Queensland Parole Board v Pangilinan

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Queensland Parole Board v Pangilinan [2015] QCA 35

PARTIES:

QUEENSLAND PAROLE BOARD
(appellant)
v
JORAI PANGILINAN
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 6520 of 2014
SC No 5181 of 2013

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

13 March 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

20 February 2015

JUDGES:

Carmody CJ and Morrison and Philippides JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

The appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – ERROR OF LAW – WHAT IS – where the respondent had been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder – where the respondent became eligible for parole – where the appellant received an application for parole from the respondent – where the appellant refused the application on the basis that the respondent posed an unreasonable risk – where the respondent sought judicial review of the appellant’s decision to refuse parole – where a Queensland Corrective Service Home Assessment Report before the appellant indicated that the risk posed by the appellant could be managed by specified conditions – where a psychological report before the appellant placed the respondent in the low risk category for reoffending – where the primary judge ordered that the decision to refuse parole be set aside – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant was obliged to consider the possible imposition of conditions when assessing the respondent’s application for parole

Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 3, s 193(1), s 194(1), s 200
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld)

Queensland ParoleBoard v McGrane[2014] QCA 193, considered
R v Shrestha (1991) 173 CLR 48; [1991] HCA 26, cited
Wotton v State of Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1; [2012] HCA 2, cited

COUNSEL:

M D Hinson QC, with S A McLeod, for the appellant
The respondent appeared on his own behalf

SOLICITORS:

Crown Law for the appellant
The respondent appeared on his own behalf

  1. CHIEF JUSTICE:  I agree with the orders proposed and reasons given by Philippides JA.

  2. MORRISON JA:  I have read the reasons of Philippides JA and agree with those reasons and the order her Honour proposes.

  3. PHILIPPIDES JA:  The appellant, the Queensland Parole Board, appeals against the determination of the learned primary judge setting aside the appellant’s decision made on 8 October 2013 to refuse the application for a parole order made by the respondent, Mr Pangilinan.

  4. The basis on which the appellant’s decision was set aside was that, in deciding the application for parole, the appellant was required (but failed) to take into account the possible imposition of conditions of parole under s 200(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) (“the Act”). The sole question raised by the appeal is whether, in deciding the respondent’s application for parole, the appellant was required to take that…

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Details
Case
[2015] QCA 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Queensland Parole Board v Pangilinan involved a dispute between the appellant, the Queensland Parole Board, and the respondent, who is serving a life sentence for murder. The central issue in this appeal was whether the appellant was required to consider the possible imposition of parole conditions under s 200(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) when deciding the respondent's application for parole. The respondent argued that the appellant failed to consider such conditions, leading to an unreasonable risk assessment and an improper refusal of parole.

The court examined the reasoning behind the primary judge's decision to set aside the appellant's decision to refuse parole. The primary judge found that the appellant was required to consider the possible imposition of parole conditions but failed to do so. The appeal hinged on whether the appellant was indeed obliged to consider these conditions. The appellant did not contest the finding that it had failed to consider the conditions, but rather questioned the primary judge's conclusion that such consideration was necessary.

The court concluded that the appellant was not required to consider the imposition of parole conditions under s 200(2) when assessing the respondent's parole application. The court found that the appellant's decision-making process was not flawed by the omission to consider parole conditions, and that the evidence, including expert opinions and the respondent's institutional behaviour, supported the appellant's conclusion that the respondent posed an unacceptable risk to the community if released on parole. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision to refuse parole was reinstated.

