Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Kim

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Kim [2014] FCAFC 47

Citation: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Kim [2014] FCAFC 47
Appeal from: Kim v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 1526
Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v YUJIN KIM
File number: NSD 2166 of 2013
Judges: YATES, ROBERTSON AND WIGNEY JJ
Date of judgment: 24 April 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – validity of visa application – respondent included in earlier unsuccessful visa application as a dependent child – respondent unaware of earlier application – whether subsequent visa application invalid because respondent had previously been refused a visa for which she had applied – whether validity of visa application an objective question to be determined by the Court
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 46, 48
Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth) s 6
Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth) s 18
Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) s 10

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.03, 1.12, 2.12, cl 1123B of sch 1

Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v WAIK [2003] FCAFC 307
Soondur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 324; (2002) 122 FCR 578
Date of hearing: 19 February 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 53
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr GR Kennett SC with Mr BD Kaplan
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr IGA Archibald
Solicitor for the Respondent: Legal Exchange

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2166 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant

AND:

YUJIN KIM
Respondent

JUDGES:

YATES, ROBERTSON AND WIGNEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

24 APRIL 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant be granted leave to rely on his amended notice of appeal filed on 5 February 2014.

2.The appeal be allowed in part.

3.Orders 2 and 3 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 3 October 2013 be set aside.

4.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

5.The respondent’s application for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Higher Education Sector (Subclass 573) visa made on 17 January 2013 was not invalid for the reason that it was prevented by s 48 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2166 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant

AND:

YUJIN KIM
Respondent

JUDGES:

YATES, ROBERTSON AND WIGNEY JJ

DATE:

24 APRIL 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

Introduction

  1. This appeal is from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 3 October 2013 quashing a…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 47
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Kim, the court addressed the validity of a visa application made by the respondent, a South Korean national who had previously been included in an unsuccessful visa application made by her father. The primary issue was whether the respondent's subsequent visa application was invalid because she had previously been refused a visa for which she had applied. The court needed to determine whether the validity of a visa application is an objective question to be decided by the Court, as well as the proper construction and application of section 48 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The court found that the validity of a visa application is indeed an objective question for the Court to decide. It concluded that while an officer or the Minister may form a view on the validity of an application, ultimately it is the Court's role to resolve any controversy regarding that question. The court also held that the respondent’s earlier visa application, although made on her behalf by her father, was an application for which she had applied within the meaning of section 48. However, the court held that the respondent's later visa application was not invalid under section 48, as the legislative intent appeared to target repeat applications by non-citizens, rather than the mere validity of earlier applications.

The court allowed the appeal in part, set aside certain orders made by the Federal Circuit Court, and declared that the respondent's visa application made on 17 January 2013 was not invalid under section 48. The Minister was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant be granted leave to rely on his amended notice of appeal filed on 5 February 2014.

2. The appeal be allowed in part.

3. Orders 2 and 3 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 3 October 2013 be set aside.

4. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

5. The respondent’s application for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Higher Education Sector (Subclass 573) visa made on 17 January 2013 was not invalid for the reason that it was prevented by s 48 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

