FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ANI15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 2129 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review application – Protection Visa – Malaysian citizen – whether failure to consider relevant material – whether irrelevant material considered – whether denial of procedural fairness – whether unreasonableness – refusal of adjournment – hearing by video-link – whether jurisdictional error – writs issued. |
| Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss.3, 5, Sch.1, cll.(da) and (db) Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Part 7, Div.4, ss.5E, 36(2), 65, 66, 289A, 338, 357A, 379G, 411, 422B, 424A(3), 425, 429A, 474, 476, 494B(4), 494D Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.2.16 |
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- Case
- [2017] FCCA 2129
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the MRT's decision to proceed with its determination without granting an adjournment, despite the applicant's request, was legally unreasonable. This unreasonableness, if established, would constitute a jurisdictional error. The Court was required to consider the principles of legal unreasonableness as articulated by the High Court in *Li* and subsequently by the Full Court of the Federal Court in *Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh* and *Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Pandey & Ors*.
The Court reasoned that legal unreasonableness can arise where a discretionary power is exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, without common sense, or in a manner that is plainly unjust. It noted that while a supervising court should not substitute its own view for that of the decision-maker, the decision must have an evident, transparent, and intelligible justification within the reasons provided. The Court highlighted that a failure to grant an adjournment, particularly if it prevents an applicant from presenting their case or meeting a visa criterion, could, in certain circumstances, be so unreasonable as to amount to a failure to conduct a proper review. The Court also acknowledged that the Tribunal has a duty to act within a reasonable time and is not obliged to afford every opportunity to an applicant to present their best possible case.
The Court found that the MRT's decision to proceed without considering the substance of the reasons for the adjournment request, and without suggesting any fault on the part of the applicant or their agent, rendered the decision arbitrary and therefore legally unreasonable. The Court concluded that the MRT's decision was fatal to the applicant's application and constituted a jurisdictional error.
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Again in Li, French CJ stated at [31]:The decision of the MRT to proceed to its determination was not, on the face of it, informed by any consideration other than the asserted sufficiency of the opportunities provided to the first respondent to put her case. The MRT did not in terms or by implication accept or reject the substance of the reasons for a deferment put to it by the first respondent's migration Agent. It did not suggest that the first respondent's request for a deferment was due to any fault on her part or on the part of her migration Agent. It did not suggest that its decision was based on any balancing of the legislative objectives set out in s 353. Its decision was fatal to the first respondent's application. There was in the circumstances, including the already long history of the matter, an arbitrariness about the decision, which rendered it unreasonable in the limiting sense explained above. [emphasis added] The relevant principles in relation to legal unreasonableness as explained by the High Court in Li and subsequently by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437; (2014) 308 ALR 280; (2014) 139 ALD 50 (“Singh”) were summarised by the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Pandey & Ors [2014] FCA 640; (2014) 143 ALD 640 (“Pandey”) as follows:(a) The requirement of reasonableness flows from or is connected with an implied legislative intention that a discretionary power that is statutorily conferred must be exercised reasonably: Li at [29], [63], [88]; Singh at [43].(b) Legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a supervising Court after the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process. Or it can be a conclusion reached without necessarily identifying another jurisdictional error: Li at [27]-[28], [72]; Singh at [44]. In the latter case unreasonableness may be taken to be unreasonableness from which an undisclosed error may be inferred: Li at [27], [68]; Singh at [44].(c) Unreasonableness can be inferred where the decision appears to be arbitrary, capricious, without common sense or “plainly unjust”: Li at [28], [110]; Singh at [44].(d) In those circumstances, where reasons are given, the supervising Court is concerned with seeing if there is an evident, transparent and intelligible justification within the decision-making process: Li at [105]; Singh at [44]-[45 ]. The intelligible justification must lie within the reasons given by the decision-maker: Singh at [47].(e) Regard can also be given to the outcome of the decision: whether the “decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of fact and law”: Li at [105] (Gageler J quoting Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 at 220-221; Singh at [44]-[45].(f) The legal standard of reasonableness and the indicia of legal unreasonableness will need to be found in the scope, subject and purpose of the particular statutory provisions in issue in any given case: Li at [67]; Singh at [48]. In the case of discretionary powers vested in the Tribunal, the location of these powers in the statutory scheme, as aids to the performance of a review function, is important: Singh at [49].(g) There is an overlap between the obligation in s 360 of the Act to invite an applicant to a hearing to present evidence and arguments and the exercise of the adjournment discretion in s 363. If, by reason of the refusal of an adjournment application, an applicant is not provided with an opportunity to present his or her evidence, it might be concluded that the hearing contemplated did not take place: Li at [62]; Singh at [51]-[52].(h) The overriding duty of the Tribunal to review a decision may require the Tribunal, acting reasonably, to consider the exercise of the discretion to adjourn in a particular case. A failure to adjourn to allow a visa criterion to be met can, in some circumstances, be so unreasonable as to constitute a failure to review: Li at [100]-[102].(i) It cannot be suggested that the Tribunal is under an obligation to afford every opportunity to an applicant for review to present his or her best possible case or improve upon the evidence. It may decide in an appropriate case that “enough is enough”: Li at [82]. The Tribunal is also under a duty to review decisions within a reasonable time: Li at [102].(j) Properly applied, a standard of legal reasonableness does not involve substituting a Court's view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker: Li at [30], [66]; Singh at [47]. The test of legal unreasonableness is stringent: Li at [113].Pandey at [41] per Wigney J.