SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Queensland Parole Board v Pangilinan [2015] QCA 35
PARTIES:
QUEENSLAND PAROLE BOARD
(appellant)
v
JORAI PANGILINAN
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 6520 of 2014
SC No 5181 of 2013DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at BrisbaneDELIVERED ON:
13 March 2015
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
20 February 2015
JUDGES:
Carmody CJ and Morrison and Philippides JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order madeORDER:
The appeal is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – ERROR OF LAW – WHAT IS – where the respondent had been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder – where the respondent became eligible for parole – where the appellant received an application for parole from the respondent – where the appellant refused the application on the basis that the respondent posed an unreasonable risk – where the respondent sought judicial review of the appellant’s decision to refuse parole – where a Queensland Corrective Service Home Assessment Report before the appellant indicated that the risk posed by the appellant could be managed by specified conditions – where a psychological report before the appellant placed the respondent in the low risk category for reoffending – where the primary judge ordered that the decision to refuse parole be set aside – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant was obliged to consider the possible imposition of conditions when assessing the respondent’s application for parole
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 3, s 193(1), s 194(1), s 200
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld)Queensland ParoleBoard v McGrane[2014] QCA 193, considered
R v Shrestha (1991) 173 CLR 48; [1991] HCA 26, cited
Wotton v State of Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1; [2012] HCA 2, citedCOUNSEL:
M D Hinson QC, with S A McLeod, for the appellant
The respondent appeared on his own behalfSOLICITORS:
Crown Law for the appellant
The respondent appeared on his own behalf
CHIEF JUSTICE: I agree with the orders proposed and reasons given by Philippides JA.
MORRISON JA: I have read the reasons of Philippides JA and agree with those reasons and the order her Honour proposes.
PHILIPPIDES JA: The appellant, the Queensland Parole Board, appeals against the determination of the learned primary judge setting aside the appellant’s decision made on 8 October 2013 to refuse the application for a parole order made by the respondent, Mr Pangilinan.
The basis on which the appellant’s decision was set aside was that, in deciding the application for parole, the appellant was required (but failed) to take into account the possible imposition of conditions of parole under s 200(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) (“the Act”). The sole question raised by the appeal is whether, in deciding the respondent’s application for parole, the appellant was required to take that…
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- Case
- [2015] QCA 35
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the reasoning behind the primary judge's decision to set aside the appellant's decision to refuse parole. The primary judge found that the appellant was required to consider the possible imposition of parole conditions but failed to do so. The appeal hinged on whether the appellant was indeed obliged to consider these conditions. The appellant did not contest the finding that it had failed to consider the conditions, but rather questioned the primary judge's conclusion that such consideration was necessary.
The court concluded that the appellant was not required to consider the imposition of parole conditions under s 200(2) when assessing the respondent's parole application. The court found that the appellant's decision-making process was not flawed by the omission to consider parole conditions, and that the evidence, including expert opinions and the respondent's institutional behaviour, supported the appellant's conclusion that the respondent posed an unacceptable risk to the community if released on parole. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision to refuse parole was reinstated.
In light of the dismissal of the appeal, the court upheld the original decision of the appellant to refuse the respondent's application for parole. The respondent remains ineligible for parole under the current circumstances.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant thus submitted that, when regard was had to its reasons, it was apparent, as was the case in McGrane, that no occasion arose for it to consider what conditions under s 200(2) might reduce the risk of reoffending. The appellant lacked confidence that the respondent was a suitable candidate for supervised release and identified what would give more confidence in that regard. The appellant conceded that, if McGrane was not an analogous case and the reasoning in that case was not apposite, the appeal should fail.Consideration McGrane concerned an unsuccessful application for parole by an offender who had been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for rape and to life imprisonment for murder. The Parole Board’s reasons were stated as follows:[12]“Based on the findings listed above, including the nature of the [respondent’s] offences, the conclusions provided by both Dr Moyle and Dr Palk, the [respondent’s] inadequate release plan including lack of community supports, proposed psychological treatment, suitable accommodation and sponsor, the Board considered the [respondent] poses an unacceptable risk to the community and decided to refuse his application for parole.”[12]Queensland Parole Board v McGrane [2014] QCA 193 at [5]. It was observed on appeal that the evidence of Dr Moyle, a psychiatrist, was that the risk of McGrane committing serious violent crime or sexual abuse in the future remained “moderately high”.[13] Dr Moyle was not of the opinion that McGrane should be released into the community on parole and opined that, before McGrane could be considered an acceptable risk, he would need to move to an environment where he could “adapt to lower security levels” and show he was trustworthy. Dr Moyle indicated that without the availability of processes established for prisoners under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (the DPSOA) or similar services, McGrane might fail to earn parole.[14] The evidence of Dr Palk (a psychologist), was that he assessed McGrane as posing a low risk of committing further acts of rape and murder, but considered he would always be a moderate risk of succumbing to “impulsive verbal and physical expression”. He did not advocate McGrane’s release into the community before undergoing an initial period of less secure incarceration, where his behaviour could be monitored and from which he could be returned to secure custody should he display unreasonable signs of “verbal or physical aggression”.[15][13]Queensland Parole Board v McGrane [2014] QCA 193 at [12], [14].[14]Queensland Parole Board v McGrane [2014] QCA 193 at [14].[15]Queensland Parole Board v McGrane [2014] QCA 193 at [17]. Muir JA explained the manner in which it was argued on appeal that the issue of possible conditions under s 200(2) of the Act arose for consideration:“[29] Counsel for the respondent argued that, even if the type of custodial accommodation envisaged by Dr Palk and Dr Moyle was not available, and it was conceded that it was not, the appellant was obliged to turn its mind to a set of conditions of the nature of those discussed by Dr Palk ‘to live somewhere, to have curfews, to have the restricted liberty, to have perhaps, the electronic monitoring that the guidelines talk about as a possibility.’ Seemingly, the need to consider such conditions was thought necessary to enable the appellant to determine whether the respondent, if released on parole, would pose an unacceptable risk of re-offending.[30]In developing these arguments counsel for the respondent submitted that if the appellant had considered such matters the respondent’s application might have had a different outcome: the appellant’s view of the existence of an unacceptable risk of re-offending may have been changed. It was further submitted that the material before the appellant, in the form of the Moyle and Palk reports and the respondent’s submissions, required the appellant to give such matters due consideration.”