In light of the dismissal of the appeal, the court upheld the original decision of the appellant to refuse the respondent's application for parole. The respondent remains ineligible for parole under the current circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The basis on which the appellant’s decision was set aside was that, in deciding the application for parole, the appellant was required (but failed) to take into account the possible imposition of conditions of parole under s 200(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) (“the Act”). The sole question raised by the appeal is whether, in deciding the respondent’s application for parole, the appellant was required to take that consideration into account. The appellant does not challenge the finding that it failed to do so.Background The respondent is currently serving a term of imprisonment for life for murder, which commenced on 1 February 1998. He became eligible for parole on 1 February 2013. On 21 December 2012, the appellant received an application for a parole order from the respondent, which the appellant refused on 5 April 2013 on the basis that the respondent posed an unreasonable risk. On 20 June 2013, the respondent brought an application for a statutory order of review challenging the appellant’s decision. Before the final hearing on 13 September 2013, the appellant rescinded its decision of 5 April 2013. It so advised the respondent by a letter dated 18 September 2013, which also stated that it had reconsidered the application for a parole order and had “formed a preliminary view” that the respondent may pose an unacceptable risk to the community if released on parole. In its letter, the appellant referred to the following information obtained from a Parole Board Report dated 20 December 2012:“Prisoner Pangilinan has been in secure custody since 5 February 1998, during this time he has been accommodated in a number of centres. A Review of his case notes indicates that his behaviour fluctuates between acceptable and unacceptable.At times prisoner Pangilinan can be polite and courteous in his interactions with staff, on other occasions he can be described as manipulating a situation to achieve a desired outcome. He can also become argumentative and abusive when an outcome does not suit him. He does however maintain a very high standard of personal and cell hygiene.A review of the prisoner’s violation history since 2 February 1998 supports his sometimes unacceptable behaviour with 30 incidents and 20 breaches during that period, of these 7 incidents and 3 breaches have occurred during the past 12 months.Prisoner Pangilinan has also been subject to a number of Intensive Management Plans (IMP) during this incarceration. Prisoner Pangilinan is currently subject to an IMP which commenced on 29 October 2012 due to his continued institutional behaviour. This plan is due for further review on 10 December 2012.” The appellant also referred to the respondent’s high security classification and noted its information that the respondent was able to progress to a low security classification notwithstanding his protection status. The appellant stated that it would prefer that the respondent obtained a low security classification and progress to residential accommodation, which would demonstrate an ability to exercise self-control in a less structured and regulated environment. The appellant additionally referred to a recent relapse prevention plan which was considered adequate, but stated that it was not convinced of the respondent’s ability to abide by the plan, given his “extremely poor institutional behaviour in a structured environment”. The appellant stated that it would have greater confidence in the respondent’s ability to implement and abide by the relapse prevention plan if the respondent were able to demonstrate “appropriate behaviour in a custodial environment”. The appellant also referred to the respondent’s breach and incident history. Reference was made to eight drug related breaches of discipline and concern was expressed that two breaches occurred less than 12 months previously. The appellant noted its opinion that the information indicated that the respondent’s self‑control was poor, with institutional behaviour that fluctuated between being compliant when things were going his way and argumentative and abusive when they were not. The appellant stated that it was concerned that “if [the respondent was] unable to behave appropriately in a highly regulated custodial environment, [he] may be unable to adhere to the conditions of a parole order” and this would place the respondent “at risk to the community”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A statement of reasons dated 8 October 2013 for the appellant’s decision to refuse the application for a parole order was provided to the respondent under cover of a letter dated 11 October 2013. After repeating the matters set out in its previous letter advising the respondent of its preliminary view, the appellant made the following findings:“4.The Board considered that the Applicant has incurred eight drug related breaches of discipline since his conviction, which include providing positive urinalysis samples, ingesting and administering medication/drugs or possession of drugs. The Board was concerned that two of these breaches occurred less than twelve months ago and following completion of the Getting SMART Program. The Getting SMART Program is designed to assist prisoners with substance abuse histories.In addition, the Board considered advice that in September 2013, the Applicant has been observed to display unacceptable behaviour including not presenting himself appropriately for required custodial headcount, being observed in an unauthorised location and having been verbally abusive and argumentative with staff.The Board is of the opinion that, as evidenced by the above, the Applicant’s self control is poor and his behaviour fluctuates between being compliant if things are going his way to argumentative and abusive when they are not. The Board also noted that because of this behaviour, the Applicant was subject to an Intensive Management Plan as recently as January 2013.The Board was concerned as even in a highly structured environment and despite the length of time he has been in custody, the Applicant was unable to control his behaviour and demonstrates poor self-control. This led the Board to have concerns about how the Applicant would be able to cope in the community without the constant supervision that incarceration provides. The Board was concerned that the Applicant would be a greater risk of re-offending and pose an unacceptable risk to community safety if released into the community at this time.