Pathania v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pathania v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1262

Citation: Pathania v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1262
Appeal from: Pathania v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 932
Parties: SAHIL PATHANIA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 516 of 2015
Judge: GILMOUR J
Date of judgment: 19 November 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for a student (temporary) visa – communication of refusal by pre-paid post to cited residential address when previous communications had been by email – whether s 494B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) gives the Minister a discretion as to the method to be used in notifying a person of a decision – whether the requirements of natural justice or procedural fairness apply to s 494B.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(23), 52, 66, 347(1)(b)(i), 494B, 494C, 494D
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.16 and 4.10
Cases cited: Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596
Attorney-General for the State of South Australia v Adelaide City Corporation (2013) 249 CLR 1
Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Haque v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 221 FCR 289
Maroun v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 424
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Kim (2014) 220 FCR 494
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Radzi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 143 ALD 124
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1
Sainju v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 185 FCR 86
Wotton v State of Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1
WZARB v Minister for Immigrationand Citizenship (2013) 136 ALD 77
Date of hearing: 5 August 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 33
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 516 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SAHIL PATHANIA
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 516 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SAHIL PATHANIA
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1262
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in the case of Pathania v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was heard before the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant, a citizen of India, sought to appeal a decision made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which had found that the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was not required to notify the appellant of a refusal of a student visa by email. Instead, the Minister was found to have complied with statutory requirements by notifying the appellant of the decision by pre-paid post to his residential address as provided in his visa application form. The appellant argued that the Minister had a discretion as to the method of notification, and that this discretion must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of natural justice or procedural fairness. The appellant also argued that a doctrine of administrative estoppel by conduct applied, and that the Minister was estopped from relying on the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) concerning notification of a decision.

The primary legal issues that the Full Court had to decide were whether s 494B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was subject to the requirements of procedural fairness, and if so, whether there was a breach of those requirements in the appellant's case. The court was also required to decide whether there is a doctrine of “administrative estoppel” by conduct and, if so, whether that doctrine applied on the facts of the appellant's case. The Full Court found that s 494B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was not subject to the requirements of procedural fairness, and that the appellant had not been denied procedural fairness as he had not reasonably believed that the Minister would only contact him by email. The Full Court also found that the doctrine of administrative estoppel by conduct did not apply to the Executive, and that even if it did, the facts did not support the finding of an estoppel. The Full Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

The Full Court's decision in Pathania v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection is a significant one for immigration law in Australia. It clarifies the scope of the discretion of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection in notifying a visa applicant of a decision, and confirms that the requirements of procedural fairness do not apply to s 494B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The decision also confirms that the doctrine of administrative estoppel by conduct does not apply to the Executive. The Full Court's decision provides certainty to visa applicants and the Minister in relation to the methods by which the Minister can communicate with a visa applicant and the times by which a visa applicant is deemed to have received a communication from the Minister.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

There are two issues in this appeal. First, whether s 494B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), concerning the communication of documents by the Minister to a person, is subject to the requirements of procedural fairness and, if so, whether there was a breach of those requirements in the appellant's case. Second, whether there is a doctrine of “administrative estoppel” by conduct and, if so, whether that doctrine applied on the facts of the appellant's case.Factual background The appellant is a citizen of India. On 24 July 2012 the Minister sent notification of refusal of the appellant’s application for a student visa by pre-paid post to his residential and postal address entered by him on the electronic visa application form he lodged with the Department of Immigration. I have described the relevant details of this form in more detail below. At the time of that decision the appellant was no longer resident at that address but, in contravention of s 52(3B) of the Act, had not notified the Minister of that fact. He did not receive the decision until September 2013. An application for review of the Minister's decision was lodged with the Tribunal on 27 September 2013. On 19 December 2013, the Tribunal found that the appellant was lawfully notified by mail of the Minister's decision pursuant to s 494C of the Act on 2 August 2012, that the time for applying for review expired on 23 August 2012, and that as a consequence his application for review was out of time and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in the matter. The prescribed form that the appellant completed in applying for a student visa, and lodged electronically, asked for, and he provided, his residential address: 11/214-220 Princes Highway, Fair Meadow, New South Wales 2519 Australia. Then under the main heading "Contact details" he was asked for his postal address. The postal address that he provided was the same as his residential address. Then, under sub-heading “Communicating with you” the form stated:We can communicate about your application more quickly using email and/or fax. Do you agree to this Department communicating with you via email and/or fax? to which the appellant answered, "Yes" and provided his email address. He also stated “Yes” as part of a “Declaration” at the end of the form in answer to the following question:Do you acknowledge that you must immediately advise this Department if you become aware that any information provided in this form is incorrect or if there is a change in your circumstances at any time? (Emphasis added.) Subsequent correspondence between the Department and the appellant was entirely by email. Indeed the approval of the appellant’s previous visa application made in 2011 was by email. His unchallenged evidence was that he had not received any previous communication by post. The only communication by pre-paid post was the Minister mailing the decision of 24 July 2012 on that date to the appellant’s residential address provided by him in the form but which, at that time, was no longer his residential address.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 52(3A) and (3B) provide:(3A) A visa applicant must tell the Minister the address at which the applicant intends to live while the application is being dealt with. (3B) If the applicant proposes to change the address at which he or she intends to live for a period of 14 days or more, the applicant must tell the Minister the address and the period of proposed residence. The Federal Circuit Court decision In dealing with the issue of natural justice raised in ground 1, particular (a) of the Amended Application before the Federal Circuit Court, the primary judge found that ss 494B and 494D of the Act served the purpose of providing certainty in the methods by which the Minister can communicate with a visa applicant and the times by which a visa applicant is deemed to have received a communication from the Minister. His Honour held that those purposes would be defeated if s 494B were subject to a duty to accord procedural fairness. Thus, he concluded that s 494B was not subject to a duty to accord procedural fairness at [25]-[26]. Having so found, his Honour then considered whether, in the event that he was wrong, the appellant had been denied procedural fairness. His Honour's conclusion was that the appellant, having provided a postal address, was not reasonably entitled to believe that the Department would contact him only by email, and should, as he was obliged by s 52(3B) to do, have informed the Minister of his proposed change of address. As to the issue of administrative estoppel the primary judge concluded that the facts did not support the finding of an estoppel even assuming such a doctrine applied to the Executive. The appealNatural justice The appellant submits that s 494B gives the Minister a discretion as to the method to be used in notifying a person of a decision. The appellant submits that this discretion is not and cannot be entirely unbridled or at large, citing Wotton v State of Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1 at [9]-[10] and Attorney-General for the State of South Australia v Adelaide City Corporation (2013) 249 CLR 1 at [214]-[216]. Further, he submits that a person exercising the power must comply with any statutory requirements that may affect the discretion, and the discretion must not be exercised in a manner that is manifestly unreasonable, citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332. Thus, he submits, a discretionary power must be exercised in accordance with any applicable law. The appellant submits that the applicable law includes the requirements of natural justice or procedural fairness unless those requirements are clearly excluded by the governing statute, and cites the following passage from Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 at 598 in support: It can now be taken as settled that, when a statute confers power upon a public official to destroy, defeat or prejudice a person's rights, interests or legitimate expectations, the rules of natural justice regulate the exercise of that power unless they are excluded by plain words of necessary intendment. ...

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.