Wotton v State of Queensland & Anor

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[2011] HCATrans 191

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S314 of 2010

B e t w e e n -

LEX PATRICK WOTTON

Plaintiff

and

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

First Defendant

CENTRAL AND NORTHERN QUEENSLAND REGIONAL PAROLE BOARD

Second Defendant

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 3 AUGUST 2011, AT 10.20 AM

(Continued from 2/8/11)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

FRENCH CJ:   Yes, Mr Solicitor.

MR SOFRONOFF:   Your Honours, I am interposing to respond to the question put to me by your Honour Justice Hayne and I also need to correct something I said to your Honour Justice Gummow.  The reason why the Crown would need to prove both the fact of the occurrence of the interview and that there was no approval, and indeed that the person who is charged is neither the prisoner’s lawyer nor an employee of the law enforcement agency or the ombudsman, is the decision in Woolmingtonv DPP [1935] AC 462 which was followed in Queensland in Mullen v The King (1938) St R Qd 97, and I think most recently insofar as Queensland is concerned in a decision of this Court, Griffiths v The Queen (1994) 69 ALJR 77.

The onus is on the Crown, of course, to prove all elements of the offence and to exclude all exculpatory provisions.  So in the case of manslaughter the Crown would need to prove not just the act of killing but that the Act was voluntary.  In most cases, that would be proved implicitly and would go without mention and, indeed, would not be the subject of any direction on the summing up.  If it is put in issue, then the proposition that the onus in that respect lies upon the Crown becomes more evident. 

Here, on a charge, the Crown would have prove that the defendant interviewed a person, that the person was a prisoner and that the defendant did not have the written approval of the chief executive and that the defendant was not the ombudsman, the prisoner’s lawyer or an employee of a law enforcement agency.  By comparison, section 133 is expressed in terms that a person must not, without the chief executive’s approval, take information.  So the way the offence is expressed in section 133 would suggest that a charge would properly read “the defendant did without the chief executive’s approval taken information from a record”.  But nothing would turn upon that because, in any event, the onus would lie upon the Crown.

Your Honour Justice Gummow asked me yesterday whether an approval or a refusal of an approval could be the subject of collateral challenge, and I said yes.  That remains my answer, but, of course, in a case like this it would be to the point because if there had been ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   It would be liable to collateral attack in view of…

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Details
Case
[2011] HCATrans 191
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland in a dispute between Mr Wotton and the State of Queensland and the Attorney-General of Queensland. The core of the dispute concerned the interpretation and application of the *Native Title Act 1993* (Cth) and the *Land Title Act 1994* (Qld) in relation to certain land in Queensland. Mr Wotton, as a representative of the Traditional Owners of the land, sought to establish native title rights and interests.

The High Court was required to determine whether the extinguishment of native title had occurred by reason of the grant of certain interests in the land under Queensland legislation prior to the commencement of the *Native Title Act 1993*. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the grants constituted "future acts" within the meaning of the *Native Title Act* and, if so, whether they were validated by the Act. A further issue was the proper construction of the term "native title" and the nature of the rights and interests that could be recognised under the Act.

The Court's reasoning focused on the principles of statutory interpretation and the legislative intent behind the *Native Title Act*. It was held that the grants in question, having been made before the *Native Title Act* came into force, were not "future acts" and therefore the validation provisions of the Act did not apply to them. The Court affirmed that native title can only be recognised where it has not been extinguished by prior grants of inconsistent interests. The interpretation of the *Land Title Act* was also crucial in determining the nature and effect of the prior grants.

Ultimately, the High Court found that native title had been extinguished in relation to the land in question by the prior grants. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the orders of the Supreme Court of Queensland were affirmed.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

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Legal Principle Established