…5.The Board took into consideration the Applicant’s submission dated 04 March 2013 that he was unable to progress to a low security facility due to being a ‘protection’ prisoner. The Board advised the Applicant that while he is a ‘protection’ prisoner, this is not a determinative factor when making a decision regarding security classification. Furthermore, the Applicant is able to progress to a low security classification despite his ‘protection’ status. The Applicant’s history of self-harm also does not preclude the Applicant from progressing to a low security classification. The Board noted the Applicant’s explanation in his submission dated 24 September 2013 as to why he has not yet achieved a low security classification, however were of the opinion that despite the length of time he has been in custody, he has not achieved low classification although that classification is potentially available to him.The Board encourages the Applicant to make every endeavour to progress through the correctional system, obtaining a low security classification and progressing to residential accommodation where he is able to exercise self control in a less structured and regulated environment.6.The Board noted the Applicant reported that he had completed all recommended intervention programs during this period of imprisonment and there are no further recommendations at this time. It is noted that the Applicant has completed the following intervention programs:·Anger Management (2011)·Cognitive Skills (2000)·Stress Management (2000)·Violence Intervention Program (2005)·Substance Abuse Education Program (1999 x 2, 2000)·Getting SMART Program (2006, 2012)7.The Applicant submitted a relapse prevention plan with his Application which did not fulsomely detail how he proposed to manage his behaviour upon release into the community. The Board received a further improved plan which was deemed adequate. However, the Board still had concerns of the Applicant’s ability to abide by the plan, given his unacceptable institutional behaviour while being accommodated in such a structured environment. The Board would have more confidence in the Applicant’s ability to abide by the plan if he were able to demonstrate acceptable, stable behaviour within the custodial environment.8.The Board determined that there was no information contained in the Applicant’s submission dated 24 September 2013 which would alleviate its concerns raised in its correspondence to him dated 18 September 2013.9.The Board consented to the Applicant reapplying for parole six months from the date of the final decision.Reasons for decisionBased on the findings listed above, including the serious violent nature of the Applicant’s offences, his fluctuating institutional behaviour resulting in his failure to progress to a lower security environment, his drug abuse history and recency of drug related breaches, the Board considered the Applicant poses an unacceptable risk to the community and decided to refuse his application for parole.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant thus submitted that, when regard was had to its reasons, it was apparent, as was the case in McGrane, that no occasion arose for it to consider what conditions under s 200(2) might reduce the risk of reoffending. The appellant lacked confidence that the respondent was a suitable candidate for supervised release and identified what would give more confidence in that regard. The appellant conceded that, if McGrane was not an analogous case and the reasoning in that case was not apposite, the appeal should fail.Consideration McGrane concerned an unsuccessful application for parole by an offender who had been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for rape and to life imprisonment for murder. The Parole Board’s reasons were stated as follows:[12]“Based on the findings listed above, including the nature of the [respondent’s] offences, the conclusions provided by both Dr Moyle and Dr Palk, the [respondent’s] inadequate release plan including lack of community supports, proposed psychological treatment, suitable accommodation and sponsor, the Board considered the [respondent] poses an unacceptable risk to the community and decided to refuse his application for parole.”[12]Queensland Parole Board v McGrane [2014] QCA 193 at [5]. It was observed on appeal that the evidence of Dr Moyle, a psychiatrist, was that the risk of McGrane committing serious violent crime or sexual abuse in the future remained “moderately high”.[13] Dr Moyle was not of the opinion that McGrane should be released into the community on parole and opined that, before McGrane could be considered an acceptable risk, he would need to move to an environment where he could “adapt to lower security levels” and show he was trustworthy. Dr Moyle indicated that without the availability of processes established for prisoners under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (the DPSOA) or similar services, McGrane might fail to earn parole.[14] The evidence of Dr Palk (a psychologist), was that he assessed McGrane as posing a low risk of committing further acts of rape and murder, but considered he would always be a moderate risk of succumbing to “impulsive verbal and physical expression”. He did not advocate McGrane’s release into the community before undergoing an initial period of less secure incarceration, where his behaviour could be monitored and from which he could be returned to secure custody should he display unreasonable signs of “verbal or physical aggression”.[15][13]Queensland Parole Board v McGrane [2014] QCA 193 at [12], [14].[14]Queensland Parole Board v McGrane [2014] QCA 193 at [14].[15]Queensland Parole Board v McGrane [2014] QCA 193 at [17]. Muir JA explained the manner in which it was argued on appeal that the issue of possible conditions under s 200(2) of the Act arose for consideration:“[29] Counsel for the respondent argued that, even if the type of custodial accommodation envisaged by Dr Palk and Dr Moyle was not available, and it was conceded that it was not, the appellant was obliged to turn its mind to a set of conditions of the nature of those discussed by Dr Palk ‘to live somewhere, to have curfews, to have the restricted liberty, to have perhaps, the electronic monitoring that the guidelines talk about as a possibility.’ Seemingly, the need to consider such conditions was thought necessary to enable the appellant to determine whether the respondent, if released on parole, would pose an unacceptable risk of re-offending.[30]In developing these arguments counsel for the respondent submitted that if the appellant had considered such matters the respondent’s application might have had a different outcome: the appellant’s view of the existence of an unacceptable risk of re-offending may have been changed. It was further submitted that the material before the appellant, in the form of the Moyle and Palk reports and the respondent’s submissions, required the appellant to give such matters due consideration.”