Fermanis v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   FERMANIS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2007] WASCA 84

CORAM:   STEYTLER P

ROBERTS-SMITH JA
McLURE JA

HEARD:   23 NOVEMBER 2006

DELIVERED          :   23 APRIL 2007

FILE NO/S:   CACR 179 of 2005

BETWEEN:   PETER FERMANIS

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CACR 187 of 2005

BETWEEN              :CLIFFORD WILBUR MITCHELL

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CACR 206 of 2005

BETWEEN              :PETER FERMANIS

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CACR 207 of 2005

BETWEEN              :CLIFFORD WILBUR MITCHELL

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MACKNAY DCJ

File No  :IND 1180 of 2002

Catchwords:

Appeal - Criminal law - Fraud - Jury unanimity - Where prosecution case run on several alternative basis - Unanimity required  on all essential elements or ingredients of offence - Jurors must rely on same allegation of "deceit or fraudulent means" in deciding to convict - Trial Judge failed to give required direction - Unsafe convictions

Criminal law - Fraud - Criminal Code (WA) s 409(1) - Test for reliance

Successful appeal - Discretion to order retrial - Co-accused acquitted at trial - Inconsistent verdicts if convictions based on particular allegations - Strength of remainder of prosecution case - Health problems and age of one appellant - No retrial ordered

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 409(1)

Result:

Appeals against conviction allowed
No retrial ordered

Category:    A

CACR 179 of 2005

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr M T Trowell QC & Mr S G Scott

Respondent:     Mr M Mischin

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Stables Scott

Respondent:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

CACR 187 of 2005

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr M J McCusker QC & Ms B A Ayling

Respondent:     Mr M Mischin

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Legal Aid WA

Respondent:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

CACR 206 of 2005

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr M T Trowell QC & Mr S G Scott

Respondent:     Mr M Mischin

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Stables Scott

Respondent:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

CACR 207 of 2005

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr M J McCusker QC & Ms B A Ayling

Respondent:     Mr M Mischin

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Legal Aid WA

Respondent:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian Steel & Mining Corporation Pty Ltd v Corben [1974] 2 NSWLR 202

Brown (1984) 79 Cr App R 115

Bruce v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 236

Chew v The Queen (1991) 4 WAR 21

Chew v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 626

Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) v Fowler (1984) 154 CLR 627

Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation Ltd (1997) 98 A Crim R 481

Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215

Hancock [1996] 2 Cr App R 554

Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459

Holland (1993) 68 A Crim R 176

Infirri (1981) 5 A Crim R 132

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Details
Case
[2007] WASCA 84
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Fermanis v The State of Western Australia, the appellants, Fermanis and his co-accused, were convicted of fraud by deceit and fraudulent means under s 409(1) of the Criminal Code (WA). They appealed the decision on the basis that the trial judge failed to properly direct the jury on the requirement of unanimity in relation to the specific acts or omissions that constituted the deceit or fraudulent means. The court was required to determine whether the trial judge’s omission to direct the jury on the necessity of unanimous agreement on the specific acts or omissions amounted to an error that rendered the verdict unsafe and unreliable.

The court held that the jury must be unanimous in their agreement on the particular act(s) or omission(s) that constituted the deceit or fraudulent means in each count of the indictment. The court found that the trial judge’s failure to give the required direction resulted in an unsafe and unreliable verdict. The prosecution had presented several alternative acts or omissions that could satisfy the element of deceit or fraudulent means, but the jury was not directed to agree on which specific act(s) or omission(s) constituted the deceit or fraudulent means. This failure meant that the jury may have convicted based on different acts or omissions, leading to an unsafe verdict.

The appeal was successful, and the convictions were quashed. However, given the appellants' health problems and age, the court exercised its discretion not to order a retrial. This decision highlights the importance of ensuring that the jury is properly directed on the necessity of unanimous agreement on the specific acts or omissions that constitute the essential elements of the offence, particularly in cases where multiple acts or omissions are presented as alternative means of satisfying those elements.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In order to sustain a conviction the State is required only to establish the essential elements of the offence charged. It is not required to prove all provided particulars: Environment Protection Authority v Sydney Water Corporation Ltd (1997) 98 A Crim R 481 at 484 ‑ 485. The offence of fraud is constituted by s 409(1) of the Criminal Code (WA) which provides that:"(1)Any person who, with intent to defraud, by deceit or any fraudulent means ‑ … (c)gains a benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, for any person;… is guilty of a crime … " Clause 5(2) of Sch 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) (given effect by s 85 of that Act) provides that it is sufficient to describe an offence in the words of the written law that creates it. Clause 6(10) of Sch 1 provides that a "charge that alleges an offence involving deceit, fraud or dishonesty … need not allege the details of the deceit, fraud or dishonesty". These provisions consequently permitted the broad generality of the terms in which each count against the appellants was framed, although s 131(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a court may order a prosecutor to give the accused further particulars of a charge. I have earlier said what were the particulars which were ultimately provided, on the second day of the trial. I have also outlined the manner in which the prosecutor put his case in closing and that in which the trial Judge summarised the prosecution case. It is plain, from what I have said, that the jury was left with a number of different acts or omissions which, the prosecutor contended, could satisfy the element, in each count, of "deceit or any fraudulent means". However, although the jury were told that any verdict must be unanimous, they were not told that they had to be unanimous in their agreement as to the particular act(s) or omission(s) found by them to amount to deceit or fraudulent means in each case. Since the hearing of the appeal, each of the parties has filed supplementary written submissions in respect of this ground. Both appellants submit that the acts or omissions particularised by the prosecutor as amounting to deceit or fraudulent means go to an essential element or ingredient of the crime charged, with the consequence that the jury could not convict unless they were agreed upon the particular act(s) or omission(s) that constituted that element. They contend that, because the jury was not directed in those terms, the verdict must be regarded as uncertain. On the other hand, the prosecutor contends that the prosecution did not proceed upon the basis that each of the particulars gave rise to a separate offence. Rather, he contends that the particulars "illustrated a course of conduct that the prosecution alleged induced the investors to supply the alleged benefit". He also suggests that the particulars were akin to the overt acts of a conspiracy, some of which may, and some of which may not, be established by the evidence. He says that these particulars "merely identified the evidence that would be pointed to by the prosecution as demonstrating deceit or fraudulent means that induced the complainants to give a benefit to Pridecrest". He argues that they "were not elements of or an element of the offences charged" and that there "was no requirement that the jury be directed that all must be satisfied of one or more of the particulars to find a deceit or fraudulent means".