as amounting to deceit or fraudulent means go to an essential element or ingredient of the crime charged, with the consequence that the jury could not convict unless they were agreed upon the particular act(s) or omission(s) that constituted that element. They contend that, because the jury was not directed in those terms, the verdict must be regarded as uncertain. On the other hand, the prosecutor contends that the prosecution did not proceed upon the basis that each of the particulars gave rise to a separate offence. Rather, he contends that the particulars "illustrated a course of conduct that the prosecution alleged induced the investors to supply the alleged benefit". He also suggests that the particulars were akin to the overt acts of a conspiracy, some of which may, and some of which may not, be established by the evidence. He says that these particulars "merely identified the evidence that would be pointed to by the prosecution as demonstrating deceit or fraudulent means that induced the complainants to give a benefit to Pridecrest". He argues that they "were not elements of or an element of the offences charged" and that there "was no requirement that the jury be directed that all must be satisfied of one or more of the particulars to find a deceit or fraudulent means".