We turn next to consider the circumstances giving rise to these legal issues.Background The respondent was born on 11 September 1993 in South Korea and first arrived in Australia with her parents on 12 January 1996. It was common ground that on 24 January 2008 the respondent’s father lodged a valid application for an Other Family (Residence) (Class BU) visa in which the respondent was included as a member of his family unit. That visa application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 11 May 2010 and the Migration Review Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 14 February 2011. The issue is whether, in the circumstances in which the Class BU visa was refused, the respondent was refused a visa for which she had applied within the meaning of s 48. It will be apparent that on 24 January 2008, the date of the application for a Class BU visa, the respondent was some 14 years and four months old. It was also common ground that the respondent did not hold a substantive visa. A “substantive visa” was defined in s 5(1) of the Act as a visa other than a bridging visa, a criminal justice visa or an enforcement visa. The proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court The application to what is now the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, made on 31 January 2013, was for an order that the respondent Minister show cause why a remedy should not be granted in exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under s 476 of the Act in respect of the migration decision made on 18 January 2013 that the application made on 17 January 2013 for the grant of the Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Higher Education Sector (Subclass 573) visa was not valid. The ground of the application was that the delegate erred in finding that the visa application was invalid because it did not meet s 48 on the basis that the present respondent had been refused a Class BU visa on 31 [sic] May 2010. The primary judge found that the 2008 application for a Class BU visa was one which the respondent did not sign and was an application of which she was unaware; the respondent’s participation in the application was undertaken on her behalf by her father; and whenever a signature appeared above the respondent’s name on the visa application form it was the signature of the respondent’s father and he signed it on the respondent’s behalf. The primary judge held that the relevant question was whether in January 2008 the respondent had achieved an understanding and intelligence sufficient to enable her to understand fully what the 2008 application for a Class BU visa involved and whether, in the circumstances, she might wish to apply for one. That was a matter on which there was no clarity because the Departmental officer made no findings on the question. The primary judge held that the officer was in no position, and failed, to consider whether the respondent’s father had the authority to make a visa application on the respondent’s behalf in January 2008. (The approach of the primary judge appears to have been influenced by the judgment of Gray J in Soondur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 324; (2002) 122 FCR 578.)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In our opinion, the legislative history and extrinsic material do not clearly show, one way or the other, what the legislature intended by the words of the present statutory provisions. We observe, however, that there is some emphasis on non-citizens making repeat applications which may tend to suggest that the mischief was narrower than the mere validity of such earlier applications.Conclusion We have set out above what, in our view, is the correct construction and application of s 48 in the circumstances of this case. It follows that the respondent’s application for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Higher Education Sector (Subclass 573) visa made on 17 January 2013 was not invalid for the reason that it was prevented by s 48. An appropriate declaration is that the respondent’s application for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Higher Education Sector (Subclass 573) visa made on 17 January 2013 was not invalid for that reason. In our opinion, the appellant Minister is correct to submit that this Court is in a position finally to dispose of the matter. It follows that the other issues raised in the amended notice of appeal and in the appellant’s submissions, such as the ground of denial of procedural fairness, do not need to be considered by this Court. It also follows that orders 2 and 3 made by the primary judge should be set aside.Orders The orders we make are to allow the appeal, to set aside orders 2 and 3 made by the primary judge on 3 October 2013, to make an appropriate declaration (see [51] above) and to order that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In oral submissions the respondent put that the officer had denied her procedural fairness and referred to Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 and Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596.Consideration In our opinion, the first issue to be decided is whether or not the validity of an application for a visa is an objective question. The issue is the validity under the Act of the visa application. The factors or criteria by reference to which an application for a visa is valid in s 46 are stated objectively and do not rest in the Minister’s or an officer’s discretion or opinion. Further, s 47 imposes obligations on the Minister, as opposed to conferring a discretion on him or her. These considerations point in favour of validity being an objective question for the Court and we so find. The consequence is that the validity of the visa application is a question which the Court should decide. It is of course competent for an officer, including the Minister, to form a view about the validity of a visa application for himself or herself but ultimately it is for the Court to resolve any controversy as to that question. We accept the appellant Minister's submission that an application for a visa is valid or not regardless of the Minister’s view, or any officer’s view, about the matter. We also accept the appellant Minister’s submission that a person who has made a valid visa application complying with the statutory requirements is at least prima facie entitled to mandamus to require the Minister to consider it. We do not accept the respondent’s analysis which, as we have noted, proceeded by reference to Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 and whether the officer’s letter of 18 January 2013 was or evidenced an administrative decision under an enactment for the purposes of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). That is not the present question. We do not accept the respondent’s submission that the validity of a visa application is not an objective question to be determined by the Court. A consequence is that the primary judge should have decided this issue on the evidence before him and should not have remitted the matter to the appellant Minister for the purposes of further fact finding. We turn then to the question which arises under s 48 of the Act which is whether the respondent non-citizen had applied for the Class BU visa in which the respondent was included as a member of her father’s family unit. As we have said, that visa application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 11 May 2010 and the Migration Review Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 14 February 2011. The issue is one of statutory construction. The parties submitted there was no authority, either binding or of assistance, dealing with the proper construction of the section. There can, in our view, be no doubt that the visa which was refused was applied for on behalf of the non-citizen respondent in the sense that if that visa application had been successful then the respondent would have been granted and would have held a Class BU visa.